



# STATEMENT ON DEFENCE

1962

## The Next Five Years

*Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence  
by Command of Her Majesty  
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# Statement on Defence, 1962

## INTRODUCTION

1. In 1957 the Government laid before Parliament a statement of Britain's future policy for defence which looked forward five years to 1962. This year's statement deals with the further evolution of defence policy.

2. It therefore sets out in some detail the basic objectives of the nation's external policy for which armed forces are or may be necessary; discusses the problems of war in the nuclear age; and takes account of the economic factors which also condition the allocation of national resources to defence. A careful balance has to be struck before long-term decisions can be taken about the strength of the forces, their equipment, deployment and strategy.

## PART I—THE SETTING

3. The basic objectives of Britain's defence policy will remain:

- (a) to maintain the security of this country;
- (b) to carry out our obligations for the protection of British territories overseas and those to whom we owe a special duty by treaty or otherwise;
- (c) to make our contribution to the defence of the free world and the prevention of war in accordance with the arrangements we have with individual countries and under collective security treaties.

We seek to exercise military power only when and where it is essential for the furtherance of these objectives, to do this with forces whose total claims on our resources are consistent with the maintenance of a sound economy, and to devise a deployment and a strategy that can rapidly be adapted to changing circumstances. Over the next decade there will undoubtedly be further rapid developments in science and technology. New nations and new national groupings will emerge. We can expect no change in the relentless pressure of every kind from the Communist powers in pursuit of their long-term aim of bringing all mankind within their system.

### Alliances

4. The defence policy of many nations to-day is chiefly determined by their membership of collective security alliances. Some nations can rely on membership of one of these alliances to meet all their basic objectives. Britain's case is different. We provide simultaneously contributions to three collective security alliances, NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Thus we must be able at any time to maintain forces in three areas of the world. On the Continent of Europe we have stationed large forces for the last 16 years in complete contrast with our previous military dispositions. In addition



we must be able to bring force to bear in areas of the world in which we have responsibilities of our own outside the scope of the three collective security alliances. The contribution which we make to each of these alliances must be judged in the light of our total contribution to the defence of freedom and the maintenance of peace, not only in Europe but also in the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East, all areas of vital interest of the Free World as a whole. War to-day, wherever it might start, would be an immediate threat to the whole world.

### Overseas Bases and Garrisons

5. The word "base" is often applied indiscriminately to any place overseas where British forces are stationed, and misleading arguments are sometimes constructed on the false premise that a static garrison is a base. The purpose of a garrison is to guard and help to maintain law and order in the place where the garrison is located. Thus the need for a garrison normally flows from the responsibility of sovereignty or agreement. The military need for an overseas base, however, is determined by the time required to deploy forces and weapons where danger threatens. A base is thus a place where troops, ships, aircraft, heavy equipment, supplies and facilities for maintenance and repair can be kept for military operations elsewhere. In the Mediterranean, for example, although Army garrisons for local defence purposes will be maintained in Gibraltar and Malta, neither of them is now a base for Army operations elsewhere. Cyprus remains, primarily, an air base, and we shall continue to require naval and air operating facilities at Gibraltar and Malta. Aden, on the other hand, is an Army and Royal Air Force base, and Singapore is a base for all three Services.

**N.B.** 6. The need for garrisons of British troops to support the civil power in internal security emergencies has demonstrably diminished already and may be expected to diminish still further. At the same time, we may suffer restrictions on our freedom to use some territories for military purposes, and we must accordingly adapt our strategy. We must insure against the possible loss of fixed installations overseas by keeping men and heavy equipment afloat, and by increasing the air and sea portability of the Strategic Reserve. This does not imply evading commitments. Greater mobility by air and sea is the best way of fulfilling efficiently over the next five to ten years the requirements set out in paragraph 3.

### War in the Nuclear Age

7. In 1957 the West had undoubted superiority in the capacity to deliver strategic nuclear weapons. To-day the West still has superiority, but each side has the capacity to inflict upon the other a degree of devastation which has never before in human history been either possible or imaginable. An armed clash involving the vital interests of either side is, therefore, likely to lead to the virtual destruction of both and not merely to conquest or defeat. This truth must increasingly condition the attitude of powers to the use of force as an instrument of policy, for Governments can no longer choose to have either a full-scale conventional war or a limited war without risking the use of nuclear weapons. So far in history, peace has apparently inevitably



been punctuated by wars of steadily increasing ferocity. The massive deterrent effect of nuclear striking power is a new fact which, if we can maintain an effective balance of force, provides a justifiable hope of holding the peace until disarmament provides a more lasting solution.

