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Committee of Public Accounts

Ministry of Defence nuclear programme

Sixty-First Report of Session 2017–19

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

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The Committee of Public Accounts

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The current staff of the Committee are Richard Cooke (Clerk), Laura-Jane Tiley (Second Clerk), Hannah Wentworth (Chair Liaison), Ameet Chudasama and Carolyn Bowes (Senior Committee Assistants), Zainab Balogun and Kutumya Kibedi (Committee Assistants), and Tim Bowden (Media Officer).

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Summary

Since 1969, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) has maintained a submarine-based nuclear deterrent to support the government's national security policy. Over the next 10 years, it faces significant pressures to provide the network of programmes, equipment and people, often termed the 'Nuclear Enterprise' (the Enterprise), necessary to provide this continuous at sea deterrent. At a time when, across the Enterprise, major organisational and governance changes have still to take full effect, the Department needs to bridge a £2.9 billion affordability gap, ensure it fills identified skills gaps, sustain its supply chain, and make important decisions on significant, high-profile projects. These include infrastructure upgrades and the defueling and dismantling of the 20 submarines held by the UK. If these complex interdependencies are not managed, alongside the many contractual relationships on which the Enterprise depends, the Department's ability to provide the continuous at sea deterrent will be put at risk.

Introduction

The 'Nuclear Enterprise' is the network of equipment, people and infrastructure which must work together to provide the United Kingdom's continuous at sea deterrent. Currently, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) has at least one of its four nuclear-armed deterrent submarines, the Vanguard class, on patrol at any given time. In 2016, the Department began construction of a new class of deterrent submarines, the Dreadnought class, to come into operation in the early 2030s. The Department forecasts it will spend £5.2 billion across the Enterprise in 2018–19, of which £1.8 billion is on procuring and supporting submarines, £1.4 billion on the missiles and warheads, and £220 million on managing the Enterprise. In 2017, the newly created Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO), a top level budget within the Department, took on oversight of the Enterprise. In 2018, the Department also formally established the Submarine Delivery Agency (SDA) as an executive agency to manage 51 nuclear procurement and support programmes. Initial feedback on these newly established governance arrangements has been broadly positive, but this has taken some years to put in place given the organisational weaknesses that the Committee identified as long ago as 2009. The Department uses four main contractors, which between them have 97% (by value) of the Enterprise-related contracts, and which in turn use an estimated 1,500 sub-contractors.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **The scale, interdependencies and complexities of the Nuclear Enterprise create timetable risks across programmes.** In providing a continuous at sea deterrent, the Department must coordinate various elements including four nuclear deterrents, six attack submarines, an estimated 30,000 people and the infrastructure to support them. It must also bring in new submarines as existing ones leave service, and sequence the use of its dock space between submarines needing maintenance and those to be stored for disposal. The Department has not met many previous promises and past programmes have slipped. For example, all seven of the Department's new attack submarines, the Astute class, were, or are expected to be, delivered late. There have also been delays to the construction of new propulsion production facilities and to the submarine dismantling programme. In 2009, we reported that the Department needed to bring into service its new Dreadnought-class submarines by 2024, when the Vanguard-class starts to leave service. The Department now expects to introduce the Dreadnought-class from the early 2030s and keep the Vanguards operational for at least 37 years, 13 years longer than the design life. The Department provides Parliament with a short annual update on some of these developments, focusing in particular on the Dreadnought programme.

Recommendation: Given the history of significant slippage across different Enterprise programmes, in its annual update to Parliament the Department should set out clearly its key milestones for the next 20 years, with their associated interdependencies, in order to make it easier to track progress across different aspects of the Enterprise, not just the development of Dreadnought.

2. **Organisations across the Enterprise, including SDA, DNO, and the Navy and government contractors face continual challenges, including in attracting and retaining the range of skills they need.** Initial feedback on the newly established governance arrangements, such as the creation of DNO and SDA, has been broadly positive, with the expectation they will address organisational weaknesses we identified in 2009. However, the Department recognises that it needs to continually review the effectiveness of these arrangements and change them if necessary. Both organisations continue to face challenges in obtaining the right skills, particularly commercial and nuclear expertise, which are in short supply nationally. This has also been problematic for contractors and the Navy, although there have been some recent improvements addressing shortages across Navy military personnel.

Recommendation: The Department should regularly review how its new organisational structures and arrangements are working, and ensure it has the right skills by filling recognised gaps as soon as possible, developing succession plans for senior posts and, where appropriate, working with contractors and government to ensure they and the Department have the skills needed.

