

ESTIMATE SHEET

EXHIBIT
C
WG CDR
PRESIDENT
BOARD

Part 1

JOB NUMBER	ASSESSOR TASK	0.3.1.1	1.7.1.1
Repair Unit	CRB ARBORFIELD	Code	
Holding Unit	ARM SUP U WITTERING	Code	F.0.1.4.6.A.0.0
Equipment	TRUCK CARGO HEAVY DUTY	Code	2.4.3.2.0.6.7.1
Regn. Mark	PH:-2TC6RB 36310 CONT:- FVE WA/43		3.0.A.5.8.4

Repairs Required		High Cost Spares Required		Qty	Cost (£)	
Operation Code	Operation Manhours	Brief Description			First Estimate	Second Estimate
	First Estimate	Second Estimate				
1A01	25					
1A74	1					
1C18	4					
1E24	2					
1F48	1					
1G39	1					
1H02	5					
1H07	4					
1H10	3					
1H09	26					
1H18	0.5					
1H25	1					
1H26	3					
1H47	20					
1L39	0.5					
X28 X38	17					
TOTAL	114					

ASSESSOR
No. 3

Repair Unit Comments
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT DAMAGE
FILE
DATE 10 JAN 87
EVAL NOT INVOLVED
DRIVER [REDACTED] SAC
WITNESS 12 [REDACTED]
LOCATION B ROAD NEAR
SPALSBURY
Provisional Repair Decision SPECIFIED REPAIR
Date 13 JAN 87 Signature [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WO
WITNESS 14

Total Cost of High Cost Spares	
Allowance for Low Cost Spares	£ 228
Total Cost of Labour	£ 1,425
ESTIMATED COST OF JOB	£ 1,653
Date of Estimate Sheet	Year 87 Mth 01
Date of Entry to Service	Year 78 Mth 11
Age of Vehicle	Year 8 Mth 02
Average Annual Miles for Vehicle Type	
Vehicle Miles Run	
Allowance Factor ACQUISITION COST	132,300
Equivalent Year of Life 75% REPAIR LIMIT	£ 33,075
REPAIR LIMIT	£ 100
CASTING COMMITTEE SENTENCE Maj Cont No 316/86 FINANCE 0410	

Major components Changed

	Date	Mileage	Date	Mileage	Date	Mileage
Engine	Nov 80	16,690				
Gearbox	ORIGINAL					

Details of Work Required

Op Code	Repair Assessment - including low cost spares
1A01	ENGINE LOSS OF 4 1/2 Gall Oil
1A74	COOLING SYSTEM TO HEADER TANK HOSE LEAK
1C18	FUEL TANK BRACKETS BENT
1E24	CHECK FRONT AXLE GEOMETRY
1F45	CHECK WHEEL BEARING AND FRONT LH WHEEL STATION
1G39	CHECK STEERING GEOMETRY
1H02	REPAIR LH CHASSIS SCREEN (LOCATED UNDER CHASSIS NR G/BOX)
1H07	REPAIR TWISTED FRONT BUMPER
1H09	REPAIR CAB LOWER SIDE PANEL, ROOF CUTTER, AND ALIGN CAB TO TILT RAM. REPLACE CAB TILT RAM TRANSFER PIPE.
1H10	REPAIR LH CANOPY CHAIN REPLACE TWO LH CANOPY SUPPORT BEAM UPPER SECURING PINS (SHARDED) REPLACE BENT CANOPY FRONT RH SHOOT BOLT.
1H15-1H25	REPLACE DAMAGED LH MIRRORS "D" ARM AND FIRE EXTINGUISHER
1H26-1H47	REPLACE FRONT LH WING - REPAIR BOTH REAR WINGS (RECOVERY DAMAGE)
1H39-x28x38x44	REPLACE FRONT LH INDICATOR LAMP - PATCH PAINT REPAIRED AREAS - FUNCTIONAL AND BRAKE TEST VEHICLE

Recommendations by Command or Formation HQ

1.1 Engineer Staff

- a. Disposal Surplus Serviceable
- b. To be repaired by Holding Unit
- c. Specified Repair
- d. Beyond Economic Repair

3.2 Supply Staff

- Command Establishment for type
- Command Strength for type
- a. Replacement vehicle is not required
- b. Replacement is required extra Command
- c. Unit to which vehicle is to be allotted

Signature and Rank Date

Appointment HQ

Signature and Rank Date

Appointment HQ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WG CD
PRESID
BOA



ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 5

CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS WITH TASK CONTROL - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONVOY COMMANDER

1. The Convoy Commander is to contact Task Control by telephone one hour before the start of each day's live running and within 30 minutes of arrival at the day's destination. In addition he is responsible for ensuring that a message is sent to Task Control as soon as the convoy is mobile, at hourly intervals giving his position and on safe arrival at destination for the day.
2. The Convoy Commander is to report all incidents or occurrences which affect the normal passage of the convoy, its composition, or its route. HF reporting codes to enable sensitive messages to be sent over the HF are detailed at Appendix 1.
3. Whenever the convoy is ordered to free run in constituted form the Convoy Commander is to comply with paras 1 & 2 above.

Appendix:

1. HF Reporting Codes.

5A - 1
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TWG CD
PRESIDENT



(2) The spare driver is to perform the load checks accompanied by the CSO/DCSO. The Team Leader is to remain outside the rear door of the vehicle. Both the spare driver and the CSO/DCSO are to wear hard hats whenever they are inside a TCHD.

(3) On completion of the safety check, the Team Leader is to move to the next load carrying vehicle, and the procedure is to be repeated until all loads have been checked.

22. General.

a. Refreshments. Liquid refreshments may be dispensed from both the front and rear close escort vehicles. Convoy personnel are to use the facility appropriate to their position in the convoy so that equal grouping can be maintained at both the front and rear of the convoy.

b. Smoking. Smoking is only permitted in front of ¹⁹ 01 and the rear of 02 during rest breaks. When the convoy is live running, smoking materials are to be deposited in the close escort vehicles before each days live running. At all other times smoking is only permitted in accordance with MT regulations.


c. Carriage of Dangerous Cargo Regulations. The Convoy Commander is to comply with ESTC Leaflet 20 (May 84) carriage of dangerous cargo regulations. Where ESTC instructions conflict with COPS the CC is to act in accordance with the latter. Signs and symbols indicating the carriage of dangerous cargo are not to be carried on any convoy vehicle.

23. Convoy Delays. Any delays en route in excess of 15 minutes are to be reported promptly to Task Control who is in turn to immediately report the delay to MOD Wpn Eng 3(RAF), SSO and the consignee. MOD Wpn Eng 3(RAF) will inform MOD AF Ops of the delay and will advise Task Control of the actions to be taken in the event of a conflict.

SECURITY

24. Routes. Only reoutes approved by HQRAFSC are to be used except where road conditions or other valid factors render it necessary for the CC, on the advice of the EC, to authorise a diversion. Diversions that are in excess of 5 miles off the approved route require prior authority from Task Control.

25. Arming of Convoy Personnel.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

PREFACE

WG CDG
PRESIDENT
BOARD



RAFASUPU CONVOY OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. RAFASUPU Convoy Operating Procedures (COPS) are published by OC RAFASUPU under the provisions of QR 64(2). The orders in COPS are mandatory and amendments or concessions may only be issued by OC RAFASUPU.
2. COPS are divided into 2 volumes. Volume 1 consisting of standard operating procedures: Volume 2 consisting of the training syllabus. Temporary Instructions are held in Volume 1, Chapter 10.
3. Individual RAFASUPU holders of COPS are to be conversant with their contents. All convoy personnel are to read COPS and sign accordingly on the cards held by the Convoy Support Clerk. COPS are to be read on the following occasions:
 - a. On first joining S Sqn.
 - b. On amendment of any order.
 - c. Annually.
4. OC S Sqn is to amend COPS in line with SD 814 amendments as necessary.

