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Authority AND 97587
By [Signature] NARA Date 1/9/91

TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET

ACTION: POC

FROM: STATE

NO: 775-86

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R 052026Z MAY 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUDI CR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8577
INFO RUEKJCSYDOD

REC'D: MAY 5 1971
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TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 077586

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SUBJ: NUCLEAR CONSULTATION WITH UK AND USE OF HOLY LOCH
BY FMBS (POSEIDON-EQUIPPED)

REFS: A. STATE 263272 (15 DEC 1970)
B. STATE 63095

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER HEATH
SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT ON MAY 4:

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 7, 1971,
EXPRESSING YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF HOLY LOCH BY
US FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (POSEIDON-EQUIPPED)
IN THE SAME WAY AS THEIR SISTERS POLARIS AND UNDER THE
SAME ARRANGEMENTS AS ARE SET OUT IN THE 1964 MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING ON HOLY LOCH.

I AM PLEASED TO GIVE YOU MY ASSURANCES THAT THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL REGARD THE MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING LAST REAFFIRMED IN MY LETTER OF
DECEMBER 14, 1970 (CONCERNING CONSULTATION BETWEEN
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS BEFORE CERTAIN FORCES EQUIPPED
WITH UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OPERATING FROM
BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OR BERMUDA WOULD USE THESE
WEAPONS) AS APPLYING WITH RESPECT TO FLEET BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES (POSEIDON-EQUIPPED) IN THE SAME
MANNER AND TO THE SAME EXTENT AS WITH RESPECT TO
POLARIS SUBMARINES.

I ACCORDINGLY CONFIRM THAT THE AMENDMENTS YOU
PROPOSE TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING
CONSULTATION ARE ACCEPTABLE TO ME. I AM ENCLOSED THE
AMENDED VERSION OF THE MEMORANDUM. SINCERELY,
UNQUOTE

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ENCLOSURE TO ABOVE LETTER/

QUOTE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE BRITISH ON THE USE OF
BRITISH BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. OUR UNDERSTANDING ON THE USE OF BRITISH BASES IS
THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER WILL REACH A
JOINT DECISION BY SPEAKING PERSONALLY WITH EACH OTHER

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CONTROL

TOP SECRET

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Authority WD 77586
By [Signature] NARA Date 5/9/92

Embassy London

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BT
TOP SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 077586

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THREAT OF WAR, THE U.S. WILL TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO CONSULT WITH BRITAIN AND OTHER ALLIES. THIS REAFFIRMS THE ASSURANCE I GAVE FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN ON MARCH 9, 1953. END INNERQUOTE
THIS ASSURANCE IS TO BE TAKEN AS APPLYING WITH RESPECT TO FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (POSEIDON EQUIPPED) IN THE SAME MANNER AND TO THE SAME EXTENT AS WITH RESPECT TO POLARIS SUBMARINES.
3. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR JOINT DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT EXTEND TO ALL U.S. FORCES UNDER SACEUR AND SACLANT BUT ONLY COVERS THOSE FORCES BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH ARE ASSIGNED OR EARMARKED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO A NATO COMMANDER. THE OTHER U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES UNDER SACEUR AND SACLANT WOULD ONLY BE COVERED BY THE MOE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING TO CONSULT IF TIME PERMITS. THE AGREEMENT FOR JOINT DECISION DOES, HOWEVER, EXTEND TO ALL U.S. FORCES OPERATING FROM BERMUDA WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE UNDER SACEUR OR SACLANT.
4. THERE IS ALSO AN UNDERSTANDING IN RESPECT OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTINED FOR RELEASE IN EMERGENCY TO MARITIME AIRCRAFT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND STORED IN ST. MARGAN, CORNWALL, WHICH WAS SET OUT IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER WILSON AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN 1965. IN REPLY TO MR. WILSON'S LETTER OF AUGUST 5, 1965, PRESIDENT JOHNSON CONFIRMED IN A LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THAT INNERQUOTE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENDED FOR USE BY NETHERLANDS AS WORKES COULD NOT BE RELEASED FOR USE IN ADVANCE OF THE JOINT DECISION ON RELEASE FOR USE TO UNITED STATES AND BRITISH FORCES OF UNITES STATES ASW NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO STORED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER THE SAME NATO PLAN. END INNERQUOTE UNQUOTE