8. We and our allies must therefore be able to deploy wherever necessary sufficient forces to hold this balance and thus prevent tension from breaking into a major conflict. Our policy of deterring war has been severely tested in the past twelve months in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. So far it has succeeded. We must continue to make it clear to potential aggressors, however, that we should strike back with all the means that we judge appropriate, conventional or nuclear. If we had nothing but nuclear forces, this would not be credible. A balance must be maintained, therefore, between conventional and nuclear strength. Neither element must be so small as to encourage an aggressor to seek a quick advantage, or to risk a provocative local incident escalating into a major war.

9. In short, we must maintain carefully balanced forces to deter every form of aggression and military threats. The Government do not believe that major war could long continue without one side or the other resorting to nuclear weapons. It is therefore the prevention of war that is vital rather than preparations for long drawn out conventional war.

N.B.

#### Disarmament and Nuclear Tests

10. The Government's object remains the achievement of general and complete international disarmament, to be attained by stages subject to effective control. They consider that the highest priority should be given to a Treaty banning further nuclear weapons tests, again subject to effective verification and control. The Government have worked patiently to reach agreement on these two issues which they regard as of outstanding importance; they will continue to do so in spite of the little success that has been achieved so far. Nevertheless, no one who has really understood the significance of the advent of nuclear weapons can seriously propose that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be separated from conventional disarmament. One without the other might not lessen, but increase the risk of large conventional wars (which only appear less terrible now by comparison with nuclear war). Nuclear and conventional disarmament must therefore go hand in hand.

#### Defence and the Economy

11. In 1962-63 the Defence Budget will be £1,721 million or 7 per cent. of the Gross National Product. In normal conditions, forward budgeting for defence needs to be for periods of not less than five years at a time. Only in this way can continuity of planning and production be provided. We must also fit defence into the general study of public expenditure in relation to prospective resources, and as part of the new forward look at defence policy expenditure is being re-examined in every detail. All public expenditure programmes, moreover, have an important effect on the economy including the balance of payments. For most of these



programmes, this impact derives from the taxation required to finance them and the manpower they absorb; for some, such as defence, other factors need careful watching, such as their competition with export potential in certain sectors of industry, and their direct expenditure overseas.

12. Our task here, the difficulty of which should not be underestimated, is not to cut defence expenditure but to contain it. Although it is our present aim to see that the percentage of the Gross National Product absorbed by defence does not rise significantly, some increase in cost in absolute terms is to be expected as the national product itself increases.

## PART II—MILITARY COMMITMENTS

### Western Strategic Nuclear Deterrent—Britain's Contribution

13. When the Government of the day decided to embark on the arduous task of becoming a military nuclear power, the only other country which possessed a nuclear arsenal was the United States. Since then, the USSR has been added to the number and France is on the way to achieving a nuclear capability. Although the British effort in this field is manifestly smaller than that of either the United States or the USSR, and although it consumes only about 10 per cent. of our defence resources, our contribution to the Western strategic deterrent remains significant. It is by itself enough to make a potential aggressor fear that our retaliation would inflict destruction beyond any level which he would be prepared to tolerate. Moreover, it adds considerably to the flexibility and dispersal of the total nuclear forces available to the West and thus to their retaliatory power. The efficacy of our deterrent will therefore be maintained throughout the 1960s by using our V-bombers and fitting them with stand-off weapons, Blue Steel in the first instance and later Skybolt.

### NATO

14. The safety of our own country lies in the success of the common defence of the North Atlantic area. The Government do not believe that the defence of Europe could be left to long-range nuclear weapons alone, nor that its fate could be decided by long drawn out fighting limited to conventional forces. The Government wish to ensure that NATO forces are balanced and NATO strategy flexible.

15. Britain's duty is to contribute not only to the formulation of an agreed strategy but to make available a fair share of the forces required to fulfil that strategy. Here we have a particular problem. We have to take account of the tasks we have to perform in other parts of the world, tasks which contribute to the containment of Communism and the maintenance of peace and order in areas whose stability is vital to the West. Moreover, our contribution to the NATO shield forces means a deployment of forces overseas and, therefore, a heavy burden on our balance of payments. After an



impartial examination of our case NATO recognises the gravity of this burden and we hope to negotiate adequate means for relieving the strain on our balance of payments. Yet we accept that the provision of adequate forces to support the strategic objectives of NATO must continue to be one of Britain's primary responsibilities as far as we can see into the present decade. During this period the proportion of these forces to be stationed on the mainland of Europe and in Britain respectively must depend to a large extent on the balance of payments position. Meanwhile we have taken steps in the Army Reserve Bill to maintain the strength of B.A.O.R., which could, if the Berlin situation deteriorated further, be brought up to war establishment within a matter of days by the recall of reservists.

