Nuclear Information Service

This region of the NIS site shows published records of UK government policy and parliamentary debates on nuclear weapons issues. It includes articles and links to the latest parliamentary debates; the views of media commentators and NGOs. The HANSARD section lists parliamentary questions and government ministers’ answers, which are a regular source of detailed information on all aspects of nuclear weapons manufacture, operations and military policy.

Flood map for AWE Burghfield. Shaded areas represent areas at significant risk of flooding, where the chance of flooding each year is greater than 1.3% (1 in 75).

events notice

NEW NIS Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CONSULTATION

Global Security: Non-Proliferation

NIS argues that the risks posed by British nuclear weapons production and road transport of warheads threaten each individual citizen and our way of life. Additionally, the risk of a criticality event at the substandard warhead assembly/disassembly facilities at AWE Burghfield is also unacceptable and unjustifiable.

Read the NIS submission to the FCO.

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Hansard on NPT

2005-04-07 22:00

7 April 2005 : Column 1769W
Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Mr. Chaytor: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will attend the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. [221359]

Mr. MacShane [holding answer 21 March 2005]: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will not be present at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May, but he has asked John Freeman (the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament) to head the UK delegation.

Mr. Simmonds: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of whether there is a need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to ensure that signatory states are not able to exploit the treaty by obtaining nuclear technology under the guise of a peaceful civilian nuclear energy programme. [223321]

Mr. MacShane: The United Kingdom supports the efforts being made by a number of bodies to consider how to ensure that nuclear technology acquired under Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) cannot be diverted to weapons programmes, either while a state is still party to the treaty, or following withdrawal from it. We hope to
continue this discussion at the upcoming NPT review conference in May, and are working towards an outcome which strengthens the non-proliferation regime to deal better with these challenges.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what response he (a) has made and (b) plans to make to the request by his Indian counterpart on 28 March that the nuclear weapons states party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty agree to irreversible and verifiable cuts in their nuclear arsenals as a condition of India signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
[224694]

Mr. MacShane: The Government, including Ministers, have frequent contact with their Indian counterparts and are familiar with India's views on nuclear proliferation matters, including Natwar Singh's speech at the Conference on "Emerging Nuclear Proliferation Challenges" held in Delhi on 28 March. The Government were not represented at this conference and is not intending to make a response to Mr. Singh's speech. Mr. Singh's speech gives no indication that India is willing to become a State Party

7 Apr 2005 : Column 1778W

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which, by the terms of the treaty, they can only do as a non-nuclear weapon state.