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M8	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement, implemented by combatant command's J-2 within 120 days.
M9	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations, specifically directed to combatant command individuals responsible for implementing any changes.
M10	Percent	Of subordinate joint force intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to theater strategic level intelligence activities.
M11	Percent	Of time dedicated to combatant command's intelligence evaluation, evaluated staff spends in interviews and data collection.
M12	Weeks	To provide final feedback, commendations, and recommended corrective actions after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.
M13	Hours	To provide initial feedback after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.

ST 3 EMPLOY THEATER STRATEGIC FIREPOWER.

To deliver firepower through available theater positions, units, or weapons systems. Theater firepower is the application of lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the desired impact in the conduct of theater strategy, theater campaigns, and joint operations. Theater strategic firepower may involve Service, joint, or multinational forces. Theater strategic firepower would be coordinated with maneuver in a campaign as a coequal component. Such firepower may be independent of land or sea maneuver. (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-52) (JP 1, 3-0, 3-05)

M1	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by forces from outside theater.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs receive desired damage levels on initial attack.

ST 3.1 Process Theater Strategic Targets.

To positively identify and select land, sea, air and space (e.g., ground stations, launch capability) targets that have a major and possibly decisive impact on achieving strategic objectives, such as WMD systems. It includes matching appropriate joint or multinational firepower to such targets. These targets include, but are not limited to, those found in nonstrategic nuclear strike plans. Theater targeting should be coordinated with national level targeting. In military operations other than war, the employment of theater strategic firepower may be restricted. (JP 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-03) (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-03, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	For issuance of CINC's apportionment guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	For identification of enemy's center of gravity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	For issuance of CINC's HPT categories (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	For issuance of CINC's prohibited target guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	For issuance of FSC measures guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To develop plan to attack target, after identification as HPT.
M7	Percent	Difference between JTCB target priorities and those in CINC and NCA guidance.

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M8	Percent	Of desired results, achieved by theater strategic firepower within specified time/phase.
M9	Percent	Of mobile targets, passed to attack assets quickly enough to allow effective ordnance delivery.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets have DMPs identified.
M11	Percent	Of selected targets have suitable munitions available in theater.
M12	Percent	Of selected targets have vital areas identified.
M13	Percent	Of targets selected by JTCB, reviewed for political ramifications.
M14	Percent	Of targets best served by nonlethal means, allocated to attack by nonlethal systems.
M15	Percent	Of time, JTCB guidance passed to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC), before ATO cycle begins.
M16	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD available).
M17	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).
M18	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M19	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M20	Hours	Identify and select targets that have a major and possibly decisive impact on achieving nuclear strategic objectives as contained in approved guidance.
M21	Percent	Of targets selected by JTCB, reviewed for compliance with ROE, law, and policy.

ST 3.1.1 Select Strategic Targets in the Theater for Attack.

To evaluate each strategic target to determine if and when it should be attacked for optimum effect on enemy centers of gravity, strategic decisive points, and in conformance with the combatant commander's strategic concept and intent. Included here are the destruction and degradation of enemy IO means and WMD production, infrastructure, and delivery systems. (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03)
(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

Note: Important associated activities are found under ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance* and ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)*. Air targets include offensive counterair but do not include air defense or defensive counterair targets: these are covered under ST 6, *Coordinate Theater Force Protection*.

M1	Days	Until phased theater strategic attack plan available for execution.
M2	Hours	To revise phased theater strategic attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy decisive points have developed strategic targets.
M4	Percent	Of enemy decisive points, translated into HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of known enemy IO capability, targeted for strategic attack.
M6	Percent	Of known enemy NBC capability, targeted for strategic attack.