#### **Mediterranean and Near East**

16. Britain no longer has to discharge alone her obligations in the Mediterranean. To-day, the maritime forces of the allied nations are sharing a NATO responsibility there. So far as Britain is concerned, we also have a responsibility to contribute an air strike force in support of CENTO and, under our treaty, to help with the defence of Libya. We are adjusting our forces in the Mediterranean in recognition of the fact that our responsibilities there are shared with our allies; this process will continue. For the Royal Navy, the main base will be in Britain, but there will continue to be the need for forward operating facilities in Gibraltar and Malta. The Royal Air Force will continue to need airfield facilities at Gibraltar and Malta, and both places will continue to require small local garrisons. A garrison will be maintained in the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus which will continue to be the main base for our air strike force in support of CENTO and for the location of NATO early warning facilities and wireless stations essential for our world-wide network of military communications. The land forces in the Sovereign Base Areas will be adjusted to the level adequate to safeguard these facilities and to maintain stockpiles and other installations needed to allow rapid reinforcement. The Royal Air Force will continue to require staging facilities at El Adem and Tripoli and the continued presence of a small land force may prove necessary to meet our treaty obligation to help in the defence of Libya against external aggression. In short, while we shall continue to maintain naval or air facilities with some land forces in Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, in none of these places need we base continuously large land forces for operations elsewhere; if necessary, such forces would be provided from Britain. Certain consequential changes to the Command structure in this theatre are referred to later.

#### **Middle East**

17. Peace and stability in the oil producing States of Arabia and the Persian Gulf are vital for the Western world. We are, and shall remain, responsible for military assistance to those States in the area to which we are bound by treaty or which are otherwise under our protection. We have an obligation under treaty to protect the Arab Rulers of the Federation and other States in the Aden Protectorate and direct military responsibility for the defence of Aden Colony. This has meant stationing a garrison in Aden Colony, and providing detachments for the assistance of Arab forces in the



Protectorate. For possible operations in the Gulf we have relied on Aden as a base and on reinforcing from Kenya. Henceforward, we plan to keep land forces permanently stationed in Aden and the Gulf and to reinforce them rapidly in emergency not only by air but also by means of an amphibious joint Service task force East of Suez capable of putting ashore in the threatened areas land forces, and their heavy equipment, and of providing air and communications support.

#### **Africa**

18. At present we maintain in Kenya a part of our Army Strategic Reserve, which is available for supporting the civil power in the African territories for which we are responsible and as a reinforcement for our forces in the Middle East, primarily for operations in the Persian Gulf. As explained in the preceding paragraph, alternative arrangements will be made to support operations in the Middle East theatre. During the sixties, therefore, our military requirements in East and Central Africa will have to be re-examined in the light of a continuing need to support the civil power. This may require the maintenance of forces in the area, but there will be no long-term requirement for a base. In addition, we shall hope to retain facilities there for air transit, staging and force training normally accorded by Commonwealth countries to each other.

#### **Far East**

19. In the Far East, Britain has made it clear, with other signatories of the Treaty of Manila, that we are vitally interested in the preservation of peace and stability in South-East Asia. We have a responsibility for assisting in the forward defence of Australia and New Zealand. We share with them a close concern for the defence of the Federation of Malaya for which Britain accepted obligations under a Defence Agreement in 1957. Hitherto our contribution has been to maintain with Australia and New Zealand the Commonwealth Brigade Group in Malaya as well as other powerful forces stationed both in Malaya and Singapore. The Government have already welcomed as a desirable aim the inclusion of North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore in the proposed Federation of Malaysia. We hope that the creation of this new State would contribute to the general stability of the area. We have agreed with the Malayan Government that in the event of the creation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Agreement of 1957 and its annexes shall be extended to all territories of the Federation of Malaysia, subject to the proviso that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit Britain to make such use of these bases and facilities as Britain may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia. The new State would of course become responsible for internal security throughout its territory and this would in due course relieve Britain of a considerable responsibility in respect of Singapore for which a



number of major units of the British Army are at present stationed in Malaya and Singapore. Discussions are now proceeding with the Malayan authorities on how this changeover could best be achieved. In the 1960s therefore our forces in the Far East will comprise land, sea and air forces with a diminished internal security role but a continuing task, in conjunction with our allies, for the preservation of peace in the area. Our main base will continue to be Singapore with forces, including our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade Group, also stationed in the Federation of Malaya.

20. There will also be a continuing need for a garrison in Hong Kong for the purpose of internal security and as an earnest of our intention to maintain our position in the Colony. Any military forces required to deal with emergencies in other countries under our sovereignty or protection in the Indian Ocean or Pacific will be provided in the first instance from the forces we plan to have available in the area for other purposes.

#### **The Atlantic and the Western Hemisphere**

21. In the Atlantic, we shall continue to contribute to NATO naval forces under the command of SACLANT. We are responsible for the internal security and external defence of our South Atlantic and Caribbean dependencies. We meet this commitment at present with local garrisons and our naval dispositions in the South Atlantic. These garrisons will no longer be our responsibility in those Caribbean territories which reach independence. Should they, however, thereafter seek our assistance, Britain will remain the main base for this task.

