

Dec 25 - 335

~~p6~~ e63 p3

- industrial situation at Ald just can't be done;
 - ~~delay~~ start shortage → delay in re-opening Pu Group every plant → need to acquire additional Pu from US
- pl - SPRINTS (SN-08) could be operable deployed in 5 yrs; Radon at test sites (for speech) inadequate to deal with the - so far;

Jan 79

"It would only be when, and if, the actual systems were operationally deployed that we would foresee a significant, but not catastrophic, reduction of chemical effectiveness."

p5 - AWR - work in other area ceased following safety issue - presently being resumed - main problem is "steady outflow of skilled craftsmen"

e64 LRTNF

e66 p1 - 'dive' of view of some colleges as 21/6/79
- re LRTNF.

e68 (i) p1 - msg to Washington rep →

"for your background information we have run into some unexpected single serious doubts about the national confidence stemming basically from anxieties over the availability of resources to fund (this as well as other programs of perhaps higher priority) (CRTNF)

e69 (c) - p1 CRTNF

Quote for OUS (PI) paper -

"there are many things they could do to us which would be too severe for (say) a tornado strike on Poland to be an adequate response but not severe enough for a Polaris strike on Moscow (bringing annihilation upon us)."

- CNS paper → US system on the move

e 45 p 6 - system - should not be today
 termed ABR - "conventional" valued due the average
 expectation of people significantly to a figure which
 would still represent, but probably below to Moscow,
 + its effect in developing a degree a difficult,
 costly, costly + one in world programme. "There is no
^{meaning}

"whatever view we may take on the 'surrender' contract
 about the case for being able to threaten Moscow,
 I am convinced that to discard this ability
 by mid-programme 1954 would be indefensible"

e 53 p 6 - Advisory panel - Lord Penney, Sir Samuel Curzon,
 Lord Zuckerman; Prof Bodman + Komberg (subject to PU),
 → technical dis re ageing of warhead - Rubby's
 ageing faults, impact of CTR, perso experts,

e 58 col 1 p 112

- "plan for the short det in its national role
 are based on the aspect that the threat to defend
 unacceptable damage on the Moscow area is required to
 deter the Soviet Union"

p 2 - ABR - diminish the ability of ABR to
 pose a continuous threat to Moscow etc at 1 board
 panel.

- "Russia would have to deploy at least 10 Calorh for each
 incoming missile to be over certain of destroying the
 two re-entry bodies with the threat base."

→ 1 board would more than exhaust 100 ABR,

e 59 p 415 - outline of content of Part 1 Reason

e 69 (i) attached ^{cos} ~~CSA~~ ^{CSA} ~~S~~ re: LRTNF

p 2 - "I cannot report a fully-agreed Chiefs of State
view to you on this."

- I myself see that US needs modest Value restraints

p 3 - "My colleagues do not share this view." - They think
Polari + Toronto have pretty long-range role + should
only do what alliance wants on.

→ comment about revenue implications

e 70 (iii) p 1

Aug 79 Tech inputs for "in advance the design of small, hard
workload. plan 2/3 more best - yield for
concrete + $\frac{1}{2}$ TNL,

p 3 - "a key part of our prog of workload dev for a
delt successor system

- should have 3rd future best & allow post-test future

e 73 (ii)

- SLCM is US full-back part if EU rejects COLCM

- So US should advocate SLCM

e 74 (c) p 2 - storage of answers at AURE

- with Pochari → 386.

Defe-19-208

e 66-0

"The remarks on Sprint & S_{100} were not considered to
be in line with observations. Also the statement that
there would be no capability against Sprint & S_{100}
needed further examination" Notes of mtg 2/9/74
re ORCW paper

AJ

Defe 19-191

e 26-2-p3 examined effects of the elimination of 4 decays for the payload - found that a loss of 0.1x of a penetration was calculated.

e 17-2-p2

Figures in Feb 74 study assume penetration for 2 subs against 100 ev-armorship counts

"If Caltech + terminal defense effectiveness are assessed as equal then the figure of - quoted by DC Polans is fairly correct"

e 17-2-p5

data from US Follow-on-Test trials will no longer be available to the applicable to new system & so need own in-ship tests.

"Character is not designed to be effective against terminal defenses, all decays being up as re-entries to atmosphere"

Harding + increased spacing only → with 1 sub on pth

"Major criteria would not be met"

→ with 2 boats would need major action

- Paper for low sea level from DC (Polans) which requires more minor upgrade

W. Lopez

Dec-27 decays in all.

Cabral 22 - Seminar - Decide - not just money - ~~AAAS~~ AAAS gave savings to a great deal else it that would drink the wells of a die (in banks)

Defe 19-190 e 1a p3

e Poseidon

a) 'exchange ratio 10 for both area + terminal defenses;

b) 'all objects are real warhead so radar signatures are inherent'

Defe 19-190-e20 p2

Poseidon only marginal differ for Super-Antelope

c 2/300 ea ABM (exams) + marginally better against
smaller numbers.

