

Against the Tide

Why the Trident Commission's views on retaining British nuclear weapons are outdated and out of touch



CND CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Against the Tide

Why the Trident Commission's views on retaining British nuclear weapons are outdated and out of touch.

THE question of whether or not to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system is of great importance and the decision must be taken on the basis of what will most contribute to the security of the British people. On this, we agree with the Trident Commission. However, CND maintains that not replacing Trident is the only credible option to achieve this aim. The serious strategic and economic benefits of non-replacement include:

- improving global security through a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, prevention of nuclear proliferation and de-escalation of international tensions
- ensuring budgetary flexibility for the Ministry of Defence to allow them to prepare a more effective response to the actual security challenges facing us today
- the vast economic savings of more than £100 billion over the lifetime of a successor nuclear weapons system could be invested in public spending priorities, as well as more effective security spending
- guaranteeing the British government's adherence to its legal obligations including responsibilities as a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- recovering Britain's moral position internationally and showing diplomatic leadership in global multilateral disarmament initiatives such as a global nuclear abolition treaty and the initiative to highlight the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons.

The Trident Commission should have listened to the majority of the British people who oppose Trident replacement – and the overwhelming majority internationally who want to see a world free of these monstrous and outdated weapons. Instead the Commission has produced a rehash of Cold War thinking which fails to acknowledge that the world has moved on

The Government's own National Security Strategy downgraded the likelihood of a state-on-state nuclear attack: prioritising terrorism, climate change and cyber warfare. To suggest that the UK should spend £100bn on a weapons system which we could never use and which doesn't meet the threats we face is mindboggling.

Britain must not remain stuck in the past: which is exactly what the Trident Commission recommends that we do.

Introduction

A NEW REPORT by the Trident Commission, led by Lord Des Browne, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and Menzies Campbell, has put the issue of the UK's nuclear weapons back into the political limelight. But, far from providing a fresh analysis of the need for the UK to remain a nuclear-armed state, the Trident Commission has repeated the same justifications for retaining nuclear weapons which have been used since the end of the Cold War. The Commission's conclusions ignore the fact that the world has changed – and that nuclear weapons nowadays, far from providing a guarantee of security, actually increase the risks to the British public. This report presents the case which the Trident Commission has sidelined – the case for the UK to abandon plans for replacing the Trident nuclear weapon system and become part of the rapidly growing global movement for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons.

As Britain moves towards the decision-point in 2016 on whether or not to replace the Trident nuclear weapons system, it is absolutely vital that the option of non-replacement is fully explored. Taking a 'yes' decision will mean Britain remains a nuclear-armed state – at huge public expense – for at least another half-century. Such a decision would have huge consequences, in terms of our economy, our security, our legal obligations and our moral standing with the rest of the world. To ensure that the 2016 decision best meets Britain's needs, parliamentarians and the public must be presented with the full range of information available.

The next General Election in 2015 will be a crucial opportunity for voters to have their say on whether Britain's Trident nuclear weapons system should be replaced. Over the last decade opinion polls have shown that a clear majority of the public do not want Trident to be replaced – especially at a time when, we are told, public services must be cut in order to balance the economic books. However, none of the three main political parties looks likely to enter the election with an unequivocal manifesto commitment to cancel the Trident replacement programme. On this issue, the views of the politicians are lagging far behind the views of the general public that they represent. Rather than pandering to the mistaken Westminster view that nuclear weapons give Britain prestige and power, it's time for senior politicians to show real leadership on the issue of nuclear weapons, and push their parties to adopt new policies which represent the growing public and international mood against weapons of mass destruction and reflect the real security challenges that Britain and the world face in the twenty-first century.