### **PART III—THE FORCES**

#### **Roles of the Services**

22. Our armed forces provide a contribution to the strategic nuclear power of the West. We support NATO and SEATO with land, sea and air forces, and CENTO with our air striking force. In addition, we have to maintain both a military presence in, and a capacity for rapid reinforcement of, some areas where we have responsibilities beyond the scope of these three regional alliances.

23. This requires forces organised and trained for mobility, both in the United Kingdom and in our overseas bases, as well as the means for moving them. In the United Kingdom we have the Army's Strategic Reserve and the transport aircraft at the disposal of the Royal Air Force. There is already the closest liaison in training and operations between the appropriate formations of the Strategic Reserve and Transport Command. The considerable degree of sea and air mobility which these forces have already achieved was amply demonstrated in the operations in July 1961 to support Kuwait. Land forces in excess of brigade strength, with their heavy equipment, were gathered from a wide area and landed by sea and air with



great speed. This operation showed that the mobile forces we are now building up are well fitted for their task. These include one Commando ship (H.M.S. *Bulwark*) in commission; another, H.M.S. *Albion*, is commissioning in July. These ships will normally carry a fighting force of 750 men consisting of a Royal Marine Commando and its associated battery of the Royal Artillery, the vehicles and equipment necessary to support them in operations ashore, a squadron of helicopters and four Assault Landing Craft. In emergency each ship could carry some 1,200 men. In addition, the Amphibious Warfare Squadron, now stationed in the Middle East, will continue to be available to lift heavy equipment and discharge it at the beachhead. The ships of this squadron will be replaced by a new type of Assault ship with improved capacity and speed; the ordering of the first of these ships has already been announced and the Government have now decided that a second will be ordered in the course of the financial year. In addition the first of a new class of logistic ship (the L.S.L.) is being laid down this year for the Army. Air cover for a task force of this kind will be provided by a carrier, and a cruiser will also normally be available providing gun support and the capacity to carry further Army troops or Royal Marines. Similarly, the total lift of the present transport fleet of the Royal Air Force will be steadily increased by the addition of new aircraft. The Comet IV is now entering service and orders have been placed for the VC-10 and the Belfast. Argosies are now being delivered to reinforce the medium range transport force. A small force of mobile light bomber and fighter squadrons is also always available to reinforce the Royal Air Force overseas and to accompany the strategic reserve forces if required.

24. Development of equipment, doctrines and techniques for mobile forces calls for a high degree of inter-Service co-ordination. This requirement has so far been met by the Land/Air Warfare Committee and by Amphibious Warfare Headquarters. These two organisations are now to be replaced by a new Joint Service Staff in the Ministry of Defence under a senior officer as director, which will serve a committee comprising representatives of the Naval, General, Air and Defence Staffs under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, responsible to the Chiefs of Staff. This new organisation will be charged with advising the Chiefs of Staff on all aspects of joint Service operations including training. In recent years, experience has been gained by combined exercises overseas, amongst which one in North Africa in 1959 and one in 1960, as well as one in the Arabian Peninsula and another in Borneo in 1961, were the more important. This form of joint exercise will continue on an increasing scale in order to give further experience in joint operations and maintain a British presence wherever this may be necessary.

25. Outside Europe, our forces will essentially become joint Service task forces using the air and the sea to transport men and equipment and to support operations conducted ashore. The reinforcement potential provides us with forces of all arms, capable of application anywhere in the world within a matter of days. We must accustom ourselves to thinking in terms of the total required strengths of the joint Service armed forces. The identity and



loyalties of the three Services must be retained, but the present high degree of co-operation will necessarily be increased.

### The Royal Navy

26. The ability to assure free movement by sea at the right time and place remains of fundamental importance to these islands; indeed the sea may in certain circumstances be the one open highway for strategic movement free of international political hindrance. To discharge this responsibility we need a balanced and versatile Fleet capable of bringing force to bear under the sea, on the surface and in the air. By the use of task forces with a significant amphibious capability, seaborne military and air power can be exerted wherever our interests require it, to preserve or if necessary to restore peace. The areas of our most vital interests to-day may not all be the same in a few years' time. The great assets of seaborne power are its mobility and flexibility, which enable it to be redeployed and concentrated wherever our policies require. A continuing need will be for effective and up to date anti-submarine forces and equipment.

