Lecture 15

Poli 419n Strategic Studies.

Lecture 15: March 2, 2004: **"SIOP."**

- Peter Pringle and William Arkin, *SIOP – The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), 101-125
- Desmond Ball and Robert Toth, "Revising the SIOP," *International Security* 14, No.4 (Spring 1990), 65-92
- Stephen Schwartz (ed), *Atomic Audit* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 197-206

Lecture: Single Integrated Operational Plan:

_**Pre-SIOP**: JCS uncoordinated planning: led to massive **duplication and triplication** of targets, **and possible inadvertent fratricide.**

_**1955 to 1960**: 1,000 to 18,000 warheads: Soviet targets from 3,000 to 20,000.

_**Included as targets**: 118 cities, 645 primary and 320 secondary airfields.

_**Steps to SIOP**: Needed **coord for pre-emption** (few days warning in 1950s).

_**Main problem**: impossible for the **political authorities** to have **control over the battle** and difficult for the **military** to **coordinate operations.**

_**SIOP-1960**: First SIOP developed by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and planned in detail (until 1992) by **the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff**: **Initial target** set was **USSR and China.**

_The target sets (NSTL: National Strategic Target List) for SIOP later drove the procurement cycle and was not well-supervised. The target list of **4,100** sites became 2,600 installations in **1,050 DGZs** (designated ground zeros).

_**Process**: Targets **received points for command and manufacturing**, and the computer allocates weapons. Initially people didn't think it put enough nuclear weapons on Moscow, so they changed it.

_**Problem**: Even after SIOP there was an **absence of supervision** because JCS **not have computers or personnel to review the plans.**

_Developed (used Sep 11 2002): **SCATANA** (Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids): clear skies of airplanes for bomber and ICBM operations.

SIOP-1961:

_In 1961, **80,000 targets were reviewed**, 3,729 installations were translated into **1,060 DGZs.**

_5 options:

_(1). Soviet strategic retaliatory forces – missile sites, bomber bases, submarine pens.

_(2). Soviet air defenses covering bomber routes.

_(3). Soviet air defenses near cities.

_(4). Soviet command and control centers.

_(5). All-out spasm attack.

SIOP-1962: Option 1: US+USSR + all satellites **Option 2:** no satellites; **Option 3:** pre-emptive or retaliatory. All missiles launched at once.

SIOP-63: flexible options: **exclude national command authorities**, **exclude China** and **other states**, and **various targets within countries. 4 Major Attack Options** (MAO).

_1967: **32,000 warheads** (high point).

_Massive SIOP error: (**discovered in 1974** following a **major review**) order to destroy **70% of overall manufacturing** was taken to mean at least 70% of each and every factory would have to be destroyed (including ones that would not have been targeted had there not been a misunderstanding).

SIOP-5 (1976): Four Soviet target categories: nuclear, non-nuclear, leadership and economic targets in the USSR. Could strike small target sets of less than 100 targets. Also, regional attack options.

SIOP-6: 1983: New goal: **concept of fighting and winning a protracted nuclear war** for 180 days. Elimination of counter-recovery mission as ineffective and beginning of mobile Soviet force targeting. The National Strategic Target Database (NSTDB) increased to 25,000 and then 50,000 by mid-1980s (topping out with 150-160,000 potential targets worldwide), but was then reduced to 14,000 by 1987.

_Economic recovery targets: it was cancelled after it was realized that North Korea recovered its pre-war GDP after only 8 years from its level of 20%. It was believed that a **protracted nuclear war** rather than a pre-programmed target set would be a better way of limiting enemy recovery.

SIOP-6F: 1989: targets Soviet leadership and SS-25 mobile assets.

_Decapitation targets: The Soviets were able to hide 175,000 leadership elements in 1,500 underground facilities, making decapitation difficult. However, the Trident II and MX missiles, because of their accuracy permitted their targeting. In Sep 1988: US defense department began a program for deep-penetration nuclear warheads.

