

first century, easily accessible media had become integral to the tacit acceptance of terrorists as part of Middle Eastern Islamic society. Even today, the United Nations and many European capitals fail to condemn terrorism with any sort of consistency, seeking instead to find moral equivalence between murder and self-defense where none exists.

Because the report does not fully consider the huge impact of the Information Age, a temporal perspective can prove helpful in examining this gap critically. We know that slaughtering or enslaving the inhabitants of a town was not an unusual practice in the classical world. Rumors of brutality increased the cache of despots, augmenting their income through the collection of protection money and taxes. The war on terrorism differs significantly from previous conflicts with respect to this tradition of violence and aggrandizement, in no small part because of today's obsequious media. Obvious to all who watched, 9/11 became a media event—precisely the effect desired by the terrorist leadership, who sought not only to commit murder, but also to create mass panic and hysteria, culminating in the cracking of the Western world. Clearly, the media has become an essential and willing tool of the terrorists.

In the past, the media did not push live pictures of battlefield action into every American's home, let alone hundreds of millions of homes around the world. Beginning with Vietnam, a pervasive media gained power. By 2001 we learned it had the ability to rivet helpless onlookers with images of planes crashing into the World Trade Center or, by 2004, to do so with footage of terrorists gruesomely beheading innocent civilian captives. Of course, it is easier to find this type of coverage in open societies such as the United States, Israel, or Spain. Atrocities that occur in dictatorships (e.g., Saddam's Iraq or present-day North Korea) generate little fanfare or international reaction because the images are not as available to the wired West or to repressed populaces. As Eric Larson notes in his RAND study entitled *Casualties and Consensus*, the influence of the media, including the Internet, on policy—especially in the West—has made it a critical variable that terrorists understand and that counterterrorists need to understand quickly (pp. 99–103).

Without having actually experienced the 9/11 media barrage and without an appreciation of the greater context of the commission's report, future historians will certainly interpret it differently than those of us who lived through these events. Their perspective of the polarization and controversies will be less acute than ours, and their understanding

of the political dynamics and the complex strategic environment will be narrower. Our proximity to 9/11 makes the dense subject matter susceptible to individual interpretation. So why read this report? Rather than relying on an executive summary or, worse, media "experts," we should read it because, in the words of Yale professor John Lewis Gaddis, "It is . . . presumptuous to speculate about those consequences so soon after the event, but it's also necessary. For although the *accuracy* of historical writing diminishes as it approaches the present—because perspectives are shorter and there are fewer sources to work with than in treatments of the more distant past—the *relevance* of such writing increases" (*Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, p. 5, emphasis in original).

Unique but not authoritative (I would have titled it *A 9/11 Case Study*), the 9/11 report stands as a piece of living history with which members of our armed forces, defense community, and citizenry at large must become familiar. Readers should analyze it critically, augmenting it with other sources to obtain a more complete picture of our dynamic international-security environment. Regardless of whether or not one considers the report legitimate, it will take years for the controversies to subside and for the facts to rise slowly to the top. Without the proper context and background, the information presented as fact and the recommendations presented as essential are insufficient to guide America's defense policy and international affairs. But don't trust me, and don't trust "experts"—read the report yourself.

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**C3: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation** by Valery E. Yarynich. Center for Defense Information (<http://www.cdi.org/index.cfm>), 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036-2109, June 2003, 291 pages, \$35.00.

C3 examines how the United States and Russia control their nuclear weapons and what steps exist for managing nuclear deterrence. Bruce Blair—author of the book's preface, president of the Center for Defense Information, and a nuclear strategist in his own right—asserts that the form of Russian negative control is more stable than the American system of permission, action, links, and codes. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, numerous questions have arisen as to the reliability of the Soviet command, control, and communica-

tions (C3) infrastructure. Author Valery Yarynich, who served in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and then advised members of the Russian Duma on defense matters, is a well-known figure on the American academic-lecture circuit. In *C3* he describes the workings of Soviet nuclear command and control, from its origins in the intermediate missile force in the 1950s to its maturity in the 1970s.

Operating under the principle of launch-on-warning, the Russian command system is poised to obtain authority for the release of nuclear weapons within 10 minutes from the president, defense minister, or chief of the General Staff. Physical control of the unlock-and-launch authorization codes resides with the military, but the General Staff has direct access to them and can initiate a missile attack with or without the permission of political authorities.

The General Staff has two methods for launching. Following the American pattern, the unlock-and-launch authorization codes held by the General Staff at its command bunkers can be sent directly to individual weapons commanders, who would execute their launch procedures. Alternatively, the General Staff could direct missile launches directly from command bunkers in the vicinity of Moscow or from other sites. This remote launch of land-based ICBMs would bypass the subordinate chain of command and missile-launch crews. The early-warning system uses Kazbek, an automated process consisting of cables, radio signals, satellites, and relays that make up the heart of Russian command and control. Tied to this automated electronic web are the three nuclear suitcases or Chegets. Once activated, these systems can start a countdown to launch nuclear weapons in the event the entire Moscow command structure is destroyed. Furthermore, an automatic feature exists for raising the nuclear force-readiness level; strategic aviation as well as naval units are tied into the General Staff network. The book also addresses how the USSR incorporated mobile SS-25 and SS-27 units as well as ballistic-missile submarines, which represented new challenges to C3 systems. Mobile ICBMs posed their own problems since they could not be constantly field-exercised to prevent excessive wear and tear.

American readers will be struck by how some defense relationships remain the same in every country and regime. For example, Yarynich details how defense contactors influenced Soviet thinking about C3 and technology, fostered close ties to individual components, and laid the foundation for decades of work. Research institutes, design bureaus, and factories establish close relationships,

just as they do in the United States. This type of information sheds light on the similarity of Cold War developments in both the United States and USSR.

The text does have a few shortcomings. Yarynich provides no information about permissive action links (PAL) in the Soviet Union, and Russian weapons-release procedures are not explained in the same detail as those in the United States, which has more open literature on its nuclear structure and practices. Nevertheless, *C3* is required reading for strategic nuclear analysts and Soviet-era historians. Modern national-security and military analysts will find it useful for its contribution to understanding how other countries could develop nuclear-weapons safeguards. Although its conclusions about American systems may seem unusually harsh, the book will prove helpful to specialists in both the Russian and Soviet strategic forces. Finally, because *C3* includes work by such Americans as Frank von Hippel and Bruce Blair, it offers the most current information available concerning strategic nuclear command, control, and communications.

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**The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940** by Henry G. Gole. Naval Institute Press (<http://www.usni.org/press/press.html>), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2003, 256 pages, \$34.95 (hardcover).

Pearl Harbor proved that American strategy makers were pygmies when the Japanese decimated the US battle fleet. North Africa proved that American strategy makers were hayseeds who had to learn their trade from the British. Hogwash! Henry Gole's fine little book works to undermine those myths.

Dr. Gole is certainly qualified to issue a definitive judgment on such issues. He fought in Korea as an infantryman, served in the special forces, and did five overseas tours. Starting as an enlisted man, he retired as a colonel with more than 30 years of service. Gole also served in Vietnam, as an attaché in Germany, and on the Pentagon staff in Washington. Moreover, he had teaching tours at West Point and the Army War College in Pennsylvania. He also has fine academic credentials, as attested by his PhD from Temple University; a good writing style; and a record of book reviews and articles that demonstrates his willingness to "tell it like it is."

Colonel Gole's research for this book focused on documentation found in the archives of the American Military Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, especially that available in previously