

Security," given at the annual National Defense University-SOUTHCOM Strategy Symposium in Miami, April 25, 1995; and the article "Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations" in the Hispano-American edition of *Military Review*, January-February 1995.

## **Conclusions.**

Southern Theater strategy and operations are focused on military operations other than war. The 1992 USSOUTHCOM strategy, finally published under General Joulwan, provided a useful example for other combatant commands because it was not based on Cold War assumptions. Rather, the strategy addressed dealing with nontraditional (transnational) threats, overcoming the scourge of drugs, and strengthening socio-economic reforms as ways to strengthen democratic institutions.

The strategy of the early 1990s was set aside during the command of General McCaffrey and replaced with a set of principles and policy guidelines. The SOUTHCOM staff is now reassessing strategy requirements in light of the movement of the command from Panama to Miami in 1998 and the guidance from the new CINC.

## **U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)**

The Strategic Command mission is to "deter a major military attack on the United States and its allies and, should deterrence fail, employ forces."<sup>45</sup> This includes conducting worldwide strategic reconnaissance and ensuring command, control, communications, and intelligence for strategic force employment. STRATCOM plans operations in designated areas such as parts of the former Soviet Union. Another aspect of the STRATCOM mission is to support the nuclear planning of the geographic CINCs.

USSTRATCOM is located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. In the peacetime environment, CINCSTRAT exercises his full combatant command

authority over single purpose nuclear forces through the two STRATCOM Air Force components, Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Force Space Command. Dual-purpose forces (nuclear and conventional capable aircraft) are not assigned to STRATCOM in peacetime.

In wartime, CINCSTRAT would establish his command and control of nuclear forces through commanders of task forces (CTF). According to Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey, former STRATCOM Deputy Director of Operations and Logistics, "we would deal directly with a bomber task force commander, a tanker task force commander, and [land and sea] missile task force commanders."<sup>46</sup>

U.S. strategic nuclear forces are among the most powerful and decisive instruments of military strategy and national grand strategy. Therefore, the CINC's strategy largely reflects the guidance found in Presidential directives, NCA policy documents, Joint Staff directives, and it accounts for conditions set forth in international agreements concerning strategic arms limitations (e.g., START II) and nonproliferation.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), conducted by DoD through the summer of 1994 has had a direct influence on STRATCOM's nuclear strategy. The NPR recognized that Russian reform could fail, and that Russian retention of some 25,000 nuclear weapons would require a "nuclear hedge."<sup>47</sup> Hedging as a strategy has been defined by STRATCOM as maintaining "... approximate strategic capability relative to extant nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union and ... sufficient readiness on the part of U.S. nuclear forces to respond to the rapid pace at which adverse political change could take place."<sup>48</sup>

STRATCOM's responsibilities extended beyond central nuclear warfighting, and the command now supports regional strategies, contingency operations and counterproliferation actions. Thus, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is no longer a stand-alone document prepared by the former Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; rather, it is now prepared by the

STRATCOM Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, and is a target list integrated into the Joint Staff's *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP). As one CINC put it to USSTRATCOM, "I want a nuclear 'hired gun' so I can pick up the telephone, call, and have STRATCOM do everything else."<sup>49</sup>

The STRATCOM staff has developed a strategic war planning system (SWPS) to provide a timely and adaptable war planning capability against a wide variety of contingencies. The process provides multiple options to National Command Authorities to meet unforeseen circumstances, and it communicates selected options to nuclear-capable forces in the field.<sup>50</sup> The SWPS was developed because of the changed nature of the threat, increased planning requirements for rapid response, and the significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear force structure.

### **Process.**

In December 1992 a 10-person planning team called the Strategic Planning Study Group was organized and tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of strategic planning. This is the group that created the SWPS.<sup>51</sup> A planning process was needed which could rapidly develop a flexible SIOF to meet new threats such as regional instability, the rise of hostile regional powers, proliferation of WMD, and the residual nuclear capability of the republics of the former Soviet Union.<sup>52</sup>


The J-5 planners reviewed procedures concerning deliberate and crisis action planning and compatibility with the geographic CINCs' strategies. Then planners examined requirements for the SIOF, crisis action procedures, non-strategic nuclear forces and support for strategic conventional forces.

An important consideration in the strategy planning process was the use of credible computer-aided modeling techniques to speed-up the planning process. The "software" had to be acceptable to the Joint planning community and

flexible enough to respond to changing warfighting requirements.

The result of STRATCOM's initiative to streamline strategic planning has been a process dubbed the "Living SIOP" by former CINCSTRAT, Air Force General George Lee Butler. The living SIOP evolved from an appreciation of a threat environment which could demand small and rapid changes to targeting, even updated on a daily basis. Substantial changes in U.S. nuclear force structure or in targeting will require a major plan revision lasting several months.