27. During the next ten years or so, we may expect the Navy to be based on the present balanced Fleet, though with a turnover to nuclear power for submarines, and some further emphasis on afloat support to supplement our shore bases and increase flexibility. Seaborne task forces will include commando ships and assault ships specially designed to carry, land and sustain, or if necessary to hold poised at sea a striking force of troops with their tanks, guns and logistic backing; frigates and guided missile ships, for anti-submarine and air defence; and aircraft carriers with highly versatile aircraft capable of long-range reconnaissance and strike, air defence, and close support for the Army. The new Buccaneer strike aircraft is now coming into service and the first squadron will embark in H.M.S. *Ark Royal* early in 1963. The first of our guided missile destroyers, whose armament includes Seaslug and Seacat missiles, will commission this year. These County-class destroyers are of revolutionary design and the most up to date of their type in the world. Looking further ahead, existing aircraft carriers will be coming to the end of their lives, starting with H.M.S. *Victorious* in about 1970. It is difficult to forecast with certainty what our requirements for this type of ship ten to fifteen years ahead will be. Clearly any new generation of carriers would have to be designed primarily for the role of support of amphibious and land operations. They would also have to have a range of aircraft common to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force which could be operated either from carriers or from shore bases. As it takes no less than nine years to plan, build and work up a carrier, the Government have decided to put the necessary design work in hand.

N.B.

### The Army

28. We shall continue to allot a substantial force to NATO. The British Army of the Rhine is trained and equipped to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. Its organisation, equipment and deployment may vary to suit the tactical doctrine of the time but it will continue to form an



essential part of the NATO shield forces. In other overseas theatres, the Army will continue to provide the garrisons which are still essential to the security of our bases and certain dependent territories and will, in addition, maintain mobile and well equipped forces at bases in the Arabian Peninsula and Singapore to support our treaty obligations in these areas.

29. The changing political circumstances outlined above will stress the importance of the Strategic Reserve in the United Kingdom. This will be maintained as a mobile force, trained to move by air or sea at short notice to reinforce BAOR or any other overseas theatre. The Army will increasingly be trained to be ready to fight in widely differing types of terrain and climate and thus become accustomed to rapid changes of environment. Over the period the Army will be re-equipped with its new family of weapons. During the next two years it will take into service more of the Malkara wire-guided anti-tank missile; Wombat, an anti-tank gun; and a general purpose machine gun. They will be followed among other items of equipment by a new heavy tank, the Chieftain, already on order, and an improved wire-guided anti-tank missile, Vigilant.

### **The Royal Air Force**

30. The Royal Air Force provides our main nuclear strategic striking power. It is responsible for shore based air defence at home and overseas and provides tactical strike as well as close support and reconnaissance for land forces. It undertakes the strategic, tactical and short-range airlift to move the Army and its supplies, and operates the maritime aircraft which co-operate with the Royal Navy in the anti-submarine role.

31. The British contribution to Western strategic nuclear power will continue to be the responsibility of the V-bomber force of Vulcans and Victors. Similarly we shall continue to contribute improved tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft equipped for nuclear or conventional warfare to NATO, CENTO and SEATO. The TSR-2, which is planned to come into service in the mid-sixties, will make an important contribution in this role.

32. The growing emphasis on air mobility as an essential requirement for our strategy is being matched by an increase in both the carrying capacity and speed of our air transport force. New types of aircraft coming into service are the Comet IV and the Argosy, with the Belfast coming along a little later, and orders have been placed for the VC-10 for long range transport. It is intended to order the Avro 748 for short range transport. In the helicopter range the Whirlwind and the Belvedere are already in service, and orders have been placed for the Wessex.

33. In future we look to vertical take-off and landing and other advanced techniques to increase the capacity of tactical and transport aircraft to operate in close co-operation with the Army in the field in the absence, if need be, of any but rudimentary facilities. It is intended that future generations of vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft (V.T.O.L./S.T.O.L.) for the Royal Air Force shall be capable of operating from the carriers of the day. Further ahead we have in hand studies on the possibilities of using space for communications and reconnaissance.



## Manpower

34. In 1957 the decision was taken to abandon conscription, on which we had relied since 1939, and to rely entirely on voluntary forces. It is sometimes asked why it is that we are almost the only NATO country which can afford to do without national service. Our decision was not so much a departure from the past as a reversion to our normal well tried practice. This country, an island with world-wide interests, has always needed long-service men in balanced sea, land, and (more recently) air forces. Balance and mobility have been as important for us as numerical strength. Although our direct involvement on the mainland of Europe has increased and our other overseas commitments have diminished, the fundamental importance to us of balance and mobility remains.

35. To discharge our world-wide responsibilities effectively we must be able to bring to bear, at very short notice, forces which are in all respects ready to fight. This can only be done with highly trained, well equipped formations with great long range mobility. In all three Services the degree of individual professional skill which is required to play an adequate part in such operations, with our highly complex modern equipment, is very high. The same men must also be able to fight in a European theatre battle. It is our view that a period of conscription cannot be long enough both to enable the necessary state of training for all these tasks to be reached and also to yield a worth-while term of service thereafter.

