



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

**The Strategic Defence Review:
A New Chapter**
Supporting Information & Analysis



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A NEW CHAPTER**

Supporting Information & Analysis

**Presented to Parliament by
The Secretary of State for Defence
By Command of Her Majesty**

July 2002

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SECTION 1

The Threat from International Terrorism: Dealing with Vulnerabilities

(i) The Threat

1. Threats consist of both the capabilities and the intent of potential or actual aggressors. Since 11 September, Usama bin Laden and his associates have made some statements of intent, and we continue to assess carefully their capabilities. We must take care not to draw conclusions from the events of 11 September that are too narrowly focused. The element of surprise was a key characteristic of those attacks, and we should in future have the agility and adaptability to deal with a wide range of scenarios. But we can make a few tentative assumptions:

- the impact of the attacks on New York and Washington might have made terrorism against the US, its friends, allies and interests a more attractive option to extremist groups: they showed it could be done;
- state sponsorship and toleration may persist, but more covertly. On the other hand, the international response to the events of 11 September may already have contributed to deterring some supporters of international terrorism, particularly states sponsoring or tolerating terrorist activity;
- the psychological threshold of shock may have been raised and other terrorists or possibly rogue states may in future seek to emulate the massive effect of the 11 September attacks. This may mean attempts to make and use weapons that have mass effect. Chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear devices cannot be ruled out. We may not have warning of any attacks;
- the range of capabilities potentially available to terrorists will continue to increase in the future with the diffusion of new technologies.

2. With state sponsored terrorism in decline, there is a continuing international terrorist threat to Western interests from extremist groups who are prepared to use terrorist methods on an international level to attempt to achieve political objectives at a regional level. However, the threat now also embraces groupings – such as Usama bin Laden's Al Qa'ida network – with less well defined or realistic political or religious aspirations, who are prepared to use weapons of mass effect to pursue their goals.

3. Many of these groups are driven by a loosely co-ordinated series of overlapping informal networks. Extremists will continue to be attracted to such networks, particularly as a reaction against political and economic failure, and disenfranchisement. Perceived arrogance and double standards also fuel resentment against the US, and the West in general, especially where our policies are perceived to support unpopular regimes.

4. Whilst there are a range of extremist groups with diverse aims, currently we assess that the principal terrorist threat to UK interests remains from those groups whose aims are to establish strict Islamic regimes and expel Western influence from their regions. Extremists linked with Usama bin Laden's network continue to pose the most significant threat.

5. International terrorist groups will continue to explore the potential of innovative and unconventional means of attack in order to achieve global impact. Although terrorists are generally more likely to mount conventional attacks, some will be attracted by the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons to achieve major impact. As long as Al Qa'ida views the UK as a target, we cannot rule out the risk of it attempting to mount a CBRN attack against UK interests at home or overseas.

6. There is as yet no sign of states deliberately providing CBRN materials to terrorists. However the acquisition by terrorists of such materials or expertise through a state's failure to secure them remains a real concern. Of course, terrorists may seek to develop their own CBRN devices, or acquire them by other means. The anthrax attacks in the US illustrate the range of possibilities.

7. Although the decline of state sponsorship of terrorism is unlikely to be reversed, failed or failing states may be unwilling or unable to prevent extremist groups functioning within their borders. Political and economic failure and disenfranchisement, together in some cases with religious fundamentalism, particularly (although not exclusively) in the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus and Central and South West Asia, will continue to provide a breeding ground for extremism – though international terrorism need not necessarily follow. Al Qa'ida linked individuals or cells have been found in many countries across the globe, for example in Europe, North America, the Middle East, North Africa, the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia.

8. Whilst the US is likely to remain the main focus for international terrorism, we are far from immune, given our involvement and support for coalition counter-terrorism operations overseas. But international terrorist groups are not immune to disruption by counter-terrorist efforts. The campaign against international terrorism has made it harder for Al Qa'ida to operate, although the same terrorist groups exist.

(ii) Dealing with Vulnerabilities

9. As societies become more networked, complex and economically interdependent, there are inevitably a greater range of potential targets that terrorists might seek to exploit. A more interdependent society can render vital services susceptible to rapid breakdown as disruption/attacks propagate through systems – for example, energy supplies or communications systems. These are not, however, likely to be as threatening to life as the kind of spectacular violent attacks that the Al Qa'ida type group seem to favour.

10. This situation calls for high quality intelligence, reliable means of collection, accurate and speedy analysis and timely dissemination. We will not, however, always have intelligence of specific attacks. With its direct experience of terrorism, the UK is well used to identifying vulnerabilities and ensuring a defensive capability. The assessment of the UK's vulnerabilities and how to manage them is a job for Government as a whole. Across Government we continue to examine our potential vulnerabilities and the possible consequences if they were to be attacked, so that we can improve our defences and resilience where possible. The Home Office has taken steps to ensure that the right legislation is in place to counter terrorist activity in the UK, through a wide range of measures, for example the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

SECTION 2

International Terrorism: Causes and Counter-Strategies

(i) The Causes of International Terrorism

11. To counter international terrorism, we need to understand its causes. This means understanding both why and how disaffected groups turn to extremism and to international terrorism, and why terrorists are harboured in certain parts of the world. No list of causes will be complete to everyone's satisfaction, and in each case the balance of factors will differ.

