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CRISIS STABILITY GUIDANCE

- JCSP ANNEX C, FY 89-90
 - US MUST NOT BE UNDER PRESSURE TO EMPLOY VULNERABLE FORCES
 - SOVIETS MUST NOT BE PROVIDED ANY INCENTIVE TO INITIATE A NUCLEAR ATTACK
 - REQUIRES THAT THE US:
 - REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES IN ITS FORCES
 - REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES IN ITS C3I SYSTEMS
 - IMPROVE ABILITY TO OBTAIN AND REACT TO WARNING
 - IMPROVE ABILITY TO DETECT AND ASSESS A SOVIET ATTACK
- JCSP ANNEX C, FY 91-92
 - CRISIS STABILITY REQUIRES THAT NO NUCLEAR POWER IS UNDER PRESSURE TO INITIATE NUCLEAR WAR TO PROTECT VULNERABLE FORCES

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CRISIS STABILITY

- REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR IN A CRISIS SITUATION
 - GOAL: REDUCE "PERCEIVED" ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST
- STABILIZING ACTIONS
 - MAKE FORCES MORE SURVIVABLE
 - REDUCE FIRST STRIKE "COUNTER FORCE" CAPABILITY
- DESTABILIZING ACTIONS
 - INCREASE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
 - DEPLOY FORCES IN LESS SURVIVABLE MODES

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 - PROTECT VULNERABLE FORCES

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Post START II Arms Reduction Warfighter's Assessment

~~Created: 30 Dec 96~~

~~Deriv From: USSTR/~~

~~Decl on: Source Ma~~

~~Date of O:~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OBJECTIVE

- Analyze the impact of reducti strategic arms to a level of [2 weapons from a “warfighter’s” perspective. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Guidance (u)



Forces (u)


Targeting (u)

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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
US / OTHER NUCLEAR NATIONS



B1
B5
455c

—SNDVS — WPNS

SOURCE: 644 SIW, UK LIAISON OFFICE

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TABLE OF 1974 DUES ON A 102/INSTALLATION BASIS

	7400	7401	7402	7403	7404	7405	7406	7407	7408	7409	7410	7411	7412	7413	7414	7415	7416	7417	7418	7419	7420	7421	7422	7423	7424	7425	7426	7427	7428	7429	7430	7431	7432	7433	7434	7435	7436	7437	7438	7439	7440	7441	7442	7443	7444	7445	7446	7447	7448	7449	7450
1000	5200	5300	5400	5250	5100	4950	4800	4650	4500	4350	4200	4050	3900	3750	3600	3450	3300	3150	3000	2850	2700	2550	2400	2250	2100	1950	1800	1650	1500	1450	1400	1350	1300	1250	1200	1150	1100	1050	1000	950	900	850	800	750	700	650	600	550	500		
1001	5200	5300	5400	5250	5100	4950	4800	4650	4500	4350	4200	4050	3900	3750	3600	3450	3300	3150	3000	2850	2700	2550	2400	2250	2100	1950	1800	1650	1500	1450	1400	1350	1300	1250	1200	1150	1100	1050	1000	950	900	850	800	750	700	650	600	550	500		

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Observations

- * Hedging in the traditional TRIAD concept will be much more important in the future.
- * The TWIN TRIAD concept places the initial day-to-day deterrence burden on the two ballistic legs.
 - ** The bomber leg augments their attack as needed and hedges against the failure of one ballistic leg.
- * Balance between the ballistic missile legs (ICBM/SLBM) permits a consistent bomber hedge requirement.

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Observations (Cont.)

- * The Secure Reserve is not a hedge. (l
 - ** It is mostly SLBMs, most enduring assets.
 - ** Cannot hedge against failure of SLBMs in the basic attack.
- * The decline of the overall target base gives us the chance to use bombers in a real TRIAD hedge role for the first time.
- * Placing the bomber force in this role allows the use of the bomber to swing as needed between the TWIN TRIADS. It makes both the TRIAD and the TWIN TRIADS possible.

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Step 6 (Cont.) Calculating Hedges

Hedging the loss of the ICBM leg:

- * 4 ICBMs (PA=.75) provide 3 arriving weapons to the basic attack.
- * 6 bomber weapons (PA=.50, 3 arriving wpns) hedge the loss of the 4 ICBMs.

