

11 JANUARY 1987

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

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OFFICE OF AIR OFFICER
 MAINTENANCE
 26 JAN 1987
 HQ RAF SUPPORT
 COMMAND
 FILE M01/P102/S/N 569

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~BOARD OF INQUIRY ASSEMBLED AT HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE SUPPORT COMMAND ON11 JAN 87

| Serial (a) | Date (b) | Time (c) | Action (d) |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|--|
| 1. | 11 Jan | 1230-1250 | Members of the Board were briefed by Gp Capt [REDACTED] at HQRAFSC, RAF Brampton. |
| 2. | " | 1300- | Members of the Board departed for RNAD Dean Hill. |
| 3. | " | 1600 | Members of the Board arrived at RNAD Dean Hill. |
| 4. | " | 1615-1645 | Members of the Board, accompanied by Sqn Ldr [REDACTED], Convoy Commander, Fg Off [REDACTED], Convoy Safety Officer and Wg Cdr [REDACTED], Command MTO at HQRAFSC, visited the accident scene. |
| 5. | " | 1700-1730 | Members of the Board viewed TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84), which was under guard in Bldg 25 (the weapon unloading shed) at RNAD Dean Hill. |
| 6. | " | 1730-1750 | The Board discussed the next days operations with Fg Off [REDACTED] who had been detailed to unload TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84). |
| 7. | " | 1750 | Board departed to accommodation. |
| 8. | 12 Jan | 0900 | The Board reassembled in the Headquarters building at RNAD Dean Hill. |
| 9. | " | 0900-1000 | The Board discussed what action was to be taken. |
| 10. | " | 1020-1100 | The Board interviewed first witness, Sgt [REDACTED] MDP ([REDACTED]). |
| 11. | " | 1100-1210 | The Board interviewed second witness, Inspector [REDACTED] MDP. |
| 12. | " | 1210-1230 | The President of the Board telephoned OC RAFASUPU to have certain documents available on arrival. |
| 13. | " | 1230-1330 | The Board discussed a change in the terms of reference proposed by HQRAFSC (later cancelled by HQRAFSC). |
| 14. | " | 1330-1430 | The Board discussed the tactics for conducting the Inquiry. |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|-----|--------|-----------|---|
| 15. | 12 Jan | 1430-1830 | Board travelled to RAFASU. |
| 16. | " | 1830-1915 | Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] isolated certain convoy documents. |
| 17. | 13 Jan | 0900-1225 | Board interviewed third witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 18. | " | 1225-1350 | Board interviewed fourth witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 19. | " | 1350-1435 | Board interviewed fifth witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 20. | " | 1435-1530 | Board interviewed sixth witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 21. | " | 1530-1625 | Board interviewed seventh witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 22. | " | 1650-1755 | Board interviewed eighth witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 23. | " | 1810-1915 | Board interviewed ninth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 24. | " | -1940 | Interim report despatched to HQRAFSC and Board adjourned for dinner. |
| 25. | " | 2030-2110 | Board interviewed tenth witness, 2nd Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 26. | " | 2110-2230 | Board interviewed eleventh witness, Fg Off [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and adjourned for the night. |
| 27. | 14 Jan | 0810-1030 | Board interviewed twelfth witness, SAC [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 28. | " | 1055-1150 | Board interviewed thirteenth witness, SAC [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. |
| 29. | " | 1200-1300 | Board interviewed fourteenth witness, WO [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 30. | " | 1305-1340 | Board interviewed fifteenth witness, SAC [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 31. | " | 1345-1350 | Board interviewed SAC [REDACTED] - no statement taken. |
| 32. | " | 1350-1420 | Board interviewed sixteenth witness, Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|-----|--------|-----------|---|
| 33. | 14 Jan | 1600-1720 | Board recalled third witness, Sen Ldr [REDACTED] |
| 34. | " | 1600-1720 | Board interviewed seventeenth witness, Wg Cdr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| | | 1925 | Board interviewed eighteenth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) and adjourned for dinner. |
| 36. | " | 2015-2145 | Board discussed findings and adjourned for the night. |
| 37. | 15 Jan | 0830-0850 | Board interviewed nineteenth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). |
| 38. | " | 0940-0955 | Board recalled sixth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED] |
| 39. | " | 1020-1105 | Board interviewed twentieth witness, Wg [REDACTED] [REDACTED] |
| 40. | " | 1120-1155 | Board recalled third witness, Sen Ldr [REDACTED] |
| | | 1200-1230 | Board recalled fourth witness, Sen Ldr [REDACTED] |
| | | 1240-1250 | Board viewed the video tape from the Galaxy Computer's witness. |
| | | 1330 | Board deliberated on their findings to date. |
| | | 1350-1405 | Board recalled fifth witness, Sen Ldr [REDACTED] |
| 42. | " | 1400-1520 | Board deliberated on their findings to date. |
| 43. | " | 1400-1500 | Sen Ldr [REDACTED] will hear [REDACTED] to recall Board witness, Inspector [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. |
| | | 1520-1530 | Board recalled eighteenth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED] |
| | | 1530-1550 | Board recalled nineteenth witness, Col [REDACTED] |
| 49. | | 1550-1700 | Board deliberated on their findings. |
| 50. | | 1700-1710 | Board recalled sixteenth witness, Col [REDACTED] |
| 51. | | 1710-1930 | Board drafted findings. |
| 52. | | 1930-2030 | Board adjourned for dinner. |
| | | 2030-2200 | Board discussed recommendations. |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|-----|--------|-----------|---|
| 54. | 15 Jan | 2200 | Board adjourned for the night. |
| 55. | 16 Jan | 0800 | Board reconvened. |
| 56. | " | 0800-1200 | Board reviewed Inquiry report for accuracy. |
| 57. | " | 1200-1300 | Inquiry checked by P1. |
| 58. | " | 1300 | Proceedings of the Board handed to OC RAFASUPU. |

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ROYAL AIR FORCE

PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS, BOARD OF INQUIRY Etc.

NOTES

(i) A4, single sheet paper only to be used. Small documentary exhibits to be pasted on A4 paper.

(ii) Use a separate page for the recording of evidence of each witness. Full signature of each witness must be inserted at end of his evidence.

(iii) All alterations and erasures in record of evidence must be initialed by the witness.

(iv) QR 1269 to be complied with whenever adverse comments are made by a witness about another.

(v) When the proceedings are complete, assemble them securely in following order:

(a) Diary of Action, showing day to day progress of the Board.

(b) Form 2 completed as to the convening authority, terms of reference, composition of the Board.

(c) List of Witnesses.

(d) List of Exhibits.

(e) Narrative of Events.

(f) Record of Evidence (check that QR 1269 has been complied with).

(g) Findings.

(h) Recommendations.

(i) Statements from Witnesses under QR 1269.

(j) Remarks by Unit and Station Commanders.

(k) Remarks by AOC and AOC-in-C.

(l) Exhibits lettered "A" to "Z".

Then number pages consecutively.

(vi) The Board, etc., is to study QR, Chapter 17 and AP 3392 Vol 4 Chap 15.

PROCEEDINGS of a Board of Inquiry

convened at Headquarters Royal Air Force Support Command

RAF Brampton

on the 11 January 1987

by order of Air Vice Marshal [REDACTED] RAF

for the purpose of Investigating the circumstances of the accidents in which 2 vehicles in a convoy on 10 January 1987 were involved in an accident.

The Board is to determine:

a. The cause of the incident and examine contributory factors.

b. Determine what injuries were caused and whether they will be the exciting cause of later disability.

c. Investigate and comment on any fatigue implications of the drivers activities in the previous 3 days.

d. Ascertain whether all the Service personnel

PRESIDENT

Wg Cdr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) (Engineer Branch) MOD
parented by RAF Abingdon

MEMBERS

Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) (Engineer Branch)

MOD parented by RAF Uxbridge

Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) (Supply Branch)

MOD parented by RAF Uxbridge

IN ATTENDANCE

(See QR 1261)

THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE TO BE PASSED THROUGH EACH STAGE WITHOUT DELAY

1. Sgt [REDACTED], RNAD West Dean (Page 10)
2. Inspector [REDACTED] RNAD Dean Hill (Pages 11, 12 & 52)
3. Sqn Ldr A [REDACTED], RAFASUPU (Pages 13, 14, 15, 16, 36, 37, 38, 46, 47 & 48)
4. Cpl [REDACTED], RAFASUPU (Page 17)
5. Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Page 18)
6. Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Page 19)
7. Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Page 20)
8. Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Page 21)
9. Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 22 & 44)
10. 2nd Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Comacchio Group (Page 23)
11. Fg Off [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 24 & 25)
12. SAC [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 26, 27 & 28)
13. SAC [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 29 & 30)
14. WO [REDACTED] RAF Uxbridge (Pages 31 & 32)
15. SAC [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 33 & 34)
16. Cpl [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 35, 50 & 51)
17. Wg Cdr [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 39 & 40)
18. Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Pages 41, 42 & 49)
19. Flt Lt [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAF Wittering (Page 43)
20. WO I [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), RAFASUPU (Page 45)

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- A. Movement Order 419 (with extraneous classified detail removed (6 pages)
- B. Four photographs of TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) - one copy only
- C. Damage assessment of TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84)
- D. Convoy communications with Task Control - Responsibilities of Convoy Commander.
- E. Convoy Operating Procedures Chapter 7 page 5 paragraph 24.
- F. Preface to RAFASUPU Convoy Operating Procedures.
- G. 1 & 2 Two pages of Task Control Diary relating to 10 January 1987 (2 pages)
- H. Responsibility of [REDACTED]
- J. Video tape from Convoy Commander's vehicle. one copy only.
- K. 1 & 2 FMT 3 and driver's statement (VRM 30 AJ 84)
- L. 1 & 2 FMT 3 and driver's statement (VRM 81 AE 13)
- M. 1 & 2 658A for (VRM 30 AJ 84 and 81 AE 13)

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PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS, BOARD OF INQUIRY Etc.

