

SECRET Covering TOP SECRET

B 5223

Copy No 4 of 20 copies

DUS(P) 259/79

PS to Secretary of State

- Copies to:-
- PS/Minister of State
 - PSO/CDS ←
 - PS/PUS
 - Sec/CNS
 - MA/CGS
 - PS/CAS
 - PS/CDP
 - PS/CSA
 - PS/2nd PUS
 - MA/VCDS(P&L)
 - DCDS(OR) (with copy of Brief No. 9)
 - DUS(P) (with copy of Brief No. 6)
 - ACDS(Pol)
 - AUS(D Staff)
 - SECCOS

File No.
58(1)

BRIEFING NEW MINISTERS

As requested in PS/PUS's minutes of 9 and 19 April, I enclose two copies each of the following briefs:

- Brief No. 2 The NATO Alliance
- Brief No. 5 Arms control
- Brief No. 6 The Defence Programme
- Brief No. 9 Strategic and theatre nuclear issues.

2. Briefs on SALT and the CTB negotiations will be submitted separately.

2 May 1979

M E Quinlan
M E QUINLAN
DUS(P)

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

DATE	COPIES
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	1

SECRET Covering TOP SECRET

14/5 ←

5432366

267



SECRET
Covering TOP SECRET

BRIEF NO. 9: STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR ISSUES

The enclosed three Annexes contain briefs on

- a. the Polaris force and the Chevaline project
- b. theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation
- c. the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

SECRET
Covering TOP SECRET

5432366

257

S



POLARIS/CHEVALINE

POLARIS A3T

1. The United Kingdom's strategic nuclear deterrent comprises the Polaris A3T weapon system embarked in four British-built ballistic missile nuclear-propelled submarines (SSBNs). The missiles, associated equipment and support, but not the warheads, are purchased from the US under the Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963.
2. The A3T missile, of which each submarine carries 16, is a two-stage ballistic rocket with a range of 2,500 miles and a payload of three nuclear warheads, not independently targettable. The missiles are assigned to SACEUR and targetted in accordance with NATO plans against military targets. The submarines also carry alternative national plans for use in circumstances where supreme national interests were at stake.
3. The submarines operate from the Clyde Submarine Base at Faslane, using the missile processing facility at the nearby Royal Naval Armament Depot, Coulport. Each submarine has two crews, which rotate between patrols. The patrols last up to 60 days with a period of some five to seven weeks between them. The submarines are refitted at Rosyth Dockyard, the refits taking approximately 20 months. The period between refits is normally five years. There is always one submarine in refit, and always one submarine, occasionally two, on patrol. When there is just one, a second is always at 48 hours' notice to sail.

POLARIS A3TK (CHEVALINE)

5. Background. Plans for the UK strategic deterrent in its national (as distinct from NATO) role are based on the assessment that the threat to inflict unacceptable damage on the Moscow area is required

/to



to deter the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 (modified in 1974) restricts the Russians to one area of ABM deployment (apart from R and D test ranges) and to a force of not more than 100 anti-ballistic missiles and launchers; it also places limits on the radar system for their control. At present, the Russians deploy 64 exo-atmospheric Galosh ABMs and launchers in the Moscow area.

6. This ABM capability, combined with current improvements in Soviet Radar coverage, diminishes the ability of the A3T system to pose a continuous threat to Moscow when only one boat is on patrol. We are therefore engaged in developing a UK "improved front end" for use with the existing Polaris missiles, in order to maintain a guaranteed capability of penetrating the Soviet ABM defences and inflicting heavy damage on Moscow. The missile fitted with the improved front end is designated A3TK and the development project is code-named Chevaline.

7. The Chevaline concept. The central limitation of the existing A3T system, in the face of the improved Soviet defences, is the ability of one well-placed Galosh ABM warhead to destroy all three Polaris warheads. The basic concept of Chevaline is the use of a large number of decoys so that the defender cannot distinguish, from among a cloud of objects travelling in a "threat tube" to the same target area, which are the warheads. The A3TK missile carries two warheads, which are "hardened" against nuclear attack by ABMs, compared with three unhardened warheads in the A3T system. The Russians would have to deploy at least 10 Galosh for each incoming missile to be certain of destroying the two re-entry bodies within this threat tube. Thus one boatload of 16 missiles will more than

/exhaust



TOP SECRET UK EYES A

U exhaust the maximum Soviet defence of 100 ABMs. The maximum range of Chevaline is just under 2000 miles - less than the present A3T because of the additional weight of the improved front end. This reduces the SSBN's operating area.