12. Poor governance by regimes which provide few legitimate political outlets for opposition appears in many cases to be significant. In some cases a combination of poor governance and weak economic management has resulted in under-employment among the young and relatively well-educated, whose political frustration is in turn exploited by radical (sometimes religious extremist) groups. This resentment is directed both towards local governments and specifically towards the West, as a perceived source of support to autocratic regimes. Weak governance can provide attractive havens for terrorists and they can spread widely. The Taliban's reliance on financial and military support from Al Qa'ida – although significantly reinforced by shared goals and values – is one example.

13. Other factors give rise to a more general sense of grievance - providing the basis for wider support to international terrorism. These include adverse perceptions of the West's international role together with more general perceptions arising from the West's colonial past. Added to this are fears of the growing hegemony of Western values, derived from its apparently dominant position in the world's increasingly globalised economy, and envy of Western prosperity.

(ii) Strategies to Counter International Terrorism

14. The counter terrorist strategy that is most likely to prove successful over the long term is one that addresses the symptoms and causes of terrorism in a holistic way, using political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as military, measures. However, where the political goals of the terrorists are diffuse, ill-defined or unrealistic, and the roots of extremist and terrorist activity so complex, there is at best likely to be some considerable time lag in the effectiveness of this kind of strategy in tackling the causes of terrorism, and a reliance on intelligence, law enforcement and, if needed, military action to disrupt and neutralise its symptoms may be required in the shorter term.

15. Classically, counter terrorist strategies can be divided into two types:

- military (or coercive) strategies, which focus on the symptoms of terrorism, by using armed force to try to settle the matter;
- political (or holistic) strategies, based on a treatment of symptoms and causes, with the military principally supporting law enforcement, in order to help establish the conditions in which other measures – political, diplomatic, economic – can deliver longer term solutions. Examples include the Northern Ireland peace process from the 1980s onwards.

16. Britain's experience, gained in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, is that popular support and wider acquiescence beyond the terrorists' core constituency are key to the terrorists' ability to operate. Support for terrorism depends in turn on the perceived legitimacy of the terrorists' aims and the belief that these aims may only be achieved by terrorist methods. By undermining support for the legitimacy of terrorism, terrorists can be isolated and are thus more susceptible to counter-measures; however, this takes time and means addressing the causes of terrorism as well as its symptoms.

17. In all this, knowledge is the starting point. By understanding the threat posed by international terrorism, we can undertake focused law enforcement action and implement effective protective security measures. We can, at the same time, improve our understanding of the underlying causes, and thus make more effective the development of broader political strategies to address them. However, to understand is not to condone terrorism. There can never be any justification for resorting to terrorism.

18. Military action has an important contribution to make in various ways, but is only likely to be successful as a component of a wider campaign. We must therefore use our understanding of terrorism to minimise the risk, when taking action against the symptoms of terrorism, of contributing to its causes.

19. The sort of holistic counter terrorist campaign, which offers the best prospect of success in eliminating international terrorism as a force for change in international affairs, cannot be undertaken successfully by any single country. Multinational co-operation will be needed to deliver the different activities required to ensure success:

- through co-operation with like-minded friends and allies, including through NATO and the European Union;
- through other international institutions – notably the United Nations and the G8;
- and by working with other key countries which have strategic and regional leverage.

20. The interconnection between addressing the symptoms and the causes is well illustrated by what we have been asking our Armed Forces to do in and around Afghanistan. From find-and-strike missions, to disruption and interdiction operations, to stabilisation, to training and capability building: all these in the space of a few months.

21. Indeed, it is possible to speculate that this pattern is likely to become, increasingly, the face of modern military operations: more complex, more multi-dimensional, less clearly sequenced and separated than the more traditional military campaigns of the past. But our Armed Forces are almost uniquely well qualified to meet successfully the challenges of this complexity, particularly given their past experience – in Malaya, in Oman, in Northern Ireland, in the Balkans and in Sierra Leone.

SECTION 3

The Campaign Against International Terrorism: Objectives, and Action Already Taken

(i) Overall Objectives

22. Following the 11 September attacks, the Government published its campaign objectives. These were set out by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on 16 October 2001, and in a paper ("Defeating International Terrorism: Campaign Objectives") released by the Prime Minister's office on the same day. The immediate campaign aims were:

- to bring Usama bin Laden and other Al Qa'ida leaders to justice;
- to prevent Usama bin Laden and the Al Qa'ida network from posing a continuing terrorist threat;
- to this end, to ensure that Afghanistan ceases to harbour and sustain international terrorism, and enables us to verify that camps where terrorists train have been destroyed;
- to require sufficient change in the leadership to ensure the breaking of Afghanistan's links to international terrorism.