36. In 1957 certain broad assumptions were made about the size of the regular forces we should need. The trends described in earlier paragraphs show that our requirements are unlikely to increase. An appraisal of Service manpower over the next five to ten years shows that the broad plan devised in 1957 was soundly based, and that the numbers we can obtain by voluntary recruitment will be adequate for our strategy in the future.

37. The Government's five-year plan to replace the National Service system with all regular forces will be completed by the end of this year. These forces will be highly trained both technically and professionally and well equipped. The Government intend to keep their pay and conditions of service under regular review.

38. The size of the forces we intend to maintain in peacetime must, if national resources are not to be wasted, be related to peacetime needs. They will in any case require some 50 per cent. of the total Defence Budget for their pay, clothing, maintenance, etc. If as may happen from time to time in the present state of relations between the Great Powers tension rises to a point beyond that which the peacetime forces can deal with, we must have a reliable means of strengthening them at short notice. Such a situation has developed over Berlin and the Government have thought it essential as a short-term measure to take powers to retain some of the existing National Servicemen in the Army for an additional six months' full-time service. As a longer term measure we need a reserve of trained men who are willing to be called up for a limited time whenever the Government consider it necessary. This is the purpose of the Territorial Army Emergency Reserve. An examination of the whole reserve system is in hand.



## Organisation of the Services

39. Increasing stress will be laid on interchangeability of functions and mutual support and assistance between the three Services, so that we get the best value out of our Service manpower as a whole. Where necessary, changes will be made over the next few years to secure an orderly process of evolution to complete the concept laid down in the White Paper on the Central Organisation for Defence (Cmnd. 476) of July 1958. The purpose is not to revolutionise the organisation of the forces but rather to secure greater co-operation and economy. The separate tasks, weapons and organisation which differentiate the teeth elements of the three Services operate also to separate their support services. Nevertheless, in many of the administrative and support functions of the Services the similarities outweigh the differences and there may well be scope for further rationalisation in the interests of efficiency and economy both of money and manpower. No single method of bringing these similar functions into closer relationship will suit all cases. One of the most useful methods is likely to be the agency arrangement under which one Service acts for the other two. Much has already been accomplished by this means. For example, the supply of food, petrol, oil and lubricants is organised on these lines in many areas in the United Kingdom and overseas. The Medical Services also operate agency arrangements on a large scale. Thus in Germany, Gibraltar, East Africa, North Africa, Hong Kong, and Malaya the Army provides practically all the hospital services needed by the other two. In particular cases some form of integration may be desirable, *e.g.*, on the lines of the administration of Service hospitals in the United Kingdom. These remain under the individual Services, but the total number of beds is related to the total Service population: a serviceman can be admitted to the nearest hospital irrespective of the Service to which he belongs; and drugs and other medical supplies are centrally procured. It is intended to integrate the long-range communications systems of the three Services. As a first essential step towards this a common signals procedure is being evolved which will enable the signals organisation of all three Services to work more readily on an interchangeable basis.

40. Because the needs of each Service and function are so diverse each of them will need separate examination and if changes are needed a form of organisation will have to be devised to meet each case. An inter-Service committee, under the Ministry of Defence, has been established for the purpose and progress is being made.

41. It has been decided as a result of a full examination to introduce officers to joint Service problems earlier than in the past by increasing the amount of joint Service training not only at the individual Staff Colleges, but also by laying greater emphasis on joint Service exercises, lectures and discussions.

## The Ministry of Defence

42. The Government's intention is that the Ministry of Defence should continue to be charged with the formulation of policy, the execution of operations and the allocation of defence expenditure. It should also co-ordinate, through the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Research Policy



and other Committees, the development of weapons and weapons systems. The administration and day-by-day management of the individual armed forces must continue to be carried out by the Service Ministries. When decisions on operational matters are required by Commanders overseas, they are given by the Minister of Defence with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. As a result of experience gained arrangements have been made to set up a small operational staff that is always at immediate readiness to man the War Room in the Ministry of Defence on a joint Service basis.

#### **Command Arrangements**

43. In order to meet our commitments in the world outside Europe, it is not enough to provide our forces with the necessary mobility, equipment and base facilities. Command arrangements must also be streamlined to allow unified control to be exercised over joint Service operations. The unified command in the Middle East (with its Headquarters in Aden) was set up with these considerations in mind. The handling of recent operations put the command to a test which amply proved that there are valuable advantages to be derived from the unified command system. For these reasons, the Government have now decided to introduce unified command in the Far East as soon as practicable. The future arrangements for command of our forces in the Near East have been reviewed in the light of the adjustments to those forces described in paragraph 16. It has been decided that the present Unified Command Headquarters in Cyprus will no longer be required in its present form and that the Army Headquarters can be reduced in size. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will become responsible for all British forces.