8. The development programme. The project is now well advanced and technical progress has been good. The flight trials programme has reached an advanced stage and has included, as well as supporting trials, five flight trials to date with Polaris missiles; three of these have involved the system as a whole. The results have been very satisfactory, although the most recent trial, in April, has not yet been fully evaluated. The next trial, one in a series from a pad at Cape Canaveral, is planned for July 1979. The first full boat-load of missiles is planned to be available in mid-1981; a second load, which will then allow for continuous Chevaline deployment, is planned for mid-1982. Chevaline is a UK project to meet a UK requirement but we continue to rely on close co-operation with the US under the Polaris Sales Agreement, and US firms as well as British are involved in the programme. The total cost of the development, trials and production programme is estimated at 1979 Survey prices to be £935m. of which some 75% has already been spent or committed. The project is proceeding on the basis that funding has been approved to completion, subject to cost being contained within the present agreed estimate and to further progress reports. Though on course, the programme is very tight and industrial trouble could threaten it; there is some cause for concern at AWRE.

9. Management. Overall management and financial responsibility is placed under the Chief Polaris Executive. The progress, cost and management of the Chevaline project is kept under review by the

/Chevaline



TOP SECRET UK EYES A

Shevaline Steering Committee which consists of CNS (as Chairman), CDP, CSA and DUS(P) and reports to the Secretary of State.

GENERAL

10. The present SSBNs are assumed to run on into the early to mid 1990s and recent studies have led to the firm conclusion that it would be impracticable to run on the present force beyond then. The US will on present plans have phased out their own Polaris A3 force and the UK system will therefore become unique by the early 1980s. This will have implications (for which financial provision has been made) for the cost of maintaining the system. It will be necessary to replace the motors for the Polaris missiles in the late 1980s and options for this are under consideration.



SECRET

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION

1. This has been an active issue in NATO during the past year, brought into focus by the formidable modernisation of the Soviet Union's large armoury of "grey area" nuclear systems, which are not covered by SALT but which are targetted on Europe and are therefore strategic in European terms (see brief on SALT). NATO's non-SALT theatre nuclear forces (TNF) are by contrast much fewer and it has become evident that the absence of a modernisation programme could weaken the Alliance's deterrent strategy and damage confidence and cohesion within the Alliance.
2. The Alliance has embarked on a two-fold approach towards a solution to this problem - options for modernising and strengthening NATO's own long range TNF are being studied by a specially convened NATO group of senior officials - the High Level Group (HLG) - under US chairmanship and comprising the eleven member nations of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) structure; and possible arms control options for limiting Soviet medium range systems are being examined by a comparable and recently established NATO Group - the Special Group. Both Groups will report in the autumn, so providing a wide framework within which decisions on TNF modernisation can be taken by the Alliance.
3. The High Level Group's work on modernisation is now well advanced. A consensus has been established, and endorsed by NATO Defence Ministers at the NPG, that, although, taking all types together, NATO has plenty of theatre nuclear weapons, there is a strong case for modernising and some strengthening of the relatively small longer-range "in-theatre" element (ie. excluding submarine launched ballistic missiles allocated to theatre targets). Subsequent work has concentrated on developing a common understanding of the basis for

/such

SECRET

5432366

257

SECRET

such strengthening and on evaluating options for achieving it. Three main areas have accordingly been covered in the report submitted to the NPG in April 1979 - the rationale for strengthening long range TNF; possible force composition; and prospects for participation in the modernisation programme by NATO nations. A summary is at Appendix 1.

