

Key points:

*End pbls - opp. to sub sum*  
*2 SSN - with → with/without us → ~~sub would be a Res~~ → ~~to~~ (A)*

7) Probability of a scenario where there would be a credible threat of independent use is so remote it can be discounted.

*SSN - 1st; SF, Cruise, Ship (Sub attached)*

Opportunity to rebalance the priorities of the submarine fleet

3) 2nd Sub option → PTO (B)  
4) Potential to extend sub life & postpone replacement decision - construct programme of sub use around this; *Nuclear Core/Mult; Rad Embair; 5-10yr?; more effect (not de-alloc);*  
*→ not SSN tasks; 2006 - dca RN str + 13 reduced reactors → 21;*

5) With single crewing could maintain patrols for considerable period, during which capability could be built to reintroduce dual crewing; *1 - 16hr; 2 - 60% long runs;*  
*6) Reactor - sum.*

7) Increasing movement between SSN and SSBN would help retain a sufficient number of qualified submariners for SSBN; it would also help address concerns about motivation of dealerted SSBN crews.

8) Opportunities for training would change - less time in patrol state, more time on varied training with other vessels.

*→ Pub Force (C)*

*but could read much of training over.*

9) Off-patrol short-notice alert would require protecting forces on high state of alert. Long notice would avoid this and enable de-mating.

10) Easier to respond to generic reactor defects when dealerted.

11) Demated posture could place additional demands on shore personnel at Coulport which might require additional training and personnel.

12) Benefit to morale by meeting a challenging demand is undermined by public questioning of the value of Trident. Dealerted posture would bring some benefits for crew. *→ say no crews will fail; pub view?*

I can't work out detail but RN has capability to adapt and produce plan of how to operate a dealerted Trident force and maintain training and morale.

Added detail:

SSN tasks – int, special forces, cruise, task forces, counter sub/ship

B

2<sup>nd</sup> Polaris alert state –

3 June 1971 Short Term Working Party on UK Strategic Nuclear Forces –

UK commitment to NATO is 16 missiles at QRA, 15 minutes notice , plus  
“a further 16 missiles shall be either at QRA, or at ‘follow-on’ status, ie missiles at 24 hours notice to fire and the SSBN at 47 hours notice for sea”.

14 November 1978 memo from Chief of Naval Staff to Secretary of State explaining that HMS Revenge had sailed on patrol with only 15 functioning missiles –

“However the routine declaration which we have to make every month to SACEUR includes the missiles of the non-deployed SSBN at basic readiness (24 hours). Therefore by keeping 13 missiles onboard Resolution during her inter patrol period our overall declaration of 28 remains unchanged. In targeting or credibility terms there is a minimal difference”.

2 May 1979 briefing for incoming Thatcher government by Michael Quinlan on nuclear issues –

“There is .. always one submarine, occasionally two, on patrol. When there is just one, a second is always at 48 hours notice to sail”.

*(High alert is not a profane term, low alert -> denials)*

Nuclear Watchkeepers

Simulators

Protecting forces