

Faith Bay 2000
Why Strategic Security is predictable
inevitable with the power of nuclear deterrence
A Lickerman + J Cabano May 200 WSCF

Laboratory]/Sandia design of a warhead to replace the W88/Mk5.... *Replacement Warhead is a new design that will not have UGTs [Under Ground Tests] for certification.*" (Emphasis added.)⁸²

The DoD Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs report also describes plans to upgrade the missiles carried aboard the Trident fleet:

"The Navy's backfit program will *update* four of the C-4 [Trident I] platforms to the *more modern and longer range* D-5 [Trident II] missile. These upgrades will begin in FY [Fiscal Year] 2000 and will finish in FY 2006." (Emphasis added.)⁸³

In its discussion of candidate replacement systems for the Mk5 delivery system, the Green Book explains that the "refurbishment" of the nuclear stockpile in response to the discovery of defects due to aging or "*updated military requirements*" may "*require the design of modified or new components.*" (Emphasis added.)⁸⁴

Independent analyst William Arkin has warned that these programs are "actually part of a larger plan" to upgrade the entire SLBM force. According to Arkin:

"Many of the navy's latest missiles, the Trident IIs, are equipped with W76 warheads rather than with the more advanced W88s. The W76s are fitted into the Mk4 reentry vehicles rather than the newer and more accurate Mk5s. In effect, the navy wants to replace the W76s with newly minted warheads similar to the W88, and it wants to upgrade the Mk4s, which were designed to burst above urban-industrial targets. *With the right kind of replacement for the Trident II's [W76] and/or a modified Mk4, Trident II's yield and accuracy to attack hard targets could extend across the entire force.*" (Emphasis added.)⁸⁵

Similarly, Rear Admiral Nanos, director of Strategic Systems Programs, U.S. Navy, wrote:

"We can chart the capability of our weapon system against targets and see what accuracy has done for us. The demonstrated capability of the D5 [missile] is excellent. Our capability for Mk 4 [reentry vehicle], however, is not very impressive by today's standards, largely because the Mk 4 was never given a fuse that made it capable of placing the burst at the right height to hold other than urban industrial targets at risk. *With the accuracy of the D5 and Mk 4, just by changing the fuze in the Mk 4 reentry body, you get a significant improvement. Why is this important? Because in the START II regime, of course, the ICBM hard target killers are going out of the inventory and that cuts back our ability to hold hard targets at risk. The Air Force has some plans for how to upgrade their ICBM force to restore that capability. We can do that with the Mk 4 reentry body for 10 cents on the dollar in terms of investment because of the accuracy of our system, and we have made this option available to the strategic CINC [Commander in Chief].*" (Emphasis added.)⁸⁶

It was precisely this kind of "upgrading" of nuclear forces that raised fears of a disarming