5. PRINCIPAL STAFF SEEN:

Topic	Names of staff seen for each topic	Position
8.3.1.	[redacted]	AWE Burghfield [redacted]
8.3.2, 8.4.2	[redacted]	[redacted]
8.3.3 8.3.4 8.3.5	[redacted]	Project Manager, [redacted]

6. POINTS OF INTEREST TO OTHER SITES/SITE INSPECTORS

None.

7. SUMMARY

No planned compliance inspection was undertaken during this visit due to the flooding event that occurred at AWE Burghfield. Progress on recovery from this is ongoing. A number of project meetings were attended, and good progress was made in clarifying a number of issues and identifying ways forward. [redacted]

8. REPORT

8.1 Planned Inspection

None carried out

8.2 Reactive Inspections

None carried out during this visit.

8.3 Licensee's Project Related Work

8.3.1 Meeting on Engineering Status of Plant Following Flood

I held a meeting with [redacted] the [redacted] and [redacted] the [redacted] to discuss recovery from the recent flooding at AWE Burghfield. [redacted] outlined the events of Friday 20th July, which is when the main flood occurred at site. Having isolated feeds to all of the switchboards, a preliminary visual inspection revealed that the majority of switchgear was above the

[redacted]

flood level and so was not badly affected. However, condensation was visible in a number of units, which had the potential to cause problems. Having ensured that all switches were of at the main switchboard and there was no distribution load, a full examination of the electrical status of the plant was begun. Condensation in some of the fire detection panels led [redacted] to believe that false alarms could be a real problem and so he made the decision not to re-instate the system. Our ND Fire Surveyor, [redacted] has assessed this situation and is content that the substitute arrangements that AWE(B) put in place whilst the fire detection system was not operable were adequate (see TRIM reference 2007/178433). These arrangements included an increased fire watch and a review of the facility fire risk assessment. A team from Criticality Safety Group was also called in and confirmed the fact that the fissile inventory in the facility was such that the risk from criticality was incredible; hence the decision was taken not to use the battery back-up for the Criticality Incident Detection system.

[redacted] then provided me with an update of the current status of each of the buildings. Power had been restored to each of the main process buildings enabling lights and HVAC to be switched back on. In many cases, HVAC was only restored to assist with drying of the buildings. The status of Building ** was particularly important as it contained an inventory which needed to be recovered. Although full power was available, power was limited to that which was required for the recovery operation. The floor was inspected and declared to be in good condition by [redacted] He advised me that the Civils DA had also undertaken an inspection; further discussion on the recovery of the inventory from this building is reported in 8.3.2 below.

The other building containing an inventory was considered to be a bit more problematic by [redacted] not from a nuclear safety point of view but rather from a Company point of view. This is because it contains a number of one-off items, for which the controlling mechanisms etc were all under water and so could have experienced significant damage. Although [redacted] believed that recovery of the inventory would not be compromised by any potential damage to these plant items, the recovery could potentially be more difficult than the other building. Again further discussion is reported in 8.3.2 below.

[redacted] described the way forward for the facility. He was working on a programme to ensure that all buildings have undergone at least a visual inspection. This will flush out the need to do more tests. A team led by [redacted] is working through the EMIT schedule. In general it is expected that most EMIT's will still be within the tolerance specified in the relevant CSI. I was advised that if the maintenance extended outside the tolerance for whatever reason, then this would go through the 804 change control process. I advised [redacted] that as part of my inspections over the coming months I would ensure that the EMIT of all plant which may affect safety is undertaken in accordance with the arrangements under LC 28, especially those items which may have been affected during the event.

Overall, [redacted] believed that from a maintenance point of view, he did not believe that the flooding caused any major issues that may affect nuclear safety.

[redacted]

8.3.2 Meeting on Remediation Following Flood

A meeting was held between [redacted] and myself to discuss the way forward for the facility following the aftermath of the flood. The immediate priority for AWE(B) was to remove the inventory from Building [redacted] explained that this was progressed via the [redacted] I was shown the minutes of the first meeting of this panel and it appeared to me that all necessary stakeholders were in attendance, e.g. representatives from safety, explosives, [redacted] etc.. I was also shown copies of reports that had been produced to justify the status of the building. These included a Civil Engineering report, an inspection report from the Maintenance Authority and a report from the [redacted] An ALARP justification was also produced to consider the options for the inventory in the building. A way forward had been produced and agreed by the [redacted] I was content that the proposed solution had been through AWE's own due process and appeared to be reasonable. (Post meeting note: this solution was invoked and the inventory has been dealt with satisfactorily).

We then discussed the way forward for the inventory in Building [redacted] I was advised that the same due process would be used as for Building [redacted] although this building would present more of a challenge, not least because there are more options available to AWE(B). [redacted] advised me that apart from recovery of the inventory, no other work was being undertaken on the facility. He added that once the recovery had been completed, all buildings would essentially be handed over to engineering for the facility to be restored to its pre-flood condition.

[redacted] also confirmed the current status of the facility's emergency arrangements. All emergency services were fully operational, although the Fallback Zone Control Point was not available. As an alternative arrangement the Burghfield Forward Control Vehicle (FCV) was positioned at a fall back position in the courtyard and the FCV from Aldermaston held in reserve. I was content that these arrangements were satisfactory.

I advised [redacted] that I would amend my inspection plan over the coming months to concentrate on specific aspects of the recovery and re-commissioning of the facility to get back to full production. Additionally, I advised AWE(B) that I would pay particular attention to how flooding is addressed in the safety case.

8.3.3 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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WHOLE PAGE REDACTED

[redacted]

Burghfield Operations:

A presentation on further details of the impact of the flooding was given. Attention will be given to how flooding is addressed in the safety case. I indicated that I would focus on how this is addressed in both the PRS and the new safety case at one of my visits in the near future. We were advised that [redacted] is to produce a RLI on the flooding event.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NII Site Inspector
August 2007

Distribution:

[redacted]
AWE Inspection Team

[redacted]