S Jul 85

Wg Cdr
OC RAFASUPU

(iii)
RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED

AL 1

~~RESTRICTED~~

DTG	OCCURRENCE
	<u>CIN 3998</u>
0915Z	CONTACTED WEATHERLINE WHO ADVISED FOLLOWING: CLOUD ALL DAY, MAX TEMP +2°C, OCCASSIONAL SNOW FLURRIES, EASTERLY WIND, FREEZING AT DUSK, SEVERE FROST OVERNIGHT
0921Z	CONTACTED BY CC, ALL IN POSITION, DISCUSSED WEATHER AND ROAD CONDITIONS, CONTACT TELEPHONE NO: [REDACTED] EXT [REDACTED] (W PLATFORM)
1032Z	CONTACTED BY CC, SERIAL 11 OF OP ORDER REACHED, APPROX 10 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE BUT CC EXPECTS TO MAKE THIS UP DURING NEXT 3 HRS
1105Z	CONTACTED BY CSO, SPARE TCHD HAS DEVELOPED A FUEL LEAK IN MAIN FEED PIPE TO THE INJECTORS. SPARE NOT CARRIED, V/S PIPE REMOVED AND CSO INTENDS TO REPAIR LOCALLY. IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE OR TIME SCALE TOO LONG CONVOY WILL REVERT TO 2+1 (CIN 702 LOAD), SPARE TCHD WILL BE DESPATCHED PM IF REQD
1202Z	CONTACTED BY CSO, SERIAL 15 OF OP ORDER REACHED. V/S PIPE EXPECTED TO BE REPAIRED IN TIME - WILL CONFIRM SOONEST. LOADING APPROX 30 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE - IF NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE UP WILL INTEND TO EXTEND SSO COVER.
1235Z	CONTACTED BY CSO, NEW PIPE MANUFACTURED LOCALLY, WILL BE FITTED AND TESTED AND THEN TASK CONTROL WILL BE INFORMED OF OUTCOME. APPROX 15 MIN OF DELAY AS AT 1215 (OP ORDER) DUE TO DEPARTURE FROM SHIP

DTG	OCCURRENCE CIN 3998
1255z	CSO RANG , '23' NOW SERVICEABLE
1325z	CSO RANG , S/N 19 (OP ORDER) HAD JUST TAKEN PLACE , JUST AHEAD OF SCHEDULE .
1435z	MESSAGE FROM SISU = RE LEAFY 3998 . "MOSINE" 1425z . (AD)
1436z	MOD WIN ENG , SSO CELL AND OC RAJASUMU INFORMED .
1512z	MESSAGE FROM SISU : RE LEAFY 3998 . UIC W 1505z XPO2 VL 37 .
1600z	CALL FROM CPL [REDACTED] AT DESTINATION , HE REPORTED " [REDACTED] " . 25 VEH HAD SKIDDED
1602z	AIR FORCE OPS , SSO CELL INFORMED . NO REPLY FROM RN . CO INFORMED OF [REDACTED] SITUATION .
1610z	ADDITIONAL INFO FROM CPL [REDACTED] - 26 SINKING INTO MUA - UP TO AXLE / ONLINE SWIM
1620z	CO ARRIVED AT TASK CONTROL .
1620z	OC M FLT CONTACTED AND INFORMED POLICE AUTH
1625z	NO CASUALTIES . VEH BATTERIES ON 25 AND 26 DISCONNECTED .
1630z	CONFIRMED THAT '25' ON ITS LEFT SIDE .
1632z	CO ADVISED WIN ENG 3 (EAF) W/DR [REDACTED] OF SITUATIONS . WITNESS 17
1635z	CORDEX ESTABLISHED AT INCIDENT .
1640z	OC M FLT REQUESTED , FOLLOW UP REPORT , FROM CG , VIA CPL [REDACTED] AT THE DESTINATION
1652z	SSO CALLED - SST DEPLOYED AT 1650z . 35 MEN . NO ETA .
1655z	A CALL FROM DUTY PRESS OFFICER AT MOD WAS DIRECTED TO DUTY AF OPS FOR DETAILS REQUIRED .
1700z	INFORMED BY CPL [REDACTED] AT DESTINATION THAT 2 LIC'S HAD ARRIVED . NOT ABLE TO

COMPLETE FOLLOW UP REPORT . OC M FLT CONTACTED AF OPS BY PHONE , BECAUSE OF DELAY IN RECEIVING SIGNAL ON TIME .

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

WG CDR
PRESIDES
BOARD

EXHIBIT

H

- (1) Any indications of hostile actions such as demonstration, ambush or illegal roadblock.
- (2) Press activity.
- (3) Road accidents.
- (4) Road blockages or diversions, whether caused by accident, road-works or other means.
- (5) Flooding.
- (6) Vehicles or persons monitoring, following or otherwise taking an undue interest in the convoy.

g. When the convoy is approximately 20 miles from its destination, the [redacted] is to go to the destination and check the approach roads and immediate area for any signs of suspicious activity. Having completed this task and ensured that the route is clear, the [redacted] is to notify the EC accordingly. Thereafter, the [redacted] is to observe discreetly the convoy's arrival at the Unit to ensure that there are no vehicles or persons following it or taking undue interest in it. The EC is to be informed of the outcome of these observations.

h. On completion of the day's running, the [redacted] is not to stand-down until authorised by the CC. The team is to arrange a time to telephone the EC the same evening to leave their accommodation telephone number with him and to receive any additional instructions.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN AN EMERGENCY

i. If an incident such as detailed in paragraph f(1)-(6) should occur ahead of the convoy, the [redacted] is to notify the EC by radio immediately. If unable to raise the EC or any other convoy vehicle, the [redacted] is to back-track along the convoy's route until either radio contact is re-established or the [redacted] sights the convoy. In case of emergency, the [redacted] is to act with speed using blue light and headlights should the circumstances warrant it. More detailed actions for the [redacted] in emergency situations are contained in Chapter 9.

ACCOMMODATION

j. The [redacted] is to use non-public accommodation, which is normally to be within 20 miles of the convoy's lodging unit. However, in the spirit of paragraph e. the team is not normally to seek accommodation in the same town as convoy personnel. Where this is unavoidable the [redacted] is to obtain prior permission of the CC. The [redacted] may book accommodation, no more than 48 hours in advance, provided that they make no reference to their parent unit or duty nor make or confirm the booking in writing.

k. The [redacted] vehicle is to be locked at all times when unattended and parked overnight (where possible) in guest house car parks. Any equipment of a Service nature which cannot be removed from the vehicle is to be concealed from view.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT OF AN INCIDENT IN RESPECT OF WHICH LEGAL CLAIMS OR PROCEEDINGS ARE ANTICIPATED - RN/ARMY/RAF/MOD (PE)/ROYAL NAVY

0 at crosses in appropriate small boxes) *(Delete as appropriate) **For codes see reverse of F. M.T. 3-3



A DATE 10-1-87 TIME 1550 HRS. Policeman receiving report: Number Rank
 PLACE COUNTY WILTSHIRE COUNTRY UK Station NONE Force
 CLASS RD WEST GRIMSTEAD TO WEST DEAN

OTHER VEHICLE - OBJECTS **MOD VEHICLE**

B Moving Vehicle Pedestrian Stationary Vehicle Animal Stationary property/object Aircraft Motor cycle/bicycle Other

G NOMENCLATURE (e.g. 4 ton 4x4, Car 2 str., 4x2, etc.) TC HD 6x4 Date and type of last w/s Overhaul Inspection or Servicing 8-10-86 INTE.