Why we shouldn't replace Trident: our security

The decision on whether or not to replace Britain's nuclear weapons system must be taken on the basis of what will most contribute to the security of the British people. A decision not to replace Trident will best meet that requirement. It will strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime by ensuring Britain's compliance with its international treaty obligations; it will

deter nuclear proliferation and de-escalate current global and regional tensions; and it will release significant financial resources to meet a range of public spending priorities, including meeting the new security challenges of the twenty-first century. A decision not to replace Trident must be taken in tandem with government initiatives towards its stated goal of multilateral disarmament: backing a global nuclear abolition treaty, actively working towards a Middle East WMD-Free Zone and supporting the work of the International Red Cross and others on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use.

The coalition government's National Security Strategy (NSS), published in autumn 2010, gives the government's 'official' view of the security threats facing the United Kingdom.¹ The NSS identifies a range of twenty-first century threats, including climate change, pandemic disease, organised crime, cyber warfare, and terrorism – but assesses an attack on the UK using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons as merely a 'Tier Two' threat, stating that "A CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood but high impact".

Nuclear weapons have been described as 'the United Kingdom's ultimate insurance policy in this age of uncertainty'.² This is an odd turn of phrase given that insurance policies are designed to pay out after an undesirable event has taken place – not to prevent them from happening. In this case, the nuclear 'insurance policy' would actually put Britain at greater risk. Replacing Trident could act as a driver for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the words of Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, 'the more that those states that already have [nuclear weapons] increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to their national security, the more other states feel that they too must have them for their security'.³

Although the Trident Commission seems to have concluded that there would be no lasting gains if the UK were to abandon its nuclear weapons programme, international experts disagree with this view. Dr Hans Blix, former United Nations weapons inspector and Chair of the WMD Commission, recently said that the UK should abandon Trident altogether and that this would be a 'big gain' towards disarmament, pointing out that 'Japan and Germany seem respected ... even without nuclear weapons'.⁴ With the exception of France, all our European neighbours consider themselves to be safe and secure without their own nuclear arsenals, and non-nuclear nations in far more dangerous parts of the world – for instance, Japan, South Korea, and Egypt – are active in calling for nuclear disarmament.

The only nations which could remotely pose a nuclear threat to the UK in the foreseeable future are Russia and possibly China. However, despite current tensions around Ukraine, there has generally been a positive trend in the UK's and the European Union's relationships with both these countries since the end of the Cold War. Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and an expert on nuclear deterrence, wrote that 'even if grounds for unease about Russia's internal evolution intensify, it is hard to imagine that country re-emerging as a military threat to the political freedom of the countries of the European Union'.⁵ China will be a growing global force over the next few decades but its priorities will be to promote economic development

and integrate into global economic and political systems on its own terms, but as a 'good neighbour'. Chinese foreign policy and military interests are focused on what China defines as its 'core interests' based around state sovereignty and territorial integrity. China has rapidly become integrated into the global market economy and financial system, and despite its growing international influence has shown no evidence of a desire to reshape the international order or establish its own power blocs.⁶

The possibility that Russia or China would at some time over the next fifty years pose a direct military threat to the UK represents an unlikely and exceptionally worst case scenario. A military confrontation with the West involving either of these powers would be highly damaging to their own development and economies. Tensions will be inevitable at certain times – as we are currently seeing over events in Ukraine - but it is difficult to see how the UK's nuclear weapons could play any role in resolving such tensions. It is time to accept that Russia and China do not pose a military threat to the UK and that they are now becoming our economic and strategic partners.

Iran and North Korea and their actual or potential nuclear proliferation are also important, not least because they are regularly used in arguments favouring the retention of nuclear weapons. However, Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons and dialogue is underway to address concerns over its uranium enrichment programme. North Korea has no delivery system with a range capable of delivering one of its very few nuclear weapons to the UK – even if it had any reason to do so. The way to address proliferation threats posed by Iran and North Korea is not to pretend that Britain's nuclear weapons mean that we will be able to deter such threats, but to create a security climate in which neither nation feels the need to continue with its nuclear programmes.