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(l) Exhibits lettered "A" to "Z".

Then number pages consecutively.

(vi) The Board, etc., is to study QR, Chapter 17 and AP 3392 Vol 4 Chap 15.

PROCEEDINGS of a

convened at

on the

by order of

for the purpose of involved were on duty.

e. Determine the state of serviceability of the TCHDs.

f. Investigate whether or not the vehicles were on an authorised journey and whether or not the drivers were authorised to drive Service vehicles.

g. Examine what orders and instructions were in issue.

h. Comply with AP 3086 Chapter 3 paras 0356-0369.

j. Establish whether the supporting post accident facilities were adequate.

k. Ascertain the value of loss/damage to Service/

PRESIDENT

MEMBERS

IN ATTENDANCE

(See QR 1261)

THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE TO BE PASSED THROUGH EACH STAGE WITHOUT DELAY

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ROYAL AIR FORCE

PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS, BOARD OF INQUIRY Etc.

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(f) Record of Evidence (check that QR 1269 has been complied with).

(g) Findings.

(h) Recommendations.

(i) Statements from Witnesses under QR 1269.

(j) Remarks by Unit and Station Commanders.

(k) Remarks by AOC and AOC-in-C.

(l) Exhibits lettered "A" to "Z".

Then number pages consecutively.

(vi) The Board, etc., is to study QR, Chapter 17 and AP 3392 Vol 4 Chap 15.

PROCEEDINGS of a

convened at

on the

by order of

for the purpose of civilian property.

l. Allocate responsibility and apportion blame.

m. Make recommendations.

PRESIDENT

MEMBERS

IN ATTENDANCE

(See QR 1261)

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BOARD OF INQUIRY CONVENED AT HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE SUPPORT COMMAND
ROYAL AIR FORCE STATION BRAMPTON ON 11 JANUARY 1987

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

1. On 10 January 1987 a convoy constituted of 4 TCHDs and supporting vehicles (Movement Order 419) was proceeding on an unclassified road approximately 2 miles east of West Grimstead. The third TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) left the road, dropped down a short bank, and came to rest on its side in a field. The last TCHD (VRM 81 AE 13) came to rest some 30 yards further back at an angle across the road with its nearside front corner embedded in the verge. The accident occurred at Map Reference 227259 on Ordnance Survey Sheet 184, 1:50,000 Landranger Series.
2. As a result of both accidents only one Service person sustained very minor injury.

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STATEMENTS OF THE WITNESSES

[REDACTED] s/c 17 Jun 87

First
Witness

Sergeant [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) Ministry of Defence
Police of Royal Naval Armament Depot, Dean Hill, having been duly
sworn, states:

1. I am a shift Sergeant in the MOD Police at RNAD Dean Hill and have been employed in this capacity since November 1981.
2. At 1554 hours on Saturday 10 January 1987, I left the Police Post to go to the site of the accident. I drove into West Dean and turned left through the village. At the junction of the Farley and West Grimstead roads, I was stopped by the Wiltshire Constabulary, who directed me to approach the scene of the accident via the Farley road and West Grimstead. I arrived at the rear of the convoy at 1610 hours.
3. Although I do not use the road on which the accident occurred daily, I am very familiar with it. In common with many other roads in the area, it is prone to icing in the winter. On this particular stretch, not only is the road shielded by a high ridge from the sun, but the drainage is reduced by debris from farm vehicles which use the road regularly. When I arrived, it was full daylight, overcast and dry. The road was in a treacherous condition due to ice, so that in places it was difficult to even stand. This was because the road surface is not flat, but cambered. I was driving a Land Rover and I found that braking and cornering were difficult.

-10-

Second
Witness

Inspector [REDACTED] Ministry of Defence Police,
of Royal Naval Armament Depot, Dean Hill, having been duly sworn,
states:

1. I am the Senior Serving Police Officer in the MOD Police, RNAD Dean Hill and have been employed in this post since May 1982.
2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was on duty at the Depot Emergency Headquarters. At 1554 hours, a message was received from the convoy that an accident had occurred outside the depot. The message requested traffic control assistance on the road to the west of RNAD Dean Hill. I immediately despatched Sergeant [REDACTED] to the scene of the accident. From this point on, I maintained close liaison with the convoy and provided assistance from my resources, as necessary.

X WITNESS 1

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Can you tell the Board something about the approach roads to RNAD Dean Hill?

Answer: In my opinion, there are 4 feasible immediately local approach roads to RNAD Dean Hill which could be used by large vehicles. All 4 roads are

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[Redacted] s/c 17/Jan

unclassified country roads which are very narrow in places. The general characteristics of these roads are that they are of tarmac construction with soft verges. We do not furnish information regarding the state of the local roads, unless this information is specifically requested.

Question: Were you asked to provide any information on the state of the local roads by RAFASUPU personnel over the period prior to the accident?

Answer: No. In my experience, the MOD Police have never been asked to

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provide this type of information.

Question: Had you been asked on this occasion, what would have been your response?

Answer: I would have advised an approach from the direction of Romsey, because of the adverse weather conditions.

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Third Witness

Squadron Leader [Redacted] ([Redacted]), Security (Provost) Branch of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit (RAFASUPU), Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a Convoy Commander at RAFASUPU and have held that post since 20 April 1985.
2. On 5 January 1987, I was detailed by Task Control, on behalf of OC RAFASUPU, to carry out the duties of Convoy Commander for Movement Order No 419. The convoy was due to leave RAFASUPU on Wednesday 7 January 1987. I now present a copy of Movement Order No 419 (Exhibit A).
3. In accordance with the Convoy Operating Procedures, I briefed the members of the convoy immediately prior to our departure on the morning of Wednesday 7 January 1987. All those members of the convoy who were present in the convoy on Saturday 10 January 1987 were present at this briefing. As is the normal procedure when no changes to convoy personnel occur during the course of the Movement Order procedure, no further briefings were required.
4. The convoy left RAFASUPU at approximately 1000 hours on Wednesday 7 January 1987.
5. During Wednesday 7 January 1987, the convoy personnel were on duty for 8½ hours, of which 3 hours were driving time.
6. During Thursday 8 January 1987, the convoy personnel were on duty for 8 hours, of which 6 hours were driving time.

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7. During Friday 9 January 1987, the convoy personnel were on duty for $7\frac{3}{4}$ hours, of which 2 hours were driving time.

8. On Saturday 10 January 1987, the convoy personnel had been on duty for $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours at the time of the accident, of which one hour 25 minutes were driving time.

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9. At no time was the break between duty periods less than $15\frac{1}{2}$ hours and on the night of 9/10 January 1987, the break was $16\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

10. In addition, the mandatory breaks during driving time of 15 minutes in every 2 hours were taken throughout the convoy movement.

11. During the overnight stops, the personnel were accommodated in hotels providing appropriate rest facilities.

12. I have no reason to doubt that the 2 drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident made full use of the rest facilities available at all the overnight stops. On the morning of 10 January 1987, I saw the drivers and they appeared to be in a perfectly normal state of health and fitness for duty.

13. During the course of the journey on 10 January 1987, the majority of the route was on major trunk roads and there were no untoward events and driving conditions were normal. Prior to turning off the A36 trunk road onto the minor, unclassified, road to West Grimstead and West Dean, the Escort Commander received a report from [REDACTED], that there was slush ahead on our route. I did not consider that this was a hazard to the convoy and from experience I accepted the Escort Commander's decision to continue.

14. Some short time later, we encountered some slush on the minor road near West Grimstead and I assumed this to be the hazard which had been reported. I was not aware of any further problem until I heard a radio transmission saying 'Convoy Accident'. At this time I was in the Transit behind the 4 Truck Cargo Heavy Duty load carriers and the Fire Tender.

15. My Transit vehicle stopped and I saw the third Truck Cargo Heavy Duty lying on its side in a field to the north of the road and the fourth Truck Cargo Heavy Duty was slowed across the road behind

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it, with the cab suspended over the ditch on the north side of the road.

1 WITNESS 11

2 WITNESS 10

16. I instructed the convoy to stop and I informed all convoy callsigns over the radio of what had occurred. I noted that the Convoy Safety Officer, Flying Officer [REDACTED] was at the scene of the toppled vehicle and also I noted that fire personnel were attending that vehicle. There was no evidence of fire. I also noted that the security forces under the direction of the Stand Off Escort Commander, Lieutenant [REDACTED] (RM), were reacting and traffic control was in operation.

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17. Within 10 minutes, I was satisfied that the situation was stable and that the security situation was under control. During that time, I was advised that there were no injuries sustained by the personnel involved.