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M7	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, had desired effect on enemy Center of Gravity.
M8	Percent	Of target sequence reflects JTCB priorities.
M9	Percent	Of targets, reviewed for collateral damage and political ramifications.
M10	Percent	Of targets selected, deemed illegal for attack.
M11	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, cause political consequences outweighing strategic benefits.
M12	Percent	Of targets selected reflect NCA and combatant commander's guidance.
M13	Percent	Of theater strategic HPTs (discovered within execution cycle) reprioritized.
M14	Weeks	To initially prepare theater strategic target list (during deliberate planning).
M15	Percent	Comply with guidance concerning selection of nuclear targets and their inclusion in respective CONPLANS/OPLANS; evaluate each target to determine if and when it should be attacked with nuclear weapons for optimum effect on enemy centers of gravity, strategic decisive points, and conformance with the combatant commander's intent.
M16	Hours	Request a Theater Planning Response Cell (TPRC)
M17	Instances	Brief and explain the Theater Nuclear Planning Document (TNPD), if available, and the advantages and disadvantages of the nuclear weapons systems available for each target in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04.

ST 3.1.2 Assign Joint/Multinational Theater Firepower to Targets/Target Sets.

To assign theater strategic firepower resources to classes or types of strategic targets, or targets themselves, in accordance with the theater combatant commander's strategic plan and intent. Task includes assigning targets/target sets to the appropriate joint force component. (JP 3-0, 3-03) (JP 3-0, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To complete targeting cycle.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.
M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective not neutralized (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments, appealed to JFC.
M5	Percent	Mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations, delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified because of improper firepower allocation.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets (not targets of opportunity), coordinated by JTCB.

ST 3.1.3 Conduct Theater Combat Assessment.

To determine the overall effectiveness of Service, joint, and multinational attacks employed in the theater, as it relates to the joint force commander's (JFC) campaign objectives. This task includes assessing theater battle

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damage, munitions effects, consequence analysis for WMD targets (as necessary), reassessing mission requirements (e.g., reattack the target), and analyzing/reporting the effects of combat missions in achieving the JFC's campaign objectives. It includes an evaluation of all force employment's tasked with supporting the theater campaign plan. (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1)
(JP 2-0, 3-05.5, 3-13.1, 3-56.1)

M1	Hours	To establish coordination process between collection elements and targeting elements (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	To provide integrated national and theater assets combat assessments (after execution of first combat fires TOT).
M3	Hours	From receipt of imagery until BDA report.
M4	Hours	To conduct theater BDA (from time attack completed).
M5	Hours	To submit recommendations for reattack (from original TOT).
M6	Percent	Difference between theater and national BDA estimates.
M7	Percent	Of available operational sources (e.g., HUD video), integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M8	Percent	Of reconnaissance assets, employed in theater BDA.
M9	Percent	Of targets correctly assessed as destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed.
M10	Percent	Of targets have applicable operational sources (e.g., HUD video) integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M11	Percent	Of targets, restruct unnecessarily.
M12	Hours	To prepare estimates of collateral effects from attacks on WMD targets.

ST 3.2 Attack Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets.

To attack the enemy to destroy or neutralize strategic level targets/target sets and to shape and control the tempo of theater campaigns and joint operations, using all available Service, joint, and allied/coalition firepower assets against land, air (including space), and maritime (surface and subsurface) targets having strategic significance. (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1) (JP 3-0)

M1	Percent	Of missions that violate the ROE.
M2	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOPs units in theater (after initial landings).
M3	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.
M4	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW, support requests unfilled.
M6	Percent	Of all available joint and allied firepower assets, considered for use in development of master attack plan.
M7	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target and deliver ordnance.
M8	Percent	Of friendly attacking manned weapons systems, lost during mission.
M9	Percent	Of friendly operations employ nonlethal systems.
M10	Percent	Of operations and operational phases, covered by deception plan.
M11	Percent	Of reattacked targets destroyed by reattacking mission.

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M12	Percent	Of target sets assigned to inappropriate strike assets.
M13	Percent	Of targets destroyed by first assigned friendly mission.

ST 3.2.1 Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Lethal Means.