23. Our wider objectives, set out in the same paper, were:

- to do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism;
- to deter states from supporting, harbouring, or acting in complicity with international terrorist groups;
- the reintegration of Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community and an end to its self-imposed isolation;
- a positive political agenda of engagement with Arab countries and the Muslim world;
- a strategy to deal with the large number of sometimes small groups of terrorists who flourish in states across the world, and the linkages between them. This includes sustained pressure on states that aid and abet terrorism. Where states are powerless to put a stop to terrorism arising from their territory, assistance will have to be made available. Where states are unwilling to take effective action they will face a vigorous response from the wider international community;
- renewed efforts to resolve the conflicts that are among the underlying causes of terrorism;
- renewed efforts to bear down on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

24. These objectives are a concrete demonstration of our commitment to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the US after the attacks on New York and Washington, to defeat international terrorism and to assist the Afghan people to create a stable and prosperous country which will never again become a base for international terrorism.

(ii) Actions Taken Across Government

25. Many arms of Government, including military, intelligence, diplomatic, development and law enforcement, have contributed to achieving our objectives. The work has been co-ordinated by three Ministerial Committees chaired by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. The Prime Minister chaired the War Cabinet, which was established to oversee the campaign. Reflecting the Home Office's lead responsibility on counter-terrorist policy, the Home Secretary continues to chair Committees which co-ordinate policy on protective and preventative security and the management of the consequences of a terrorist attack. There is also a cross-Government group under Cabinet Office auspices on countering terrorism overseas.

26. Government Departments are working closely with the emergency services, local authorities and the Devolved Administrations to ensure joined up planning in all aspects of counter-terrorism work. Actions taken by the Government to date include putting in place enhanced security measures in key sectors, including the civil nuclear and aviation sectors, building up the UK's capacity to respond to CBRN incidents of various kinds, and developing and exercising contingency plans. Further work is ongoing to deal with potential vulnerabilities.

27. The UK has also been working with the international community to combat terrorism, including as chair of the United Nations Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee. We have also offered training to a number of states that have requested help with tackling international terrorism and helped others (eg Russia) with programmes to secure or eliminate CBRN materials.

28. New mechanisms have also been put in place across Whitehall to tackle terrorist financing, ie Part 1 and Part 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.

(iii) Military Actions Taken Overseas

29. UK military operations in Afghanistan have consisted of two broad strands. The first, Operation VERITAS, is the UK's contribution to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the US-led coalition formed to defeat at the military level terrorism perpetrated by Al Qa'ida from Afghanistan. The second, Operation FINGAL, is the UK contribution to the International Security Assistance Force designed to support security in Kabul while the Bonn political process moves forward. This illustrates our determination both to treat the symptoms of terrorism and to address underlying stability issues.

30. Through Operation VERITAS, the UK has been involved in coalition military operations to defeat international terrorism, from the outset of the campaign on 7 October 2001. UK participation in the coalition air campaign against terrorist targets in Afghanistan included launches of Tomahawk cruise missiles from our submarines, and the provision of specialised support to coalition strike forces, including airspace command and control, air to air refuelling, photo-reconnaissance and air transport.

31. At the same time the Royal Navy and RAF, as part of a large coalition force, maintained patrols in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations. This was in addition to the continuous presence of a frigate or destroyer in the Gulf undertaking maritime interdiction operations, and to participation in similar operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as part of NATO's Standing Naval Force. We also positioned an Amphibious Ready Group to support operations in Afghanistan. These operations included the deployment of elements of 40 Commando to help secure the airbase at Bagram for the coalition.

32. As well as dealing with the immediate terrorist threat we are helping to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. Utilising its capabilities in deploying and organising expeditionary forces, the UK acted as Lead Nation for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for its initial six months. Originally authorised to deploy under UNSCR 1386, nineteen nations have contributed troops to ISAF, which at one point was some 5,000 strong. ISAF's initial role was to help stabilise Kabul, provide security assistance and assist the Afghans in

developing a safe environment in the lead up to the Loya Jurga in June.

33. As Lead Nation, the UK element was the largest at 1,800 personnel plus 300 airfield construction, operating and maintenance personnel. The success of ISAF prompted the UN to extend its authorisation to deploy for a further six months from 20 June, under UNSCR 1413. At the same time, Turkey confirmed its agreement to take over leadership of ISAF, in a demonstration of international burden sharing. Turkish forces have now replaced British forces in many of their roles, and our contribution to ISAF is reducing to about 400 troops, primarily engineers and logistics support personnel essential to the future operation of ISAF.

34. In April, the deployment to Bagram of around 1,700 personnel was based around 45 Commando Group (Task Force JACANA). This formed a balanced force with its own integral artillery, engineer, signals and logistics and air support. It began operations as part of a three-month deployment under the command of the US 10th Mountain Division. Task Force JACANA has completed four useful operations to gather intelligence, to destroy the terrorist infrastructure in South-East Afghanistan, and to prevent terrorist operations. In the course of those operations it destroyed 28 bunkers and caves, and over 45,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, as well as discovering a substantial quantity of weapons, ammunition and bomb-making equipment in a village compound.

