

No datum

p \$93

Nov '63 word for SAC → STACUR

P^{p93} - "an individual (or) entity who does not
exist → who does 'not interact with the air'

p90 - No combat around the world

p102 - not targets -

Thor - Jan 58 agreed →

operational use of IRBMs - command channel direct
SAC with the though STACUR
+ dual key entry

Robert

RH Paterson

Bud St. & Reb: from before the V-Kont
to Bgrund Tzi

Frah Cor & Co, Inc 1531-71A 6829,


-5-

Ch 5 - Kelly's Law Jan 13/2/04

David Kelly - a Br

'There is no diff between offensive + defensive
attack - the only difference is intent.'

Can UK use SRS independent of US?



Qs - ① Can Northwood create target data for SRS?

② Does target data feed for SRS (+old sys) come directly from STRATCOM or ~~Intelligence~~ via Northwood?

→ Will SRS change the way EAMs are handled on SSBN?

SACEUR

CINCPACFCOM

STRATCOM

MIDB

Northwood

UK

(1) UK Independent plan for Strategy w/ &

Ww against Russia

(2) Capabilities for adaptive planning

- allocated by ~~Stratcom/SACCOM~~; ~~Approved by Northwood~~

(3) Role within US S1OP in response to SACCOM inputs
to S1OP

(4) Role with EURCOM/STRATCOM planning
in prep & review for SACCOM

(5) Poss UK independent adaptive plan

(6) Capability for adaptive plan

- ~~coordinated~~ by STRATCOM/EURCOM, approved by Northwood

AHO 02 Annual Report

25 yr contract 2000 - 2025

- 'now covers the expected life of the Trident system'.

Long term contract to publish weather forecasts - VIPER

New computer - commissioned 02

→ and improved ice computer from planned
proposed hydrodynamic research facility (HRF)
(for AHO radiography)

02 - AWE/Cod Alans collaboration over a decade
→ to validate computer model

New tritium facility - system as exists one
on the B6503/4
"It will provide the means to deal with research &
support the Trident warhead stockpile + will also
mean a 100-fold reduction in the operational
discharges of Tritium at AHO".

'We have performed well during the first year of Co
and ten-year contract + probably do
the year under review. We have met all our
objectives'

3 potential uses of BPL

- ① Independently against Russia
- ② As part of NATO
- ③ In US approved operation elsewhere
→ As a proxy

Br use of nuc outside NATO +
where there is no threat to Br's world
only be sensible where there is no
US approval → i.e. as a US proxy.

For CND deter

- ① Is there a low risk of nuc use
→ redundant + irrelevant
- ② Is there a threat of nuc use
→ dangerous