In the eyes of some, Trident replacement serves to undermine and delegitimise the international non-proliferation regime. Ken Booth, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, has asked the pertinent question: 'If the present British government announces that it will retain nuclear weapons until about 2050, and if this contributes to the erosion of the norms so far sustaining the NPT (and history shows the fragility of international regimes when key states ignore their obligations) then what might British security look like, even if it possesses nuclear weapons, in a world of 20 plus nuclear powers?'⁷

The emerging threats which look likely to threaten the UK over the first half of this century are of a nature which military responses and a deterrent approach cannot address. As we have seen over recent years, the threats which impact most on the livelihoods and wellbeing of the people of the United Kingdom in the twenty-first century do not come from foreign states, but from dramatically different factors which cannot be addressed by a traditional military response. At the beginning of 2014, flooding caused havoc across the United Kingdom, forcing thousands of families out of their homes for long periods and causing hundreds of millions of pounds worth of damage. Severe flooding also hit the country in 2000, 2003, and 2007.⁸ Such flooding is likely to continue and get worse if climate change predictions prove accurate. In 2007-08 Britain's financial markets were rocked by the credit crunch, which inflicted significant damage on the economy, left the banking sector in ruins even after a massive bailout paid for

by public money, and wiped hundreds of billions of pounds worth of value from the savings accounts and pensions of ordinary people.

Nuclear weapons are, of course, utterly irrelevant to threats of this kind, but every penny spent on replacing Trident is one penny less which is available on spending to address the real security issues the country faces. Britain's future security is best guaranteed by investing money to help local communities insulate themselves from disaster by building resilience at the local level, and ensuring that the armed forces are properly equipped to conduct the military roles they can realistically be expected to play over the years to come.

Why we shouldn't replace Trident: humanitarian issues

Under international law, the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is illegal under virtually all conceivable circumstances. In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that 'the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.'⁹ The ICJ went on to state that 'the radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area.'¹⁰

This concern over the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons is shared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has identified further humanitarian consequences, including widespread famine and the destruction of medical facilities and personnel. The International Committee of the Red Cross stated in a 2011 report: 'The use of even a limited number of nuclear weapons would affect the environment for many years and render agriculture impossible in vast areas, most likely causing mass starvation and disruption of global food distribution.'¹¹ The report goes on to cite the 'likely destruction of health infrastructure and widespread death and injury of health-care professionals in areas affected [which] would increase human suffering exponentially.'¹²

Indeed, such ramifications of a nuclear explosion were acknowledged as a core issue at the NPT Review Conference in 2010, with the outcome document expressing 'deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons'.¹³ This led to the convening of intergovernmental conferences in Oslo in March 2013¹⁴ and Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014¹⁵ to examine the 'immediate humanitarian impact of a nuclear detonation' and 'the possible wider developmental, economic and environmental consequences'. The British government has refused to take part in either conference – and as a result its views are being left out of the rapidly evolving debate on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and the need for a new treaty to ban their use and possession. The British government should urgently confirm their attendance at the next conference in Austria in December.

Why we shouldn't replace Trident: the cost

The cost of replacing and running Trident on a 'like-for-like' basis will be well in excess of £100 billion. According to the government's Trident Alternatives Review scaling down the size of the Trident fleet, possibly to two submarines, and moving away from a posture of continuous at-sea nuclear patrols could result in capital savings of up to £5 billion and revenue savings of close to £1 billion annually in crew and maintenance costs,¹⁶ but this represents limited savings within the budget for like-for-like replacement proposed in the 2006 White Paper which announced the Trident replacement programme (capital costs of £15–20 billion at 2006-7 prices and in-service costs of around 5–6% of the defence budget).¹⁷

Within military and political circles, concerns about the costs of replacing Trident centre on the large proportion of the defence equipment budget that the programme will consume. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimates that spending on Trident replacement will reach a peak of around 30 per cent of the defence equipment budget by 2021/22 or 2022/23, when the first submarine begins production, and is likely to remain close to this level until 2028.¹⁸

