

c). How to integrate the role and resources of the newly formed Government Offices in the Regions (GORs) into the response at the Off Site Centres. NEPLG has engaged in discussions with the GOR's sponsoring government department and produced a protocol that includes certain specific roles for GORs during the acute phase of an emergency. Chapter 4 of NEPLG guidance is being revised to reflect this.

d). The need for guidance to ensure the provision of consistent and adequate facilities at Off-site Centres. Lessons Learned Sub-Group engaged an experienced member from the emergency services (police) to bring best practice from the various Off-site Centres around the UK. The guide subsequently produced is now available to the individual Off-site Centres as a generic model.

Seq. No	Country	Article	Ref. in National Report
140	, Republic of	Article 16	16.9 , p108

Question/ Comment What are the rationale and the assumptions used for establishing "detailed emergency planning zone" in the case of postulated accidents and accident consequence assessment?

And what extent of accident severity is included in the postulated accident?

Answer The response to this question has also taken into account the requirements of the very similar questions seq 140 & 141. The requirements for nuclear emergency response planning and preparedness in the UK are long standing and predate both the current legal framework and indeed its predecessor. The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations of 2001 (REPPPIR) implement the relevant requirements of EC Council Directive 96/29. REPPPIR applies to all operations in the UK where radioactive substances are used, stored or handled. It requires that operators assess their operations and in cases where it is "reasonably foreseeable" that an accident could give rise to a 5 mSv consequence which would affect members of the public, operators must provide a summary of their assessment to HSE and to the relevant Local Authority (LA). HSE will confirm the size of the 5mSv consequence zone to the LA for use as the basis for the LA's obligations for co-ordinating Emergency Planning. REPPPIR requires that the LA co-ordinate detail response plans within this 5 mSv consequence zone which is known as the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ). REPPPIR defines "reasonably foreseeable" as an accident that is credible but less than likely. In respect of civil nuclear licensed sites NII have determined that "reasonably foreseeable" should be interpreted as an accident in the infrequent range which, within the fault schedule which underlies the safety case for the operation of the plant, has an initiating frequency of greater than 10⁻⁵. There are two separate additional constraints imposed by Government Policy. Firstly a DEPZ in respect of an operating reactor site will be no less than 1km radius from the site. Secondly that at any site where there is a DEPZ established as above, there should also be an additional contingency planning zone imposed in respect of larger but non-reasonably foreseeable accidents. This obligation on the LA's planning process, described at <http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/safety/neplg9.pdf> is for outline plans to address evacuation to 4 km and shelter to 15km from the site.