18. I took reporting action in accordance with Convoy Operating Procedures and RAFASUPU Task Control were advised of the occurrence at 1600 hours.

19. At no time were any classified documents lost or compromised.

20. Having read the foregoing statement, I wish to clarify the position of the slush referred to in paragraph 14 in relation to the accident site. The slush was some $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles before the accident site and the road conditions appeared reasonable to me up to the time I received the accident call.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Can you tell the Board the road conditions at the precise scene of the accident?

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Answer: No. The Standard Operating Procedures require me to retire some way from the scene of the accident to set up a Command Post.

Question: Can you give an estimate of the damage to farm property after the accident site had been cleared?

Answer: There was some damage to an intermittent and poor quality hedge over a total distance of some 30 yards and no apparent damage to the field.

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Fourth
Witness

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Royal Air Force Police, Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a member of the RAFASUPU [REDACTED] and have been employed on these duties since January 1984.

2. I was detailed to act as the NCO IC [REDACTED] for Movement Order No 419.

3. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was responsible for [REDACTED] and at a point some $\frac{1}{4}$ mile past West Grimstead, I encountered some slush on the road, which extended for approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ mile and the road then became clear. I encountered no further adverse conditions between this point and the convoy destination.

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4. I then returned to the junction with the A36, by the same route and reported the slush to be Escort Commander. At this time the convoy had not arrived at the junction and did not pass me until a short time later.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: At any point between the A36 and the convoy destination, did you notice any severe road surface icing?

Answer: No.

17

Fifth
Witness

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) Royal Air Force Police, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am employed on convoy support duties at RAFASUPU and have been so employed since August 1985. I successfully passed the Civil Police Advanced Motorcycle Course in March 1986.
2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was the motor-cyclist in the lead over the section of road where the accident occurred. On this section, roads were not good. There were patches of slush and I suspected that there was black ice. However, travelling at 20 to 25 mph and keeping within the tracks of previous vehicles, I did not have any particular problems with the handling of my motorcycle.
3. I saw an oncoming civilian car, to which I gave a hand signal to slow down, but I did not stop. About a minute or a minute and a half later, I heard the Convoy Accident transmission.

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Sixth
Witness

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) Royal Air Force Fireman, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am employed on convoy fire duties at RAFASUPU and I have been so employed on these duties since April 1978.
2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was the NCO IC Fire Crew on the convoy. At the time the accident occurred, I was in the Convoy Fire Tender, which was travelling immediately behind the last Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD). I saw the last but one TCHD attempting to negotiate a stationary on-coming vehicle, which was a civilian car. We were travelling at 5 to 10 mph and I estimate that the TCHD was travelling at a

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similar speed or less. There did not appear to be any problem until, suddenly, the TCHD toppled very slowly off the road onto its left hand side. The last TCHD braked sharply and slewed across the road. Our vehicle also slipped as it came to a halt.

3. I jumped down from the cab and only then did I realise how slippery conditions were under foot. In fact, I shouted to the Convoy Safety Officer, who was just ahead of me, 'Take it easy Sir'.

4. I ran to the toppled TCHD and checked that the fuel tank was not ruptured and that there was no other fire hazard.

Seventh Witness

Corporal [Redacted] ([Redacted]) Royal Air Force Police, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am employed as a Royal Air Force Policeman at RAFASUPU and have been so employed since 13 January 1986.

2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was acting as the Vehicle Escort in Truck Cargo Heavy Duty, Vehicle registration mark 30 AJ 84, driven by SAC [Redacted].

3. A couple of minutes before the accident to our vehicle occurred, I remarked to SAC [Redacted] that I was detailed to ride a motorcycle the next day and I was not looking forward to it if the conditions were similar to those we were travelling on at that time.

4. As we approached the point at which the accident occurred, SAC [Redacted] had slowed down due to the condition of the road and because we had been warned of an oncoming vehicle. As we approached the on-coming vehicle, I noticed that it was a car and was stationary, but some 1 to 4 1/2 feet from its nearside verge.

5. We continued to move forward to pass the car and I estimate our speed to have been 5 mph. We had just got level with the front of the car, when I felt our vehicle slide to the left, so that the nearside wheels were off the metalled surface of the road. As we continued forward, SAC [Redacted] said 'I can't hold it' and the vehicle slowly toppled to the left and came to rest on its left hand side. As the vehicle came to rest, I fell to the side and banged my head on the side of the cab. I have suffered from a headache since the accident and have reported sick at Royal Air Force Wittering. The Medical Officer told me that I might be suffering from slight concussion.

X WITNESS 12

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Eighth
Witness

Corporal [Redacted] ([Redacted]) Royal
Air Force Police, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit,
Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a Royal Air Force Policeman on RAFASUPU and I have been employed on convoy security duties since November 1986.
2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was acting as the Vehicle Escort in Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Vehicle Registration Mark 81 AE 13, driven by SAC [Redacted]. We were the last of the 4 load carriers in the convoy.
3. After we turned off the A36, apart from hearing the message about slush on the road, I was not aware that my driver was having any problems. At the time of the accident, when the TCHD in front of us toppled off the road, we were about 30 metres behind it and a black civilian car was between us and the other TCHD.
4. We were travelling at walking pace and I could see a car which was stationary on the opposite side of the road in front of us. As the TCHD in front of us approached this car, the car appeared to move and then stop again further from its nearside verge. The TCHD appeared to move slightly more to the left to pass the car. I then saw it slide to its left and gently topple over and come to rest on its side.
5. I reached for the radio to report the accident, when I saw the civilian car in front of us brake and slide slightly. At the same time, I realised that our vehicle was sliding to the left and it came to rest at an angle to the road; with the left front corner buried in the hedgerow. Before I could report it, I heard Cpl [Redacted] report a Convoy Accident. I was completely uninjured in the accident and remained on duty in the vehicle.

1 WITNESS 13

2 WITNESS 7

Ninth
Witness

Flight Lieutenant [Redacted] ([Redacted]) Security
(Provost) Branch of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit,
Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am the Escort Commander at RAFASUPU and have held this post since October 1986.
2. On Saturday, 10 January 1987, I was Escort Commander for the convoy, travelling in the leading Ford Transit of [Redacted]. A few minutes before we reached our exit junction on the A36, I received a radio message from [Redacted] warning me that there was slush on the unclassified road leading to our destination.
3. After leaving the A36, we proceeded along the unclassified road and encountered a small and intermittent amount of slush about one kilometer east of West Grimstead. I then passed

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a message to the convoy, warning of the presence of this slush. During this time, we were having problems in communicating with our destination and I was not aware of any further problems with the driving conditions. The next thing I heard was a Convoy Accident radio message, which I logged at 1545 hours.

4. I immediately took the appropriate emergency actions in accordance with Convoy Operating Procedures, including informing the Civil, and Ministry of Defence Police at our destination, that a Road Traffic Accident, involving a convoy, had occurred and requesting the assistance of the Civil Police in controlling traffic.

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Tenth
Witness

Second Lieutenant [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) Royal Marines, of Comacchio Group, Royal Marines Condor, having been duly sworn, states:

1. For the period of the convoy, I was detached to Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, under the command of OC RAFASUPU.
2. On Saturday, 10 January 1987, I was the Stand+Off+Escort Commander for the convoy. When the convoy turned off the A36, my vehicle was to the rear of the 4 load carrying vehicles, in its correct convoy position. During the rest of the journey, up to the time of the accident, I was not aware of any unduly adverse road conditions. I did, however, hear the Escort Commander's transmission concerning the slush on the road.
3. When I heard the Convoy Accident transmission, I immediately leapt from my vehicle to proceed with establishing the Security Cordon. I also sent the Convoy Medical Attendant forward.

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Eleventh
Witness

Flying Officer [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Engineer Branch, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a Convoy Safety Officer at RAFASUPU and have held that post since June 1984.
2. On Wednesday 7 January 1987, after Squadron Leader [REDACTED] had given his Convoy Commander's briefing, I then gave all convoy personnel the official Safety Brief. I was present throughout the whole of Movement Order No 419, up to the time of the accident.

X WITNESS 3

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3. Although I am not formally required to monitor the rest periods of the drivers, I do concern myself with these matters and therefore I am able to say, with confidence, that the 2 drivers of the accident vehicles received adequate rest throughout the whole period of Movement Order 419. In particular, on the Friday night before the accident, they both had adequate rest. I saw them on the Saturday morning and can confirm that they were rested and fit. SAC [Redacted] is known to me as a non-drinker and SAC [Redacted]² is a responsible airman, with very moderate habits.

4. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was travelling in the Convoy Fire Tender, immediately behind the last of the 4 Trucks Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD). As far as I was concerned, nothing of particular note occurred up to the time of the accident. I was first made aware of the accident by the Convoy Accident transmission. Virtually at the same time I saw the TCHD ahead of us slewing across the road and, although my view was obstructed, I was aware of the one in front of that toppling into the field. Our vehicle slithered to a stop and I jumped out.

5. I had trouble keeping my feet on the treacherous road surface and I went forward to what I judged to be the more serious accident, the vehicle lying on its side.