C Copy from Road Fund Licence
 Make Registration Number HP/CC/U.W/V Stg. Cap.
 Year of Manufacture LH Drive RH Drive Tyres Good Tyres Smooth

H NAME IN FULL (Surname first) RANK/RATING/ GRADE SAC
 MOD DRIVER DETAILS SERVICE/STAFF No. REGT/CORPS ** RAF AGE 23

DRIVING EXPERIENCE Yrs. Months 15 06 No. of days if under 1 month
 MOD Other DRIVING BEFORE ACCIDENT Total for day of accident Hrs. Mins. Miles 1 20 158
 Since last rest of more than 10 mins. 040 20

WAS DRIVER UNDER INSTRUCTION 0 = No 1 = Yes (enter 0 or 1) 0
 NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS IN WHICH DRIVER HAS BEEN:- CONCERNED 0 TO BLAME 0

J UNIT NAME AND ADDRESS (in full inc. postal town or County) RAF ASULU WITTERING PETERBOROUGH CAMBS
 Unit identity Number F.O. 1461A BFPO
 Unit's Civilian tel. No. including STD Code UNITS FILE REF. DISTRICT/THEATRE OR COMMAND SUPPORT

D OTHER VEHICLE DAMAGE
 (a) Indicate by arrow point of impact

K JOURNEY CLASSIFIED FROM: MO 419 TO: JOURNEY AUTHORITY (Details) MTD (If none signed reason must be given in Driver's statement)

(b) Nature of damage (in fullest detail) noting any previous defects

L VEHICLE AND LOAD DAMAGE (in fullest detail) LOAD NIL DAMAGE CAB DAMAGED REAR MUD GUARDS BENT DIESEL TANK BRACKETS BENT

E	Names	Addresses	Telephone Numbers	Position at time of accident
Witnesses	1 <u>CPK [redacted]</u> 2	<u>RAF ASULU RAF WITTERING</u>	<u>0780 64501</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In MOD vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> In other vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Elsewhere
	2 <u>CPK [redacted]</u> 3	<u>RAF ASULU RAF WITTERING</u>	<u>0780 64501</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> In MOD vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> In other vehicle <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Elsewhere

F	Names	Addresses	Age	Injury	Doctor or Hospital
Injured Persons If in Armed Forces give Service No. and Unit	1			<input type="checkbox"/> Slight <input type="checkbox"/> Serious <input type="checkbox"/> Fatal	
	2			<input type="checkbox"/> Slight <input type="checkbox"/> Serious <input type="checkbox"/> Fatal	

MOD VEHICLE

OTHER VEHICLE

Enter zeroes in boxes 1-6 if item not applicable

1-SIGNALS MADE BY

- 1 Horn
- 2 Horn
- 3 Indicator
- 4 Brake Lights

0

2-TO SHOW

- 1 Turning left
- 2 Turning right
- 3 Slowing or stopping
- 4 Ready to be overtaken
- 5 Overtaking
- 6 Hazard

3

3-LIGHTS ON

- 1 Tail Side (Parked)
- 2 L Head
- 3 R Head
- 4 Fog Front
- 5 Fog Rear
- 6 Dipped
- 7 All

6

4-SIGNALS MADE BY

- 1 Hand
- 2 Horn
- 3 Indicator
- 4 Brake Lights

0

5 TO SHOW

- 1 Turning left
- 2 Turning right
- 3 Slowing or Stopping
- 4 Ready to be overtaken
- 5 Overtaking
- 6 Hazard

0

6-LIGHTS ON

- 1 Tail/Side (Parked)
- 2 L Head
- 3 R Head
- 4 Fog Front
- 5 Fog Rear
- 6 Dipped
- 7 All

0


N	Seat Belt Details	Worn	Not Worn	Not Fitted	Casualty	Worn	Not Worn	Not Fitted	Casualty
	Front: Driver	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Front: Passenger	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Rear: Passengers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

O	1. CONFIGURATION	2. ROAD SURFACE	3. WEATHER	4. STREET LIGHTS	5. TRAFFIC	P SPEEDS Enter zeroes if not applicable MOD VEHICLE OTHER VEHICLE On approach <input type="text"/> mph <input type="text"/> mph On impact <input type="text"/> mph <input type="text"/> mph Speed Limit <input type="text"/>	
	1 Straight Road 2 Bend 3 Junction 4 Crossroads 5 Roundabout 6 Road Narrows 7 Parking Area 8 Cross Country 9 Airfield	1 Concrete/Tarmac 2 Cobble/Setts/Wood Blocks 3 Earth/Gravel	1 Clear 2 Fog/Smoke 3 Rain or Hail 4 Snow or Sleet 5 Strong Wind 6 Other	1 Bright 2 Fair 3 Dim 4 None/Off	1 None 2 Light 3 Medium 4 Dense		1 1
	6. ROAD CONDITIONS	7. GRADIENT	8. TYPE OF CARRIAGEWAY	9. PERIOD OF DAY	2 2		
ACCIDENT CIRCUMSTANCES Enter zeroes in boxes 01-09 if item not applicable	1 Dry 2 Wet 3 icy 4 Muddy	1 Level 2 MOD vehicle facing Uphill 3 MOD vehicle facing Downhill	1 One-way street 2 Two-way street 3 Dual carriageway 4 Motorway (M)	1 Dawn 2 Daylight 3 Dusk 4 Night	2		

Q	MOD CASUALTIES	ACCIDENT TYPE	MOD VEHICLE	R Did the accident occur on ground owned or requisitioned by a Government Department? 0 = No <input type="checkbox"/> 1 = Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Fatal <input type="checkbox"/>	Inj'd <input type="checkbox"/>	Type ** K	

V SPACE FOR SKETCH OF SCENE OF ACCIDENT. (Show the following points)

- Road layout and all widths.
- Position of vehicles before impact, with direction of travel of each vehicle.
- Position of vehicles on impact.
- Position of vehicles after impact
- Position and length of all skid marks
- Islands, obstructions, tramlines, etc.
- Street names
- Village names or distances away.
- Road numbers in country.
- White lines and studs in roadway and road markings.
- Traffic lights, traffic signs, pedestrian crossings, warning signs/restrictions.



(Note: Driver must also sign section T of F. MT. 3-1) DRIVER'S SIGNATURE

WG CDR
PRESIDENT
BOARD

K2

Royal Air Force
Wittering
Peterborough
PE8 6HB

Date: 10.1.87

Sir,

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING RAF MI VEHICLE

Make and Type ICHD Reg No 30AJ84
which occurred at (Place) West Dean Farm
on (date) 10.1.87 at (time) 15.50 hrs

I, [REDACTED] SAC [REDACTED], have the honour to report that

Whilst I was driving 30AJ84 on MO 419
I was involved in a road accident. Upon
reaching the brow of a hill I received a
radio message informing me that there
was an on-coming vehicle approaching.
I immediately reduced my speed to approx
5mph; whereupon I then sighted the vehicle
which was approx two feet from the side
of the road. As I approached within sixty
feet of the stationary vehicle I positioned
myself to pass the vehicle. On reaching
the side of the car, a combination of
icy conditions and a camber in the
road forced the vehicle to slide off
the road, which by this time I had lost
all control of the vehicle because of the
momentum. Because of a declining bank the my
vehicle turned onto its side into a field.