4. The Special Group's work is still in its preliminary stages. There is a clear need for it in order to produce a prepared position on the issue of whether or how any grey area systems should be included in future SAL negotiations and to establish a relationship between arms control and TNF modernisation. But the Group's existence should not be seen as the first step leading automatically to a negotiation with the Soviets. There are formidable difficulties in envisaging how an acceptable arms control deal could be reached in this area where the Soviet Union enjoys a massive numerical superiority and is modernising and enhancing its capability at a time when NATO's is ageing and declining. In these circumstances it will be important that the arms control aspects being prepared by the Special Group should not be allowed to inhibit any modernisation programme - still less be regarded as a substitute for it. In the MOD view NATO should not enter any grey area arms control negotiation until adequate bargaining counters are in existence.

5. The public presentation of any adjustments to NATO's existing TNF capability will be particularly important. Public concern over nuclear weapons was re-awakened by the debate over the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW - the so-called "neutron bomb"), and although the ERW is essentially a battlefield system the Alliance may well face similar concern in justifying long-range TNF modernisation. There are a number of possible ways of overcoming problems of public

SECRET

acceptance. These include a public education campaign about the needs of NATO strategy and the nature of the threat; accompanying any announcement of deployments with a serious position on arms control; and (possibly) making reductions in other nuclear forces of lesser value. This is an area in which further work will need to be done by the autumn by both NATO Groups.

6. The NPG discussion has made clear that the USA will wish to settle on a programme by the end of the year. The FRG supports this aim since they judge that a difficult situation will be made harder, not easier, by prolonging a decision beyond then. Both want to get the problem out of the way before it could become an issue in their 1980 elections. The USA has the additional task of securing programme funding from Congress, which will be needed by the end of the year if slippages are to be avoided. They doubt whether they will get the appropriations unless they can demonstrate that their Allies support deployment in Europe.

7. The role which the UK decides to play will be important, partly because of the delicate state of German/American relations but also because of the UK's special position as a nuclear power with long-range TNF forces already deployed (Vulcan) which are due to be phased out at about the same time as the new US systems could be made available. We may be asked to provide basing facilities for US operated systems (along the lines of existing F111 aircraft deployments). In addition the MOD is studying the case for maintaining a UK-owned long-range capability (which would have value in terms of the UK nuclear deterrent as well as for a NATO long-range TNF force) and is evaluating the system options available. This study is to be completed by August 1979.

SECRET

THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

1. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which began the first of its bi-annual meetings in April 1967, was created to provide a consultative forum in which the non-nuclear members of the Alliance could participate more fully in nuclear matters. More particularly it exists to help to contain what is potentially one of the most awkward questions which NATO faces, of European and especially FRG confidence in the US nuclear guarantee. This remains its main purpose, in which it has so far been successful. There has, however, been a shift of emphasis in its work. Until the advent of US Secretary of Defense, Dr. James Schlesinger, in 1974, the NPG focused its attention on nuclear philosophy and strategic doctrine; but since that time it has become increasingly occupied with equipment programmes and TNF modernisation - partly at the behest of the US, but more recently to meet FRG security preoccupations.

Composition

2. Unlike the Defence Planning Committee (which is attended by the Defence Ministers of all NATO countries within the Alliance's integrated military structure), the NPG has from its inception had only four permanent members at Ministerial level (US, UK, FRG and Italy). The remainder serve in rotation, on a 'three meetings-on, three meetings-off' basis. Norway alternates with Denmark, Greece with Turkey, Canada with Portugal (under normal circumstances) and Netherlands with Belgium. This arrangement was made at the behest of the Americans who felt that in a restricted forum the exchange of views would be fuller and more intimate than was possible at bigger set piece gatherings such as the DPC. Security considerations also played a part; but since all nations participate continuously at official level, irrespective of the Ministerial rotation, and business now gets into very sensitive areas, this is no longer a serious point.

SECRET

5432366

257



SECRET

2. Following various objections to this restricted system and a Dutch initiative in April 1979, it seems likely that in the future membership at Ministerial meetings will be increased, at least to make permanent all the present "alternating" members. On the understanding that this will not limit the amount of information which the US are prepared to divulge or upset any of the other permanent members we would welcome this development. Wider membership would be consistent with the increased emphasis being placed by the Alliance on such subjects as theatre nuclear force modernisation and the need for the widest possible participation in a collective programme.