1 WITNESS 12

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6. I ordered Corporal [Redacted]³, my Fire NCO, to attend to possible fire risks. Almost at this point, the Convoy Fire Tender arrived. On moving round to the front of the vehicle, I noticed that Corporal [Redacted]⁴, the Escort, was in an agitated state and still inside the cab, whilst the driver was outside and uninjured. I made arrangements for Corporal [Redacted]⁴ to be helped from the cab as soon as possible. I ensured that the engine of the vehicle, which was still running at this time, was shut off and the condition of the vehicle was stable. I then directed the MT Fitter and spare driver from the Convoy Support Vehicle to attend to the batteries, which were leaking.

2 WITNESS 13

3 WITNESS 6

4 WITNESS 7

7. I ensured that the vehicle cab had been cleared of personnel and I left Corporal [Redacted]³ to maintain a fire watch on the vehicle.

8. I then went to the second vehicle and there appeared to be no hazards and the personnel were uninjured.

9. I now present 4 Polaroid photographs, which I took with the convoy camera, taken approximately 1/2 hour after the accident. (Exhibit B).

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Twelvth
Witness

Senior Aircraftman

Mechanical Transport Driver of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a Mechanical Transport Driver at RAFASUPU and have been so employed since August 1986. I have completed 4 previous convoys driving a Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD).
2. On Movement Order No 419, I was tasked as the driver of TCHD Vehicle Registration Mark 30 AJ 84. I was fully briefed before starting the Movement Order and at no time did I have any problems understanding my instructions. At each night halt, I was allocated comfortable accommodation and received adequate rest. This was particularly so on the night 9/10 January 1987. I did not consume any alcohol that night and I slept soundly and awoke refreshed. I had a full breakfast in the hotel before leaving for duty. I was fully fit up until the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, I had been on duty for about 7 hours. I had only driven for less than 2 hours in total prior to the accident. I had a meal at lunch time and most of the rest of the time I spent sitting in my vehicle waiting. I wasn't in any way frustrated by the waiting and at the time of the accident I was in a perfectly normal state of mind. The convoy that day proceeded in a perfectly normal way.

1 WITNESS 7

3. We turned off the main dual carriageway onto a country road. After some time on this road, we encountered some slush, of which we had been previously warned. The slush was in thin and intermittent patches and had no effect on the handling of my vehicle. At some stage, Corporal [redacted], my escort, said to me 'I wouldn't like to drive my motorcycle in these conditions'. In common with other members of the convoy, I received a warning of an on-coming vehicle. We were approaching a hump in the road, on a bend and I could not see the TCHD in front. I slowed to between 15 and 20 mph, by braking and changing gear and did not notice any handling problems. I then saw that the on-coming vehicle, a private car which was stationary, although not fully pulled into its nearside, appeared to have left sufficient room for me to pass it. I estimate this car could have pulled a further one to 1 1/2

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feet to its nearside. I lined up my vehicle to pass the car, decelerating under control, so that as the front of my vehicle reached the front of the car, I estimate my speed to have been 5 mph. At this point, I felt the front of the vehicle slide towards the nearside, still moving forwards. This drew my attention to the pronounced camber on the road and I realised I was on ice.

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4. In view of this, I avoided violent corrective actions, I did not brake or yank the wheel to the right. I maintained a firm pressure to the right on the steering, hoping that the nearside front wheel would grip on the verge and enable me to regain my original course. However, the vehicle continued to move forwards, at the same time toppling over onto its left hand side. As the vehicle fully landed on its side, we stopped moving forward.

5. Corporal [redacted]¹ asked me to get out first and I did so through the roof hatch. Flying Officer [redacted]² ordered me to get back into the cab and switch off the engine, which was still running, which I did. The Fire Crew then assisted myself and Corporal [redacted] to leave the cab via the drivers door. I was totally uninjured, but Corporal [redacted] had hit his head on the side window. He appeared shaken and disorientated and he received immediate medical attention from the Convoy Medical Attendant. Some 2 hours after the accident, I was seen by a Medical Officer from Royal Air Force Lyneham, who told me I was perfectly fit. At no stage did I feel that I had suffered any effects of shock. I assisted Corporal [redacted]³, then Convoy NCO IC MF, to complete the FMP 3 (Accident Report) and I started a statement, which I completed after I returned to base.

1 WITNESS 7
2 WITNESS 11
3 WITNESS 16

Questioned by the Board:

Question: At any time during your approach to the stationary car, did you see it move?

Answer: No.

Question: What maintenance was carried out on your
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vehicle on the day of the accident?

Answer: I carried out my normal Daily Inspection that morning and a tyre condition check was carried out at the 10 mile check.

Question: At any stage, during the course of Movement Order 419, had you any problems with the vehicle handling?

Answer: I have never driven this particular vehicle before and each TCHD has its own characteristics. After I had got used to the characteristics of this vehicle, after about 10 miles driving on Wednesday 7 January 1987, I had no further problems at any time.

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Question: What class of driving license do you hold?

Answer: Heavy Goods Vehicle Class 1, although TCHD is only a Class 2 vehicle.

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Thirteenth
Witness

Senior Aircraftman [REDACTED] ([REDACTED])
Mechanical Transport Driver, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am employed as a Mechanical Transport Driver on RAFASUPU and have been so employed since April 1986. I have been driving Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) since then, but I had a break of 4 months due to a joint infection in my ankle and I returned to TCHD driving some 2 months ago. I hold a Heavy Goods Vehicle Class 1 license and have completed 4 previous convoys driving TCHD.

2. On Movement Order No 419, I was tasked as the driver of TCHD, Vehicle Registration Mark 81 AE 13. I was fully briefed before starting the Movement Order and at no time did I have any problems understanding my instructions. At each night halt I was allocated comfortable accommodation and received adequate rest. On the night of Friday 9 January 1987, I consumed 2 pints of beer whilst having a meal and went to bed at about 2300 hours. I had a good sleep and awoke refreshed. I had a full breakfast and I was fully fit when I reported for work. At the time of the accident, I was still fully fit. I had been on duty for about 7 hours at the time of the accident, of which only 2 hours had been actual driving time. I had a lunchtime break and meal and most of the rest of the time was spent sitting in my vehicle waiting.

3. As we were driving along the country road, having turned off the dual carriageway, I was following TCHD 30 AJ 84. I had heard a call warning of an on-coming vehicle and a little later I saw the TCHD, then some 50 metres ahead of me, clearly slowing down and attempting to negotiate past a stationary on-coming vehicle. There seemed to be no problem until suddenly the vehicle started to topple sideways to its left. At this point I had slowed to 5 mph and I applied the brakes and to my surprise, my vehicle slithered to the left and my nearside front wheel became embedded in the soft verge and I then realised that there was ice on the road. Up to that point I had had no problems

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in handling my vehicle and during the whole of the Movement Order, my vehicle handled perfectly normally.

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4. I was completely uninjured, as was my escort Corporal [REDACTED] and I remained on duty guarding my vehicle.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: What maintenance was carried out on your vehicle on the day of the accident?

Answer: A full Daily Inspection and the tyres were checked on the 10 mile check.

30

Fourteenth
Witness 8

Warrant Officer [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Mechanical Transport Technician of Royal Air Force Brampton, parented by Royal Air Force Uxbridge, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am the MT Assessor No 3, stationed at Royal Air Force Brampton and I am responsible for the Eastern District, which includes RAFASUPU at Royal Air Force Wittering. I have held this post since September 1983 and I have previously been involved in damage assessments for Trucks Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD).
2. On Monday 12 January 1987, I was detailed to carry out a damage assessment on the TCHDs, Vehicle Registration Marks 81 AE 13 and 30 AJ 84, which had been involved in accidents on 10 January 1987.
3. On Tuesday 13 January 1987, I inspected TCHD 81 AE 13 and considered that there was no damage to this vehicle, but decided that it was prudent that a check of the left hand front wheel station and the steering geometry was carried out on return to base. I was satisfied that the vehicle was roadworthy and could be driven back to base, therefore I did not raise a damage assessment sheet.
4. I then inspected TCHD 30 AJ 84 and found the damage which I have listed on the Estimate Sheet, AFG 1084B, MT Assessor Task No O31 of 1987. I now present this estimate sheet (Exhibit C).
5. Due to the weather conditions and lack of serviceable batteries, I was unable to run the engine and I cannot therefore state whether it is serviceable or not. My damage assessment does not include an allowance for replacement of the engine if it has been damaged.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: When you carried out the assessment of the vehicles, did you examine them

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for signs of defects in the brakes, steering and front suspension, which may have been present before the

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accidents?

Answer: Yes I did. During the inspections I found no visible defects in those systems, but I was unable to carry out functional tests on the brakes of either vehicle.

Question: What will happen to TCHD 30 AJ 84?

Answer: I have arranged through Contract Repair Branch at Arborfield for the repair of the vehicle by Glover Webb Ltd and for RAFASUPU to be responsible for towing the vehicle to the Contractors.