I have the honour to be,
Sir
Your obedient Servant

[REDACTED]

Officer Commanding
Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit
Royal Air Force
Wittering
Peterborough

1 WITNESS 12

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT OF AN INCIDENT IN RESPECT OF WHICH LEGAL CLAIMS OR PROCEEDINGS ARE ANTICIPATED - RN/ARMY/RAF/MOD (PE)/ROF

F. MT. 3-2

0 () at crosses in appropriate small boxes) *(Delete as appropriate)

**For codes see reverse of F

LI

A DATE 10-1-87 TIME 1550 HRS. _____
 PLACE CLASS RD WEST GRIMSTEAD TO WEST DEAN COUNTY WILTSHIRE COUNTRY UK
 Policeman receiving report: _____
 Number _____ Rank _____
 Name _____
 Station NONE
 Force _____

B Moving Vehicle Pedestrian
 Stationary Vehicle Animal
 Stationary property/object Aircraft
 Motor cycle/bicycle Other

C Copy from Road Fund Licence
 Make _____ Registration Number _____ HP/CC/U.W./Stg. Cap. _____
 Year of Manufacture _____
 LH Drive RH Drive
 Tyres Good Tyres Smooth

Insurance Co. _____
 Driver's name and address _____
 Owner's name and address _____
 Owner's contact Telephone No. _____

D OTHER VEHICLE DAMAGE
 (a) Indicate by arrow point of impact

(b) Nature of damage (in fullest detail) noting any previous defects
8

G NOMENCLATURE (e.g. 4 ton 4x4, Car 2 str., 4x2, etc.)
TCHD 6x4
 Date and type of last w/s Overhaul Inspection or Servicing
8-10-86 INTL
 REGISTRATION No. 81 AE 13 MAKE AEC HP or CC 12470cc DRIVE LH RH

H NAME IN FULL (Surname first) _____ RANK/RATING/GRADE SAC
 MOD DRIVER DETAILS: SERVICE/STAFF No. _____ REGT/CORPS ** RAF AGE 24

DRIVING EXPERIENCE Yrs. Months 17 0 8 No. of days if under 1 month _____
DRIVING BEFORE ACCIDENT Total for day of accident Hrs. Mins. Miles 1 20 58
 Since last rest of more than 10 mins. 04 0 20

WAS DRIVER UNDER INSTRUCTION
 0 = No
 1 = Yes
 (enter 0 or 1)

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS IN WHICH DRIVER HAS BEEN:-
 CONCERNED
 TO BLAME

J UNIT NAME AND ADDRESS (in full inc. postal town or County)
RAF ASUPU WITTERING
PETERBOROUGH CAMPS
 Unit identity Number F101416A BFPO _____

Unit's Civilian tel. No. including STD Code _____ UNITS FILE REF. _____ DISTRICT/THEATRE OR COMMAND SUPPORT

K JOURNEY FROM: CLASSIFIED TO: MO 419
 JOURNEY AUTHORITY (Details) MTO
 (If none signed reason must be given in Driver's statement)

L SECURITY LEAD NIL DAMAGE
 VEHICLE AND LOAD DAMAGE (in fullest detail) VEHICLE NIL DAMAGE

E	Names	Addresses	Telephone Numbers	Position at time of accident
Witnesses	1 <u>CPX [REDACTED]</u>	<u>RAF ASUPU WITTERING</u>	<u>[REDACTED]</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In MOD vehicle
	2			<input type="checkbox"/> In other vehicle
				<input type="checkbox"/> Elsewhere

F	Names	Addresses	Age	Injury	Doctor or Hospital
Injured Persons If in Armed Forces give Service No. and Unit	1			<input type="checkbox"/> Slight	
	2			<input type="checkbox"/> Serious	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Fatal	

L-1

	MOD VEHICLE				OTHER VEHICLE								
Enter zeroes in boxes 1-6 if item not applicable	1-SIGNALS MADE BY 1 Hand 2 Horn 3 Indicator 4 Brake Lights	2-TO SHOW 1 Turning left 2 Turning right 3 Slowing or stopping 4 Ready to be overtaken 5 Overtaking 6 Hazard	3-LIGHTS ON 1 Tail/Side (Parked) 2 L Head 3 R Head 4 Fog Front 5 Fog Rear 6 Dipped 7 All	4-SIGNALS MADE BY 1 Hand 2 Horn 3 Indicator 4 Brake Lights	5-TO SHOW 1 Turning left 2 Turning right 3 Slowing or stopping 4 Ready to be overtaken 5 Overtaking 6 Hazard	6-LIGHTS ON 1 Tail/Side (Parked) 2 L Head 3 R Head 4 Fog Front 5 Fog Rear 6 Dipped 7 All	0	3	6	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

N	Seat Belt Details				Casualty			
	Worn	Not Worn	Not Fitted	Casualty	Worn	Not Worn	Not Fitted	Casualty
Front: Driver	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Front: Passenger	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rear: Passengers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>


O	1. CONFIGURATION		2. ROAD SURFACE		3. WEATHER		4. STREET LIGHTS		5. TRAFFIC		P SPEEDS	
	ACCIDENT CIRCUMSTANCES Enter zeroes in boxes 01-09 if item not applicable	1 Straight Road	2 Bend	1 Concrete/Tarmac	2 Cobble/Setts/Wood Blocks	1 Clear	2 Fog/Smoke	1 Bright	2 Fair	1 None	2 Light	Enter zeroes if not applicable MOD VEHICLE OTHER VEHICLE On approach <input type="text"/> mph <input type="text"/> mph On impact <input type="text"/> mph <input type="text"/> mph Speed Limit <input type="text"/>
3 Junction		4 Crossroads	3 Earth/Gravel		3 Rain or Hail	4 Snow or Sleet	3 Dim	4 None/Off	3 Medium	4 Dense		
	5 Roundabout	6 Road Narrows			4 Strong Wind	6 Other						
	7 Parking Area	9 Airfield										
	6. ROAD CONDITIONS		7. GRADIENT		8. TYPE OF CARRIAGEWAY		9. PERIOD OF DAY					
	1 Dry	2 Wet	1 Level	2 MOD vehicle facing Uphill	1 One-way street	2 Two-way street	1 Dawn	2 Daylight				
	3 Icy	4 Muddy	3 MOD vehicle facing Downhill		3 Dual carriageway	4 Motorway (M)	3 Dusk	4 Night				

Q	MOD CASUALTIES		ACCIDENT TYPE		MOD VEHICLE		R Did the accident occur on ground owned or requisitioned by a Government Department?
	Fatal	Inj'd	Type **	Type **	Vehicle Code No.		
			16	K	2413306711		0 = No <input type="checkbox"/> 1 = Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

V

SPACE FOR SKETCH OF SCENE OF ACCIDENT. (Show the following points)

1. Road layout and all widths.
4. Position of vehicles after impact
8. Village names or distances away.
2. Position of vehicles before impact, with direction of travel of each vehicle.
5. Position and length of all skid marks
9. Road numbers in country.
3. Position of vehicles on impact.
6. Islands, obstructions, tramlines, etc.
10. White lines and studs in roadway and road markings
7. Street names
11. Traffic lights, traffic signs, pedestrian crossings, warning signs/restrictions.



NOTE
This report must be accompanied by the signed and witnessed statements of the Service driver and of any Service witnesses.

Note: Driver must also sign section T of F. MT. 3-1) DRIVER'S SIGNATURE [REDACTED]

WG CD
PRESIDENT
BOARD

L2

Royal Air Force
Wittering
Peterborough
PE8 6HB

Date:

Sir,

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING RAF MT VEHICLE

Make and Type TCAD Reg No 31 AF 13

which occurred at (Place) WEST MEPPIN FARM

on (date) 10-1-87 at (time) 1550 hrs

I, [REDACTED] SAC [REDACTED], have the honour to report that

while down on convoy duties on MO 419 a message came over the radio stating there was an oncoming vehicle. I was driving up a hill, down approx 15 mph. When I reached the top of the hill I could see 30 AT 84 approx 50 metres in front. I reduced my speed to approx 5 mph. 30 AT 84 started to descend down the embankment & I started to brake to come to a halt and heard nothing so they vehicle slid on the ice upon which the front left hand wheel had slid off the road down the embankment when suddenly came to a rest on the front axle

I have the honour to be,


Sir

Your obedient Servant

Officer Commanding
Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit
Royal Air Force
Wittering
Peterborough

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PR

Destination _____
 Time of pick-up _____ Date _____ Vehicle required for _____ hours/day _____
 Purpose of detachment **MOVEMENT ORDER No. 411 W60**
 No. of passengers/cases **AS PER TASK** Total weight/dimensions **AS PER TASK**
 Vehicle to report to **OC/SNCO i/c** at (place) **TASK CONTROL**



Fleet No.	Serial No.	Vehicle Type and Reg. No.	Driver Detailed	Time	Odometer Reading
		TMD	1's	IN	
		30 AT 84	DETAILED	OUT 08:00	12213
Totals					

Next servicing due	Lub/Minor/Major/Area	Odometer	Calendar
--------------------	----------------------	----------	----------