Not surprisingly, military sources have questioned whether this money would be better spent on meeting more pressing and relevant needs which the armed forces have. Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, General Sir Hugh Beach, and Major General Patrick Cordingley – four former senior military commanders – have written in *The Times* that 'replacing Trident will be one of the most expensive weapons programmes this country has seen. Going ahead will clearly have long-term consequences for the military and the defence equipment budget that need to be carefully examined'.¹⁹ They pointed out that 'this decision will have a direct impact on our overstretched Armed Forces, 'and that 'it may well be that money spent on new nuclear weapons will be money that is not available to support our frontline troops, or for crucial counterterrorism work; money not available for buying helicopters, armoured vehicles, frigates or even for paying for more manpower'.

Former Prime Minister Sir John Major has taken a similar line, asking: 'What is the opportunity cost of Trident in the loss of conventional capability? In what circumstances, and upon whom, is Trident likely to be used? These are uncomfortable questions, but they must be answered before billions are committed'.²⁰

Britain's overseas military allies are also said to share similar concerns about the impact that the UK's nuclear weapons programme is expected to have on conventional forces and our ability to contribute to joint missions. The New York Times recently reported that American officials are quietly urging Britain to drop its nuclear weapons, quoting an unnamed senior American official as saying: 'Either they can be a nuclear power and nothing else or a real military partner'.²¹

Why we shouldn't replace Trident: meeting our legal obligations

The United Kingdom has binding legal obligations in international law requiring it to take steps towards the eventual elimination of its nuclear weapons. These obligations have been accepted by successive governments, both Labour and Conservative.

The UK is a depositary state for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT),²² giving it a duty to ensure that the Treaty is properly executed. Under Article VI of the Treaty nuclear weapon states have an obligation ‘to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)²³ was signed in 1996 but has yet to come into force, although it has been ratified by, and is thus binding on, the United Kingdom. The Treaty bans all nuclear explosions globally whether for military or for peaceful purposes. The Preamble to the Treaty recognises the importance of ‘constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced types of nuclear weapons’ – raising questions as to whether the development of a new warhead – as has been suggested by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) – would be lawful.

In 2000 the UK, along with other nuclear-weapon-states, gave ‘an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’ in the ‘13 practical steps’ adopted at the NPT Review Conference that year.²⁴ The obligations of the nuclear-weapon-states to take steps towards disarmament were reaffirmed in the Final Document and Action Plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT²⁵.

Expert legal opinion indicates that replacing Trident would not be acceptable under the NPT. In a legal opinion commissioned in 2005 by Peacerrights, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin concluded that replacement of Trident is likely to constitute a breach of Article VI of the NPT, saying: ‘It is difficult to see how unilateral (or bilateral) action that pre-empts any possibility of an outcome of disarmament can be defined as pursuing negotiations in good faith and bring them to a conclusion and is, in our view, thereby in violation of the NPT, article VI obligation’.²⁵

Regardless of the legal position, there is strong evidence that the decision to replace Trident is undermining the NPT – one of the most important guarantees we have against the spread of nuclear weapons. In evidence to the Trident Commission²⁶, Professor John Simpson OBE, Adviser to the UK Delegation to NPT Review Conferences from 1999-2010 pointed out that ‘The number of nuclear weapon states outside the Treaty has slowly increased, significant non-proliferation challenges are arising within the scope of the NPT, and many states lack faith in the nuclear weapon states’ intentions to disarm’. Erosion of the NPT would make the world a far more dangerous place – even for states which have nuclear weapons – yet confidence in the ability of the Treaty to support its

non-proliferation and disarmament objectives is slowly waning. As Professor Simpson warned the Trident Commission, the UK's current position of professing to support multilateral disarmament steps while replacing Trident 'may prove difficult to sustain'.

