

## NOTES

*Mottram's comments show that the Government were not looking for the minimum criteria in the Duff report and that they were planning to have more destructive capability than was deployed in 1979.*

Duff's introduction of this new option had been based on intelligence information which showed that the Soviet Union was building new and deeper bunkers. An annex to his report states "the importance which the Soviet leadership attach to maintaining their administrative centre unimpaired is shown by these measures and by the effort expended in the complementary ABM defence system around Moscow."<sup>79</sup>

Damage Criteria as a moveable feast:

Concern that discussion of Duff criteria could undermine spending on Chevaline. The Chancellor had argued that if the Moscow criterion was unnecessary then Chevaline should be cancelled.<sup>80</sup>

"The view taken in Tony Duff's report that the credibility of the deterrent could be maintained if we had the ability to cause unacceptable damage to certain cities and other targets in Russia, excluding Moscow, seems to me to call the requirement for Chevaline into question."<sup>81</sup>

"deterrent criteria for damage required are not absolute in either scale or probability"<sup>82</sup>

Handwritten note by Richard Mottram to Michael Quinlan:

Critique of Owen 1 million dead:

"If we reduce dramatically, comparison with the French standard (and our own former standard) will be a major component of the subsequent evaluation our allies and our adversaries make"<sup>83</sup>

This would be "a strike of relatively modest proportions" in the light of Soviet deaths in World War II.<sup>84</sup> It was questionable whether this would give a British government confidence to act resolutely in a dangerous situation.

Criteria for deterrence with regard to Chevaline:

"an assured and continuous capability to inflict damage unacceptable to the Russians by credibly threatening to destroy Moscow".<sup>85</sup>

For Polaris and Chevaline the criterion was "an assured and continuous capability to inflict damage unacceptable to the Russians by credibly threatening to destroy Moscow".<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent, Part II Criteria for Deterrence, Annex A: Unacceptable Damage, 30 November 1978, DEFE 25-335

<sup>80</sup> Criteria for Deterrence, Draft Minute from Sir John Hunt to Jim Callaghan, July 1978, DEFE 23-219 e71

<sup>81</sup> Criteria for Deterrence, letter from Douglas Wass, Treasury, to Sir John Hunt, 27 June 1978, DEFE 23-219 e57

<sup>82</sup> Criteria for Deterrence, letter from DUS(P) [Michael Quinlan] to PUS, 20 June 1978, DEFE 23-219 e55

<sup>83</sup> Nuclear Matters, letter from Michael Quinlan to PS to Secretary of State for Defence, 18 December 1978, DEFE 25-433 e21

<sup>84</sup> *ibid*

<sup>85</sup> Polaris Improvements, letter from Roy Mason to Harold Wilson 18 September 1975

Duff group early work

"An assessment was needed of whether the importance of Moscow as a target might be affected by measures which the Russians had taken or might take in the future to reduce its importance as the centre of government and party leadership".<sup>87</sup>

- suggested question to be drafted for JIC; Draft questions were considered at the group's meeting on 15 March 1978 – "it was suggested that the main question in paragraph 1 of the draft should be simplified and no longer request advice on how various factors might be weighted by the Russians."<sup>88</sup> Also that a relatively small level of damage could have serious implication in terms of the ability of the Soviet Union to compete effectively with the United States.<sup>89</sup>

The early approach, in 1947, was that, "It is not possible to assess the precise number which we might require but we are convinced we should aim to have as soon as possible a stock in the order of hundreds rather than scores".<sup>90</sup>

In 1961 it was estimated that the planned force of 144 V-bombers would be able to "threaten with destruction 50% of 40 major Russian cities using free-falling bombs, and this has been provisionally accepted as the measure of a worthwhile British controlled contribution to the Western deterrent."<sup>91</sup> Quinlan indicates that the plan was to attack 30-40 cities, causing 50% damage to each.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Polaris Improvements, letter from Roy Mason to Harold Wilson 18 September 1975,

<sup>87</sup> Criteria for Deterrence Minutes of meeting on 23 February 1978 DEFE 68-405 e3 page 2

<sup>88</sup> Criteria for Deterrence Minutes of meeting on 15 March 1978 DEFE 68-405 e8 page 1

<sup>89</sup> Criteria for Deterrence Minutes of meeting on 15 March 1978 DEFE 68-405 e8 page 1

<sup>90</sup> Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-64, John Baylis, OUP 1995

<sup>91</sup> The Bomber Force and Skybolt, 1961, CAB 21-4979;

<sup>92</sup> "In the late 1950s, it was variously forecast in official appraisals that the aircraft could knock out (this being defined as inflicting 50 percent destruction) between 30 and 40 cities". The British Experience, Michael Quinlan in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its origins and practice, Henry D Sokolski (Ed), Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2004, p266.