Range of Activity

4. The NPG receives a regular briefing from the US Secretary of Defense on the current strategic balance, which is followed by a full exchange of views about the current and projected forces deployed on each side. Of late, it has also devoted much attention to the question of TNF modernisation. Other topics covered in discussion include conceptual studies about the follow-on use of nuclear weapons and maritime nuclear warfare, the case for continued possession of defensive nuclear systems such as Atomic Demolition Munitions, the exercise of nuclear release procedures, and nuclear employment planning.



Flag 10:

Originator: DUS(P)

Title: Future of the Strategic Nuclear Force

Date: 4 May 79

Classification: Top Secret

Our Ref: B5353



SECRET

Appendix 1

AREAS ON WHICH THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG)
OF THE NPG HAS CONCENTRATED

Rationale for TNF modernisation

1. Different nations have tended to emphasise different aspects. The UK has sought to focus attention on the case for ensuring strong linkage, in terms of flexible response deterrent strategy, between theatre and strategic nuclear forces so as to avoid any misperception that gaps exist at any particular level from which the Soviets could gain advantage. The FRG, on the other hand, has emphasised the need to demonstrate some response to the introduction of SS20 and the Backfire bomber in order to allay the public concern about these systems in their country. The US, for their part, have tended to lay the stress on more direct military considerations. It is, however, common ground that there is a clear case, based on the military and deterrent requirements of NATO strategy, for modernising the Alliance's ageing and declining capability at long range (that is, reaching into Soviet territory). There is also consensus that the case is enhanced by, but not solely dependent on, the increased military threat posed by the new Soviet systems; but that attempting to match the Soviet armoury one for one is neither necessary nor desirable. It could, for example, foster the dangerous idea that there is a "Eurostrategic" balance to be worked towards, with its attendant implications for decoupling from the main US strategic armoury.

Force Options

2. Six options for a NATO force, all for US-developed systems, have been considered by the HLG; cruise missiles in three modes

/(air-

A-1
SECRET

5432366

252

SECRET

(air-launched (ALCM), ground-launched (GLCM) and sea-launched (SLCM)); two ballistic missiles (an extended range version of the Pershing currently deployed in FRG, and a new Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)); and penetrating aircraft with free-fall bombs. No consideration has been given by the Group to any joint or non-United States development of new longer-range systems. The options have been evaluated against a variety of criteria including costs, operational effectiveness, time scale for initial deployment, presentational aspects and arms control implications.

3. The conclusion of the HLG is that there is no single absolute best buy for the Alliance, either in terms of cost-effectiveness or other factors. However, an extended range Pershing would be available before a new MRBM and GLCM would be cheaper than other dedicated CM systems. A mix of extended range Pershing and GLCM may therefore be preferable, subject to political considerations and the importance of achieving wide participation. ALCM and SLCM have not, however, been ruled out.

4. As regards a possible UK-owned contribution, it is already clear that cruise missiles are preferable to available ballistic systems in the post-Vulcan timescale.

5. The force size envisaged is of the order of 200-600 warheads, accomplished within the NATO inventory of 6000-7000 intheatre warheads.

Participation

6. Achievement of maximum Alliance participation - for reasons of political solidarity, and of the sharing of risks and burdens - has been a main aim throughout the exercise. It is recognised that such participation may take a variety of forms, including the

/widest

A-2

SECRET

5432366

257



SECRET

widest possible sharing in ownership, basing of systems, financing, or at the lowest level, firm political support for the venture. No nation is excluding the possibility of participation at this lowest level (although the Greek representative suggested that his country's answer would be subject to the outcome of the current Greece/NATO negotiations).

7. The crucial factor in deciding the upper levels of realistic participation by Continental members of the Alliance will be the decision made by the FRG. German Ministers see domestic political difficulties over any deployment of long-range systems on their soil. There have, however, been indications that the FRG would not rule out such deployment provided :

- a. that it was not confined to the FRG (and there are indications that they want someone other than the UK to accept basing);
- b. that the FRG did not become owner or operator of the new long-range systems.