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BEFORE CERTAIN FORCES EQUIPPED WITH U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OPERATING FROM BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OR BERMUDA WILL USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NAMELY SAC, BRITISH STRIKE COMMAND (EXCLUDING AIRCRAFT OF SUCH COMMAND EQUIPPED WITH BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS), FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH ARE ASSIGNED OR EARMARKED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO A NATO COMMANDER, U.S. POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES IN BRITISH TERRITORIAL WATERS AND U.S. FORCES IN BERMUDA. THE BASIC UNDERSTANDING IS CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JANUARY 9, 1952, COVERING THE TRUMAN-CHURCHILL TALKS:

INNERQUOTE UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE COMMON DEFENCE, THE UNITED STATES HAS THE USE OF CERTAIN BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE REAFFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE USE OF THESE BASES IN AN EMERGENCY WOULD BE A MATTER FOR JOINT DECISION BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME. END INNERQUOTE

PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT THIS BASIC UNDERSTANDING WERE AGREED UPON IN THE MURPHY-DEAN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 7, 1958, WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. THE VOERING DOCUMENT, THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, REPEATS ALMOST LITERALLY THE LANGUAGE OF THE TRUMAN-CHURCHILL COMMUNIQUE:

INNERQUOTE 2. THE BASIC UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS, REGARDING THE USE OF BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BY UNITED STATES FORCES, PROVIDES THAT SUCH USE IN AN EMERGENCY SHALL BE A MATTER FOR JOINT DECISION BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. END INNERQUOTE.

2. THERE IS A SECOND, MORE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE BRITISH THAT WE WILL CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE, IF POSSIBLE. THE BASIC UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT IS CONTAINED IN A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND EDEN ON MARCH 9, 1953. EDEN HAD ASKED FOR AN ASSURANCE OF CONSULTATION BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO U.S. USE OF ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON.

INNERQUOTE HE (THE PRESIDENT) SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD, OF COURSE, IN THE EVENT OF INCREASED TENSION OR THE THREAT OF WAR, TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO CONSULT WITH BRITAIN AND OUR OTHER ALLIES. END INNERQUOTE

THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED THIS UNDERSTANDING WHEN HE WROTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON OCTOBER 27, 1960, IN CONNECTION WITH THE HOLY LOCH BERTHING:

INNERQUOTE WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAUNCHING OF MISSILES FROM THE U.S. POLARIS SUBMARINES, I GIVE YOU THE FOLLOWING ASSURANCE, WHICH OF COURSE IS NOT INTENDED TO BE USED PUBLICLY. IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, SUCH AS INCREASED TENSION OR

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4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR DATED MAY 4, 1971:
I HAVE THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR NOTE NUMBER 89 OF APRIL 8, 1971, EXPRESSING THE AGREEMENT OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO THE USE OF BALD HOLY LOCH BY FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (POSEIDON-EQUIPPED) IN THE SAME WAY AS THEIR SISTERS POLARIS, AND UNDER THE SAME ARRANGEMENTS AS SET OUT IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ANNEXED TO MR. BUTLER'S LETTER TO MR. BRUCE OF FEBRUARY 20, 1964. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO CONVEY TO YOU MY APPRECIATION FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS ACTION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON THIS MATTER.

ACCEPT EXCELLENCY, THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

5. REFTEL B PARA THREE NOTED THAT DEPT OFF RAISED QUESTION WITH UK EMBOFF WHETHER HMG INTERPRETED CURRENT EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING FBMS (POSEIDON) USE OF HOLY LOCH TO CONSTITUTE AGREEMENT SEPARATE FROM 1964 HOLY LOCH AGREEMENT. ON APRIL 16 UK EMBOFF REPLIED ORALLY THAT FONOFF CONSIDERED THERE WAS ONLY ONE AGREEMENT EXTANT, 1964 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AND THAT BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S NOTE OF APRIL 8 (SEE PARA 2 REFTEL B) COULD BE VIEWED AS AN INTERPRETATION OR ELABORATION OF 1964 BASIC AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY APRIL 8 NOTE HAS EFFECT OF CONFIRMING APPLICABILITY OF 1964 MOU TO POSEIDON-EQUIPPED SYSTEMS. FOR FURTHER UK VIEWS ON 1964 HOLY LOCH AGREEMENT AS APPLYING TO FBMS (POSEIDON-EQUIPPED) AND FUTURE SYSTEMS ALSO SEE STATE 51010 PARA 2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, SECSTATE REPLY IS IN FORM OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S NOTE, ALL NECESSARY ASSURANCES OR COMMITMENTS HAVING BEEN MADE IN 1964 HOLY LOCH AGREEMENT. GP-1 IRWIN

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