3. **In providing the Enterprise, the Department relies on four main contractors, whose past performance has been poor, and around 1,500 sub-contractors, many of which are small and specialist.** The Department recognises that past contractor performance in building submarines, including the Astute class, has been poor. Consequently, it has rated its commercial relationships as a high risk to programme delivery for Dreadnought. It has introduced a number of changes designed to improve performance, including new 'alliance' working arrangements between the main contractors on Dreadnought. The

SDA recognises the potential fragility of its main contractors' supply chains and is now working to understand them better, develop continuity plans if necessary, and to consider common standards across sub-contracts.

Recommendation: The Department should continue to push for high performance across contractors by using more joint incentives and closer working in future contracts, and ensuring a common approach to the supply-chain across contractors. It should update the Committee by March 2019 on ongoing work to understand the supply-chain and its fragility, explaining any contingency plans it will put in place.

4. Wider political arrangements, such as international trade arrangements, could impact on the Enterprise. To provide a continuous at sea deterrent, the UK works with both contractors and allied countries, in particular, the United States and France. The Department is currently involved with US counterparts in relation to the Trident missile programme. On US steel tariffs, the Department says it is not materially concerned about the direct impact of tariffs, but was considering the indirect effect on UK suppliers should their export markets diminish. The Department acknowledges that the UK's departure from the European Union could affect its supply chain, alongside potentially impacting on availability and regulatory arrangements.

Recommendation: As we get clarity on future international arrangements, the Department should set out for the Committee, by the end of the year, how it will manage the uncertainties arising from political developments and in particular how it will ensure the ongoing prosperity of its supply chain.

5. **The Department's infrastructure, including its facilities to maintain and decommission submarines, does not effectively support the Enterprise.** The age and condition of the Enterprise's 13 UK sites varies, and the Department currently has 52 programmes (valued at £4.9 billion) underway to upgrade and renew the estate and facilities across the Enterprise. However, the Department's infrastructure programmes have a history of problems. For example, upgrades to the AWE warhead assembly facility are six years late, with a 146% (£1.1 billion) cost increase, arising in part because the Department started to build with only 10–20% of the design complete. The Department also does not have enough berthing space at HM Naval Base Devonport to maintain and defuel submarines. The UK currently has 20 submarines awaiting disposal, nine of which contain fuel. The Department stated that, although they had deferred dismantling on affordability grounds in the past, this was no longer acceptable on safety and reputation grounds. The Department has started work dismantling its first submarine, which it expects to complete in the mid-2020s.

Recommendation: As a priority, the Department should review and determine its future infrastructure requirements to enable it to better plan and control the costs of these projects, and end the practice of delaying disposal of out of service submarines. Its annual report to Parliament on Dreadnought should also include a progress update on the decommissioning of submarines and key infrastructure programmes.

6. **Decisions over the next few years will affect, and potentially increase, costs across an Enterprise that is already unaffordable.** The Department has identified a £2.9 billion affordability gap across equipment and support programmes in the 10 years from 2018–19, representing 6% of the costs for that period. This figure already takes account of the

Department's decision to delay programmes, commitments to deliver £3 billion efficiency savings, and HM Treasury's agreement for the Department to use £600 million of the Dreadnought class contingency in 2018–19. The inherent uncertainties of long-term nuclear programmes, alongside decisions set out above, may affect Enterprise costs. The Department says it cannot guarantee Dreadnought will not exceed its current £31 billion budget, given uncertainties such as inflation and foreign exchange rate. Looking beyond 2018–19, the Department's Modernising Defence Programme will consider further options across nuclear programmes to address the affordability gap.

Recommendation: Given the identified affordability gap, the Department should write to the Committee, following the outcome of the Modernising Defence Programme review and decisions on infrastructure programmes and refuelling, setting out how it will ensure that the funds it needs for the Enterprise are available.