_Relocatable Targets (RT): In 1985, the Soviets deployed SS-25 road mobile ICBMs, and in 1987 the

SS-24 rail-mobile ICBM. In 1987 the Pentagon began an integrated program to destroy RTs, consisting of:

_(1). Aurora stealth reconnaissance vehicle (Mach 5 at 100,000 feet). Possibly cancelled in 1993.

_(2). Unmanned remote sensing devices.

_(3). Magnum and Mentor Geostationary Signals Intelligence satellites (launched in Jan 1985 and Nov 1989). Each satellite cost over $1bn.

_(4). Four and other KH-12 Photographic Intelligence satellites.

_(5). Lacrosse All-Weather (see through clouds) Radar-Imaging Satellites. Each satellite cost over $0.5bn.

_(6). B-2 Stealth bomber.

_(7). Rapid launch of Minutemen and MX missiles on mobile targets.

_(8). Soft kill EMT (electro-magnetic weapons).

→ REACT +SRS

Updates to SIOP: 1990-1996: Eastern Europe off target list. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea detailed targeting, and development of a quick-targeting strategic reserve.

_4 Basic counterforce options: Major Attack Options (MAO) -1, -2, -3, -4.

MAO-1: basic counterforce plan.

MAO-2: MAO-1 + conventional military targets and secondary airfields.

MAO-3: MAO-2 + leadership.

MAO-4: MAO-3 + major economic targets.

_Despite end of CW, SIOP (2001) continues with 2,000 targets in the former Soviet Union, 300-400 China, 100-200 elsewhere.

_Planning time is an average of 14-18 months; SIOP-94 took 67 weeks.

_It would also take just a few hours to set-up forces to strike targets in the third world that were not on the SIOP target set. STRATCOM also draws up regional nuclear attack plans, incl. fire its nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles.

_Planned against the Soviet RISOP (Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan): produced every fiscal year.

_Soviet SIOP termed the Plan of Operation of the Strategic Forces.

_**Soviets** had **tapes that were geographic specific** so the **nuclear missiles** had to be launched from a specific point or they would not work at all – this was partially because they did not trust their own naval personnel.

ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPACITY OF THE USSR

NAME	REQUIRED	CAPACITY	PERCENTAGE
Daugherty et al.	100.000 EMT	220.616 EMT	221
Levi et al.	117.000 EMT	220.616 EMT	189
McNamara	200.000 EMT	220.616 EMT	110
Grieco	400.000 EMT	220.616 EMT	55

ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPACITY OF THE USA

NAME	REQUIRED	CAPACITY	PERCENTAGE
Daugherty et al.	100.000 EMT	120.978 EMT	121
Levi et al.	117.000 EMT	120.978 EMT	103
McNamara	200.000 EMT	120.978 EMT	60
Grieco	400.000 EMT	120.978 EMT	30

Workshop: write SIOP for small states for upcoming nuclear war simulation: US, USSR, UK, France, China: 5 teams.

Exchange Chart:

To destroy one:	Requires:
Silo ICBM	1 ICBM, 1 SLBM, 1 Bomber, 1 IRBM
Mobile ICBM	1 Bomber, 3 ICBM, 3 IRBM
Fixed IRBM	0.5 ICBM, 0.5 IRBM, 0.5 carrier, 0.5 bomber
Mobile IRBM	1 Bomber, 3 ICBM, 3 IRBM
SLBM	0.5 Carrier
Carrier-Based	1 Bomber
Bombers*	1 ICBM, 0.5 SLBM, 1 Bomber, 0.5 IRBM

Bombers suffer 50% casualties every turn they are used; 100% casualties when used against carriers.

Related Files:

- Lect 15 SIOP-(msword)
- SIOP Bibliography-(msword)
- Sino Indian Nuclear War-(msword)
- Global Arsenal List 2004-(vnd.ms-excel)