A-3

SECRET

5432366

257



CONFIDENTIAL

B5187

Folio No
58 (M)

NATO LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

1. The Chiefs of Staff will recall that the current NATO work stems from the LTDP, one component of which was TNF modernisation. Task Force 10 tackled this, and reached agreement early on that there was a clear case for some strengthening of the long-range in-theatre element of NATO's capability - long-range, for this purpose, meaning able to reach into the Soviet homeland.

2. The basis for this view was a combination of factors -

- a. An in-theatre capability of this class (i.e. a capability additional to the NATO-assigned SLBM forces) is an important element in NATO's deterrent linkage.
- b. The current capability (Vulcans and F.111s) is declining - the former due to phase out in 1982/83, the latter facing increasingly effective Soviet air defences.
- c. Soviet IRTN improvements (SS20, Backfire, Fencer) aggravate the problem, both militarily - greater capability to pre-empt - and politically - much European concern about these powerful new systems with no evident NATO counterpart.

CHIEF OF DEFENCE	
DATE	205/9/
CDS	
Hd SDCS(A)	
SDCS A 1	
SDCS A 2	
Hd SL	
SDCS B 1	
SDCS B 2	
SDCS B 3	
SDCS B 4	
SDCS B 5	
SDCS B 6	
SDCS B 7	
SDCS B 8	
SDCS B 9	
SDCS B 10	
SDCS B 11	
SDCS B 12	
SDCS B 13	
SDCS B 14	
SDCS B 15	
SDCS B 16	
SDCS B 17	
SDCS B 18	
SDCS B 19	
SDCS B 20	
SDCS B 21	
SDCS B 22	
SDCS B 23	
SDCS B 24	
SDCS B 25	
SDCS B 26	
SDCS B 27	
SDCS B 28	
SDCS B 29	
SDCS B 30	
SDCS B 31	
SDCS B 32	
SDCS B 33	
SDCS B 34	
SDCS B 35	
SDCS B 36	
SDCS B 37	
SDCS B 38	
SDCS B 39	
SDCS B 40	
SDCS B 41	
SDCS B 42	
SDCS B 43	
SDCS B 44	
SDCS B 45	
SDCS B 46	
SDCS B 47	
SDCS B 48	
SDCS B 49	
SDCS B 50	
SDCS B 51	
SDCS B 52	
SDCS B 53	
SDCS B 54	
SDCS B 55	
SDCS B 56	
SDCS B 57	
SDCS B 58	
SDCS B 59	
SDCS B 60	
SDCS B 61	
SDCS B 62	
SDCS B 63	
SDCS B 64	
SDCS B 65	
SDCS B 66	
SDCS B 67	
SDCS B 68	
SDCS B 69	
SDCS B 70	
SDCS B 71	
SDCS B 72	
SDCS B 73	
SDCS B 74	
SDCS B 75	
SDCS B 76	
SDCS B 77	
SDCS B 78	
SDCS B 79	
SDCS B 80	
SDCS B 81	
SDCS B 82	
SDCS B 83	
SDCS B 84	
SDCS B 85	
SDCS B 86	
SDCS B 87	
SDCS B 88	
SDCS B 89	
SDCS B 90	
SDCS B 91	
SDCS B 92	
SDCS B 93	
SDCS B 94	
SDCS B 95	
SDCS B 96	
SDCS B 97	
SDCS B 98	
SDCS B 99	
SDCS B 100	
FILE: / / 5	

c. SDCS (100)

3. NATO Ministers have broadly accepted, albeit without final commitment, this case for improvement; and the "High Level Group" under US chairmanship (ex-Task Force 10) has been reviewing force options. Work has now reached the stage where further NATO studies, at least on the defence side, would merely be devices for delay - the options and implications are adequately exposed, and nations must now be making up their minds what to do in

DEFE 25/335
5432366

CONFIDENTIAL

concrete terms.

4. The High Level Group will still be used in this next phase, but in a coordinating rather than a working role. The US, who have accepted the lead in shaping up a programme, are conducting soundings of individual countries, and will then present for HLG discussion a couple or so concrete programme options - concrete, that is, in terms of system types, numbers and deployments. The HLG will discuss these in July and September, with a view to putting matters before Ministers at the NPG in November and then at the main December meetings.