1 Managing the Defence Nuclear Enterprise

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on the management and challenges it faces across the programmes within the Nuclear Enterprise.¹

2. The Defence Nuclear Enterprise (the Enterprise) includes the equipment, people and a network of around 75 programmes which need to come together provide a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The Department forecasts it will spend £5.2 billion across the Enterprise in 2018–19, of which £1.8 billion is on procuring and supporting submarines, £1.4 billion on the missiles and warheads, and £220 million on managing the Enterprise. The Enterprise is overseen by the Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO) within the Department, headed by Director General Nuclear. DNO was set up in 2016 as a single point of accountability for the Enterprise. It sponsors the Submarine Delivery Agency, which manages 51 contracts for procurement and support on behalf of the DNO and Royal Navy. A sub-committee of the National Security Council, a ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister, considers nuclear deterrence and security.² In 2007, Parliament voted in favour of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, and in 2016, endorsed the decision to start construction of the Dreadnought class of nuclear submarines, which will come into service in the 2030s.³

Coordinating nuclear programmes

3. To provide a continuous at sea deterrent, the Department must effectively coordinate the various elements of the Enterprise, including four nuclear deterrent submarines (the Vanguard class), six attack submarines (the Astute class), an estimated 30,000 people and supporting infrastructure spread across 13 sites in the UK and one in the United States of America. There are also 201 active contracts, valued at £48.9 billion, covering the designing, building and maintenance of submarines, nuclear propulsion systems and warheads.⁴ The Department must also introduce new submarines when existing ones leave service, and sequence the use of its dock space between submarines needing maintaining and those to be stored for disposal.⁵

4. The scale, interdependencies and complexities of the Nuclear Enterprise create timetable risks across programmes. For example, the decision to refuel HMS Vanguard in 2014 fundamentally changed the parameters of the Department's programme to upgrade and maintain its nuclear core production capability, leading to increased costs and the programme being reset.⁶ In addition, the Department has not met previous promises and past programmes have slipped. For example, all seven of the Department's new attack submarines, the Astute class, were, or are expected to be, delivered late. The first three boats were an average of 19 months late, and the remaining four are 27 months behind

1 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, [The Defence Nuclear Enterprise: a landscape review](#), Session 2017–19, HC 1003, 22 May 2018

2 [C&AG's Report](#), paras 2.2, 2.10

3 [C&AG's Report](#), paras 1, 3, figure 9

4 [C&AG's Report](#), paras 1.18, 1.19, 3.12

5 [C&AG's Report](#), paras 3.29–3.35

6 Q 128

schedule.⁷ There have also been delays to the construction of new propulsion production facilities and submarine dismantling programme. In 2009, we reported that the Department needed to bring into service its new Dreadnought class submarines by 2024, when the Vanguard class starts to leave service. The Department now expects to introduce the Dreadnought class from the early 2030s, and keep the Vanguard class operational for at least 37 years, 13 years longer than its design life.⁸ It told us that it had experienced some engineering and project control problems, and the challenge was to get to a mature design ready for production.⁹

5. The Department assured us that bringing together the nuclear functions into the Defence Nuclear Organisation was making a big difference in terms of better managing the interdependencies between various aspects as it felt the impact of poor progress could be properly assessed.¹⁰ Given the long timescales involved and the history of past delays on nuclear programmes, we consider transparency on progress is essential. The Department has indicated a series of delivery dates, which we have set out below:

	Milestones ¹¹
2018	Decision point on HMS Victorious refuel
2020	Devonport infrastructure plans complete
Early 2020s	Future warhead decision
2022	Final Trafalgar-class submarine leaves service
2023	Completion of disposal work on HMS Swiftsure
2024	Detailed plan for submarine dismantling complete
2024	Seventh and final Astute-class submarine in service
Early 2030s	First Dreadnought-class submarine enters service

Ensuring the right structures and skills

6. In 2008, the National Audit Office reported that the arrangements for overseeing the Enterprise were not effective. No single senior responsible owner (SRO) covered the whole Enterprise. Subsequently, the Department introduced a devolved model, with one team retaining control over significant nuclear programmes, and responsibility for the Dreadnought programme passing to Defence Equipment & Support, an executive agency of the Department. After 2014, the Department increasingly recognised the need to improve these governance arrangements.¹² The Permanent Secretary told us the robustness of arrangements that had previously been in place could have been better and that developing and implementing plans for the introduction of the Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO) and the Submarine Delivery Agency (SDA) took up much of his time when he was appointed in 2016. He was confident that the governance arrangements had been ‘seriously improved.’ In its report, the National Audit Office identified broadly positive initial feedback following creation of the SDA and DNO, although there remained lots to

7 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 3.32

8 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 3.31

9 Q 6

10 Q 55

11 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 1.5, figure 2; Qq 71, 74, 78, 79

12 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 2.8

do. The Department told us it will continually review the effectiveness of arrangements, pointing to the example of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Board, which had become unwieldy and has since been reformed.¹³