(iv) Urgent Military Capability Enhancements

35. The Treasury has already made an additional £155M available to allow the Ministry of Defence to bring forward changes to our Armed Forces' equipment capabilities and to provide urgent equipment enhancements for operations in and around Afghanistan. These improvements have proved invaluable, providing the Armed Forces with important additional capability and increasing the safety and effectiveness of our Service personnel on operations. The key enhancements have been as follows:

- an improved ability to communicate securely and operate closely with US forces and other Allies. This includes secure links between our planning staffs, links between US Navy and RN ships deployed on Operation VERITAS, and significantly improved interoperability for key aircraft;
- improvements to our ability to collect intelligence from the air and at sea, and to process it in the UK;
- significant enhancements to the capability of our forces to meet the demanding requirements of the Afghanistan theatre.

36. We have been well-supported by industry in delivering these rapid enhancements, as well as in giving advice on what available technology might offer for future enhancements.

(v) Actions Taken at Home

37. Although the main contribution of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces to combating international terrorism since 11 September has been through our deployments overseas, we have also been building on our contribution to the defence and security of the UK. We have already taken a number of measures to enhance this contribution.

38. Within the UK, the Home Office takes the lead in Government in the response to terrorism. The lead for domestic security lies with the civil agencies, and the police in particular. In managing this form of criminal threat, the Home Office and police draw on other Departments and agencies, including the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.

39. The Armed Forces have always played an important part in the defence of the home base: the

RAF as the defender of our airspace and the Royal Navy and RAF with a key role in ensuring the integrity of our territorial waters. Immediately following 11 September, elements of the Armed Forces, including air defence fighters, were placed at increased readiness. We have also put in place a number of other enhancements to our response capabilities. Command and control arrangements have been improved to allow more rapid decisions, as have the means to detect, deter and if necessary ultimately to destroy aircraft which threaten the population of the UK.

40. Beyond these specific roles, we assist the Home Office in contributing towards the tried and tested mechanism for responding rapidly and effectively to terrorism in the UK, addressing prevention, crisis management and recovery. It combines the widest necessary range of expertise and resources. The MOD maintains a number of well practised and rehearsed counter terrorist contingency plans that can be put into effect at very short notice. The contingency plans cover the land, maritime and air environments and include, for instance, specialist capabilities to make safe CBRN devices. Sadly operations in Northern Ireland over the last 30 years have given the UK as much experience of how to deal with terrorism as any country in the world.

41. We have made a number of enhancements here too, contributing to those being made across Government, to:

- procedures for handling suspect packages which might contain chemical, biological or radioactive material;
- stocks of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence equipment, and the distribution of these stocks in the UK;
- command and control mechanisms for managing emergencies and civil crises;
- support to police training. As well as additional training provided direct to the police, implementation of the Home Office plan to form a Civil Police CBRN Training Unit, co-located with the Defence NBC Centre at Winterborne Gunner, was accelerated. The Home Office unit is now up and running;
- explosive ordnance disposal manpower and equipment.

42. These enhancements are in addition to those made as a result of the training and exercise programmes for those capabilities involved in counter-terrorist operations in support of the police. These programmes are designed to identify and implement, as a matter of routine, necessary enhancements to meet the evolving threat.

(vi) Actions by the United Nations, NATO and the European Union

43. A large number of international organisations have contributed to the campaign against international terrorism. Three key organisations for us are the United Nations, NATO and the European Union: each have already taken some significant actions.

44. The **UN** has, for example, passed several Security Council Resolutions, including ones imposing obligations on all states to suppress terrorist financing and deny terrorists safe havens in which to operate. It has set up a Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee chaired by the UK; and authorised the dispatch of the International Security Assistance Force to Kabul. In addition, other UN agencies have been active on humanitarian issues and in addressing the question of Afghanistan's reconstruction.

45. **NATO** declared the events of 11 September to be an attack on all members and invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its 52 year history. Since then it has taken a number of actions, including:

- deploying NATO airborne warning and control system aircraft to help patrol US airspace;
- deploying NATO standing naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean for reconnaissance and surveillance;
- employing NATO-led forces in the Balkans against terrorist groups with links to the Al Qa'ida network;
- enhancing intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and actions to be taken against it;
- opening of airspace to aircraft engaged in coalition operations.

The UK Armed Forces have been fully involved in these actions.

46. We plan to use the NATO Summit in Prague in November to drive forward the wider transformation of the Alliance to enhance its ability to provide protection against new threats, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

47. The **EU** held an emergency summit in Brussels on 21 September last year and by the end of the year had agreed some 80 separate measures, including:

- implementation of a common European arrest warrant;
- increased links between security services;
- measures to strengthen air security;
- co-operation on civil protection measures, including in the sphere of health security against bio-terrorism;
- co-operation to cut off terrorist finances.

