




Ministry  
of Defence

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Our Reference:  
FOI2013/00031  
(previously 21-10-2013-  
144742-015)

Your Reference:  
24/13

Date: 1 July 2014



Request for Information under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act

Further to our letter of 3 June 2014, I am now writing to provide you with a final response to your FOI request dated 16 October 2013, in which you ask for the following information:

***I should be grateful if you would provide me with copies of the following information which may be held by the Ministry of Defence relating to the High Security Vehicles which are used by the Ministry of Defence for the transport of Special Nuclear Materials.***

- ***The date when these vehicles are currently scheduled to leave service.***
- ***Reasons for the delay in their leaving service when compared with Nuclear Weapons Integrated Project Team Initial Business Case for Replacement of High Security Vehicles (22 September 2006).***
- ***Copies of any submissions made to management by High Security Vehicle crews on the need for replacement of the vehicles.***

Please note that the FOI reference number for this case has been changed as shown above as we have introduced a new FOI IT system.

I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence holds some information that falls within the scope of your request.

Please find attached the following documents which are in scope of your first two points:

Status Mutatio [redacted] Project – 12 June 2012  
TSC Point Brief – [redacted] – 21 June 2013  
Monthly Status Report -November 2013

The MOD does not hold any information in scope of the third point in your request.

I must inform you that some of the information has been withheld under qualified exemptions Section 24 (National Security) and Section 26 (Defence). Some of the information is exempt under Section 24(1) which has been engaged because its release could prejudice national security. Some information has been excluded under Section 26(1)(a) and (b) because it could be exploited by those with hostile intent and could harm defence capability, effectiveness and security,

It is recognised that there is a public interest in providing information to reassure people that the transportation of Special Nuclear Material is undertaken safely and securely and that decisions to replace the High Security Vehicle (HSV) have been fully considered. However, there is a stronger public interest in maintaining the safety and security of the population by not putting into the public domain any information in relation to the programme to replace the HSV which could assist hostile individuals or groups which could result in harm to national security or information which would be likely to undermine the UK defence capability.

Under Section 16(1) of the Act, Public Authorities have a duty to provide advice and assistance to people who request information. The exact programme date in relation to the first part of your request has been withheld for the reasons given above. However, I can let you know that the out of service date for the HSV depends on a number of factors and is expected to be around late 2014 to early 2015.

I very much regret that the time taken to review the information has taken considerably longer than I would have wished.

If you are not satisfied with this response or you wish to complain about any aspect of the handling of your request, then you should contact me in the first instance. If informal resolution is not possible and you are still dissatisfied then you may apply for an independent internal review by contacting the Information Rights Compliance team, 1<sup>st</sup> Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB (e-mail [CIO-FOI-IR@mod.uk](mailto:CIO-FOI-IR@mod.uk)). Please note that any request for an internal review must be made within 40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach informal resolution has come to an end.

If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. Please note that the Information Commissioner will not investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed. Further details of the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website, <http://www.ico.gov.uk>.

Yours sincerely,

Sue Ford  
Defence Equipment & Support Policy Secretariat

Defence Equipment & Support

**STATUS MUTATIO [REDACTED] PROJECT – 12 JUN 12**

1. The Scope of [REDACTED] covers the movement of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) currently carried in the High Security Vehicle (HSV) and the transition towards the TCHD Mk III [REDACTED]. Those items not requiring Stage Approval (as defined by the SWAA) i.e. those being transported under Civil Regs – CDG 09 (essentially inter site movements of SNM, SNM movements to the primary airhead, and SNM movements to RRMARPOL) require Approval To Proceed (ATP) by [REDACTED] (Phase 1). Those items requiring Stage Approval require ATP by [REDACTED] (Phase 2). The ATP dates for Phase 2 are determined by the due process that must be followed to provide for current Facility Safety Cases to be reviewed and amended by the LCP3 Authorisee, i.e.

[REDACTED] timescales required to contract AMEC to conduct the HAZOPS [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- the time needed to draft and agree the amended NWASC i.c.w. the SWAA [REDACTED]
- the time needed to draft and prove the revised documentation and processes by formal SRT (Dependent on NWMC/T approval of draft/ formal procedures)
- the time needed to review, amend, and approve [REDACTED] documentation [REDACTED]
- approval of the Change Proposal by NSC and TSC

2. The Phase 1 key elements in [REDACTED] are:

[REDACTED]

3. The Phase 2 key elements in [REDACTED] are:

[REDACTED]

**Key Risks**

4. The principal project risks are:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Mitigation**

[REDACTED] project risk is mitigated by ensuring the continued availability of the HSV to deliver the SNM programme until [REDACTED] has been achieved. [REDACTED]

Personnel resource issues can be mitigated by LM staff working with the resource tight areas to produce documentation.

**TSC POINT BRIEF – [REDACTED] – 21 June 2013**

By LM1 – as agreed to be provided to be included in TSC minutes.

- Project has been delayed from previous target dates for various reasons principally [REDACTED] work and [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] strongly recommends achieve HSV out of service by end [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] Project being phased as some loads require Stage 1 approval. To carry these loads requires all documentation changes at all affected sites to be assessed against Facility Safety Case before load can be moved at any site. This is part of the project most affected by the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]. Target date for this Phase 2 completion is [REDACTED]. To support this Phase, [REDACTED]

RESTRICTED

**MONTHLY STATUS REPORT – NOVEMBER 2013**

**Update**

Phased [REDACTED] programme; non stage 1 approved fissile material/components in Phase 1 followed by rest in Phase 2. First move of SNM by TCHD planned [REDACTED] subject to confirmed transport requirement. Phase 2 on track for [REDACTED]. Comprehensive HSV servicing and maintenance routines to minimise risk of breakdown/malfunction”.

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