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Fifteenth
Witness

Senior Aircraftman [REDACTED] ([REDACTED])
Mechanical Transport Driver of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am an MTD at RAFASUPU and have been so employed since June 1983.
2. I was tasked as the driver of the second Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) on Movement Order No 419 and this is the position I took up for the journey on Saturday 10 January 1987. After turning off the A36, driving along the country road, I did not experience any problems in handling my vehicle. I noted that the road had patches of thin slush in places, of which we had been previously warned. In many places the road is so narrow that it is necessary to reduce speed to 5 to 10 mph when passing oncoming traffic.
3. The first I knew of the accident was when I saw, in my nearside mirror, the next TCHD toppling onto its side. At this time I was some 30 to 40 metres in front and I had just passed an on-coming stationary private car. I did this without undue difficulty and I noted as I passed the car it moved forward. I also noted that in this area there was ice on the road. I cannot estimate how far forward the car moved, but I am sure it did move.

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Questioned by the Board:

Question: Roughly over the 200 metres which covered the accident site, had you noted any problem in discerning where the metalled road ended and the verge began?

Answer: No, I could reasonably clearly see where the edge of the metalled road was.

Question: At any stage of your drive along the country road, had you found it necessary to put your nearside wheels onto the verge in order to avoid

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on-coming traffic?

Answer: No.

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Sixteenth
Witness

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Mechanical Transport Driver of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am an MTD at RAFASUPU and I regularly act as NCO IC convoy drivers. I have carried out these duties since July 1984.
2. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I was driving the Convoy Support Vehicle as part of Movement Order No 419. I was the last but one vehicle in the convoy and as is the normal procedure, we were some 2 miles behind the Trucks Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD).
3. Just before we turned off the A36 onto the minor road, we were notified of the accident by the Convoy Commander. I immediately switched on my emergency blue light and I drove as fast as possible towards the scene of the accident. During this time, I did not experience any problems in handling the vehicle. I stopped at the Royal Marine Cordon Roadblock and shortly afterwards, I was called forward by the Convoy Safety Officer, in company with the Convoy Fitter. On arrival, we were instructed to disconnect the batteries on both TCHDs. I noticed when we arrived, that the road surface was very icy at the scene of the accident.
4. Some hours later, I assisted the 2 drivers to complete the FMT 3s and statements.

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Third
Witness
(Recalled)

Squadron Leader [redacted] ([redacted]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Did your Convoy Commander's Brief prior to Movement Order No 419 include any instructions with regard to weather?

Answer: No. This is not normal procedure, unless there was some extraordinary known weather conditions imminent.

Question: During the course of the Movement Order, what daily checks do you make on weather conditions?

Answer: I am required by Convoy Operating Procedures, Annex A to Chapter 5, to contact Task Control prior to leaving. During this contact, the question of weather is invariably discussed. I can confirm that this was the case prior to departure on this occasion. I present a copy of the relevant instruction (Exhibit D).

Question: Do you make a distinction between weather conditions and road conditions?

Answer: Yes. It is recognised, however, that the 2 are often complementary.

Question: Since weather forecasts do not always cover actual road conditions, how do you address the specific question of road conditions?

Answer: If there was any doubt in my mind, I would ensure that specific checks on road conditions were made, as far as is possible, either by Task Control or by the Convoy Escort Commander, or both.

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Question: Did you have any concerns in this regard on Saturday 10 January 1987?

Answer: No.

Question: If you had been so concerned about the weather and road conditions on your planned route that day, prior to departure, are you authorised to postpone the convoy?

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Answer: Yes. I would communicate my decision to Task Control. However, they could override my decision, should they wish to, with the authority of OC RAFASUPU. Co-incidentally, on the morning of 8 January 1987, during the same Movement Order, I had postponed the convoy's departure from another location because of ice on the road at our departure point. I arranged for the ice to be treated and only after it had thawed, did I authorise the departure of the convoy.

Question: If during a convoy, you became unhappy about conditions ahead, what would you do?

Answer: I would stop the convoy, take time to fully appraise the situation; consider my options; inform Task Control at RAFASUPU of my intentions. I have the authority to direct the convoy up to 5 miles from a planned route, but circumstances permitting, I would seek Task Control's approval. Longer diversions require their prior authority. I present the extract from my orders (Exhibit E).

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Question: When was the route, used on the 10 January 1987 journey, chosen and by whom?

Answer: Sometime before 7 January 1987 by Task Control.

Question: Were you given a planned alternative route for that days journey in the Movement Order?

Answer: No. This is not normally done unless there is an exceptional reason.

Question: How did you satisfy yourself that you were setting out on an approved route on 10 January 1987?

Answer: I accept that a route given to me by Task Control in the Movement Order is fully approved.

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Seventeenth
Witness

Wing Commander [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) Engineer
Branch of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit, Royal Air
Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am the Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Armament
Support Unit and have held that post since December 1983.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Were you on duty and aware of the convoys
progress on Saturday 10 January 1987?

Answer: I was in my house and I had instructed
Task Control to keep me informed of the
progress of the convoy.

Question: Were you at any time made aware of any
problems with the operation of that convoy?

Answer: I had been notified periodically throughout
Saturday 10 January 1987 of the satisfact-
ory progress of the convoy, until I
received a telephone call at 1602 hours
Zulu, informing me of the convoy accident.

Question: Are you the authority for changes to
planned routes, once the Movement Order
has started?

Answer: I have the authority for a deviation of
up to 5 miles, which I delegate to the
Convoy Commander. For diversions of
greater length, I would seek the formal
approval of Weapon Engineering 3(RAF) at
the Ministry of Defence.

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Question: Who is the authority for approving
pre-authorized routes?

Answer: Command Provost and Security Officer
at Headquarters Royal Air Force Support
Command.

Question: Are you the authority for Convoy Operating
Procedures?

Answer: Yes, I publish the Convoy Operating
Procedures under the provisions of QR 64(2)
and I present a copy of the Preface to
the current Orders (Exhibit F). As Unit
Orders, I publish them under my own authority.

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Eighteenth
Witness

Flight Lieutenant [Redacted] ([Redacted])
Supply Branch of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit,
Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn states:

1. I am the Officer Commanding M M Flight at RAFASUPU and I have held this post since October 1985.
2. I was the officer responsible for planning Movement Order No 419. I did not actually preface the plan, but I checked it thoroughly and authorised it. In particular, I personally authorised the route used on Saturday 10 January 1987. This had been chosen by my Flight Sergeant on the basis of previous frequency of use. The choice of this route had no other consideration. This route is known as Route 44. I was the Task Control Officer on duty at all times when the convoy involved in Movement Order No 419 was on the road. On Saturday 10 January 1987, I came on duty at 0915 hours. At 0921 hours, I received a call from the Convoy Commander. This was a routine call, during the course of which we discussed weather and road conditions. I present the relevant pages of my log which records the information I received from Weather line, which I conveyed to the Convoy Commander at 1032 hours, but we did not discuss the weather or the state of the roads.
3. I received a call, from the Convoy Safety Officer at 1325 hours in which the weather was discussed. He advised me that there were a few snow flurries in his immediate area. I asked him if it was going to have any effect on the convoy's departure and he said 'No'. I had no other conversations with any convoy personnel on the subject of weather or road conditions prior to the accident. We monitored the hourly weather forecasts on the radio and there were no significant changes from the information previously exchanged. Based on the information available to me, I had no reason to suspect that there were any particularly adverse weather or road conditions on the route of the convoy that day.
4. As Task Control Officer, I would not have authorised

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any significant change to any aspect of the authorised Movement Order, without reference to the Ministry of Defence, Weapon Engineering 3 (RAF).

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Were any alternate routes planned for Movement Order No 419?

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~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

[Redacted]

Answer: It is not normal to plan alternate routes, because my understanding of the policy is, that it could lead to confusion with the Special Safety Organisation and the Civilian Police. In addition, there would be a logistic problem in the transportation of additional route maps. It could also lead to confusion within our own convoy personnel.

Question: Did you make a call on Saturday 10 January 1987, to the convoy destination, to ascertain their weather and road conditions?

Answer: No. There is no formal requirement that I know of for me to do this. We do sometimes do this, however I saw no reason to do it on this occasion.

42

Nineteenth
Witness

Flight Lieutenant [Redacted] ([Redacted])
Medical Officer of Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am a Unit Medical Officer at Royal Air Force Wittering and have been so employed since February 1986.
2. On the afternoon of Monday 12 January 1987, I saw Corporal [Redacted] who had reported sick complaining of a headache. He told me that he had had the headache since he was involved in the accident on Saturday 10 January 1987.
3. I examined Corporal [Redacted] and concluded that his headache was precipitated by the accident and that it was due to a simple injury to the head of which there were no physical signs. He was prescribed a simple analgesic and returned to duty. He was also given a standard head injury warning, which is normal in these circumstances.

WITNESS 7

Questioned by the Board:

Question: In your opinion, will this simple injury to the head be the exciting course of later disability?

Answer: In my opinion it is unlikely.

43

Ninth
Witness
(Recalled)

Flight Lieutenant [Redacted] ([Redacted]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: What are the orders for [Redacted] close to the destination?

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~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

[Redacted] 17/2/87

Answer: I present the relevant section of Convoy Operating Procedures, Convoy Standing Temporary Instruction Number 7 subparagraph 1g. (Exhibit H).

Question: In respect of Saturday 10 January 1987 did you alter or supplement in any way these instructions?

Answer: No.