7. All aspects of the Enterprise require specialist skills and face continuing challenges in securing the required expertise, particularly nuclear and commercial, which is in short supply nationally. In January 2018, for example, the Department identified a shortage of 337 skilled personnel across seven nuclear specialisms. Since that point the Department said there had been improvements. Also, the Director General Nuclear told us that DNO had now filled 250 of its 300 posts, with a further 30 to be filled in the next four months. Its focus was now to strengthen the commercial team handling the Atomic Weapons Establishment. For SDA, there was a need for staff to manage supplier development and improvements to supply chain resilience. It is also looking to strengthen those teams which examine costs in detail, and is increasing its intake of graduates to 30 a year from September 2018, along with 10 apprentices.¹⁴ The Second Sea Lord told us that the situation in the Navy was improving as a result of initiatives to increase apprenticeships, train personnel more quickly, and invest in the submariner community to consolidate them around Faslane and the Clyde and to reduce the number leaving.¹⁵

8. Given the complexity of programmes across the Enterprise, the organisations involved need to have the right leadership. Director General Nuclear stated that finding the right people was the biggest risk to his programme, and the Chief Executive of the SDA also considered maintaining and growing the skills base were his biggest risks.¹⁶ In view of the long timescales involved in Enterprise programmes and the importance of close working between organisations and their senior personnel, we were concerned that performance might be affected by churn amongst senior staff. Witnesses agreed that future success required time and commitment and told us initial thought had been given to succession planning.¹⁷

13 Q 90

14 [C&AG's Report](#), para 3.24, Qq 3–4, 8, 53

15 Qq 44–47

16 Qq 117–119

17 Qq 104–108

2 Challenges for the Defence Nuclear Enterprise

Managing the main contractors and the supply chain

9. In providing the Enterprise, the Department relies on four main contractors—BAE Systems, Babcock Marine, AWE ML and Rolls-Royce—for 97% (by value) of the £48.9 billion worth of the contracts it managed in 2017–18. The Department recognises contractor performance has been poor, and with the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, considers this to be a high risk to programme delivery for the submarine and nuclear core production programmes.¹⁸ The Department explained that new senior appointments had been made at BAE Systems in Barrow, which would provide additional operational focus. Similar steps had previously been taken to improve performance at Rolls-Royce in Derby.¹⁹ As a result, the Department considered that there had been ‘really material improvements in performance’ in the last two or three years amongst suppliers but there was no grounds for complacency.²⁰ Both the heads of DNO and SDA considered that improving supplier performance remained one their top priorities.²¹

10. The Department has introduced a number of changes designed to improve performance, including new ‘alliance’ working arrangements between the main contractors on Dreadnought in April 2018. The Chief Executive of SDA told us this involved a joint programme office so that all parties were working from the same schedule and data, and decisions could be taken in the best interests of the whole programme. Lessons had been applied from work on the new aircraft carriers, Olympics and Heathrow Terminal 5. The Department emphasised that the focus was on developing trust, transparency and openness, and there were people from BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and the Department working in alliance offices.²² The Department said it had confidence in the senior teams in the main contractors, but it was examining performance data routinely and tackling signs of problems promptly.²³ It was also managing the programme in a way so that contractual arrangements could be tightened as the programme matured. This included introducing a financial incentive for suppliers to work together and meet milestones, and is looking at ways to tighten contractual arrangements as programmes mature, moving from ‘cost plus’ contracts to ‘target cost incentive fee’ or ‘fixed cost’ contracts.²⁴

11. The Enterprise also depends on the supply chains of its main contractors, comprising an estimated 1,500 companies, many of which are small and specialist. SDA recognises the potential fragility of these supply chains, and highlighted the importance of long term continuity. Its Chief Executive said SDA was working with BAE Systems and Rolls Royce to measure and understand the supply chains, assess their robustness and develop continuity plans if necessary. Where a valuable supplier was a concern, the SDA said it would do what was needed to keep them in business. If the supplier had decided not to continue in the field, it would find an alternative to ensure continuity of supply. In the

18 [C&AG's Report](#), paras 3.14–3.16

19 Q 110

20 Q 39

21 Qq 113–118

22 Qq 16–17

23 Qq 40, 114

24 Q 14

longer term, the SDA intends to take a more consistent approach to how it works with contractors, including through transparency of performance reporting, payment terms and quality standards.²⁵

