

REGINA -v- MS JULIET M^CBRIDE
NEWBURY MAGISTRATES COURT FEBRUARY 2006

ADDENDUM EVIDENCE

CLIENT: BINDMAN & PARTNERS

REPORT REF N^O R3071-ALDERMASTON-2

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R2		3 January 2006	20 FEBRUARY 2006

REGINA -V- MS JULIET MCBRIDE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 I am John H Large.

1.2 Previously in my evidence reference R3071-Aldermaston-1 dated 16 February 2006, I have given my background, qualification and experience relating to this matter.

1.3 I have been passed a copy of the statement of PC Chaliner date 31 January 2006 which I did not have when I compiled my previous evidence in the main.

2 STATEMENT OF PC GRAEME LLOYD CHALINOR, 31 JANUARY 2006

2.1 In full, the statement reads (my emphasis):

*“ . . . I am PC 7120 Chaliner of the British Transport Police, formerly PC 1944 of the MOD police. Whilst employed by the MOD police I received a briefing from PS Hewitt with regards to the new instructions regarding intruders into the establishment. This briefing took place sometime in March prior to the 15th March 2005. PS Hewitt stated that due to **health and safety** reasons if an intruder entered the establishment then **that area** of site would be closed down, and the people working made to stop until the intruder was dealt with. The briefing also outline [sic] officers response to intruders and stated that due to the lawful work being disrupted officers where [sic] to issue section 69 aggravated trespass warnings to intruders then eject them from the site. I received no other briefings prior to myself issuing the section 69 warning to MCBRIDE on Tuesday 15th March 2005*

. . .”

2.2 In my previous evidence (para 5.1) I referred to a number of witness statements and related documents produced by the Crown Prosecution Service. I have two additional comments to make in light of PC Chaliner’s latest statement:

2.3 First, none of the documents referred to in paragraph 2.2 above that I have studied make any reference whatsoever to ‘*health and safety*’ as being the reason for areas of the AWE site being closed down. Indeed, I note that Mr Firth who styles himself as ‘*Manager of the Emergency Response*’ goes on to refer to ‘*security alerts*’ and the subject of his e-mail of 8 March (which I assume relates to the briefing referred to by PC Chaliner) is headed ‘*Security Alerts*’.

2.4 Similarly, Mr Matthews refers to a ‘*security alert being broadcast*’ and the Shift Manager’s (Control’s) log of 13 June also refers to a ‘*tannoy message security alert*’. The ‘*Practioners (sic)*

Guide lists (under paras 7 and 68) a number of offences that may be committed by protestors, none of which relate to health and safety, and it specifically states that *'it is good practice to charge them [protestors] with disrupting security activities . . .'*

2.5 My point here is that PC Chalinor must have been mistaken in recalling why areas of the AWE site would be closed down because all of the documents and witness statements refer to security and **not** health and safety reasons.

2.6 Secondly, I note that PC Chalinor states *'if an intruder entered the establishment then **that area** of site would be closed down, and the people working made to stop until the intruder was dealt with'*, but as I have shown in my previous evidence (para 5.1.5 to 5.1.9) that part of the site closed down on 15 March was a considerable distance from the point where Ms M^cBride climbed the inner boundary fence and entered the AWE site.

JOHN H LARGE
LARGE & ASSOCIATES
CONSULTING ENGINEERS