Delays and procrastination on the part of Britain and other nuclear armed states in meeting their NPT disarmament obligations have led to frustration and allegations of bad faith by many non-nuclear weapon states with the result that one such state, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, has commenced a law suit in the International Court of Justice asking the court to rule that nuclear armed states are in breach of their NPT obligations and order them to take action to comply with the treaty.²⁷

Why we shouldn't replace Trident: safety risks

The consequences for the UK of remaining a nuclear-weapon-state will be neither neutral nor benign if a serious accident involving nuclear weapons takes place in the UK. Accidents can and do happen: production of plutonium for the nuclear weapons programme resulted in the UK's worst nuclear accident, the Windscale fire in 1957²⁸, and there have been a number of documented accidents which have resulted in the dispersal of radioactive material or breakup of US nuclear weapons.²⁹

Some of the more significant 'near miss' incidents which have been reported as occurring in the UK's military nuclear programme over recent years include:

- Serious flooding at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield on 20 July 2007 which caused damage valued at £5 million and resulted in the plant being out of action for nine months.³⁰
- A collision between the Royal Navy's Trident submarine HMS Vanguard and French nuclear armed submarine MN Le Triomphant whilst submerged at sea on the night of 34 February 2009, which required each vessel to return to port for repairs.³¹
- A fire in an explosives processing area at AWE Aldermaston on 3 August 2010 which left one worker injured and required the precautionary evacuation of nearby homes.³²
- Discovery of corrosion in the structure of one of the main nuclear processing buildings at AWE Aldermaston during the summer of 2012, resulting in closure of the building and an eighteen month remediation programme.³³
- Discovery of a leak in a test reactor of the type used in 'Vanguard' class Trident submarines in 2012, requiring an unplanned extra refit for HMS Vanguard.³⁴

Conclusion

BRITAIN currently faces no nuclear threat, and no other security threat that can be resolved through the possession or use of nuclear weapons. In a time when financial resources are scarce and the armed forces are facing substantial reduction in numbers, spending vast sums of money on an outdated nuclear weapon system which has no clear purpose is both wasteful and irresponsible.

Unfortunately, the Trident Commission has done little to challenge the pro-Trident mind set which dominates government and the leadership of the main political parties. Perhaps this is not surprising. The political figures at the head of the Commission took little concrete action to adapt Britain's nuclear forces to the post-Cold War circumstances which evolved while they were in power.

We're glad that the Commission acknowledges that the mistaken view that possessing nuclear weapons confers status and prestige on the United Kingdom should not be a reason to replace Trident. This view is also not shared by those in the real world outside the Westminster corridors of power. A clear majority of the British public believe that Trident should not be replaced. In Scotland, the opposition to Trident from the public, politicians, and civil society is overwhelming. Globally, 184 nations have pledged never to develop nuclear arsenals by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The mind-set reflected by the Trident Commission represents the views of a small – but powerful – minority who are desperately struggling to justify keeping weapons of mass destruction against the tide of worldwide opinion.

Britain's policy on nuclear weapons is currently stuck in a political rut, and only imaginative new steps can prevent us from further isolating ourselves from the rest of the world and potentially jeopardising the future of the NPT – the most important protection we have from the spread of nuclear weapons. We have seen in the past how courageous initiatives can lead to substantial disarmament, and the international situation cries out for another such initiative which could help put the world firmly on the path to global abolition. A decision by Britain not to replace Trident would be such a move. It would help to restore confidence in the possibility of NPT compliance and would demonstrate that relations between nations, and resolution of their security concerns, can be built within the framework of international law.

Cancelling the programme to replace Trident nuclear weapons is a pragmatic and realistic alternative. To do this, the government should take the following steps:

- Scrap Trident and cancel its replacement
- Participate in international initiatives to achieve the global abolition of nuclear weapons
- Focus foreign and defence policy resources on conflict prevention rather than war fighting capabilities.