Managing the impact of external events

12. The UK has had a close relationship with the United States on nuclear programmes since the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. It also works closely with France, including under the Teutates programme, to develop testing facilities for new technologies. The Department is currently involved with US counterparts in undertaking a missile life extension programme, and participates in other US-led programmes to extend the service life of missile components and spares.²⁶ Wider political developments, such as changing international trade arrangements, could impact on the Enterprise. On US steel tariffs, the Department said it was ‘not materially concerned about the direct impact of tariffs’, but this remained one of the main areas for conversation between the Permanent Secretary and his US counterpart. The Department was concerned at the indirect effect on UK suppliers should their export markets diminish. It was working with some specific companies to mitigate the potential effect.²⁷

13. The Department acknowledged that the UK’s departure from the European Union could affect its supply chain and told us that it was examining the potential risks. Although future trade arrangements remain unclear, the Department recognised that since it imported material from some EU countries, changes may affect prices. It was also working with its suppliers to consider the impact, for example, of alterations to chemical regulation, and discussing with some suppliers concerns over possible changes to material standards.²⁸ The Department also felt that Brexit might impact its efforts to ensure that it had the skills it needed. The Permanent Secretary told us it might be more difficult to bring engineers from the continent. The Department told us it was in close contact with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to understand its plans and how they may impact the Enterprise.²⁹

Maintaining the infrastructure

14. The age and condition of the Enterprise’s 13 UK sites varies. The Department told us that past decisions to delay maintenance had created ‘a ticking time bomb.’ The Department currently has 52 programmes (valued at £4.9 billion) underway to upgrade and renew the estate and facilities. It also recognised that its initial assumption on the required infrastructure to maintain the Astute-class submarine, which have been in service from 2010, and to defuel submarines at HMNB Devonport, had been incorrect. It estimated that 40% of the £1.2 billion cost pressure across the Enterprise in the next 10 years relates to the potential cost of dock infrastructure.³⁰

15. The Department’s infrastructure programmes have a history of problems. For example, upgrades to the AWE warhead assembly facility are six years late, with a 146%

25 Qq 25–27, 30

26 [C&AG’s Report](#), paras 1.16, 1.8

27 Qq 83, 89

28 Qq 28–29, 37

29 Q 52

30 Qq 67–70

(£1.1 billion) cost increase, which arose as the Department started to build with only 10-20% of the design complete. The Department told us it now recognises the challenges and importance of getting the design of infrastructure programmes, which are often unique, right in advance. The Department said the UK was not alone in having such problems, which had also been experienced in the US and France. This included project management failings, magnified by the additional safety requirements of nuclear projects.³¹ The Department told us that it was starting to make progress at Faslane and the Clyde, although nuclear infrastructure was complex and projects were large and one-off designs.³²

16. The UK has never completely disposed of a nuclear submarine. There are currently 20 awaiting disposal, nine of which contain fuel, with the rest having been defueled. In due course, further submarines from the Trafalgar class will come out of service. Although the Department said it did not anticipate running out of storage space, it agreed that its plans for Devonport needed to reflect how it would complete the work needed to operate a defueling facility. It estimates it will begin defueling the next submarine in the mid-2020s, after which a programme of disposals would take ‘at least a couple of decades’.³³ When pressed about past delays in disposal, the Department stated that, although delays were understandable given affordability challenges, that was no longer an acceptable position on safety and reputation grounds.³⁴ The Department admitted that it would take six or seven years to develop its plans, as it needed to complete developments at Devonport, decide whether to refuel any more Vanguard-class submarines, and then learn lessons from the current work in Rosyth to dismantle HMS Swiftsure by 2023.³⁵

Ensuring that the Enterprise is affordable

17. The challenges set out above all have consequences for the cost of the Nuclear Enterprise. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent is expected to cost £5.2 billion, some 14% of the total defence budget, in 2018–19. This includes £1.8 billion on procuring and supporting submarines, £1.4 billion on the missiles and warheads, and £220 million on managing the Enterprise. Between 2018 and 2028, nuclear equipment and support programmes will cost £51 billion, of which £23 billion is expected to be on submarines and £13 billion on strategic weapons and warheads.³⁶ There is considerable uncertainty over these costs given the immaturity of some of the long-term programme plans and the need for decisions on, for example, infrastructure and propulsion, which have yet to be reflected in the numbers.