44

Twentieth
Witness

Warrant Officer [Redacted] ([Redacted]),
Mechanical Transport Technician, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit (RAFASUPU), Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am the Mechanical Transport Officer at RAFASUPU and have held that post since 15 September 1986.
2. I confirm that I have inspected the documentation for TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) and TCHD (VRM 81 AE 13) and confirm that both vehicles have been correctly serviced at the appropriate frequencies and that neither vehicle was overdue for any servicing at the time of the accident. I produce to the Board the documents in confirmation of this statement. In as far as I can be I am satisfied that both vehicles were fully serviceable at the time of the accident.
3. I produce the records for SAC [Redacted]¹ and SAC [Redacted]² showing the currency of their Heavygoods and County Council licences, in addition to their MT Drivers Permits.

1 WITNESS 12
2 WITNESS 13

45

Third
Witness
(Recalled)

Squadron Leader [Redacted] ([Redacted]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Is it normal to travel in wintry conditions?

Answer: Yes. The presence of snow itself would not necessarily prevent a convoy's departure providing black top conditions had been assured along the route, and, that all the usual sources of road travel information indicated that conditions were satisfactory.

Question: Do you have, as a Convoy Commander, a published set of guidelines in your orders regarding weather.

Answer: No.

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~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

SECRET & TRUE COPY

[Redacted]

Question: Is the Board correct in thinking that a Convoy Commanders judgements on weather are based on personal experience and the advice of Task Control.

Answer: Yes, and a Convoy Commander would also consult the Convoy Safety Officer and Escort Commander before making his decision.

Question: In respect of your decisions and actions on Saturday 10 January 1987 do you, with hindsight, consider that there is anything that you could have done which would have avoided the accident.

Answer: No. I have obviously thought about this and discussed the matter with other Convoy Executives since the accident and I am satisfied that all my decisions and actions were correct.

46

Third
Witness
(Recalled)

Squadron Leader [Redacted] ([Redacted]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Immediately after the accident were you satisfied that you had all the supporting equipment and facilities.

Answer: Yes. For the initial actions in response to the accident I had sufficient fire rescue, first aid and security equipment and facilities.

Question: Can you think of any additional equipment or facilities which could be added to the Convoy inventory which would be useful in similar circumstances?

Answer: No, but we did at times have problems with radio communications. This has been reported to the appropriate authorities.

Question: Can you produce your Convoy Commanders Orders?

Answer: Yes. I produce Convoy Operating Procedures which are published under the authority of OC RAFASUPU. These contain all the orders for all convoy personnel under normal and emergency circumstances.

47

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~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

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[REDACTED] 17/08

Third
Witness:
(Recalled)

Squadron Leader [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) recalled on his former oath, states:

1. I present to the Board the video tape taken from my vehicle which records visually the events leading up to the accident. (Exhibit J).

48

Eighteenth
Witness
(Recalled)

Flight Lieutenant [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Can you produce the document which authorises route 44 as an approved route.

Answer: No because the relevant part of the RAFASUPU file was Put Away and has since been destroyed; the original authorising documents were lost in a recent fire at Headquarters Royal Air Force Support Command. No copies of the authorising document were held by any other formation.

Question: Can you quote the relevant regulation governing weather checks.

Answer: Yes. SD 814, 3rd Edition, Part F, Leaflet F4 paragraph 14 states: "The following factors are to be borne in mind; Road Condition Reports from Civil Police Traffic Departments, motoring organisations, radio and other sources are to be studied prior to and during movement".

49

Sixteenth
Witness
(Recalled)

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Can you now present the Form MT3 and drivers statements to the Board?

Answer: Yes, I now present the original copies of the Form MT3, completed shortly after the accident. In addition the statements of the 2 TCHD drivers. (Exhibit K&L)

50

Sixteenth
Witness
(Recalled)

Corporal [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) recalled on his former oath, states:

Question: Can you now produce the RAF Form 658A authorising the journey to take place on 10 January 1987.

Answer: Yes. I present the RAF Forms 658A for TCHDs (VRM 30 AJ 84) and (VRM 81 AE 13). (Exhibit M).

Second
Witness
(recalled)

Inspector , having been recalled on his previous oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Will you amplify the answer to the last question?

Answer: The weather conditions locally were icy and I know that the road from West Grimstead is particularly prone to icing, although I had no specific knowledge of the state of that stretch of road on the day in question. I also know that as the road in question is in Wiltshire, the Wiltshire County Council are notorious in this area for failing to grit the minor roads.

Question: Knowing that a convoy was due, why did you not contact Task Control and advise them of the state of the road.

Answer: I was not advised of the route the convoy was taking and when I heard that an accident had occurred and where it was, in company with many people at Dean Hill, I was very surprised, as this road had never previously been used in my experience and the question of informing Task Control never arose. They have always arrived from the direction of Romsey and that is a more feasible route and a better road. In addition, I am familiar with the make-up of a convoy and I assumed that unless I was specifically asked, the convoy personnel would be aware of the condition of the route they were travelling on.

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CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT

1. On the afternoon of Saturday 10 January 1987 the convoy was heading north on the A36 trunk road approaching the junction with the unclassified road leading to West Grimstead and West Dean. Before the junction a report was received from the Convoy [redacted] (Cpl [redacted]) that there was slush on the unclassified road. Up to this point the road conditions had been completely clear.

1 WITNESS 4

2. The convoy turned on to the unclassified road and shortly after passing West Grimstead some intermittent thin slush was encountered. This slush did not affect the handling of the vehicles, as recorded by several witnesses. Some further way down the road the Escort Commander (Flt Lt [redacted]) warned the convoy of an on-coming vehicle.

2 WITNESS 9

3. The driver (SAC [redacted]), of the second TCHD saw the on-coming stationary car ahead of him. He adjusted his position on the road and decelerated to approximately 10 mph. He passed the vehicle without difficulty and as he did so he noted that the vehicle moved off.

3 WITNESS 15

4. When the driver (SAC [redacted]) of the third TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) saw the vehicle it was stationary approximately one to one and half feet from the verge, as confirmed by Cpl [redacted]. There was still sufficient space to pass as can be seen from Exhibit J. He slowed down to an estimated 5 mph and as the front of his vehicle reached the front of the car the TCHD slid toward the nearside still moving forward. The nearside wheels ran onto the verge which gave way and the vehicle toppled to its left coming to a halt on its side in a field 3 feet below the level of the road. This was confirmed by SAC [redacted] and Cpl [redacted].

4 WITNESS 12

5 WITNESS 7

6 WITNESS 13

5. The driver, SAC [redacted], of the fourth TCHD (VRM 81 AE 13) saw the TCHD some 50m in front slowing down to negotiate the stationary vehicle, and slowed in order to pass by in his own turn. At the point where he saw the TCHD in front start to topple sideways he had slowed to 5 mph. He braked and his vehicle slid to the left coming to rest with its nearside front wheel embedded in the soft verge.

7 WITNESS 8

6. From the evidence of several convoy personnel who disembarked from their vehicles on this stretch of road it is clear that there was severe icing. In addition, the camber at the accident site is pronounced and the verge is soft.

CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS

7. The Board considers that the cause of the accident

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involving the third TCHD was a combination of slow forward speed, the camber of the road, and ice. The contributory factors were the position of the on-coming stationary car and the soft verge. On the other hand the cause of the accident to the fourth TCHD was solely ice on the road. The contributory factor was the accident which occurred immediately in front of this vehicle.

INJURIES CAUSED AND FUTURE EFFECTS

- 1 WITNESS 7 8. The only injury noted during the 2 accidents was sustained by the Escort Cpl [REDACTED] in the third TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84). When the vehicle rolled over on to its side he hit his head on the nearside window superstructure. He also suffered from shock. Cpl [REDACTED] was medically examined by Flt Lt [REDACTED] Medical Officer at RAF Wittering, who prescribed an analgesic to relieve his headache.
- 2 WITNESS 19 9. The Board considers that the injury to Cpl [REDACTED] is unlikely to be the exciting cause of later disability.

CONSIDERATIONS OF DRIVER FATIGUE

- 3 WITNESS 12 10. Movement Order 419 started on the morning of 7 January 1987 and during the 3 days prior to the accident the drivers never had less than 15 hours rest and indeed had 16 1/2 hours rest prior to duty on 10 January 1987. They were accommodated in good conditions each night. On the Friday night SAC [REDACTED] consumed no alcohol, and SAC [REDACTED] consumed 2 pints of beer with his evening meal. On the day of 10 January 1987 both drivers had a full breakfast and lunch and drove for only 2 hours or less out of their 7 hours duty.
- 4 WITNESS 13 11. Movement Order 419 was the authority for the drivers to be on duty.
- 5 WITNESS 14 12. The Board accepts both drivers were fully fit for their duty at the time of the accident.

PERSONNEL ON DUTY

13. The Board is satisfied that all personnel who were involved in Movement Order 419 were on duty prior to the accident.

THE STATE OF VEHICLE SERVICEABILITY

14. Both TCHDs (VRM 30 AJ 84 and 81 AE 13) had received their correct periodic maintenance and would have completed this Movement Order before being due their next lubrication maintenance. The damage assessor WO [REDACTED] 5 ([REDACTED]) could not see any signs of defects other than those caused by the accident in either vehicle, from his visual inspection.

.....President
.....Members

TO BE USED FOR FINDINGS ONLY

15. The Board are satisfied that both vehicles were fully maintained in accordance with current procedures and the Board believes that the vehicles were serviceable at the time of the accident.