5. In parallel with the HLG operation it has become politically essential to set up a similar US-led group, referred to as the Special Group, to look into arms control aspects and possibilities relating to long-range theatre nuclear systems. D of DP(C) and a Defence Secretariat representative are members. It is going to be a delicate task to coordinate the work of the two groups, and to prevent the arms control side - which in cold fact has few realistic possibilities in front of it - delaying (or being used to delay) practical decisions on the TNF side.

6. I should like to say a word about the general setting, as it has now developed, for NATO TNF decisions. They have become both urgent and highly important. Urgent partly because the Vulcans go soon and the Soviet build-up is already far advanced, partly because the US cannot easily persuade Congress to go on indefinitely spending money on systems which remain merely options, and partly because both the US and the FRG want to get this sensitive business settled before they get into 1980, which is an election year for both of them. Important not just because of

CONFIDENTIAL

DEFE 25/935

5432366

CONFIDENTIAL

the direct defence case - though that is a very strong and significant case - but also because, whether we like it or not, this issue has been firmly established in public awareness - less in the UK than elsewhere - as a crucial test of NATO's political resolution and ability to act firmly and cohesively in the defence field. The ERW shambles, still in everyone's mind, sharply heightens this perception. The result is that TNF has become, in overall political terms, the issue for NATO defence this year. That is not just my view. Dr Apel said in Florida that if NATO did not come through with a positive decision it would be "in crisis". In Brussels last week he used the words "in grave danger".


7. It is nevertheless going to be very difficult for NATO to get its act together. The Germans, for domestic political reasons, have made awkward conditions to the effect that they can accept deployment of new long-range systems (there is no question of their accepting ownership) only if at least one other non-nuclear country does too. It is not clear who will meet this condition. The flanks are out, for various reasons, so the candidates are the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. All have difficulties, particularly the Netherlands, where public opinion on any nuclear matter is now explosively irrational.

8. The UK role will be crucial. The political setting is such that I see virtually no prospect of getting a positive NATO response together if we stand aside or prevaricate. It will be increasingly necessary for us to make our preferences clear, indeed within the next month or so. I have to advise, against this background, that the Chiefs of Staff should if at all possible put themselves in a position to advise Ministers on system

CONFIDENTIAL

DEF 25/335

5432366



83907

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-9333022 218 2111/3

Folio No.
58

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 19/1/1

2nd April 1979

Copy to:
PSO/CDS
PS/PUS
Sec/CNS
PS/CSA
PS/CDP
DUS(P)
DCA(PN)
CPE
AUS(D Staff)
AUS(OR)
AUS(NS)
CFR

Dear Bryan,

The series of Chevaline-related Polaris flight trials, which began in September 1977, is due to continue with a fifth launch from Cape Canaveral on 4th April. The Defence Secretary considers that the timing of this flight is unfortunate but has given his approval for it to go ahead.

Publicity will follow the revised US practice which Roger Facer described in his letter of 13th December last about HMS REPULSE's DASO firing. A short notification will be issued locally to the media two days in advance but with publication embargoes until the time of the launch; no post-launch release will be issued unless something goes wrong. We shall do the same in the United Kingdom. Our line in dealing with any subsequent Press enquiries will be the same low-key one as for the earlier launches and your Press Office will again be told the result immediately.

B.14639

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

10001 am copying this letter to George Walden (FCO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

10001	
CGS	
CA S	
SECDEF	
SECDEF (P)	
SECDEF (M)	
SECDEF (A)	
SECDEF (S)	
SECDEF (I)	
SECDEF (O)	
SECDEF (C)	
SECDEF (E)	
SECDEF (R)	
SECDEF (T)	
SECDEF (Y)	
SECDEF (U)	
SECDEF (V)	
SECDEF (W)	
SECDEF (X)	
SECDEF (Z)	

Yours sincerely,
John Cartledge
(J D CUTTERIDGE)

B G Cartledge Esq
No. 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEFE 25/336
5432366