18. Decisions over the next few years will affect, and potentially increase, costs across an Enterprise that is already unaffordable without further action being taken. During 2017, the Department undertook a thorough review of costs, based on identified risks and particular costing scenarios. This work applied a common approach to costs and assumptions, and encouraged teams to be realistic about risks. The results were subjected to a comprehensive review by the Department’s independent cost assurance team.³⁷ On the basis of this work, the Department identified a £2.9 billion affordability gap across

31 Qq 55–59

32 Q 55

33 Q 71

34 Qq 72–73, 82

35 Q 74

36 [C&AG’s Report](#), figure 12

37 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 3.5

equipment and support programmes in the 10 years from 2018–19, representing 6% of the costs for that period. This figure already takes account of the Department’s decision to delay programmes such as work on the development of the replacement for the Astute-class submarine, commitments to deliver £3 billion of efficiency savings, and HM Treasury’s agreement for the Department to use £600 million of the Dreadnought-class contingency in 2018–19. The Department’s Modernising Defence Programme will consider further options across the nuclear programme to address affordability challenges beyond 2018–19.³⁸

19. We challenged the Department as to whether providing the Enterprise was feasible given the costs involved. The Department told us it could not guarantee the Dreadnought programme will not exceed its current £31 billion budget, given uncertainties such as inflation and foreign exchange rate. This was why the government had put aside £10 billion in contingency. However, it was developing an agreed schedule and resource plan that was ‘completely transparent’ between the Department and its suppliers and had only started construction with a larger proportion of the design, 80–85%, complete compared to the Astute-class submarine.³⁹

38 [C&AG’s Report](#), para 3.7–3.8

39 Qq 11–12

Formal Minutes

Monday 10 September 2018

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Bridget Phillipson

Anne Marie Morris Lee Rowley

Draft Report (*Ministry of Defence nuclear programme*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 19 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixty - first of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 12 September at 2:00pm]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 2 July 2018

Question number

Ian Booth, Chief Executive, Submarine Delivery Agency, **Julian Kelly**, Director General, Nuclear, Ministry of Defence, **Stephen Lovegrove**, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence; and **Vice Admiral Radakin**, Second Sea Lord, Royal Navy

[Q1-128](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

NCP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Jag Patel ([NCP0002](#))
- 2 Mr Mike Kiely ([NCP0001](#))
- 3 University of Sussex ([NCP0004](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current session

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2017–19

First Report	Tackling online VAT fraud and error	HC 312 (Cm 9549)
Second Report	Brexit and the future of Customs	HC 401 (Cm 9565)
Third Report	Hinkley Point C	HC 393 (Cm 9565)
Fourth Report	Clinical correspondence handling at NHS Shared Business Services	HC 396 (Cm 9575)
Fifth Report	Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital trusts	HC 397 (Cm 9575)
Sixth Report	The growing threat of online fraud	HC 399 (Cm 9575)
Seventh Report	Brexit and the UK border	HC 558 (Cm 9575)
Eighth Report	Mental health in prisons	HC 400 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9596)
Ninth Report	Sheffield to Rotherham tram-trains	HC 453 (Cm 9575)
Tenth Report	High Speed 2 Annual Report and Accounts	HC 454 (Cm 9575)
Eleventh Report	Homeless households	HC 462 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9618)
Twelfth Report	HMRC's Performance in 2016–17	HC 456 (Cm 9596)
Thirteenth Report	NHS continuing healthcare funding	HC 455 (Cm 9596)
Fourteenth Report	Delivering Carrier Strike	HC 394 (Cm 9596)
Fifteenth Report	Offender-monitoring tags	HC 458 (Cm 9596)
Sixteenth Report	Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts	HC 463 (Cm 9596)
Seventeenth Report	Retaining and developing the teaching workforce	HC 460 (Cm 9596)

Eighteenth Report	Exiting the European Union	HC 467 (Cm 9596)
Nineteenth Report	Excess Votes 2016–17	HC 806 (Cm 9596)
Twentieth Report	Update on the Thameslink Programme	HC 466 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-First Report	The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's Magnox	HC 461 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Second Report	The monitoring, inspection and funding of Learndirect Ltd.	HC 875 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Third Report	Alternative Higher Education Providers	HC 736 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fourth Report	Care Quality Commission: regulating health and social care	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fifth Report	The sale of the Green Investment Bank	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Sixth Report	Governance and departmental oversight of the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership	HC 896 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Seventh Report	Government contracts for Community Rehabilitation Companies	HC 897 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Eighth Report	Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of defence equipment	HC 724 (Cm 9618)
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