AUTHORISATION OF ROUTE AND DRIVERS

16. The route used on Movement Order 419 was Route 44. This route is well documented at RAFASUPU but during the Board's proceedings it has not been possible to produce the actual authorisation by HQRAFSC. The Board understands this to be due to a recent fire at HQRAFSC and the destruction of the relevant P/A files at RAFASUPU. However the Board is satisfied that Route 44 had been correctly authorised.

17. The drivers both hold current Service and civilian licences.

EXAMINATION OF ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

18. All of the relevant Ministry of Defence and Command Orders and Instructions pertinent to the operation of convoys are extracted and published under the authority of OC RAFASUPU, who supplements them with his own detailed instructions, in a document called Convoy Operating Procedures. The Board had inspected this document and is satisfied that the instructions were complied with. In 4 cases excerpts have been presented to the Board and they are appended at Exhibits D, E, F, H.

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

19. The Board found that AP 3086 Chapter 3 paragraph 3056 was not appropriate. (Loss of Classified Documents).

SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

20. The Board is satisfied that the supporting equipment and the facilities available to the convoy were satisfactory for the initial post accident actions and responses.

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO SERVICE/CIVILIAN PROPERTY

21. As a direct result of the accident TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) suffered damage to the softer parts of the vehicle estimated to cost £1653. Wheel tracking, suspension and braking could not be operationally checked. However, the engine, which had lost 4½ gallons of oil by the time it was examined, could not be run or checked for internal damage. TCHD (VRM 81 AE 13) did not appear to have suffered any damage at all and was considered drivable, although functional checks would have to be carried out prior to the vehicle being used operationally.

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..... Members

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22. As a result of TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84) leaving the road and its subsequent recovery some 30 yds of poor hedging were removed.

23. The Board accepts the advice of the assessor. On sensitivity considerations the Board has not pursued the question of damage to private property. However, from the Board's experience at the site of the accident the Board consider that if any claim is made on the Crown it should be very small.

DISCUSSION

24. The combination of circumstances that have been determined as the cause of the accident might conceivably have been foreseen, but the fact that they were not cannot be attributed to negligence on the part of any individual. Having said that, there are clearly organisational matters which can be addressed to avoid such an accident in the future. The weather information available to RAFASUPU Task Control and the Convoy Commander did not indicate any route problem, nor during the journey up to the time of the accident did any of the convoy personnel report conditions which would have caused the convoy to stop. However, according to the second witness there was information that there was ice on the road in the vicinity of the accident site. In future this sort of local knowledge information at destinations should be more routinely utilised.

25. No member of the convoy had a clear awareness of the extent of the ice on the road until after the accident. It is clear to the Board that in sub-zero conditions more attention must be paid to the hazards of ice in Convoy Operating Procedures. This could be by using dedicated personnel or by utilising commercially available detection equipment (if suitable), or both. This action would lead to a need to introduce into the Convoy Commanders Orders a set of authorised guidelines specifically for ice on roads. The Board's inspection of the Convoy Operating Procedures produced by the third witness showed that there are no detailed instructions relating specifically to ice or the reporting of it by convoy personnel.

26. The question of ice as one of the causes of the accident has been dealt with above.

27. In respect of road camber and the soft verge these are matters that can only be dealt with by a detailed road survey. With the hindsight of the accident the Board consider that any road which has a soft verge coinciding with a drop of level below that of the road should be considered very carefully before use.

.....President

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Date.....

TO BE USED FOR FINDINGS ONLY

28. The Board could not avoid the conclusion that on-coming traffic and one civilian car in particular had contributed to the accident. However, there would seem to be no completely satisfactory solution to this question. The car in question was behaving reasonably, even co-operatively, and had left sufficient passing space under normal circumstances.

29. The Board does not consider that a recommendation to close roads to civilian traffic is merited.

30. The Board is satisfied that the private car moved between the time the second TCHD passed it and its location at the time of the accident (Fifteenth Witness). Consequently the precise combination of circumstances faced by the accident driver SAC [REDACTED] had not previously pertained.

WITNESS 12

ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND APPORTIONING OF BLAME

31. All relevant orders, instructions and operating procedures were complied with and all personnel concerned in Movement Order 419 showed adequate care. No person is held to be blameworthy. This includes OC RAFASUPU and the sponsors of the various publications from which OC RAFASUPU extracts information in order to publish Convoy Operating Procedures; who could not reasonably be criticized for not having foreseen the particular set of circumstances leading to the accident.

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

Wg. Cdr. President

Sqn Ldr

Sqn Ldr

Members

Date 16 Jan 87

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32. It is recommended that:

- a. HQRAFSC re-issues authorisations for the Convoy Approved Routes.
- b. Mandatory checks are introduced for the Convoy Commander to confirm with destinations that there are no local factors affecting road conditions on his route. Such checks should be made at all times of the year.
- c. In sub-zero, or recent sub-zero conditions that a unit in the vanguard of the convoy should have the task of maintaining an ice-watch.
- d. If suitable ice detector equipment can be found commercially, it should be utilised.
- e. The Convoy Commander be provided with a specific set of orders relating to ice and the possibility of ice.
- f. All Approved country roads are re-surveyed bearing particularly in mind the lessons to be learned from the accident: verges which can collapse and cause a vehicle to topple down a slope or drop; and road cambers which can affect very heavy vehicles.
- g. Consideration should be given to the possibility that some routes should only be authorised for certain seasons of the year.
- h. Very careful consideration should be given by the Route Authorising Authority before Route 44 is ever used again and it should not be used in the meantime.

REMARKS by UNIT COMMANDER

1. I have the following comments on the Findings at paragraph 7 to 32 inclusive.

CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS

2. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

INJURIES CAUSED AND FUTURE EFFECTS

3. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

CONSIDERATIONS OF DRIVER FATIGUE

4. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

PERSONNEL ON DUTY

5. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

THE STATE OF VEHICLE SERVICEABILITY

6. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

AUTHORISATION OF ROUTE AND DRIVERS

7. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

Unit

Signature

Date

See attached continuation sheet.
(pages 60 & 61)

REMARKS by STATION COMMANDER

NOT APPLICABLE

Command

Signature

Date

Commanding

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EXAMINATION OF ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

8. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

9. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

WITNESS 3

10. I note the evidence of the third witness, Squadron Leader [REDACTED], regarding problems with communications at the accident site. This unsatisfactory feature will be pursued through engineering staff channels.

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO SERVICE/CIVILIAN PROPERTY

11. I agree with the Findings of the Board.

DISCUSSION

12. All RAFASUPU personnel employed on convoy movements and in Task Control undertake their role as their primary function. No duty personnel are employed on such activities. Extensive training is given and assessment of performance is made over a period of up to 3 months before each individual is declared fit to undertake the operational task.

13. As routine before the commencement of each daily convoy movement Task Control assess weather conditions by obtaining weather and traffic reports with respect to the intended areas of movement. These conditions are discussed with the Convoy Commander prior to deployment. The destination is consulted if the weather forecast suggests inclemency or deterioration in that area. Individual routes are not discussed for reasons of security. If, at anytime during this process, there is concern with respect to potential safety anywhere along the route a recommendation is made to Wpm Eng 3(RAF) to postpone the movement.

14. Convoy routes vary in length from [REDACTED]. Precise and changing weather/road conditions have to be monitored continually by the Convoy Commander en route. [REDACTED]

15. The activities described above were undertaken on 10 January 1987 and have been illustrated in the evidence given during the Inquiry.

16. I agree with the conclusions drawn by the Board including their consideration not to recommend closure of roads to civilian traffic. I do not agree, however, that the second witness had information that there was ice on the road in the vicinity of the accident site. When recalled the second witness stated that he had no specific knowledge of the state of the West Grimstead to West Dean road on the day in question.

ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND APPORTIONING OF BLAME

17. It is inappropriate for me to comment on the Findings of the Board.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- 18. I agree that HQRAFSC should re-issue authorisation for Convoy Approved Routes.
- 19. I intend to introduce mandatory checks for Task Control to confirm weather conditions with destinations prior to convoy departure. I wish to discuss the ramifications of security before a decision is made regarding assessment of the specific route during this mandatory check.
- 20. I intend to assess with HQRAFSC Engineering Staff the feasibility of providing ice detection equipment for use on RAFASUPU convoys. If such equipment can be made available its employment and orders and instructions for its use will be devised.
- 21. I intend to resurvey approved unclassified roads used by RAFASUPU convoys bearing in mind the lessons learned from the accident.
- 22. Consideration will be given to the possibility of authorising some routes for seasonal use. However, the general application of such a suggestion is felt to be impracticable without restricting movements to some areas of Great Britain to the summer months.
- 23. All 6 routes utilising the West Grimstead to West Dean road have been prohibited from further use pending the actions of the Inquiry.

Unit RAFASUPU Signature 

Date 17 Jan 87 Wg Cdr
OC RAFASUPU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(when completed)

W6 CDR
PRESIDENT OF

TCS

RAFASU/MO 419 186-87

EXTRANEOUS DETAIL CLASSIFIED ABOVE
CONFIDENTIAL HAS BEEN REMOVED.
ALL CHANGES INITIALED. CERTIFIED.

