

BRIEF BY D OF DP(C) ON VCNS AMENDMENTS

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AMENDMENTS

1. General. You may wish to make the point that Ministers will not want, nor could the Chiefs of Staff responsibly submit, a paper that makes light of any problems that are foreseen. Any impression that the Commentary is a "no sweat operation" would be counter-productive.

2. Particular.

a.(1) Para 11, Line 4.

✓ Accept. It changes reasoning rather than the sense.

(2) Para 11, Line 11.

agree Reject. This is a fair illustration of the sort of thing that would happen and is not insignificant in terms of influence on Alliance affairs.

b. Para 12, Line 4.

✓ Accept. It is a statement of the obvious but worth saying nonetheless.

c. Para 24, Line 7.

✓ Accept. The important point is in the preceding sentence.

d. Para 28, Line 12.

Discuss. The problems of an alternative site are not mentioned in the ND amendment, but DUS(P) and PUS have voiced (1)(2) their misgivings. The ND's amendment might more accurately end

?

"....at considerable cost and with the prospect of knotty legal and political problems". Alternatively, the ND may prefer the present text.

e.(1) Para 29, Line 3.

✓ Accept. The ND's wording is better.

(2) Para 29, Line 7.

✓ Accept. Ditto.


f. Para 30, Last Sentence.

Discuss. This is professional advice from the Navy Department which I am not competent to judge, though my information so far suggests that the technical characteristics of a SSBN in service in 1991 could not be so advanced as that envisaged by Duff/Mason (para 22) for 1994. You may wish particularly to question CNS on the feasibility of fitting PWR2 in a boat in service by 1991. ?

Reactor SSN 2 class

Notes:

1. DUS(P) 457/79 dated 11 Jul 79
2. RCM/79/1074 28/12 dated 13 Jul 79



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g. Para 31, First Sentence.

Accept. in the light of discussion at d. above. ✓

h. Para 32, Line 4.

Accept. An internal ND matter on which views are changing rather fast. The amendments are welcome. ✓

i. Para 34.

Discuss. This touches on the most critical of all the questions facing the COS and you may wish to ask PUS and ACDS(Pol) to contribute the latest information culled from discussions on DP16. If indeed VCNS is correct then there is no objection to the deletion he seeks, but it would be prudent to round off the paragraph with:

"Although the cost of the Successor System could be accommodated within the planning guidelines provided by S of S, some of the necessary adjustments could have a distorting effect on other major elements. ?

j.(1) Para 35, Line 11.

Accept. The UK's dependence is, after all, broadly based. Alternatively, if some of your colleagues think the amendment is too broadening, "nuclear" could be deleted from the present text. ✓

(2) Para 35, Line 15.

Reject. VCNS's rewording is trying to explain, in shorthand, a very complex calculation concerning Chevaline decoys, Polaris Re-entry bodies, MIRVs and ABM, which has led Duff-Mason to recommend a very large increase in warheads for the Successor over Chevaline. But this fact cannot be ducked. In any case, the rewording would be hard for Ministers to understand; the text is reasonably simple. X

k. Para 37.

Reject. VCNS's rewording is altogether too bland. Our experience over Chevaline alone suggests that "formidable" is an accurate word to describe the challenges we face.

Considerable.

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