To engage strategic targets (other than air defense or defensive counter air targets) with available Service, joint, and allied/coalition delivery systems, delivering lethal ordnance. Lethal means may include among other operations forcible entry, direct action, unconventional warfare, information, and theater of war operations in depth. Paramount consideration must be given to how best to hold at risk what the enemy values most. The objective of such attacks may be to delay, disrupt, defeat, destroy, or degrade enemy forces and to affect the enemy's will to fight for strategic results. Alternatively, the objective may be to damage or destroy critical facilities (including C4I and WMD targets) or to delay, disrupt or degrade critical tasks, achieving strategic results. Means may include surface and subsurface land and sea based joint and multinational theater systems and air and space forces (aircraft, missiles, helicopters, UAV, space vehicles). This activity includes the attack of offensive counterair targets. (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1) (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3)

Note: This task may support ST 1.6, *Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s)* and ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Loss rate for attacking systems (of total sorties).
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of attacked targets incurring desired damage levels.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled time, used for execution of strategic target program.
M5	Percent	Of enemy WMD capability destroyed.
M6	Y/N	Engage targets with available nuclear delivery systems to delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy forces and the enemy's will to fight or overcome a critical enemy advantage gained as the result of enemy use of WMD.

ST 3.2.2 Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Nonlethal Means.

To engage strategic land, sea, air, and space (less air defense) targets with joint and multinational means designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy forces, activities, and facilities to achieve strategic results. These means include the use of electronic warfare, military deception, OPSEC, computer network, psychological operations, and special operations forces. Nonlethal means also includes employment of PSYOP activities as part of counterinsurgency efforts in military operations other than war. In these cases the objective is to foster favorable attitudes toward the host nation and modifies insurgent behavior. (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-11, 3-13.1, 3-56.1) (JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-53, 3-54, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01)

Note: This task may support ST 1.6, *Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s)*, ST 1.6.4, *Gain and Maintain Information Superiority in Theater*, and ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (after initial landings).
M2	Hours	To establish Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To establish and integrate IO cell into planning process (after CJCS Warning Order).

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M4	Hours	Until combatant commander requests and coordinates PSYOP, EW, and deception appropriate element, activity and joint agency support to JTF components IO cells (after establishment of JTF).
M5	Instances	Of information warfare (IW) IO planners, not being included in campaign planning inner circle (from warning order).
M6	Percent	Of increase in support for US activity in country of operation resulting from PSYOP efforts.
M7	Percent	Of theater strategy, OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated theater PSYOP plan.
M8	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW, support requests unfilled.
M9	Percent	Of all targets, evaluated by JTCB as candidates for attack using nonlethal means.
M10	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M11	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M12	Percent	Of time nonlethal means are integrated into daily ATO.
M13	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO element or activity actions causing disruption or delay of theater plans and objectives.
M14	Percent	Of theater IO objectives verifiably achieved.

ST 3.2.2.1 Conduct Theater Psychological Activities.

To conduct theater-wide psychological activities to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries or groups to wage war (or insurgencies). Psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of theater strategic operations exploit vulnerabilities of foreign governments, military forces, and populations to advance broad or long-term national and theater strategic objectives. This task includes ensuring theater conformance with national military and theater PSYOP policy and programs. (JP 3-0, 3-53) (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-61, CJCSI 3110.05, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To devise PSYOP plan (when none exists).
M2	Hours	From warning order until PSYOP efforts begin in JOA (in crisis).
M3	Hours	To revise/confirm PSYOP plan (after warning order in crisis).
M4	Hours	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (from C-Day and L-Hour).
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host nation.
M6	Instances	Of PSYOP effort failing to portray forces as NBC trained and ready.
M7	Y/N	Target information-gathering interests and activities identified.
M8	Y/N	Use of host-nation resources and non-PSYOP military assets for media production of PSYOP products.
M9	Y/N	Use host nation and US Country Teams to gain local support.
M10	Y/N	Impact of the effects of terrain, weather, and NBC environment on forces, equipment, and planned method of dissemination of PSYOP products.