VI. TUNCSAMP
 7 JAN 1987
 R A F
 A. SUP. U.

Special tasks to be carried out on the following dates

5 12 19 26

Target MPG 1.8

Approved
 Signature _____ Date 1-1-87

UIN F0148A00
 AVC 2.632.067
 TANK CAP 173
 RANGE ML8

Day of Month	Destination	Drivers name in capitals where not specified in heading	Purpose of Journey	Approval (Initials)	Time	Odometer Reading	Miles Run	Fuel Issues	Station and Voucher No. (Fuel)	Certified that daily servicing and special tasks (where applicable) have been completed, that the vehicle is serviceable, and has sufficient fuel, oil and water for the journey stated.
7	100-100		MO 419		IN 15:00	12375	49			
					OUT 01:00	12213	82			
8	100-100		MO 419		IN 15:40	12455				
					OUT 29:00	12285				
9	100-100		MO 419		IN 16:00	12518	92		43 WKS	
					OUT 14:00	12455	62			
10	100-100		MO 419		IN					
					OUT	12518				
					IN					
					OUT					
					IN					
					OUT					
					IN					
					OUT					
					IN					
					OUT					
					IN					
					OUT					
					IN					
					OUT					

Destination _____
 Time of pick-up _____ Date _____ Vehicle required for _____ hours/days _____
 Purpose of detachment **MOVEMENT ORDER No. 419**
 No. of passengers/cases **AS PER TASK** Total weight/dimensions **AS PER TASK**
 Vehicle to report to **OC/SNCO 1/c** at (place) **TASK CONTROL**

M2

Fleet No.	Serial No.	Vehicle Type and Reg. No.	Driver Detailed	Time	Odometer Reading
106	1	TCND 81 AE 13	RS Detailed	IN	
				OUT	08:00 80262
Totals					

Next servicing due	Lub/Minor/Major/Area	Odometer	Calendar
--------------------	----------------------	----------	----------

M.T. CONTROL
 UNIT STAMP
7 JAN 1987
 R.A.F.
 A. SUP. U.

Special tasks to be carried out on the following dates **5 12 14 26**
 Target MPG **1.8**
 Approved _____
 Signature **7-1-87** Date

UIN F0148A00
 AVC 2432 067
 TANK CAP 173
 RANGE MLS

Day of Month	Destination	Purpose of Journey	Approval (Initials)	Time		Odometer Reading	Miles Run	Fuel Issues	Station and Voucher No. (Fuel)	Certified that daily servicing and special tasks (where applicable) have been completed, that the vehicle is serviceable, and has sufficient fuel, oil and water for the journey stated.
	Drivers name in capitals where not specified in heading			IN	OUT					
7	MO 419	MO 419		IN	1600	80401			HENRY'S	
				OUT	0800	80262	139			
8	MO 419	MO 419		IN	1700	80659			CRYS	
				OUT	0800	80401	158			
10	MO 419	MO 419		IN	1700	80760			FR375	
				OUT	0800	80659	101			
				IN						
				OUT						
				IN						
				OUT						
				IN						
				OUT						
				IN						
				OUT						
				IN						
				OUT						
				IN						
				OUT						

RECONVENED BOARD OF INQUIRY ASSEMBLED AT HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE SUPPORT COMMAND

20 JANUARY 1987

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

EXHIBITS

<u>Page No</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Page No</u>	<u>Classification</u>
1	C	A-1	C
2	C	B-1	C
3	C	C-1	U
4	C	C-2	U
5	C	C-3	U
6	C	C-4	U
7	C	D-1	U
8	C	D-1-1	U
9	C	D-1-2	U
10	C	D-1-3	U
11	C	D-1-4	U
12	C	D-1-5	U
13	C	D-1-6	U
14	C	D-1-7	U
15	C	D-1-8	U
16	C	D-1-9	U
17	C	D-1-10	U
18	C	D-1-11	U
19	C	D-1-12	U
20	C	D-1-13	U
21	C	D-2	U
22	C	D-2-1	U
23	C	D-2-2	U
24	C	D-2-3	U
25	C	D-2-4	U
26	C	D-2-5	U
27	C	D-2-6	U
28	C	D-2-7	U
29	C	D-2-8	U
30	C	D-2-9	U
31	C	D-2-10	U
		D-2-11	U
		D-2-12	U
		D-2-13	U
		D-2-14	U
		E-1	C
		F-1	U
		F-2	U
		F-2-1	U
		G-1	U
		G-1-1	U
		G-2	U
		G-2-1	U
		H-1	C

COVERING ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~COVERING CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF AIR
 MAINTENANCE
 23 JAN 87
 FILE 1709 F102 5/10 570

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

RECONVENED BOARD OF INQUIRY ASSEMBLED AT HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE SUPPORT
COMMAND ON 20 JAN 87

Serial (a)	Date (b)	Time (c)	Action (d)
1.	20 Jan	1415	Board reconvened.
2.	21 Jan	0810-0910	Board recalled third witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED].
3.	"	0915-0945	Board recalled twelfth witness, SAC [REDACTED].
4.	"	1015-1030	Board recalled third witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED].
5.	"	1045-1130	Board photographed accident site.
6.	"	1230-1245	Board recalled twelfth witness, SAC [REDACTED].
7.	"	1245-1255	Board recalled eleventh witness, Fg Off [REDACTED].
8.	"	1400-1430	Board interviewed twenty first witness, Mr [REDACTED].
9.	"	1520-1540	Board interviewed twenty second witness, Mr [REDACTED].
10.	"	1540-1830	Board travelled to RAF Brampton and adjourned for the night.
11.	22 Jan	-0950	Board interviewed twenty third witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED].
12.	"	0950-1020	Board travelled to RAF Wittering.
13.	"	1110-1250	Board interviewed twenty fourth witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED].
14.	"	1300-1330	Board recalled eighteenth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED].
15.	"	1340-1600	Board recalled twentieth witness, WO I [REDACTED].
16.	"	1600-1615	Board interviewed twenty fifth witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED].
17.	"	1615-1900	Board considers further findings.
18.	23 Jan	0800-1030	Board reviews Inquiry report for accuracy.
19.	"	1030-1045	Board recalled twentieth witness, WO I [REDACTED].
20.	"	1100	Proceedings of the Board handed to OC RAFASUPU.

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS, BOARD OF INQUIRY Etc.

NOTES

- (i) A4, single sheet paper only to be used. Small documentary exhibits to be pasted on A4 paper.
- (ii) Use a separate page for the recording of evidence of each witness. Full signature of each witness must be inserted at end of his evidence.
- (iii) All alterations and erasures in record of evidence must be initialed by the witness.
- (iv) QR 1269 to be complied with whenever adverse comments are made by a witness about another.
- (v) When the proceedings are complete, assemble them securely in following order:
 - (a) Diary of Action, showing day to day progress of the Board.
 - (b) Form 2 completed as to the convening authority, terms of reference, composition of the Board.
 - (c) List of Witnesses.
 - (d) List of Exhibits.
 - (e) Narrative of Events.
 - (f) Record of Evidence (check that QR 1269 has been complied with).
 - (g) Findings.
 - (h) Recommendations.
 - (i) Statements from Witnesses under QR 1269.
 - (j) Remarks by Unit and Station Commanders.
 - (k) Remarks by AOC and AOC-in-C.
 - (l) Exhibits lettered "A" to "Z".Then number pages consecutively.
- (vi) The Board, etc., is to study QR, Chapter 17 and AP 3392 Vol 4 Chap 15.

PROCEEDINGS of a Reconvened Board of Inquiry
convened at Headquarters Royal Air Force Support Command
RAF Brampton
on the 20 January 1987
by order of Air Vice Marshal [REDACTED] RAF

for the purpose of reconvening to obtain more evidence on the circumstances and cause of the accident and to clarify authorisations and minor anomalies in documentation.