#### **Research and Development**

44. With general strategy settled for the period ahead we shall be able to form a much clearer view of the arms and equipment that we shall need and of the research and development programme required to produce them. At the same time, the main recommendations of a Committee which has recently reported on the management and control of research and development, in so far as they concern the control of defence research and development, have been put into effect. While all encouragement continues to be given to members of Government establishments, and also to research workers in industry, to pursue new ideas in the early stages of implementing operational requirements and devising new weapons, we have instituted check points in the process of development to ensure that no major development contract proper will be placed until a fully evaluated project study has been completed. The project study includes a detailed examination of the scientific and technical problems which need to be resolved and the preparation of a detailed development programme in terms of technical manpower, cost and time.

45. New ideas for research and development in the field of defence are being generated continuously in all the countries of Western Alliance, no single member of which can afford to exploit the whole range of possibilities now that we have moved into an era of immense technological complexity characterised by ballistic missiles and space technology. For this reason we are strengthening all measures to achieve interdependence in research and



development both in NATO and within the Commonwealth. Only in this way will it be possible to spread the load and economise in scarce scientific and technological resources. We ourselves will concentrate our effort in those areas in which we can hope to make the most valuable contribution to Western defence as a whole. Good examples of the kind of interdependence at which we are aiming are the joint programme that has been agreed with the German Federal Republic and the United States to obtain logistic and operational experience in the V.T.O.L. field by using the P-1127 aircraft, and the tripartite agreement with the Federal Republic and France to develop the Rolls Royce lightweight lifting engine, which should have important applications in the V.T.O.L. field.

### Civil Defence

46. Over the next five to ten years it is clear that Civil Defence will play an important part in maintaining the general preparedness of the whole nation for any emergency. In the report on defence for 1961 it was stated that the Government had reviewed home defence plans and concluded that some additional expenditure was needed to secure a balanced programme over the next few years. These plans have to cover a wide field, and are an integral part of our defence preparations. Departments are actively engaged in implementing a revised programme. Next year will be its second year, and the estimated home defence expenditure of civil departments will be £19.37 million compared with £18.61 million for the current year.

47. Among the preparations which will be advanced, the scheme of emergency control will be further developed, and emergency radio communications will be provided. For the warning and monitoring organisation, a new system for rapidly passing messages over the telephone is being installed, arrangements are being made for the B.B.C. to supplement other warning channels, and a start is being made with the provision of special equipment and radio communications. Stocks of emergency equipment for maintaining drinking water supplies are being increased. Stockpiling of radiac instruments for essential services will continue, and further training equipment will be provided for the Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service.

48. There have been a number of joint civil/military exercises in order to test plans for military aid to the civil power, and joint planning for this purpose is continuing.

49. An examination of the functions and organisation of the Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service has been carried out, and the Government now propose to discuss with the local authority Associations certain changes designed to make the Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service better able to discharge their role. The strength of these Services on 31st December last was over 395,000 compared with just under 380,000 on the corresponding date in 1960.

50. The Government have reviewed dispersal policy in the light of developments in the strategic situation over recent years, and have had consultations with the local authority Associations. They have concluded



that although the circumstances that might precede an attack upon us cannot be foreseen, it is necessary to have available a scheme which could be implemented, if it were thought right to do so, for dispersing mothers and children and other people in priority classes from major centres of population. The detailed application of the scheme will be worked out with the help of local authorities.

### CONCLUSION

51. A long-term plan is essential if the best use is to be made of manpower and resources. No settled weapons policy is possible in a short time-scale. This White Paper however does not attempt to set out the details of strategy and weapon systems over the period. This will be done each year in the individual Service memoranda.



## APPENDIX

### DEFENCE STATISTICS, 1962-63

#### Manpower

1. An analysis of the active strengths of the three Services is given in Annex I, Table 1.

2. In 1962-63 the Armed Forces will need about 52,000 male entrants. This figure includes men who enter upon regular engagements and those who enter as boys, apprentices and juniors.

3. An analysis of the Volunteer Reserve and Auxiliary Forces and National Service Reserves for the three Services is given in Annex I, Table 3.

#### Finance

4. The estimated cost of the defence programme is:

	<i>£ million</i>
(a) as estimated for 1961-62 ... ..	1,655·60
(b) as estimated for 1962-63 ... ..	1,721·06

5. The division between Departments for 1961-62 and 1962-63 is shown below.

	<i>£ million</i>	
	<i>1961-62</i>	<i>1962-63</i>
Admiralty ... ..	413·20	422·27
War Office ... ..	506·90	523·92
Air Ministry ... ..	526·67	552·15
Ministry of Aviation ... ..	190·20	204·30
Ministry of Defence ... ..	18·63	18·42
	1,655·60	1,721·06

The 1961-62 figures include £13·9 million in respect of civil superannuation payments which for 1962-63 have been transferred to Civil Votes. An analysis of the 1962-63 Estimates is at Annex II.