48. At its Seville Summit in June, the EU set an agenda for further work to strengthen its contribution to combatting terrorism, including agreement to adapt the Headline Goal for the European Defence and Security Policy to give deployed forces better protection from terrorist attacks.

SECTION 4

Progress with SDR Implementation

49. The SDR set in hand a range of measures to give our Armed Forces the right posture and capabilities, many of which are relevant to our needs in the wake of the events of 11 September. We already have significantly improved capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance, rapid deployment, target acquisition, precision strike and effective command and control, all of which are highly relevant to the new strategic environment. Already planned capabilities such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the future aircraft carriers will enhance this further.

50. SDR implementation began in 1998 and will continue until well into the next decade. So far, we have completed over two-thirds of the key SDR measures, achieving a significant increase in capability. We have made good progress towards the more flexible and rapidly deployable expeditionary forces that the SDR saw were needed. We have significantly improved our:

- **strategic transport capabilities** by leasing four C17 aircraft pending the introduction of the multi-national A400M aircraft; by ordering a fleet of six modern roll-on, roll-off ferries in an innovative Private Finance Initiative arrangement; and by placing contracts for four new and improved landing ships;
- **force projection and strike capabilities** with the acquisition of smart weapons;
- **tactical mobility** through combining airborne and airmobile forces with the new Apache attack helicopter to form a new, highly capable air manoeuvre formation (16 Air Assault Brigade) trained and equipped to operate deep into enemy territory;
- **force protection** with the continued development of new and improved measures to protect against the CBRN threat, including working up the Joint NBC Regiment towards its full operational capability.

51. We are also investing in future strike capability with new aircraft carriers to replace the existing carriers from 2012. These will be able to act in a variety of roles and have the capacity to carry the RN/RAF Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FCJA) (planned to be the Joint Strike Fighter) and helicopters in a variety of configurations. The FCJA will also be able to operate from land bases.

52. We have also made good progress with a series of initiatives, launched by the SDR, to co-ordinate the activities of the three Services more closely, pooling their expertise and maximising their punch, while at the same time eliminating duplication and increasing efficiency.

53. In particular, we have:

- established the **Joint Rapid Reaction Force** to provide more capable, more deployable and better-supported joint forces with increased size and punch. Elements of the JRRF have operated successfully in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone, and the operational concept was proven in Saif Sareea II, the major exercise held in the Gulf of Oman in October 2001;

- restructured the Army's armoured and mechanised formations to create an **additional deployable brigade** (12 Mechanised Brigade);
- formed the **Joint Helicopter Command** which brings together all our attack, troop-carrying and heavy lift helicopters into a single force to improve operational flexibility;
- formed **Joint Force Harrier** which has demonstrated its operational effectiveness as an interim offensive capability;
- established the **Defence Logistics Organisation** to provide a more streamlined logistics service to the front line;
- established the **Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre** to champion a joint approach at the heart of our military thinking;
- reorganised the **Territorial Army** to make its unit and individual capability more relevant, usable and better integrated into our Armed Forces and defence plans, concentrating on specialist roles such as communications, equipment maintenance, logistics and medical support, while reducing its overall size. This will increase our ability to use the Reserves in more flexible ways at home or abroad to meet the new threats.

SECTION 5

Doctrine and Concepts

54. The New Chapter work has examined whether we have the right doctrine and concepts to employ our military capabilities to best effect against international terrorism.

55. The purpose of our military doctrine is to capture the fundamental principles of the British approach to warfare in order to guide the conduct of operations. Although our doctrine draws on historical experience, it is not dogma: it is dynamic and constantly tested against our operational experiences.

56. We have audited our national doctrine in the light of the new challenges presented by international terrorism and our initial operations against it. Our conclusion is that the principles on which our doctrine rests remain enduring. However, these principles must be applied in an agile and innovative manner by our commanders, both in the headquarters and the field, if we are to prevail against the complex, dynamic and elusive threat presented by international terrorism.

57. The UK's Armed Forces have evolved in the face of asymmetric strategies such as those employed by terrorists and we seek to exploit asymmetries ourselves. We also have considerable experience in countering terrorism, whether abroad in Malaya or Oman, or at home in the context of Northern Ireland. However, we must apply the key tenets derived from these operations against the new threat from terrorists operating internationally and seemingly without any restraint. In doing this we must seek to match the dynamism of our opponents, striving constantly to develop and exploit new techniques and methods to maintain our defences and to enhance our offensive operations.

58. We have already begun work to this end in two areas. Firstly, we are developing a new publication to capture the key elements of the UK military approach to counter-terrorist operations. This is in support of our capacity building efforts abroad and is aimed at improving the ability of other nations' armed forces to take effective and proportionate action against terrorist threats in their territory.