Hedging the loss of the SLBM leg:

- * 3 SLBMs (PA=.75) provide 2.25 arriving weapons to the basic attack.
- * 5 bomber weapons (PA=.50, 2.5 arriving wpns) hedge the loss of the 3 SLBMs.

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Step 6 (Cont.)

How could a leg fail?

- * Associated with PLS:
 - ** a communications failure could make the → *Launch on warning*
 - ** a breakthrough could make the ocean transparent to satellites
- * Associated with WSR:
 - ** a design flaw in the Minuteman III or Trident II missile of the associated nuclear weapons



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STEP 3

Special Weapons

- * Given the high quality of today's weapons, we can generally assume that if any weapon arrives, it will accomplish the task required
- * Those few situations that call for qualities beyond the average weapon are handled by exception



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Phoenix



Step 5 Reserves

- * Traditionally, we have held a portion of our most survivable forces in a secure reserve.
- * The secure reserve handles contingency and gives limited restrike capability.
- * For our example, suppose the standard were to set aside 25% of our SLBM force.
- * We must consider the removal of this force from the basic attack.

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→ Summary
 case in question is 1970s
 → ~~ATX plan~~
 note missile per

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(
 STRIKE

- MINUTEMAN
- CORNERSTONE OF 1960s NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
- SURVIVABLE
- PROMPT
- ECONOMIC TO OPERATE
- EFFECTIVE
- UNDERGROUND, HARDENED, DISPERSED LAUNCHERS
- CAPABLE OF RIDING OUT A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

ICBM HISTORY (cont)




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HARD TARGET KILL

WEAPONS AVAILABLE




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Signatures

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PARITY AND STABILITY ANALYSIS

- **Advantage Ratios - US vs Russia comparison**
 - Delivery vehicles
 - Weapons
 - Megatonnage
 - Hard target kill
- **Stability Measures**
 - Stability index
 - Sensitivity to generate
 - Sensitivity to Prompt Retaliatory Launch
 - Second Strike Dialect
 - Incentive Index
 - Drawdown curves



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(U) In-depth analysis of US-Russia parity and various measures of stability provided interesting results; however, the measures did not discriminate between the force options.

(U) In considering US-Russia parity, advantage ratios were calculated for delivery vehicles, weapons, Megatonnage (MT), Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT), Hard Target Kill (HTK), and Time Urgent Hard Target Kill (TU HTK). The ratios were calculated for each force option for each year from 1994-2003. We will show you the results for 1994 and 2003 only and explain why we feel advantage ratios should be considered as non-discriminating. *S-BA/W88*

(U) A number of different stability measures were considered. The measures listed are the products of "think tanks" such as RAND Corporation and the national labs, and are quite complex. We will show you one measure, the Stability Index and explain our conclusions.

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— Page 39

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CHINA SCENARIOS

- 2 POTENTIAL US/CHINA ADVERSARIAL SCENARIOS IDENTIFIED
- 1ST SCENARIO DEPICTS A US/NK/CHINA EXCHANGE
 - REGIONAL AS OPPOSED TO GLOBAL CONCERN
 - CALLS FOR AN ADAPTIVELY PLANNED RESPONSE AGAINST NK
 - » NOT A FULL SCALE ATTACK AGAINST CHINA
 - DPF, NSNF, OR CONVENTIONAL (CALCM/TLAM-C) RESPONSE MORE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION
- 2ND SCENARIO FOCUSES ON A CHINA/CONUS CONFRONTATION
 - IMPLIES A NEED FOR A MAJOR-ATTACK RESPONSE

DPF?
NSNF

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Phrens

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AT REDUCED WEAPONS LEVELS

- LOWER INCENTIVE TO STRIKE FIRST
 - APPROACHING 1:1 EXCHANGE RATIO
 - AT "BEST" INITIATOR REMOVES BOTH ARSENALS
 - BETTING OPPONENT WILL RIDEOUT ATTACK
 - AT "WORST" INITIATOR ATTACKS EMPTY HOLES
- GPALS FURTHER DEINCENTIVIZES AGAINST FIRST STRIKE
 - ADDS UNCERTAINTY TO WAR PLANNER
 - SOME RVs GET DESTROYED

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Step 6 (Cont.)

