

	Annual operating costs, £million, averaged over 30-year life of Trident
Manpower ^[2]	33
In-service support of submarine	33
In-service support	13
In-service support	47
Base / site running costs	61
Refit-maintenance	53
Stores and spares	35
In-service trials	1
Dedicated communications	1
Total	277

Notes:

1. *This estimate has been derived from a compilation of 30-year estimates covering the activities listed above which are directly attributable to the operation of the Trident force. They are based on current assumptions about operating patterns. These estimates are shown as an annual average for presentational purposes only. They do not represent actual expenditure in a given year nor the amount which might be saved if the activity were terminated.*

2. *Includes: operational crews, specialist crew training, dedicated shore staff, and technical staff.*

3. *Includes: the command system, sonar and Spearfish.*

Nuclear Warhead Programme Costs

19. The nuclear warhead programme costs directly related to Trident in financial year 1997/9 are estimated at £114M. Expenditure on our nuclear warhead programme as a whole amounted to £410M. This included the cost of decommissioning weapons withdrawn from service; substantial continuing costs arising from earlier stages of our nuclear warhead programme; infrastructure costs at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (including expenditure to achieve safety and environmental improvements); and other activities, including support to

other Government Departments and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification. The overall cost of the warhead programme is declining. A breakdown of the costs is shown in *FIGURE*

	£m
Direct Trident-related warhead expenditure	
(a) Trident Production costs at Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)	20
(b) Trident In-Service Support at AWE	9
(c) Research, Development and Capability Maintenance at AWE	58
(d) Trident related waste management at AWE	4
(e) Other warhead programme expenditure outside AWE	23
Sub-Total	114
AWE infrastructure	
(f) Maintenance, safety and environmental improvements to meet Nuclear Installations Inspectorate requirements	168
Other activities	
(g) Other activities including support to other Government Departments and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring	19
Costs arising from earlier programmes	
(h) Breakdown and dismantlement of WE177 and Chevaline warheads	11
(i) Payments to British Nuclear Fuels Limited and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority etc. in respect of liabilities from earlier stages of the UK nuclear programme	103
(j) Management and disposal of waste at AWE from earlier stages of UK nuclear programme, and decommissioning of redundant facilities	13
Sub-total	127
Total	428
Less 1996/97 VAT receipt £18m	18
GRAND TOTAL	410

21.6
1.3

Note:

Total AWE running costs comprise all above elements excluding (e) and (i) to give a total of **£302M**.

Arms Control

20. Consideration of how best to carry forward the Government's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons has been a key aspect of the Review. But this goal cannot be achieved in isolation from wider political and security realities, including the recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. The challenge is to create the conditions in which no state judges that it needs nuclear weapons to guarantee its security. The radical improvements in European security in recent years have shown that this is not an impossible objective. But it is not a task for the Nuclear Weapon States alone. All states have their part to play.

21. The Government welcomes the continuing bilateral START process between the US and Russia, and looks forward to prompt Russian ratification of START II, to enable early negotiations on further bilateral reductions in their strategic holdings, under START III, as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Helsinki in March 1997. In parallel, with our NATO Allies, we are consulting with Russia in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council on issues relating to Russia's continuing substantial holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

22. The Government is unequivocally committed to Britain's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The effective implementation of all its provisions is vital for global peace and security, and we attach great importance to the strengthened review process agreed in 1995. We also welcome the various measures taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency in recent years to strengthen its safeguards systems.

23. We have to stop nuclear proliferation to reach our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. There is a clear international consensus that the way to achieve this is through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). By testing, India and Pakistan have challenged this consensus. They risk igniting a dangerous arms race and endangering stability in and beyond their region. This is the wrong way to go. We and many other states, including through a resolution by the UN Security Council, have called upon both countries to join the global regime against nuclear proliferation by signing the CTBT and joining in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without conditions. We