Defe 19-190 e21

Super Antelope - 'little scope for elevation of the
exchange ratio problem below the stated
equivalent level of 15'

Defe 19-190-e23

- UK aware of UCRS in Nov 71

- UCRS + ~~strategic~~ plan for (CA)

e26

Re warhead for Poseidon - a lot of delay into for US
~~to~~

e27 p1

Pos warhead not known to UK - based on advanced technology
not exposed in UK

p2 - range of US eq - gives as all they can legally transfer
+ non-nuclear components a \leftrightarrow only ~~missile~~. C3 missile +
MIRV system, no warhead / RV into

10 warheads instead of 2 per missile

e6 p3

UK comment to SACOUR - 16 missiles @ 15 mi

+ 16 mins @ 24h + a 7h to see.

- Sub can alter plan for UK plan

of
lyt
warhead -

Defe 19-190

e 6 p 5

greater days to SSBN is port exit + transit to open ocean
- danger of "mining", combined 'audits' + waiting on SSNs

e 6 p 8

RAF + RN Ac independent of US 'except that US intelligence information is used for targeting purposes.

US Sp for UK policies -

parts - spans for 9 months

admin + assistance, data on performance evaluation

e 6 p 9

- Dep on US -

Nav - US geodetic info request for diving + home their
efficiency

e 6 p 12

Effect of sudden loss of US Sp -

'low credibility as an effective 2nd strike deterrent'

Defe 19-191

e 17 p 2

2nd sub at notice to fire 13 missiles

e 23-1-p 11

Options - only 5 Washburn canals

- UK pos could have more of water + over decoys

Defe 19-208

e 5-2 p 1

Defe rev + Strat Mem Dec 1970.

e 5-2- p 3 / criteria for debate -

- because of delays or may be used or are required
to allow unambiguous data on the choice of target

Defc 19-208

e5-2 p31a

'The 16 missiles held at readiness are capable of
delivering well over 30 warheads on [redacted]'.

p415

(ABM can neutralize any Pol warhead within 50-100 miles

e5-2-p8

- Effect of disturbing UK SS system -

e12-1-p7

Kardis opinion - to withdraw Res ABM - RBs of this

||

harder need to be separated by 10 miles - to be from
from an ABM before then → greater spacing than current Pol

e12-1-p8

|

RB tilt could decrease ABT accuracy from 0.4 nm to
over 1 nm.

Full 25 pla to multiple - wanted bond
on AB 17 early site

CRNF

Com range = > 1000 km

Defe 25-335 2600 AA p5 - selecton strikes on Soviet Gentry

→ NATO security depend on US Pol Poseidon + to
have about UK Pol to comply

64 A p3

Polan about only credible in regard to threat of
simult attack.

p16

- CRNF for selective Employment rather than
General Nuclear Release Response

p30

US Assesment of CM for NCG penetrations -
1:10 to 9:10

p32

Number of SSN in ^{with Am} ~~KA~~ (sub of 6 total group) - a-b;

p44

Selectable yield varied regime with warhead tearing
- 2 design suitable for CM

SU deployed ends - after by '89
→ these are the missiles.

Dele 25-335

e6 - Chevali paper given July 1978

p2 - re light weight variant poss

p3 → +6000m range - low yield - for 3rd world

p4 - poss endo-abrupt ABM.

e12 - p1 "improvements" not to be used in per release

e16 - p3 - ^{missile} May early 79 to discuss 'the criteria for decision'

e18 p2 - light weight tested - add' cost

e29 p1 - test + demand diagrams on explosion
'of the very small nuclear charge'

e31 p2 re 28 missile for NATO

e37 p1 - test ^{20/11/78} results Jan to Pos; for high speed RV
→ need test - open per for ground test + open
end. Is open done for ~~to~~ end up into Am on the
basis of a similar nature?

e45 p2 - Almost all Chevali designs now frozen (Jan 79)

p3 - light weight variant - not proceeds 'although its
incorporation could be re-considered later.'

- test justified → increasing design knowledge + close cooperation US

p4 - SPRINTSKI - new high acceleration ~~re~~ SU ABM

- which could give endo-abrupt as Soviet def. cap.

(C-SU-08) - further trials of SU-08 since July - (a factor,

- deployed - definitely before late 1980; Test + opalt formidable

(Chevali designed for endo-abrupt variant + SU-08)

→ "even then, as long as the Moscow ABM system remains
within the numerical limits of the ABM Treaty, one hundred
of Chevali missiles should still ~~be~~ achieve on average
sufficient penetration to inflict critical damage on the
built-up area of Moscow." (Jan 79)