Calculating Hedges]

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OLD VISION ... FUTURE WORLD

OLD VISION...CURRENT DIRECTION

- TOWARDS FEWER SILOS
 - EMPHASIS ON VULNERABILITY (TO LARGE ATTACK)
 - FOCUS ON MOBILITY (PKRG, SIGBM, TRIDENT SSBN)

FUTURE WORLD CONDITIONS

- EMPHASIS ON MOBILITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH NEW WORLD ORDER
- THREAT TO SILOS NOW REDUCED AND NUMERICALLY LIMITED
- NO CONSIDERATION OF GPALS
- CHANGE IN RISK TOLERANCE
- GIVEN SHRINKING DEFENSE BUDGET & SMALLER TRIAD BUDGET
 - FOCUS SHOULD BE ON LOWER COST SYSTEMS WITH ADEQUATE CAPABILITY
- TRIDENTS
 - TOO MANY EGGS IN TOO FEW BASKETS (WORSE AT START II)
- SHIFT IN DIRECTION
 - AWAY FROM MOBILITY -- HIGH COST/NEW SYSTEM
 - TOWARDS SILOS -- LOW COST/PROVEN TECHNOLOGY

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B1, B5

USSC

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- UNAMBIGUOUS ATTACK INDICATIONS
- SECURE FROM UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACKS (TERRI
- SOVEREIGN BASING
- WSR + CEP + YIELD = PROMPT HARD TARGET KILL
- ACCURATE AND EFFECTIVE
- REDUNDANT
- SECURE
- RAPID
- COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY
- 30 MINUTE TOF
- RAPID RESPONSE

Historical ICBM Strengths

WHY ICBMS?



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6000

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02 SEP 1992

Reply To:
J000
USSTRATCOM
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Renaming the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

^U
(S) Given the significant changes introduced by recent guidance, and the definitive departure from Cold War thinking signalled therein, I have decided to rename the SIOP. This document is evolving to a collection of far more differentiated retaliatory choices, tailored to a threat environment of greater nuance and complexity. Therefore, in future correspondence we will use the title, "National Strategic Response Plans," to refer to this diverse family of options. The title, "SIOP-93," will be retained until the impending major revision is completed over the next several months.

24 Nov. 97 - 97/644
Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen
DEC. 18, 97.

George L. Butler
GEORGE L. BUTLER
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

~~Classified By: USSTRATCOM/J000~~
~~Declassify: OADR~~

THIS DOCUMENT WAS TOTALLY DECLASSIFIED AND
RELEASED AS PART OF USSTRATCOM FOIA CASE #98-24

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:
USSTRATCOM/J0734
901 SAC BLVD STE 1E5
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6073

12 December 1997

Mr. Hans M. Kristensen
1927 Tulare Avenue
Richmond CA 94805-2024

97-64h

Reference your 24 November 1997 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (97-64h) for "Documents relating to the National Strategic Response Plan...."

A search of USSTRATCOM records revealed the only documents referencing National Strategic Response Plan(s) were a USSTRATCOM Form 915/1 (USSTRATCOM ACTION PROCESSING FORM), 3 Aug 92, and an accompanying memorandum, 2 Sep 92, signed by General Butler, CINCSTRAT. The two documents indicated the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) would thereafter be referred to as the National Strategic Response Plans. Although the memorandum purports to announce a new name for the SIOP, the name never changed and there is no indication in the records why the change was never made. //

Attached are copies of the documents described above.

Pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 5400.7-R, Chapter 6, paragraph 6-103, we waive fees associated with this request.

A. F. KREMER
Command FOIA Manager
Office of the Chief, Information Management

Attachment
As stated


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prob x Korea

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TIME REQUIRED TO STRIKE STRATEGIC TARGET SET

SCENARIO 2



SOURCE: AF/XOX


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SSBN ALERT CAPABILITY

- RANGE OF D-5 MISSILE
 - W88 WARHEAD USED
- TIME TO MOVE INTO RANGE
- MAINTAINING ALERT TARGET PACKAGES
 - SINGLE AND TWO OCEAN CASES

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(U) The next three slides will show you the processes we used to determine SSBN alert capability. This was a critical factor that was required before commencing the allocation/application process.

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - ✓ •• RESERVE → *Secure Reserve Force (S₂CBM)*
 - HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY

- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
 - ARMS RACE STABILITY
 - DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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