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M11	Y/N	Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information to support unit operations officers and other PSYOP planners. (1) Enemy PSYOP activity. (2) Apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities. (3) Any anticipated changes to ongoing activity.
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ST 3.2.2.2 Conduct Theater Electronic Attack (EA).

To conduct attacks involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy, to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy forces, activities, and facilities, to achieve strategic results. (JP 3-0) (JP 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-51, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To create frequency deconfliction plan.
M2	Hours	Delay in enemy action at theater or strategic level because of EA attack.
M3	Percent	Of overall effort, devoted to EA.
M4	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks, actually conducted.

ST 3.2.2.3 Attack Theater Information Systems.

To employ offensive information warfare capabilities to achieve theater objectives. (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03) (JP 3-13.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of decrease in enemy message traffic on command nets after one week of IW/C2W attack.
M2	Percent	Of decrease in significant enemy message traffic on command nets after initial IW/C2W attack.
M3	Percent	Of adversary information conduits, penetrated, corrupted, or monitored.
M4	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, attacked.
M5	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, in HPT category.
M6	Percent	Of fixed location enemy C2 facilities, destroyed within one hour.
M7	Percent	Of selected access programs, employed with intended effect.
M8	Weeks	To achieve information superiority in theater.

ST 3.2.3 Synchronize Theater Strategic Firepower.

To synchronize theater attacks on single or multiple theater targets of strategic significance at the decisive time and place. Synchronization is simultaneously across strategic targets and to strategic depths. This synchronization includes lethal and nonlethal means, to include friendly information operations, and the minimizing of their effect on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants. It also includes integrating theater strategic firepower with national military strategic firepower and operational firepower within the theater to ensure unity of effort, and not to disrupt supporting campaigns and major operations, or to reveal friendly force intentions at any level. (JP 3-0) (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)

Note: Full synchronization requires consideration of actions under SN 3.2, *Manage National Strategic Firepower*, ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*, and OP 3.2.7, *Synchronize Operational Firepower*

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M1	Casualties	Caused by friendly fires.
M2	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective (from original TOT).
M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic target (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of national strategic missions aborted because lack of necessary theater/JOA support.
M5	Instances	Of operational, strategic theater, and strategic national fires, not integrated into attack plan.
M6	Instances	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M7	Instances	Of strategic attacks originating from out of theater, not synchronized with those tasked from within theater.
M8	Percent	Of attacks, deconflicted with friendly forces operating in AO.
M9	Percent	Of enemy offensive capability, diverted to defensive reaction.
M10	Percent	Of failed attacks on HPTs, attributed to lack of integration of fires assets.
M11	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly fires.
M12	Percent	Of HPTs, attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M13	Percent	Of operational attacks, aborted because of planned, but unavailable theater support.
M14	Percent	Of SOF missions, executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M15	Percent	Of strategic national assets, used to attack targets suited to available theater assets.
M16	Percent	Of strategic national missions, aborted because of lack of necessary theater support.
M17	Percent	Of theater assets, used to attack targets better suited to available operational assets.
M18	Y/N	Integrate theater attacks on single or multiple theater targets of strategic significance.
M19	Instances	Provide support to combatant CINCs in fulfilling supported CINC nuclear requests as identified in the EAP-CJCS.
M20	Days	Request nuclear planning in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04 and EAP-CJCS.
M21	Hours	Request a theater nuclear strike in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04 and EAP-CJCS.
M22	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of USCINCEUR's relationship with NATO with respect to EAMs that result from a NATO involved conflict at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M23	Instances	Minimize collateral damage, civilian casualties, and fratricide using STRIKEWARN messages or other communications to notify intent of attack.

ST 4 SUSTAIN THEATER FORCES.

To perform logistical support activities in the theater required to sustain the force. Logistical support activities will aid in the execution of theater strategy, campaigns, joint and multinational operations, using all available resources (Service, civilian, host nation). Obtaining sustainment can also refer to support from sources other than Service