PRESIDENT

Wg. [REDACTED] (Engineer Branch)
MOD parented by RAF Abingdon

MEMBERS

Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] (Engineer Branch)
MOD parented by RAF Uxbridge
Sqn Ldr [REDACTED] (Supply Branch)
MOD parented by RAF Uxbridge

IN ATTENDANCE
(Sec QR 1261)

THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE TO BE PASSED THROUGH EACH STAGE WITHOUT DELAY

LIST OF WITNESSES

1. Third Witness recalled, Sqn Ldr ~~STAFF [REDACTED]~~
RAFASUPU (Pages 4, 5, 6, 7, 9)
2. Twelfth Witness recalled, SAC [REDACTED]
RAFASUPU (Pages 8, 10,)
3. Eleventh Witness recalled, Fg Off [REDACTED]
RAFASUPU (Page 11)
4. Twenty first Witness, Mr [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], Nr Salisbury (Page 12)
5. Twenty second Witness, Mr [REDACTED], Southampton
Weather Centre (Page 13)
6. Twenty third witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED]
HQRAFSC (Pages 14, 15)
7. Twenty fourth Witness, Sqn Ldr [REDACTED]
RAFASUPU (Pages 16, 17, 18)
8. Eighteenth witness recalled, Flt Lt [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RAFASUPU (Pages 19, 20)
9. Twentieth Witness recalled, WO [REDACTED]
RAFASUPU (Pages 21, 22, 24)
10. Twenty fifth Witness, Flt Lt [REDACTED]
RAFASUPU (Page 23)

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- A. Photographs of the accident site
- B. Sketch map of accident site.
- C. Certified True Copies of the weather state 091137 Jan 87 to
101155 Jan 87. (4 pages)
- D. Army Forms G1084A (Vehicle Job Cards) and RAF Form 4870A (Servicing
Record Card).
- E. Extract of MT Orders. Responsibilities of SNCO IC MT Flt.
- F. RAF Forms 4761 (MT Personnel Record Cards) SAC [REDACTED] and SAC [REDACTED]
- G. FMT 3-1 for TCHD (VRM 30 AJ 84 and VRM 81 AE 13). WITNESS 12 WITNESS 13
- H. Video from Convoy Escort Commander's Vehicle. (one copy only)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STATE IN CONFIDENCE~~



[Handwritten signature]

Third
 Witness
 (Recalled)

Squadron Leader [REDACTED] recalled on
 his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: How many times did you speak with Task
 Control on Saturday 10 January 1987?

Answer: On arrival at point of departure at
 approximately 0930 hours and on 2 or
 3 further occasions prior to our departure.
 My last conversation was at about 1345 hours.

Question: On which of these occasions did you
 discuss the weather?

Answer: Certainly on the final occasion. It
 had been discussed before, but I am
 not sure on which occasions, on that
 Saturday morning.

Question: Can you describe the weather, as you
 saw it, on that morning when you got
 up?

Answer: A beautiful, blue sky day with hardly
 a cloud in sight. It was cold, but
 not freezing and I had not been aware
 of any frost on the previous night.
 There was hardly any wind. These
 conditions prevailed right up to the
 time the convoy left, but I did
 consider that it had got a little colder,
 but not down to freezing.

Question: From your conversations with Task Control
 on the Saturday morning, can you
 remember what they told you about the
 weather in your area for that day?

4

Answer: I cannot remember specific details,
 but they did not pass any information
 which contradicted my assessment at the
 departure point.

Question: Did Task Control warn you of any snow?

Answer: I recall snow being mentioned, but not
 for my area.

1 WITNESS 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STATE IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STATE IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY



6/22/87

Question: Were frost conditions discussed?
Answer: I cannot remember, but there would have been no significant mention of frost, as I would have remembered it.

Question: Did you instruct any other member of the convoy to discuss weather with Task Control?

Answer: I did not instruct anyone.

Question: Did any other member of the convoy express any doubts, to you, about the suitability of the weather, that morning, for the movement of the convoy?

Answer: I am virtually certain that they did not. I would like to emphasise that, based on all the information available to me and by local observation, there was no question in my mind that the weather was suitable that day.

Question: Apart from your own observations, and discussions with Task Control, did you make any other enquiries about the weather that day?

5

Answer: No. I had absolutely no cause to. If there had been any doubt in my mind, I would have made further checks.

Question: What is your experience of weather delays on convoys?

Answer: I have undertaken approximately 50 convoys. On about one third of these, the question of weather has had to be addressed closely, especially during the winter months. On about 5 occasions we have actually had weather delays.

Question: In discussion, with reference to the weather, you have mentioned to the board 'marginal conditions' for convoy movement. What do you understand by marginal conditions?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

 8/20/88

Answer: Whilst there are no specific criteria and it is a subjective judgement which I, in consultation with others, make; there are no doubts in my mind what constitutes 'marginal conditions'. For instance, in winter, we would not leave if the visibility was less than 100 yards and there would be considerable discussion if fog or mist was present, even if the visibility was greater than that. If there was considered to be any danger of icing on the roads, this too would be the subject of considerable debate and could be the cause of delay or postponement of the journey. A light flurry of dry snow would not cause too much concern, but a forecast of heavy snow showers would

6

cause the convoys departure to be questioned.

Question: How did the conditions on Saturday 10 January 1987 compare with your previous experience?

Answer: Almost perfect for the time of year.

Question: Do you remember how many times you personally, as Convoy Commander, have used Route 44 and particularly the minor road on which the accident occurred?

Answer: Once or twice as Convoy Commander, but also 5 or 6 times for other purposes prior to the accident.

Question: Did you have any knowledge that this road was prone to icing?

Answer: No. We do have routes which, in places, are known to be prone to ice and special consideration is given, but the accident site was not one of those places, nor are there any such places on Route 44.

Question: Have you ever used Route 44 and the minor road in particular either as Convoy Commander or on other occasions, in winter?

Answer: I don't think so.

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

CERTIFIED COPY



Twelfth
Witness
(Recalled)

Senior Aircraftman [REDACTED]
having been recalled on his former oath, states:

Question: From the point where you first noticed the front of your vehicle slip to the near side, approximately how far forwards did the vehicle travel before it came fully to rest, on its side, in the field?

Answer: About 2 vehicles lengths or 20 metres. For the first 2 or 3 metres, the only angle on the vehicle resulted from the road camber. Thereafter, the toppling process was gentle and continuous and the vehicle only became fully on its side at approximately the position at which it stopped. I have seen the vehicle since the accident and I can confirm that there were no signs of sliding on its side visible.

Question: You have seen the accident site since the accident. Can you tell us, from those observations, what you think happened?

Answer: It appears that when the near side front wheel first went onto the verge, this wheel only sank slightly into the verge. Shortly afterwards, the near side rear wheels also went onto the verge and now, with the full weight of the vehicle, the verge started to collapse more rapidly.

8

Third
Witness
(Recalled)

Squadron Leader [REDACTED] recalled
on his former oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: To make the weather conditions absolutely clear, on the morning of Saturday 10 January 1987, up to the time of departure, there was absolutely no snow on the ground in the area where you were?

Answer: That is correct. We had travelled some 35 miles before we saw any snow at all and then it was in very small quantities off the road. Up to the time of the accident, during the whole of that Saturday, I saw no falling snow of any description.

9 DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

[Redacted] 13/01

Twelfth
Witness
(Recalled)

Senior Aircraftman [Redacted]
having been recalled on his previous oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Throughout Movement Order No 419,
did you carry a copy of JSP 351
(MT Drivers Handbook)?

Answer: No. Not on me personally, but there
might have been one in the vehicle document
pack-up?

Question: What type of footwear were you wearing
at the time of the accident?

Answer: Doctor Martins Airwear Boots, which I
purchased myself. They have a soft
rubber sole with a prominent pattern.

Eleventh
Witness
(Recalled)

Flying Officer [Redacted]
having been recalled on his former oath states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Flight Lieutenant [Redacted]
eighteenth witness, has told the Board
that he had a telephone conversation with
you at 1325 hours on Saturday 10 January
1987, during which you advised him that
there were a few snow flurries in your
immediate area. Can you clarify this?