59. Secondly, we are updating our doctrine on peace support operations which is widely held in high regard. This aims to take into account the changing and increasingly complex strategic security environment (one which, for example, has seen us undertaking simultaneous peace support, humanitarian and counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan), and to reflect the added importance of effective peace support operations in helping to mitigate the conditions (including absence or failure of governance) within which terrorism can emerge and prosper.


60. The common understanding that shared doctrine provides is key to maximising the military effectiveness of coalition action against international terrorism. We are therefore engaging NATO, the EU and others on the basis of our thinking in order to shape the evolution of new multinational doctrine to combat international terrorism.

61. Additionally we are working to reflect the challenges of confronting non-state actors, both in terms of our high level concepts for future operations, and within the more discrete concepts being developed for the employment of new capabilities.

SECTION 6

A Conceptual Framework for the Military Contribution to the Campaign Against International Terrorism Abroad

62. The diagram below illustrates the range of effects that military action could contribute to the overall cross-Government and international campaign to eliminate terrorism as a force for change in international affairs.



(i) Knowledge Superiority

63. There are three strands to “knowledge superiority” in the context of countering international terrorism:

Detect. We need to detect the emergence and development of organisations intent on international terrorism using both intelligence and open sources. We then need to determine when and how they intend to conduct their attacks in order to counter them.

Understand. We need to understand the nature of the threat from international terrorism in terms of causes, motivations, intentions, capabilities, organisational structures, and value sets. This will allow us better to identify our vulnerabilities, target the weaknesses of our adversaries, and avoid unintended consequences from our actions.

Influence. We need to maintain public support for our actions, share our knowledge with allies and partners, and obstruct the understanding and decision-making of our opponents. And invariably we want to win the hearts and minds of the local populace away from supporting the terrorists, through effective information operations.

(ii) Prevent

64. A variety of Government activities, include Ministry of Defence activities, can help prevent the conditions that favour international terrorism in the first place, the development of terrorism once it has arisen, and its sponsorship by rogue regimes. The Government and the Ministry of Defence's wider conflict prevention activities are described at Section 2.2 of the main paper, but prevention focussed specifically on counter-terrorism broadly encompasses the following activities:

Persuade. We need to influence others through diplomacy, for example by: shaping the actions of our coalition allies or working with new partners in the fight against international terrorism; dissuading groups from adopting international terrorism as a strategy; or encouraging regimes to end their support for international terrorism. Our defence diplomacy activities have an important role to play here.

Build capacity. We can assist less capable states to develop the capacity to act effectively against international terrorist activity in their own territory through conflict prevention activities, such as military and civilian training, as well as security sector reform.

Stabilise. We can prevent security vacuums which international terrorist organisations could exploit, by undertaking peace support operations and by assisting in post-conflict recovery to help states achieve self-sustaining security.

(iii) Deter

65. We should seek to dissuade international terrorists and would-be state sponsors from attacking the UK and our allies by making clear our capability and willingness to respond. Again, how the Armed Forces can contribute here is set out in more detail in a Box following Section 2.2 of the main paper, but to deter effectively we must:

Communicate. We should ensure that potential attackers are clear that attacks against us will not secure political or military advantage, but will invite a proportionately serious response including holding the perpetrators personally to account.

Demonstrate. We should show that we have a wide range of options to draw on in order to reduce the likelihood of a successful attack and to respond following any attack. These include our significant military capabilities.

Respond. Should an attack nevertheless occur, we would respond in self defence with proportionately serious force and hold those responsible to account, in the process demonstrating our resolve to other would-be aggressors.

(iv) Coerce

66. We can attempt to force international terrorist organisations, and those regimes that continue to sponsor them, to stop their actions by the threat or use of military force. This may involve:

Demand. We can demand that organisations cease employing terrorism or supporting those that do so.

Threaten. We can back up this demand with the threat of military action if they do not cease these activities. The demonstration of effective military capability is key to this.

Force. If this threat is insufficient in itself, we may then need to employ military force (in accordance with the applicable law) until the adversary complies with our demands.

(v) Disrupt

67. We must aim to obstruct international terrorist organisations' ability to plan, organise, and execute attacks. Military capabilities can be used directly to disrupt the activities of terrorists in at least three areas:

Isolate. We can attempt to isolate them by targeting their sources and flows of finance, equipment and information. Specialist surveillance and maritime counter-drug operations are key examples of military contributions in this area.

Deny. We can track and obstruct the movement of their personnel and agents, deny them territory in which to operate unobstructed, and prevent their freedom of movement between locations.

Dislocate. We can keep international terrorist organisations off balance by attacking their physical infrastructure, including their training camps, weapons and supplies.

(vi) Destroy

68. We can use military action to seek to destroy terrorist cells, entire terrorist networks and, if necessary, state sponsored facilities and infrastructure supporting terrorism. This may involve:

Strike. We can use military force to strike decisively against individual terrorist cells. Although other elements might remain, such operations against key cells, such as those of Al Qa'ida in Afghanistan, could achieve sufficient impact to render the organisation incapable of significant activity.

Eliminate. We can strike against several cells at the same time, or in sequence, with the aim of collapsing entire terrorist networks.