CC1/CC2

RAFASU/MO MOVEMENT ORDER

SQU LDR. 15 JAN 87

1. You are detailed to complete the task detailed in this document in accordance with Convoy Operating Procedures. This document, together with completed Annexes A to I is to be returned to SNCO Task Control, within 7 working days of task completion.

2. MOVEMENT DETAILS

2.1 Movement Order (MO) is 419 Dates of MO: 7-14 JAN 87
Brief Time: 070930Z AND 111530Z Location: INTERJECT AND PANIC.

2.2 EXECUTIVES:

WITNESS:

2.3 NOMINATED APPTS:

- a. CC: SONADR. [REDACTED] 3
- b. Escort Cdr: RJLT [REDACTED] 9
- c. CSO: F904 [REDACTED] 11
- d. SOB Cdr: LT [REDACTED] 10

- a. DSO: SQT [REDACTED]
- b. Team Ldr: SQT [REDACTED]
- c. Fire NCO: CPL [REDACTED]
- d. MTD NCO: CPL [REDACTED] / CPL [REDACTED]
- e. MT Fitter: CPL [REDACTED] / CPL [REDACTED]
- f. Radio Fitter: CPL [REDACTED]

2.4 ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

- a. Mileage and Time Chart (Annex A) Yes/No
- b. Temperature Record (Annex B) Yes/No
- c. Staging HO/TO (Annex C) Yes/No (x 2.)

2.5 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

| Page No | Classification | Page No | Classification | Page No | Classification |
|---------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|----------------|
| 1 | SECRET | 6 | SECRET | | |
| 2 | SECRET | 7 | SECRET | | |
| 3 | SECRET | 8 | SECRET | | |
| 4 | SECRET | | | | |
| 5 | SECRET | | | | |

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2.6 LOAD DETAILS

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| 2 | 2 | D01 | | | | |
| 3 | 1 | D02 | | | | |
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| 5 | 6 | D01 | | | | |
| 6 | 3 | D01 | | | | |
| 7 | 1 | D02 | | | | |

2.7 AUTHORITY FOR THE CARRIAGE OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Authority is granted for the carriage of the following documents:

- a. COPS (x 3)
- b. Classified Notebooks (x 3)
- c. CC's folder (x 1) EC's folder (x 1) CSO's folder (x 1)
- d. RAFASU/MO 419/86-87
- e. Route Cards (5 sets)
- f. Paging Unit 532075489-CC
- g. Paging Unit 532076497-DCSO
- h.

2.8 Additional Information. 7/187 F/R CONSTITUTED BASE TO REFUEL, LOAD

1/1 F/R BASE TO REFUEL, LOAD ON ARRIVAL OF CONCESSION TO PARK LOADED OVERNIGHT.

3+1. PRE-UNLOADED ON ARRIVAL PARK LOADED OVERNIGHT, 1/1 F/R BASE REFUEL PARK EMPTY.

2/1 COMPLETE OFFLOAD OF THEN REFUEL, LOAD TO REMAIN PARKED AT UNTIL 1730 JUST BEFORE DEPARTING.

REFUEL WALKER WILL JOIN CONVOY F/R CONSTITUTED 3+1, REFUEL ON ARRIVAL, PRE-EMPTY OVERNIGHT.

1/1 AT REFUEL, 3+1 TASK OFFLOAD ON ARRIVAL PARK EMPTY OVERNIGHT 1/1 1/1 TO REMAIN

UNTIL 1430 JUST BEFORE DEPART TO SALO, F/R 2+1 TO ARRIVE 11/54, AS PLANNED, 2+1 TASK

2+1 TASK NOT REFUEL ON ARRIVAL PARK LOADED OVERNIGHT. 2/1 3+1 TASK OFFLOAD

ON ARRIVAL REMAIN PRE-EMPTY OVERNIGHT. D/R EXACT TO CC 2/1 F/R 2+1 REFUEL ON ARRIVAL PARK

EMPTY OVERNIGHT. 1/1 RTG XTANDES. EXACT EXACT D/R

14/1 3+1 OFFLOAD ON ARRIVAL. PARK EMPTY, Signed: [Redacted]

5/1 REFUEL AND RTA, Name: [Redacted]

Date: 22-12-86 Appt: OIC: M/RTA

Page No 2, ... (when completed)

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ad 4

R

| | |
|----------------|--------|
| Type | Can No |
| Serial (front) | |
| Type | Can No |
| Serial (rear) | |

Key

NOTES:

- (1) CC to obtain following from DCSSO - location of each can.
- (2) CC to obtain following from site controller - Serial No and type of weapon in each can.
- (3) CC to annotate detail on pro formae.
- (4) CSO or DCSSO to pass following information to the Task Controller:
 - (a) Location by Serial No of each can.
 - (b) Type of weapon in each can.

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RAFASU/NO 419 / 86-87 CONVOY DETAIL

3.1 Date: 7 Jan 87 CIN: 10

Call Sign: 10 Route: 89

3.2 DAYLIGHT HRS From: 071736Z To: 071632Z

3.3 SAFETY DETAILS Type of Move: [REDACTED]

SST COVER:

| Unit | GPO Tele No | From | To |
|--------------|-------------|-------|-------|
| 1. <u>10</u> | <u>10</u> | 1250Z | 1410Z |
| 2. <u>10</u> | <u>10</u> | 1340Z | 1520Z |
| 3. <u>10</u> | | | |
| 4. | | | |
| 5. | | | |
| 6. | | | |

3.4 DECONFLICTION 10

3.5 ITINERARY

| | Planned (Time or Location) | Actual | Mileage | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------|-----------|
| | | | Reading | Total Run |
| 1. Departure Point | <u>10</u> | | | |
| 2. Departure Time | 1330Z | 1315Z | 51140 | 510 |
| 3. TMC | 10 | 1245 1355 | 51224 | |
| 4. Break | | | | |
| 5. Break | | | | |
| 6. Break | | | | |
| 7. Break | | | | |
| 8. Break | | | | |
| 9. Arrival Times | 1440Z | 1425Z | | |
| 10. Arrival Point | <u>10</u> | | | |

TOTALS: Time 1.00 Mileage 34

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(when completed)

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SECRET (when completed)

RAFASU/MO 419 186-87 CONVOY DETAIL

3.1 Date: 8 Jun 87 CIN: [initials]

Call Sign: [initials] Route: 3

3.2 DAYLIGHT HRS From: 080732Z To: 081645Z

3.3 SAFETY DETAILS Type of Move: [redacted]

SST COVER:

| Unit | GPO Tele No | From | To |
|---------------|-------------|-------|-------|
| 1. [initials] | [initials] | 0820Z | 1030Z |
| 2. [initials] | [initials] | 1000Z | 1215Z |
| 3. [initials] | [initials] | 1145Z | 1510Z |
| 4. | | | |
| 5. | | | |
| 6. | | | |

134

164

3.4 DECONFLICTION [initials]

3.5 ITINERARY

| | Planned (Time or Location) | Actual | Mileage | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|-----------|
| | | | Reading | Total Run |
| 1. Departure Point | [initials] | | | |
| 2. Departure Time | 0900Z | 0925Z | 42235 | |
| 3. TMC | 10 | 0945 10.15 | 42249 | 14 |
| 4. Break | 15 | 1140 11.15 | 42255 | 50 |
| 5. Break | 15 | 1140 1425 | 42361 | 126 |
| 6. Break | | | | |
| 7. Break | | | | |
| 8. Break | | | | |
| 9. Arrival Times | 1430Z | | | |
| 10. Arrival Point | [initials] | | 42395 | 160 |

1214

+10

+25

+45

TOTALS: Time 4.45 Mileage 160

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(when completed)

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15.30

6.05

1.20

20

40

15

6.00

1.20

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(When completed)

RAFASU/MO 419 186-87 CONVOY DETAIL

3.1 Date: 10 JAN 57 CIN: 10

Call Sign: 10 Route: 44

3.2 DAYLIGHT HRS From: 100734Z To: 101652Z

3.3 SAFETY DETAILS Type of Move: [REDACTED]

SST COVER:

| Unit | GPO Tele No | From + ² W. | To |
|--------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|
| 1. <u>10</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>1330Z</u> | <u>1640Z</u> |
| 2. | | | |
| 3. | | | |
| 4. | | | |
| 5. | | | |
| 6. | | | |

3.4 DECONFLICTION 10

3.5 ITINERARY

| | Planned (Time or Location) | Actual | Mileage | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|-----------|
| | | | Reading | Total Run |
| 1. Departure Point | <u>10</u> | | | |
| 2. Departure Time | <u>1430Z</u> | <u>1425Z</u> | <u>42450</u> | |
| 3. TWC | <u>10</u> | <u>1510</u> <u>1520</u> | <u>42500</u> | <u>20</u> |
| 4. Break | | | | |
| 5. Break | | | | |
| 6. Break | | <u>DELAY</u> | | |
| 7. Break | | | | |
| 8. Break | | | | |
| 9. Arrival Times | <u>1600Z</u> | <u>11 JAN 11.28</u> | <u>N/A</u> | |
| 10. Arrival Point | <u>10</u> | | | |

TOTALS: Time 11 28 Mileage 44

Page 5...
(When completed) Remaining Time
estimate 1-30
~~SECRET~~

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FOUR PHOTOGRAPHS OF TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84)

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