Answer: We did discuss the weather, but there
appears to have been a slight misunder-
standing, for as far as I recall, the
snow flurries to which I referred, I had
seen reported on my hotel room television
during the early morning programme. I
had not seen any snow flurries that morning
myself, either prior to or during the
convoy movement. The snow flurries
which I saw on television were during the
weather forecast, which covered the whole
country. I did not pick up from that
broadcast any particular indication of
snow in our area.

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

23/10/87

Twenty
First
Witness

Mr [REDACTED], of [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Near Salisbury, having been duly sworn,
states:

1. On Saturday 10 January 1987, the first time I travelled along the stretch of road where the accident occurred was at approximately 1530 hours. I was travelling towards West Dean and noted that the road was wet with some slushy patches. I returned in the opposite direction some 20 minutes later. I saw some large vehicles coming in the opposite direction and I pulled into the side and stopped. As one of the trucks approached me very cautiously. Until the front of his vehicle drew level with the front of mine, I was not aware of any problem. He appeared to have adequate room to pass and continued to do so. I was not aware that anything was wrong until the rear of his vehicle was level with my rear passenger door. I was not aware that the separation between the vehicles had increased. I was not watching too closely, because my main concern was the next vehicle which was approaching me. I heard a sliding noise and a thump and I looked round and saw the vehicle lying on its side in the field. During this time, I had not moved and the rear of the truck lying in the field was some 2 metres behind the rear of my vehicle.

12

Twenty
Second
Witness

Mr [REDACTED] of Weather Centre, 160 High Street Southampton, having been duly sworn states

1. I present to the Board, Certified True Copies of the Weathercall Forecast for Area 3 for 091137 Jan, 091702 Jan, 100446 Jan and 101155 Jan. (Exhibit C.)

13

Twenty
Third
Witness

Squadron Leader [REDACTED]
Security (Provost) Branch of Headquarters Royal Air Force Support Command, having been duly sworn, states:

1. I am Sy 2 at HQRAFSC and I have held this post since 1 January 1984.
2. I am the Desk Officer at this Headquarters, responsible for issuing approval for requests from RAFASUPU in respect of Convoy Routes.

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

CONFIDENTIAL COPY
51 23
[Redacted]

3. I have a copy of a Master Route Index issued by RAFASUPU, which I produce to the Board, which clearly indicates that some time in the past, Route 44 has been approved. The document was issued under cover of RAFASU/6254/2/Sy, dated 19 December 1986.

4. I do not know how long ago Route 44 was approved. I do not know if the original approval was given by this Headquarters. The Route could have been in use for some 20 years. I do not know, but it is conceivable, that another Formation may have been responsible for issuing approvals.

5. This Headquarters had a major fire in 1985 and all the relevant specialist files were lost. However I cannot confirm from my own knowledge, that even prior to the fire, copies of all route approvals were held on HQRAFSC files.

6. Since the fire we have not taken any action to re-establish a comprehensive set of route approvals to be held at this Headquarters and I know of no requirement that we should do this. During my tour, I have been requested to approve three completely new routes and several changes to existing routes.

7. We would normally do this by sending an Officer or Senior NCO to drive over the route to be authorised. He would be required to verify the route's suitability. By this I mean its suitability

14

for use by a Convoy and its compliance with SD 814 Leaflet F4 Paragraph 12, which in essence says that the route should avoid roads with excessive gradients; it must have no bottlenecks or accident black spots; avoid built-up areas, and must utilise to the maximum motorway, dual carriageways and major trunk routes. I produce the whole reference to the Board. This Headquarters does not give any other written instructions to the person tasked with viewing the route.

8. I should make it clear that the Master Route Index, previously referred to in my statement, does not include full details of the routes. In respect of Route 44, it does not specifically indicate the minor road on which the accident took place.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Are any instructions given to the person carrying out the route approval check to pay particular attention to the possibilities and consequences of ice on the road?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

[REDACTED] 23/87

Answer: No. I don't see how this could be done effectively.

Question: Can you quote the regulation which requires HQRAFSC to issue route approvals.

Answer: Yes. It is SD 814 Leaflet F4 paragraph 12, part of which says, 'Before being used by a convoy, each route is to be submitted to HQRAFSC (C Sy O) for vetting, approval and registration with MOD, Sy 1 (RAF).' I have made enquiries with MOD DD Sy (RAF) and I received a reply from Sy 1b (RAF) to the effect that they were unable to find an approval document for Route 44, or a record of its registration.

Twenty
Fourth
Witness

Squadron Leader [REDACTED]
Supply Branch, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit,
Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn,
states:

1. I am the Officer Commanding Supply Squadron at RAFASUPU and I have held this post since 19 August 1985. I am responsible to OC RAFASUPU for the Operations of Convoys. This means that I have the responsibility for all the orders and instructions contained within Convoy Operating Procedures. I am the RAFASUPU officer responsible for carrying MOD requirements for convoy movements. However, the Convoy Commander is responsible for Tactical Control of the Convoy on the road.

Questioned by the Board:

Question: What is the policy for choice of routes?

Answer: To guidelines laid down in SD 814, one of the main criteria is the previous frequency of use, with the aim of not using the individual routes too often, and this was a major consideration in the choice of Route 44 for use on Saturday 10 January 1987.

Question: Can you tell the Board, from your records, when the particular stretch of road where the accident took place was last used by a convoy during the months of December, January or February?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

Answer: My records which go back to January 1980, do not show any occasion when it was used during these months. However, the route has been used on numerous occasions at other times of the year and it is purely fortuitous that the months December, January and

16

February do not appear in the records. I know of no restrictions which have ever been placed on the use of this stretch of road in winter.

Question: Can you produce the Route Map for Route 44?

Answer: Yes. I now produce it to the Board. The copy I produce is one of 7 which are used on a convoy. The maps used are originals, cut from the Ordnance Survey 1:50,000 Landranger Series. Details of the route are highlighted on the map in colour and supplemented by detailed printed route instructions. These route maps, or ones very similar, for Route 44, have been in existence, to the best of my knowledge for at least 6 years. I am unable to produce any other authorising document held at RAFASUPU. I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that Route 44 was an approved route on 10 January 1987.

Question: Have you any specific instructions or considerations to be taken with regard to black ice?

Answer: No. However we consider icing, together with all other weather related factors. Where we know that routes, or parts of routes, are specifically prone to icing, then we are particularly careful over the choice of route, as a matter of judgement and experience.

Question: Within your experience, 2 winters, how many winter convoys have been delayed or rescheduled because of weather?

17

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY



8.23.87

Answer: We do not reschedule or delay too often, but it does happen for weather reasons.

Question: Why are no specific instructions issued to personnel in the vanguard of the convoy, when travelling in winter, to watch out for and report ice?


Answer: There instructions are to look out for anything that will impede or delay the convoy and I know, from personal experience, that these personnel do report any adverse weather factors.

Question: For a new route or route alteration, what actions do you undertake, prior to a submission to HQRAFSC for approval?

Answer: I would normally send a small team of RAF Policemen to drive the route, in its entirety, and report back on its suitability. Maps are then drawn up and a full description of the route prepared. This is then staffed internally, prior to submission.

18

Eighteenth
Witness
Recalled

Flight Lieutenant 
having been recalled on his previous oath states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: What are the qualifications required for an MT Driver to be employed on driving Truck Cargo Heavy Duty?

Answer: He must hold an HGV Class 2 licence and have completed an 'S' Squadron training week, which is mandatory for all convoy personnel. In addition, he must complete 3 full Movement Orders, driving the spare TCHD and accompanied by an experienced TCHD driver. Subject to satisfactory completion of this, he is then allowed to drive TCHD on convoys. There is no specific local authorisation issued, in addition to the HGV Class 2 licence.

Question: Can we clarify your previous evidence with regard to weather discussions with the Convoy Commander on Saturday 10 January 1987?