- 1 'A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy'. Cm 7953. Cabinet Office, October 2010.
- 2 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review'. Cm 7948. Cabinet Office, October 2010. Foreword by David Cameron and Nick Clegg (p.5)
- 3 Kofi Annan speaking at the UN 60th anniversary celebration, London, January 2006.
- 4 'Hans Blix urges Britain to relinquish Trident nuclear programme', Shiv Malik. *The Guardian*, 26 May 2013: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/26/hans-blix-trident-abandon-britain-nuclear>
- 5 'The Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons', Sir Michael Quinlan, *International Affairs*, Volume 82(4) page 633. 2006.
- 6 'When China Rules the World', Martin Jacques. Penguin Books, 2009.
- 7 'Debating the future of Trident: Who are the real realists?', Ken Booth. In *The Future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons* edited by Ken Booth and Frank Barnaby. Oxford Research Group, March 2006, (pp.76-91)
- 8 'Past Weather Events'. Met Office: <http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/interesting#y2014>
- 9 International Court of Justice, 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 105.2.E: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=498&code=unan&p1=3&p2=4&case=95&k=e1&p3=5>
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 International Committee of the Red Cross – 'Nuclear Weapons' Report (2011): <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/weapons/nuclear-weapons/index.jsp>
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Final Document, Vol. 1, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/>
- 14 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selectedtopics/humanitarian-efforts/humimpact_2013.html
- 15 Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Secretaria De Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico: <http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/humanimpact-nayarit-2014>
- 16 'Trident Alternatives Review'. Cabinet Office. 16 July 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Alternatives_Study.pdf
- 17 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent', Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Cm 6994, December 2006. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27378/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
- 18 'Looking into the Black Hole: Is the UK Defence Budget Crisis Really Over?', Malcolm Chalmers, Royal United Services Institute, September 2011. <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSIBriefingPaperSept2011.pdf>
- 19 'Money spent on Trident can't go on troops', Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, General Sir Beach, and Major General Patrick Cordingley. *The Times*, 21 April 2010: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article7103196.ece
- 20 Sir John Major: Speech: 'The Limits of Power'. Churchill College, Cambridge, 26 November 2010: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopping/politics/8163394/John-Major-The-Limits-of-Power.html>
- 21 'Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concern' Steven Erlanger, *New York Times*, 22 April 2013: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/world/europe/military-spending-stirs-concern.html>
- 22 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>
- 23 'The Treaty'. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation: <http://ctbto.org/the-treaty/>
- 24 'Final Document'. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/npt/revcon2000/docs/2000FD.pdf>
- 25 'The Maintenance and Possible Replacement of the Trident Missile System' Joint Opinion, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin. Peacerrights, 19 December 2005
- 26 'Deterrence, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and UK Trident', John Simpson. Discussion Paper 4 of the BASIC Trident Commission. March 2013.
- 27 'The Nuclear Zero Lawsuits?': <http://www.wagingpeace.org/nuclearzero/>
- 28 Windscale fire: 'We were too busy to panic', Roger Highfield, *Daily Telegraph*, 9 October 2007: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/3309842/Windscale-fire-We-were-too-busy-to-panic.html>
- 29 'Broken Arrow: The Declassified History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents', James C. Oskins and Michael H. Maggelet. Lulu, 2008
- 30 'Britain's nuclear weapons factory 'nearly overwhelmed' by flood, Julian Rush. *Sunday Telegraph*, 11 October 2008: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/3178392/Britains-nuclear-weaponsfactory-nearly-overwhelmed-by-flood.html>
- 31 'Nuclear subs collide in Atlantic'. BBC News, 16 February 2009: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7892294.stm>
- 32 'Fire in bunker at atomic weapons site in Aldermaston'. BBC News, 4 August 2010: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-10863205>
- 33 'Investigation into the corrosion of class 1 structural steelwork at AWE Aldermaston, in support of an enforcement decision', Office for Nuclear Regulation, February 2013: <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/pars/2012/aldermaston-1.htm>
- 34 'Nuclear submarines', Oral statement to Parliament, 6 March 2014: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-submarines>



July 2014. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament • Mordechai Vanunu House
162 Holloway Rd • London N7 8DQ • 020 7700 2393 • www.cnduk.org

