NSERs raised in conjunction with Submarine Incident Reports (IRs) 1 Jun 06 – 31 May 07

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NSER No.	Description	Cat
D/177	Secondary containment was breached in an SSBN whilst docked in the Shiplift. ESW Hull valves were	0
D/178	An SSN carried out a plant shutdown and start up without the PAG approved Nuclear Logic being	В
	onboard or authorised by the Commanding Officer.	
D/194	During the reinstatement and testing of the CRDM Manifold in an SSBN, the Primary MEA carried out the	В
	wrong steps within the Nuclear Procedure. NSI tape was removed and RCFW pipework reconnected	
	without the required NSI clean and clear inspection being carried out.	
D/196	An SSBN docked in the Shiplift without Stbd AW supplies connected. Due to difficulties experienced by	В
	divers in the removal of hull valve gratings prior to docking, the fitting of the Stbd side flooding bonnets	
	was postponed until the submarine was berthed in the Shiplift. However, due to a breakdown in	
	communication between the Dockmaster and Ship's Staff the supplies were not connected until the	
	submarine was taken dry.	
D/203	A primary coolant spill occurred in an SSBN as a result of a HPMU Pump discharge flexible failure during	В
	Hellet Valve testing. An item of clothing belonging to a member of Ships Staff involved in the testing was	
	CONTRAINING TO STATE OF THE STA	
D/222	Due to operator error an upstream steam leak occurred in an SSBN, shutdown PSA, in the EHJ.	
D/229	A Control Rod drop occurred during a planned Reactor Start up in a SSBN. The reactor was manually	0
	full scrammed and the subsequent investigation identified a loose rod fuse, but no damage to the CRDM.	
D/232	A failure of a HP Make Up Pump discharge flexible occurred during CMU Relief Testing in an SSBN.	A
	This event is a repeat of NSE D/203.	
D/257	An unauthorised chemical was added to the flushing water during the chemical cleaning process to	O
	remove oil contamination from an SSBN Steam Generator.	
D/259	Radiological contamination of 2 persons (1 x Ship Staff, 1 x Base Staff) occurred in an SSN's Reactor	C
	Compartment during disconnection of a test rig.	
D/262	In preparation of pumping the RC bilge in an SSN it was observed that the LP Relief's had been	В
	inadvertently isolated for an indeterminate time during solid operation.	
D/268	An SSBN was conducting Full Leak Protection (FLP) initiation checks law a Nuclear Procedure. On	В

D/282	
An unintentional Emergency Cooling initiation demand occurred in an SSN during the intended isolation of the Stb loop. Having already shut M1 the METOW shut M4 in error (instead of M3). Action was taken by Ship Staff that prevented EC initiation and flow was restored (plant was in a no nett flow condition for approx. 10 seconds).	initiation of FLP the Main Isolation Valve (MIV) did not shut due to the VOGS not being in the correct line up. During a second attempt a further event occurred whereby deviation was made from the Nuclear Procedure.
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