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

Answer: I received a call at 0921 hours, this was a routine call, during the course of which we discussed weather and road conditions. I presented the relevant pages of my log which recorded the information I received from Weatherline at 0915 hours, which I conveyed to the Convoy Commander. At 1032 hours, I had a further call from the Convoy Commander, but we did not discuss weather or road conditions.

Question: In your previous statement you reported that the Convoy Safety Officer told you

19

at 1325 hours that there were a few snow flurries in his immediate area. Questioned on this, he says that he had seen snow flurries on the television but none in his immediate area and it was this that he had reported to you. Can you clarify this?

Answer: Thinking about it again, it is quite possible that his version of the conversation is correct.

20

Twentieth
Witness
Recalled

Warrant Officer [REDACTED] having been recalled on his previous oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: Do you have Army Forms G1084A for the vehicles involved in the accidents for the 3 months previous to that time?

Answer: Yes. I present copies of these Forms (Exhibit D) together with copies of the RAF Forms 4870A.

Question: Is Sergeant [REDACTED], your Senior NCO IC MT Flight, authorised to sign Forms 658A?

Answer: Yes, in accordance with my MT Flight Orders, Part 4 Order No 2 of M Flight Orders. On the day the F658As were signed, I was absent from the Flight on duty. I present a copy of this order (Exhibit E).

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

26 JAN 87

Question: Are the 2 drivers, SAC [REDACTED]¹ and SAC [REDACTED]² competent to drive Truck Cargo Heavy Duty and have there been any adverse reports on their driving?

Answer: TCHD is a Class 2 HGV vehicle and both drivers are HGV Class 1 License holders. I produce copies of their RAF Forms 4761 (Exhibit F). I have received no adverse reports on their driving, in fact I have had several laudatory comments.

Question: Having heard the statement given by SAC [REDACTED]¹ and pursued the FMT 3-1, do you consider that

21

the actions taken by the driver, in the circumstances of the accident, were competent?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Can you now present the completed FMT 3-1s for the accidents?

Answer: Yes (Exhibit G). The forms are fully completed except for the drivers signatures. I cannot obtain these at this time as the drivers are not available. The previous copies of FMT 3 presented to the Board were the originals completed by the drivers immediately after the accidents and had not been checked and verified by myself. I found several minor anomalies when I carried out my check.

Question: Can you tell the Board the approximate weight of a loaded TCHD?

Answer: Each TCHD varies slightly, but the approximate weight, loaded, is 22 tons.

Question: Do you have any instructions that your drivers are to carry JSP 351 (MT Drivers Handbook) when on driving duties?

Answer: No. JSP 341 only requires the driver to be in possession of a JSP 351, not that is to be carried when driving.

22

1 WITNESS 12

2 WITNESS 13

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 26 JAN 87

Twenty
Fifth
Witness

Flight Lieutenant [REDACTED], Security
(Provost) Branch, of Royal Air Force Armament Support Unit,
Royal Air Force Wittering, having been duly sworn, states:

1. On Saturday, 10 January 1987, I was part of the Convoy,
travelling in the Escort Commanders vehicle and I now present
the video film taken from the Escort Commanders vehicle.
(Exhibit H).

23

Twentieth
Witness
Recalled

Warrant Officer [REDACTED] having been
recalled on his previous oath, states:

Questioned by the Board:

Question: The Board noted that there was an entry on
Army Form G1084A, Serial Number ASU 104, for
Truck Cargo Heavy Duty Vehicle Registration
Mark 30 AJ 84 to the effect that the steering
was unserviceable. There is no annotation other
than the FORWARD Operation Code "1G89A" to
explain this defect. Can you tell the Board
what the defect was?

Answer: Yes. This was a requirement to check the
steering rod end, as a result of a defect
reported on AEC Chassis of similar type.
The item on this vehicle was not unserviceable
and was not replaced. This is confirmed by
the suffix letter "A" on the FORWARD Operating
Code, as suffix letter 'B' would have been used
for replacement.

Question: When was this check carried out?

Answer: The actual date of that specific item is not
recorded, as there are a number of operations
on the AFG 1084A. However, the vehicle was
unserviceable for the period 15 October 1986
to 17 October 1986 in total.

24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO BE USED FOR FINDINGS ONLY

FURTHER DISCUSSION

1. The Board made further inquiries concerning the approval of Route 44 (twenty third and twenty fourth witnesses). The process by which routes are authorised for use leads to them being termed 'Approved Routes'. The current process for new routes or route changes is initiated at HQ RAFASUPU. A team of RAF Police carry out an initial survey of the roads concerned. At RAFASUPU maps and written instructions are prepared and staffed prior to submission to HQRAFSC. At HQRAFSC a further survey of the route is carried out by SNCOs of the RAF Police. After further appropriate staffing a signal or letter is sent to RAFASUPU formally approving the route. The best evidence available indicates that Route 44 could have been in use for some 20 years. It is not possible to say what the approval process then was, or indeed which formation was responsible for actually giving the approvals. It has not been possible to trace an approval document for Route 44 issued by a higher formation than RAFASUPU. Records at HQRAFSC were lost in a fire and records of this age at RAFASUPU have been destroyed. No other formation holds copies. The Board has inspected the Route Maps, Route Instructions and Route Records of Use and accepts from the statements of Witnesses that at some indeterminate time the approval process had been carried out in a similar way to current practice.

2. The Board revisited the scene of the accident to vehicle TCHD 30 AJ 84, took photographs of the scene (Exhibit A), produced a sketch of the accident site (Exhibit B), interviewed a civilian witness (twenty first witness), re-interviewed the TCHD driver (twelfth witness) and took further evidence from the RAFASUPU Mechanical Transport Officer (twentieth witness). The Board accepts the sequence of events as described by the TCHD driver without reservation and consider this to be fully supported by the other evidence. Expert evidence from the twentieth witness supports the actions taken by the driver from the point when he began to lose control of the vehicle.

3. Originally the Board was informed by RAFASUPU that a video record of the drive over the accident site made from the Convoy Escort Commander's vehicle towards the front of the convoy was not available. This video has now been presented by the twenty fifth witness (Exhibit H). It re-inforces evidence that little warning of trouble was visually available to the convoy personnel. Indeed, it indicates that prior to the accident site, road conditions were satisfactory.

.....President
.....
.....Members

Date..... ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
RECOMMENDATIONS

RAF Form 2A

DECLASSIFIED

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Further questioning by the Board of the third, eleventh and eighteenth witnesses about weather conditions supported earlier statements to the effect that no person involved in the operation of the convoy on Saturday 10 January had cause to delay the convoy due to weather. This was further supported by the Board obtaining from the Regional Southampton Weather Centre the official meteorological weather (twenty second witness) summaries for the period 1137 hrs on the 9 Jan 87 to 1155 hrs on the 10 Jan 87 (Exhibit C, 4 sheets). It is upon these summaries that all other weather information for the accident area from other UK sources would have been based. The Board accepts that the actual and forecast weather information available to the responsible personnel was suitable for the operation of the convoy.

5. The Board re-interviewed the twentieth witness who presented documents (Exhibits D to G) to amplify evidence of specialist Motor Transport matters.

6. In earlier findings the Board expressed the opinion that 'the combination of circumstances that have been determined as the cause of the accident might conceivably have been foreseen'. By this, the Board did not mean to infer in any way that a specific accident should have been foreseen and indeed the Board did not criticize any person in this respect. However there was local knowledge that the accident site road was prone to icing in winter (first and second witnesses) and the state of the road is plainly to be seen: narrow, marked camber in places, and occasional soft verge combined with a drop.

7. The Board has no additions to make to its earlier recommendations.

	Wg Cdr	President
	Sqn Ldt	Members
	Sqn Ldt	

Date 23 January 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
RECOMMENDATIONS
DECLASSIFIED

RAF Form 2A

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

DECLASSIFIED

~~STAFF IN CONFIDENCE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~