As a part of this planning process, STRATCOM provides supporting documents that can become counter-WMD sections (or annexes) to the supported CINCs contingency plans. Figure II-8 illustrates the Theater Planning Support Process.



**Figure II-8.**  
**USSTRATCOM Theater Planning Support Process.**

Source: USSTRATCOM J5, April 1995.

### **Participation.**

Because the nuclear mission and forces of USSTRATCOM are a central and conspicuous part of U.S. national strategy, leaders at the top levels of government contribute toward the development of the CINC's strategic

concepts. About 20 Presidential Decision Directives, and additional Secretary of Defense guidance such as the Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP), provide National Command Authorities' guidance to the STRATCOM staff.<sup>53</sup> Sometimes the impact of Presidential decisions on strategic planning is dramatic, such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of September 1991, which withdrew nuclear weapons from the theater CINCs' areas of responsibility (except for gravity bombs in Europe).<sup>54</sup> The President and Secretary of Defense directly participate in the approval sequence for some STRATCOM planning, particularly the SIOP.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, national fora involving Congress, government officials, and the informed public have directly influenced STRATCOM's force structure and strategic planning. For example, results from the Secretary of Defense's 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 1994 Nuclear Posture Review determined, in great measure, the resources to conduct the STRATCOM mission.

The SIOP is now being incorporated into the JSCP (Annex C) according to Chairman JCS Instructions 3110.3. Thus, planners on the Joint Staff have a contribution to make towards the development of CINCSTRAT's strategic plans.

CINCSTRAT plays a direct role in developing his strategic concepts and writing a "vision" statement for OPLAN 8044 and the like. In addition, he "enjoys" considerable help from outside sources in the U.S. Government because of the sensitive and important role that nuclear weapons play in national military strategy. The key staff player assisting the CINC is his J5.

### **Product.**

The result of CINCSTRAT's strategic planning initiatives has been a new form of SIOP developed by the Strategic War Planning System that was designed to respond to changes in the strategic environment and to

quick-action tasking from the National Command Authorities.

An annual posture statement, prepared to inform Congress, is the single document which provides an overview of the CINC's strategic concepts. Beyond that, the CINC's operation plans and operation plans in concept format provide specific direction to subordinates. CINCSTRATCOM does not produce a written strategy document in the manner of the geographic CINCs.

## **Conclusions.**

Leaders at the top levels of government contribute strategic objectives and concepts that guide STRATCOM operations. CINCSTRAT does not have a traditional strategy. Rather, he keys on other combined and unified command strategies for input because he is tasked to provide nuclear support to the geographic CINCs. National fora including government officials and the public have also influenced STRATCOM's planning and force structure.

## **CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

Because the U.S. CINCs key on the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* as base lines for their strategic planning, there is a degree of continuity among the combatant commands planning processes—at least in terms of the general security policy. However, the extent to which planning staffs systematically use the range of threat assessment resources available clearly varies from command to command. Also, the planning processes, scope, formats, and currency of the CINCs' strategy documents vary widely within commands—based on the CINCs' interests and what they want to do about strategic planning.

In some cases a combatant command is without a current CINC-approved strategy document. Still, there is a need for coherent and up-to-date strategy documents to provide guidance to subordinates and to facilitate

44. David G. Bradford, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE), and former command strategist for USCINCSAC, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM, letter to authors, February 22, 1996.
45. "United States Strategic Command, Strategic Deterrence . . . Foundation of America's Security," pamphlet, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, 1994.
46. James W. Canan, "The New Order in Omaha," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1994, p. 28.
47. William J. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks to the Henry L. Stimson Center, September 20, 1994; *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, Autumn 1994, p. 1.
48. "Nuclear Forces Post 1994," CINCSTRATCOM Staff Group, J004, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, July 12, 1994, reprinted in *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Strategic Command, Autumn 1994.
49. Interview by the authors with USSTRATCOM planners, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
50. Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Command, "Posture Statement," before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 23, 1995, *CINCSTRAT Newsgram*, Winter 1995, p. 8.
51. George Lee Butler, General, U.S. Air Force, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, "Reengineering Nuclear War Planning," U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: December 16, 1993, p. 4. Butler paper provided authors by STRATCOM Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paula L. Hoffman, April 26, 1995. Description of planning process is based on General Butler's paper.
52. The Cold War SIOP took about 18 months to build; today it takes about 6 months, and there are adaptive planning options for developing new courses of action within 24 hours.
53. William R. Coy, Jr., Commander, U.S. Navy, USSTRATCOM J513, interview by authors, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

54. John T. Parsons, Deputy Chief, Contingency Planning Cell, J534, interview by authors, April 25, 1995, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Also, Coy interview.

55. According to Joint Staff administrative guidelines (MOP 132 and 133), most OPLANS are approved at the level of the Deputy Operations Deputies, Operations Deputies, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Chairman, JCS.