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ACNS(OR)

DUS(P)  
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 AUS(D Staff)  
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 PSO/CDS

NST 7070 - SSBN SUCCESSOR

| CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF                  |            |
|---|------------|
| DATE                                    | COPIES     |
| 02/08/87                                |            |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CDS | CNS        |
|   | CGS        |
| Hd SCDS(A)                              | CAS        |
| SCDS A 1                                | SECCOS     |
|   | VCDS (P&L) |
| Hd SCDS(B)                              | DCDS (I)   |
| SCDS B 1                                | DCDS (OR)  |
| SPC                                     | ACDS (OPS) |
| ADC                                     | ACDS (POL) |
| SO/CDS                                  | ACDS (P&L) |
| PA/CDS                                  | ACDS (S)   |
| FILE: 1141/5                            |            |
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ACDS(Pol)96/81  
 (DPS(C)/C12/3)

1. In reading NST 7070, it occurs to me that we should be wary of rejecting the D5 missile option prematurely. If, using D5 missiles we seek to do no more than achieve an initial capability equivalent to that to be derived from an outload of 16 C4 missiles, there may be scope to reduce considerably the apparent capital cost differentials involved. I should make it clear that this thought is not addressing "deterrence" or "criteria" arguments but rather a simple comparison of value for money.
2. Adoption of OHIO centre section/D5 could:
  - a. Probably retain the advantages of US/UK commonality.
  - b. Possibly yield reduced through life costs.
  - c. Give greater confidence of our having a valid deterrent in the 21st century.
  - d. Enable us to phase and smooth capital expenditure so as to render the programme more digestible to the defence budget in the 1980's. (Some 44% of the planned fifteen year spend would otherwise fall on the 3 years 86/87 to 88/89).
3. These considerations give rise to the following questions which are not addressed fully in the NST:



~~SECRET~~



DRAFT

C.A. Whitmore, Esq,  
No. 10 Downing Street

CHEVALINE FLIGHT TRIALS


You will recall that my letter to you of 14 October gave notice of a sequence of three CHEVALINE flight trials from HMS RENOWN in mid-November, following the successful completion earlier in the year of the pad-launched trials.

2. It was decided in the event not to proceed with the third, because the first two went wrong. Briefly, the launches themselves went successfully, but in both cases a failure in the primary ordnance supply circuit, after the separation of the Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC) from the second stage of the missile, meant that the complex sequence of events which should then follow (e.g. the deployment of decoys) was not initiated.

3. This is an unwelcome setback, especially as despite intensive investigation we are not yet sure of the causes. Some areas of potential weakness in the primary ordnance circuit have been identified and remedial action is in hand. We plan to launch three further trial rounds from a submarine in July 1981. There will inevitably be delay to the first operational deployment, previously scheduled for mid-1981 (although initially with only a partial complement of missiles). Public statements on the matter have however been deliberately imprecise, so no new announcement is needed. We are now aiming at first deployment of a full tactical outload in March 1982. Whether we achieve this depends crucially on how the July trials go.

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4. None of this has come to public notice. The US Government of course knows of it, but we see no particular reason why it should come up when the Prime Minister visits Washington next month.
5. My Secretary of State will continue to watch the position closely and I will keep you informed.
6. I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden and Donald Wright.



