

**HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE
HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE**

[\(Click here for guidance on the new SIR format\)](#)

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1.	VISITING OFFICERS	Name(s)				
		[REDACTED]	all			
		[REDACTED] (NWR)	8.1.2, 8.1.3, 8.1.4, 8.1.5			
2.	DATE(S) OF VISIT	8 th – 11 th October 2007				
3.	SITE AND LOCATION OF VISIT	AWE, Burghfield				
4.	PURPOSE OF VISIT -					
SIR Paragraph	Inspection details (including operating unit / building)	Plan Name.	Div 3 IIS Code	LC / Topic	Outcome Rating	
8.1	<u>Planned Inspections</u>					
8.1.1	[REDACTED]	AWE	A1	LC 11	4 (prov)	
8.1.2	[REDACTED]	AWE	A1	LC 15	4	
8.1.3	[REDACTED]	AWE	A1	LC 21	3	
8.1.4	[REDACTED]		A1	LC 22	3	
8.1.5	[REDACTED]		A1	LC 23	3	
8.1.6	[REDACTED]		A5	LC 27	4	
8.2	[REDACTED]					
8.3	[REDACTED]					
8.3.1	[REDACTED]					
8.4	<u>Other Site Related Work</u>					
8.4.1	[REDACTED]					
8.4.2	Site Flood following flood					
9.0	<u>Recommendations and actions</u>					

5. PRINCIPAL STAFF SEEN:

Topic	Names of staff seen for each topic	Position
8.1.1	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield
8.1.2	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield
8.1.3	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield
8.1.4	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield
8.1.5	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield
8.1.6	[REDACTED]	AWE Corporate
8.3.1	[REDACTED]	Project Manager
8.4.1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
8.4.2	[REDACTED]	AWE Burghfield

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Although the flooding has hindered AWE's progress with PRS fixes in the facility, there are still a number of issues for which I would have expected further progress, particularly ALARP justifications for those changes that have not been completed. For this reason, I consider that the following rating is appropriate for compliance with LC 15:

[REDACTED]

8.1.3 Licence Condition 21 - Commissioning

I held a meeting with [REDACTED], the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] to discuss re-commissioning of plant items and buildings following the recent flooding at AWE Burghfield. [REDACTED] described the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

way forward for the facility. His programme to ensure that all buildings have undergone at least a visual inspection has now been completed. One switchgear was replaced, which was completed using the 804 Change Control. [REDACTED] advised me that all buildings would undergo a full commissioning when returned to full operation. A particular example given was Building [REDACTED] which had been fully inspected and returned to operation to recover an item. The 804 Change Control process (see 8.1.4 below) was used to record the decision making process, which was discussed at a Defect Panel Review meeting and agreed by Governance. Records for this process were checked in the meeting recorded at 8.1.4 and were found to follow AWE's arrangements adequately. This process included a full maintenance check of all items. A full EMIT was carried out on all Safety Related items; this task was supervised by [REDACTED] and was recorded as part of the 804 Change Control.

A team led by [REDACTED] is working through the EMIT schedule. In general it is expected that most EMITs will still be within the tolerance specified in the relevant CSI. I was advised that if the maintenance extended outside the tolerance for whatever reason, then this would go through the 804 change control process. I advised [REDACTED] that as part of my inspection in November, I would ensure that the EMIT of all plant which may affect safety is undertaken in accordance with the arrangements under LC 28, especially those items which may have been affected during the event. Action: [REDACTED] to ensure the maintenance and testing of all flood affected plant has been adequately addressed on the EMIT schedule.

Overall, [REDACTED] believed that from a maintenance point of view, he did not believe that the flooding caused any major issues that may affect nuclear safety. Nevertheless, from the discussion reported here and the evidence contained in the 804 Change Control records, I consider that AWE(B) are re-commissioning buildings and plant items affected by the flood in an appropriate manner. I therefore consider that the following rating is appropriate for LC 21:

[REDACTED]

8.1.4 Licence Condition 22 – Modification or Experiment on Existing Plant

We met with [REDACTED], the Burghfield [REDACTED] who described the process used at to comply with LC 22. AWE has previously identified Company Safety Instruction CSI 1522 as the primary document setting out AWE's arrangements for compliance with LC 22, in addition to the Company Quality Manual (QM 804), and CSI 801 to define the hazard and change categorization. These arrangements appear to be appropriate for compliance with this LC.

At the facility level, the Burghfield Licensed Site Modification Control Committee (BLSMCC) has the role of reviewing all of the modification proposals raised within the Licensed Site, as required by CSI 1522. I was particularly interested in how the process had been followed to record remediation work necessary after the flooding


[REDACTED]



event. Firstly, we looked at the documentation to support the recovery of operations in Building [REDACTED]. This was actually reviewed via the Defect Review Panel meeting. The minutes of this meeting were made available to us, in addition to the assessment report of the work that was to be undertaken. Final authorization was given by DSM governance. From the minutes of the meeting, it was apparent that this had been subject to some considerable challenge, with specific attention given to the nuclear safety aspects of the work. As this change had gone through this arguably more rigorous process, it was only noted at the BLSMCC. This was in agreement with AWE(B)'s own arrangements and we were content that the change had been handled adequately.

For Building [REDACTED] the remediation work was handled in two stages. The first stage involved some initial preparation work and was discussed via the BLSMCC. The minutes showed that this appeared to have been considered appropriately and was adequately closed-out. The second stage of the work was more challenging and so this again was progressed via the Defect Review Panel and taken through governance. Again, all of the supporting documentation appeared to have been subject to adequate scrutiny and was signed-off appropriately.

We also reviewed a number of other items that had been taken through the 804 process as a result of the flood. Although some of these modifications had no impact on nuclear safety, the facility management team made the decision to take all flood-related remediation work through the 804 process so that there was a means of tracking all of the changes and monitor the work that was going on. WE considered this to be a sensible measure and all of the accompanying documentation appeared to have been processed correctly. I am therefore content that the arrangements in place for dealing with LC 22 are adequate and consider that the following rating is appropriate.



[REDACTED]

I asked how flooding had been addressed in the revised safety case. In response, [REDACTED] indicated that he did not believe that this was a significant issue as it not raise any immediate nuclear safety concerns. I stated that I did not consider this to be an appropriate response, as the recent flooding event had reduced protection offered by the fire detection system, for example. Additionally, the criticality baselines have not yet been completed and so issues with regard to criticality under full flooding conditions have yet to be resolved. [REDACTED] accepted my concerns and indicated that the facility would look carefully at the Review, Learn and Improve (RLI) investigation that is being undertaken as a result of the flooding to see what lessons could be learned. I indicated that I would re-visit this subject once the RLI had been issued.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Burghfield Operations:

A presentation on further details of the impact of the flooding was given. Attention will be given to how flooding is addressed in the safety case. I indicated that I would focus on how this is addressed in both the PRS and the new safety case at one of my visits in the near future. We were advised that [REDACTED] is to produce a RLI on the flooding event.

8.4.2 Site Tour Following Flood.

Progress had been made with remediation of the licensed site following the flood. In particular, all areas had been sanitised and specific areas, such as the Zone 4 back-up Zone Control Point was almost back to its pre-flood condition.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
9.2 Actions from this visit

[REDACTED]
2007/079/02: [REDACTED] to ensure the maintenance and testing of all flood affected plant has been adequately addressed on the EMIT schedule.

[REDACTED]

Site Inspection Report No: AWE 2007/079

[REDACTED]

NII Site Inspector
October 2007

Distribution:

[REDACTED]

AWE Inspection Team

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]