69. There is thus a range of effects to counter international terrorism that we may want to achieve, acting alone or in coalition. Our ability to counter international terrorism will depend crucially on knowing when and how to employ these military effects, which can range from conflict prevention and capacity building to the employment of lethal force in strike operations against terrorist cells. Where use of force is justified, it is important that the conduct of military action is in accordance with our obligations under international humanitarian law.

SECTION 7

SDR New Chapter: Process

70. The New Chapter work has been split broadly into two phases. The first, from October last year to January this year, sought to establish a policy and conceptual framework, including setting the scope of the work and identifying the key issues and questions to be tackled. Our thinking in this phase was reflected in the discussion paper we published on 14 February. The second phase, more heavily focused on the potential capability and resource implications, considered a range of possible options for giving practical substance to the policy and conceptual framework.

71. In the work we wanted to build on the openness and inclusivity of the SDR. Work in each of the first two phases was undertaken by working groups led at senior official/senior military officer level and comprising representatives of key stakeholders, as well as individuals without everyday responsibilities for the issues but able to bring fresh perspectives to bear. The broad subject areas considered by the working groups were: strategic issues; overseas relations; deterrence; home defence and security; and overseas operations. The working groups also involved representatives from relevant other Government Departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Cabinet Office (including the Civil Contingencies Secretariat), the Treasury, the Department for International Development, the Department for Transport and the intelligence agencies. The Association of Chief Police Officers was also involved in the work. In addition, where appropriate the Working Groups drew on external academic expertise.

72. Throughout the work we have sought to gather external views and keep Parliament and the public informed of progress. The Secretary of State for Defence launched the work with speeches at the Labour Party Conference on 2 October and in the House of Commons on 4 October. He then set out more fully the scope of the work, the issues being addressed and some emerging elements of the policy and conceptual framework in a speech at King's College London on 5 December.

73. As promised, we then published a discussion paper on 14 February setting out more of our thinking, and seeking views on a range of the key questions. A summary of the responses we received is at Section 8. Shortly after that, we held an invited seminar, led by the Secretary of State for Defence, at the University of Birmingham on 28 February, to discuss the paper. Those present included the Conservative Defence Spokesman, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, academics, representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations (International Alert and Save the Children Fund UK), Muslim representation, and representatives from the Reserves, the Police and other Government Departments. More generally, throughout the process we also debated our emerging ideas at a number of academic institutions, and with other groups.

74. The Secretary of State for Defence subsequently gave a further indication of our thinking in a speech at the National Liberal Club on 23 May. On 12 June, we then published a further discussion document setting out our proposals for additional roles for the Volunteer Reserves in assisting the civil authorities in home defence and security tasks, and seeking views on these.

75. Finally, and importantly, we have sought throughout the process to keep our allies and partners informed, both bilaterally and through NATO and EU meetings. The Secretary of State for Defence sent the 14 February discussion paper to a wide range of allies and partners, a number of whom offered responses.

SECTION 8

Summary of Responses to Discussion Paper Published in February

76. We published a discussion paper on the SDR New Chapter work on 14 February. This, together with a summary pamphlet, was distributed nation-wide to all 470 local authorities; to all public libraries; to all members of the two Houses of Parliament; to academics and other interested parties; and to allies and partners. The discussion paper was also published on the Ministry of Defence's external and internal websites. A deadline of 15 March was set for responses, although we have considered those received after that date.

77. Responses were received from the following main groups:

Parliamentarians	8
Local Authorities	22
Academics	14
Other Governments	11
Non-Governmental Organisations	9
Industry	3
Public	185
Total	252

78. The responses received were copied to the relevant working groups, depending on the points raised, so that the ideas, suggestions and views could be considered. Each response was acknowledged, by post or e-mail, in all cases where a return address was provided (some were anonymous). We also received a number of responses from Ministry of Defence personnel.

79. The general approach of responses to the discussion paper was constructive, with some substantial papers submitted. In addition, debate continued on the Ministry of Defence's new internal electronic "bulletin board" with over 3,000 messages being posted, giving comments and raising questions.

80. The following identifies some of the key points addressed in the responses we received:

(i) OVERALL

- The SDR was seen as a sound piece of work and the work on the New Chapter was broadly welcomed.
- There was support for the Armed Forces operating abroad and the need for rapid effect and high readiness forces.
- There were a variety of opinions over the UK's exact role and those of the UN, NATO and the EU in combating international terrorism.
- There was a strong concern from members of the public over the threat of terrorist attacks in the UK, aligned with support for the Armed Forces playing a role in preventing them.

- There was a wide range of views on the role of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in combating terrorism in the UK, with some saying that it was an issue for the civil authorities and others saying that the MOD should be in the lead.
- There was strong support for an increased role for the Reserves (particularly the Territorial Army (TA)) in home defence.
- Some concerns were expressed about Armed Forces' overstretch.
- There was some scepticism about the adequacy of resources available for Defence.
- There was also some scepticism about the effectiveness of cross-Government co-ordination, particularly for home defence.
- There was a suggestion that many Muslims resident in Britain felt detached from the Government's approach since 11 September.

