



This document is the basis of information that we have about nuclear issues in Derby. There are many questions posed, and if you have information which could be added to this document then please let us know. We also welcome comments and clarification.

1. Rolls Royce and Associates, Derby. (RR+A)

We know (Derby Telegraph - 4th June 1996) that Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is transported from AWE Aldermaston, near Reading to Rolls Royce and Associates on Ranesway near the centre of Derby. Transports come up in guarded Special Nuclear Materials convoy (SNM) every month. HEU is a material which is used to make nuclear weapons, like the one used at Hiroshima. AWE Aldermaston is where Britain's nuclear weapons are designed. MoD personnel stay to guard the HEU at RR+A in Derby for 2 days for security reasons. RR+A must undertake some process which transforms the HEU so that it ceases to be a security risk, i.e. that no-one would be able to use it to make a nuclear weapon.

RR+A produce the reactors for nuclear powered submarines, some of which are Trident, Britain's nuclear weapon submarines. RR+A are a key component of the nuclear submarine fuel cycle. The reactors which are produced at RR+A in Derby are transported to Barrow in Furness to be put into new submarines or to Rosyth and Devonport to refuel submarines when they have a major refit.

RR+A also have two research reactors, Neptune and Vulcan, which may also be fuelled by HEU fuel. The Neptune reactor is in Derby, and Vulcan is in the north of Scotland.

2. The transport of nuclear materials.

The transportation of material to and from Derby is the responsibility of the MoD, and comes under their specifications and regulations. It is also secret. We do not know what transports leave Derby, but new reactor cores probable leave at a rate of one or two a year. Replacement fuel rods are probably in continual production.

Citizen Verification of nuclear convoy movements enables Nukewatch to inform MPs, the local authority, the media, non-governmental organisations and local people. The Ministry of Defence refuse to inform anyone except the Chief Constable that nuclear materials are travelling through the area. Emergency Planning Units of local councils are not told of the movement of nuclear materials. The implications of this lack of openness is that in the event of a serious accident involving fire and impact, the protective packaging could be damaged releasing radioactive and toxic materials into the environment. People may have to be evacuated or take shelter, and in any event, fire-service water from dealing with the incident may become contaminated and enter the rainwater run-off and river system.

3. Nuclear site safety.

RR+A at Derby is a nuclear licensed site. They are subject to inspection by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate which are part of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The inspector for HSE produces an internal report for the HSE, but it is unavailable to the public. We are not even allowed to know the name of the inspector. There is no chance for the people of Derby to find out what is happening on their doorstep.

Nuclear sites in the UK usually have a local liaison committee for local people to learn about the standards, safety and activities of a nuclear licensed site. In the past these liaison committees have raised health and safety concerns of local people.