

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							damage and conflict escalation. It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy."		
423.	8	USN	A	2.08	(3)	23.26	Delete: "For many contingencies... will affect the overall strategy."	This exact sentence is in the paragraph above it.	M – see JSDS Comments
424.		USN	S	2.08		25.26	Clarify: It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.	Agreed, but this is never explained satisfactorily in the pub. Coordination is certainly required, but integration is not clear. Specific examples are needed. This is a major weakness in the pub.	M – see JSDS Comments
425.		J-3	S	2.08	(3)	25.26	"It must be understood... overall strategy" should be removed from para 4.a.(3) and added to the beginning of Para 4.a.(2).	Context	M – see JSDS Comments
426.		DTRA	S	2.08	(3)	25.26	"It must be understood... overall strategy" should be removed from para 4.a.(3) and added to the beginning of Para 4.a.(2).	Context	M – see JSDS Comments
427.	78	EUCCOM	C	2.08		26.28	EUCCOM NONCONCURS with the sentence as it presently reads. An acceptable change to the sentence would be as follows: "To make the most efficient use of the nation's strategic assets, and to maximize combat power, or to facilitate alliance or coalition action, CDRUSSSTRATCOM shall facilitate strategic nuclear operations may be accomplished through the integration of US and allied strategic assets."	At present, the sentence fails to take account of the fact that, absent specific directions to the contrary from the POTUS, CDRUSSSTRATCOM does not necessarily have authority to integrate "US and allied strategic assets" in Europe. That integration can occur in consultation between the POTUS, SACEUR, and the NATO Secretary General, exclusive of any integrative actions by CDRUSSSTRATCOM.	M – see JSDS Comments
428.		USN	S	2.08		28.30	Delete: Integration of forces exploits the full range of characteristics offered by US strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.	Meaningless unless at least some notion of how it's to be done is included.	R – JSDS comment – There are lots of things that are classified

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459	85	EUCOM	A	2.09		43	Change "... territory, it..." to "... territory'. Hence, it?"	Correctness: run-on sentence.	M – see JSDS Comments
460		DTRA	A	2.09	(5)(a)	43	"... missile fly over overflight of friendly territory..."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
461		J-3	A	2.09	(5)(a)	43	"... missile fly over overflight of friendly territory..."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
462		STRATCO M/J5515	M	2.10	5. b.	5-10	Comment: overflight considerations affecting ICBM & SLBM transit are not applicable under the sovereign airspace rights generally observed. Rather, those systems fall under the global agreements that impact operations of space systems and general space orbit and sub-orbit authorizations. As such, no requirement exists to coordinate missile flight trajectories that lie over a sovereign nation (hostile or friendly). Overflight concerns in the strategic planning environment are generally concerned with the potential for detection by a non-hostile but potentially threatening source, and the measures necessary to avoid such overflight if possible	Implied in comment	R – JSDS Comment: I am pretty confident that STRATCO M was the source of the original text
463	42	USAF	S	2.10	4a5b	5.10	Change to read: "(b) Overflight. ICBM and SLBM flight corridors may traverse the territory and airspace of other nations sovereign nations only when permitted under international law. Consideration must be made with regard to their response. As a matter of national policy and pursuant to international law, the US respects the airspace rights of non-hostile, sovereign nations. Therefore, overflight overflight plans must be carefully reviewed to determine whether nations to be overflown are belligerents or whether the US will need to obtain permission for overflight. to ensure compliances with international law."	Clarity: The concern is overflight of airspace, not territory. Also clarifies obligations under international law for overflight.	M – see JSDS Comments
464		DTRA	A	2.10	(b)	9	"... ensure compliances ..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
465		J-3	A	2.10	(b)	9	"... ensure compliances ..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
466	26	USA	A	2.10	(c)	12	Rename "Land, Air, Maritime, Space, and Special Operations Forces"	Reflects listing in Figure II-4	A Comments

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429	EUCOM	A	2.08		28-30	Delete last sentence of paragraph. Integrate the full range of characteristics offered by US strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.	The sentence adds no particular value to the paragraph	R – JSDS comment – There are lots of things that are classified that are not explained in these unclassified pubs. Rhetorically, why should this line be any different?
430	DTRA	A	2.08	(3)	32	Delete the word “..offer a relatively higher...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
431	J-3	A	2.08	(3)	32	Delete the word “..offer a relatively higher...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
432	JSDS – JS Nuc	S	2.08		32-35	Change as follows: “(a) Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a relatively higher greater degree of flexibility in escalation control because they are may be a highly visible sign of resolve and, <u>once ordered to conduct a nuclear strike, are recallable, if necessary. Aircraft delivered Aircraft-delivered weapons also provide strike capability across the entire range of nuclear operations.</u> ”	Accepts USAF and EUCOM changes Recognizes that they are only high visibility if we choose to make them so...	A
433	EUCOM	A	2.08		34	Add hyphen between “aircraft” and “delivered”	Correctness. Closely related (i.e., words that in context exist in a	M – see JSDS