(ii) STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Terrorism

- A number of academics questioned whether international terrorism really poses a strategic threat, ie whether it actually threatens international security.
- Some commented that the UK was seen as a sanctuary for terrorists.

Legal Issues

- There were a variety of opinions ranging from those that emphasised the primacy of international law to those that saw it as so general a concept as to have little practical meaning. On the whole the view was that conformity to international law was essential to provide legitimacy for action and reduce the potential to provide a cause of further terrorism.

Risks

- Concerns were expressed that current and future actions could result in reprisal attacks against the US and its allies.

Causes and Symptoms

- There was almost unanimous support for more treatment of the causes of terrorism, but there was also recognition that this was not solely a MOD task.
- A range of causes was suggested, mainly relating to the Middle East and perceived injustice (poverty, unrepresentative government, ethnic/religious intolerance) in general. The UK was identified by some as a supporter of bad governance and corrupt regimes, with that suggested as a reason for the UK being a target for international terrorism.
- There was a lot of support for more defence diplomacy in treating the causes, because of its perceived large area of engagement, high degree of influence and low cost.
- Some saw perceptions of US cultural and economic imperialism, support of Israel and unfair treatment of others, particularly Muslims, as providing an environment in which terrorists can multiply and thrive.

(iii) OVERSEAS RELATIONS

Role of Organisations

- A number of replies said that the UN could provide the required legitimacy for operations. It was important that the UK did not act without this legitimacy. The UN also had a humanitarian role.
- Almost equal numbers of responses supported an increased role for NATO or supported the EU in a military role, but there were few that advocated both. What was clear was that they should not duplicate each other. Those that supported NATO suggested that the EU was too weak and lacked capability, while those that supported the EU said that NATO could not deliver consensus or was not configured for a counter-terrorism role.
- There were many suggestions for increasing our use of the Commonwealth.
- One or two responses suggested that, rather than trying to use existing organisations to undertake counter-terrorism activities, a new (unspecified) one should be established.

Allies and Partners

- There was little support for the view that partners or allies should be used to provide military reach. Most who commented on the subject thought that the UK should have its own capabilities. Reach would be obtained from air transport and air-to-air refuelling.
- One view was that role specialisation would leave the UK vulnerable if there were no coalition partners covering those military roles we no longer possess.
- Some suggested that the UK's military capability to intervene has a direct relationship with our influence on US global security policy. But others argued that the UK should avoid being a "deputy to the US's world policeman".
- A number of responses said that we should play to our strengths, eg high capability rapid reaction forces, in contributing to solutions to international problems.

Security Sector Reform

- Those that addressed this agreed that it was a good idea, and suggested that areas for security sector reform work should include Africa, the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent.

Deterrence

- A few responses specifically mentioned deterrence, and were primarily concerned with reviewing the requirement for, and role and posture of, the UK nuclear deterrent in the post-11 September security environment.

(iv) COUNTERING TERRORISM ABROAD

- There was a high level of support for the UK continuing to operate overseas (and for the balance of UK military effort to be overseas). This was tempered with concerns about potential overstretch. The UK could not take on the role of the world's policeman.
- There was particularly strong support for peace support operations, at which we were viewed as being world leaders.

- There was support for deploying abroad in order to defeat terrorists as far from home as possible.
- Some suggested that the core regions of UK interest identified in the SDR (Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean) were not adequate, as they did not fully cover the geographic sources of international terrorism.
- Rapid effect and high readiness were seen as key by many.

(v) HOME DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Reserves

- Many welcomed an increased role for the Reserves/TA in support of the civil authorities.
- Some thought home defence should be the primary mission for the Reserves (instead of supporting the Regular Forces). Others strongly opposed this, and said that, if a home defence role was established for the Reserves, this should not be at the expense of Reserves augmenting the Regular Forces on overseas deployments.
- Local authority responses expressed a strong desire to be better aware of, and make better use of, Reserve (and Regular) capabilities in the full range of pre- and post-incident activities.
- Concern was expressed about civilian job protection and call-up mechanisms.
- Some responses expressed anger at reductions in the TA over the years.
- Some thought that there is a role for the Reserves in raising public awareness at a local level of defence issues, including the threat from terrorism, and also in recruiting to the Regular Forces.

(vi) CROSS-GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION

- A number of responses suggested that co-ordination of “national security” issues, at all levels of government, is poor. A variety of suggestions were made, for example forming a UK National Security Council or a military command for home defence.
- There were some suggestions that MOD should take more of the lead at the Government level in home defence issues.
- Local authorities were very keen to have a clearer joint local and regional emergency planning architecture between them and the Armed Forces.
- Local authorities were not happy with having to pay the additional costs when they call on military personnel and assets¹.

¹ These are not charged when there is a danger to human life; but are for other tasks such as protecting property.

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