6. In the Financial Year 1962-63 £19·37 million will be provided for home defence expenditure by Civil Departments. This compares with £18·61 million in the Estimates for 1961-62. An analysis of the proposed expenditure is given in Annex III.



## ANNEX I

TABLE 1—ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE STRENGTHS

(Figures in thousands)

	1st April, 1961 (actual)				1st April, 1962 (estimate)				1st April, 1963 (estimate)			
	Royal Navy	Army	R.A.F.	Total	Royal Navy	Army	R.A.F.	Total	Royal Navy	Army	R.A.F.	Total
Regular Adult	87.3	152.5	131.0	370.8	86.6	158.7	128.9	374.2	87.8	166.5	132.6	386.9
Males	0.1	64.8	13.4	78.3	—	26.0	5.4	31.4	—	*	—	—
National Service...	3.3	6.2	6.0	15.5	3.3	6.3	6.6	16.2	3.5	6.3	7.1	16.9
Women ...	4.6	7.8	7.8	20.2	4.7	9.6	7.3	21.6	4.9	9.9	7.7	22.5
Boys ...												
Total	95.3	231.3	158.2	484.8	94.6	200.6	148.2	443.4	96.2	182.7	147.4	426.3

\* No provision has been made in this table for the effect of the Army Reserve Bill.

TABLE 2—FORCES ENLISTED OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM

		Strengths at 1st January, 1962			
Royal Navy	...	...	...	...	2,700
Army	...	...	...	...	33,200
Royal Air Force	...	...	...	...	1,100
Total	...	...	...	...	37,000



TABLE 3—ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTEER RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES AND NATIONAL SERVICE RESERVES

	Strength at 1st January, 1961				Strength at 1st January, 1962			
	Normal Volunteers	Volunteers from N.S.	Part-time N.S.	Total	Normal Volunteers	Volunteers from N.S.	Part-time N.S.	Total
<i>Royal Navy</i>								
Royal Naval Reserve ... ..	9,561	1,185	726	11,472	8,016	1,094	390	9,500
Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve ... ..	1,067	157	79	1,303	882	144	57	1,083
Royal Naval Special Reserve ... ..	—	—	9,356	9,356	—	—	4,623	4,623
Women's Royal Naval Reserve ... ..	1,033	—	—	1,033	974	—	—	974
<i>Army</i>								
Territorial Army ... ..	114,784	4,684	124,927	244,395	100,004	2,815	55,577	158,396
Women's Royal Army Corps (T.A.) ... ..	5,789	—	—	5,789	4,498	—	—	4,498
Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps (T.A.) ... ..	273	—	—	273	294	—	—	294
Army Emergency Reserve ... ..	11,761	616	130,248	142,625	11,594	616	147,144	159,354
Women's Royal Army Corps (A.E.R.) ... ..	30	—	—	30	43	—	—	43
Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps (A.E.R.) ... ..	97	—	—	97	87	—	—	87
<i>Royal Air Force</i>								
Royal Auxiliary Air Force ... ..	901	35	—	936	382	7	—	389
Women's Royal Auxiliary Air Force ... ..	350	—	—	350	116	—	—	116
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve ... ..	2,506	249	—	2,755	2,029	96	—	2,125
Women's Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve ... ..	46	—	—	46	54	—	—	54
Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers (N.S.) and Class H of the Air Force Reserve ... ..	—	—	81,491	81,491	—	—	52,012	52,012
<b>Total</b> ... ..	<b>148,198</b>	<b>6,926</b>	<b>346,827</b>	<b>501,951</b>	<b>128,973</b>	<b>4,772</b>	<b>259,803</b>	<b>393,548</b>



## ANNEX II

## DIVISION OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET UNDER THE PRINCIPAL HEADINGS

Financial year, 1962-63

1	2			3			4			5			6			7		
	Admiralty			War Office			Air Ministry			Ministry of Aviation			Ministry of Defence			Totals		
	Gross	A. in A.	Net	Gross	A. in A.	Net	Gross	A. in A.	Net	Gross	A. in A.	Net	Gross	A. in A.	Net	Gross	A. in A.	Net
1. Pay, &c., of Service personnel	73.96	1.35	72.61	140.04	6.96	133.08	123.60	4.42	119.18	1.77	—	1.77	5.31	—	5.31	344.68	12.73	331.95
2. Pay, &c., of Reserve, Territorial and Auxiliary Forces and grants for administration, &c.	1.22	—	1.22	18.62	0.24	18.38	0.91	0.23	0.68	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.75	0.47	20.28
3. Pay, &c., of civilians	55.93	0.64	55.29	127.09	1.52	125.57	55.73	5.38	50.35	26.33	—	26.33	1.47	—	1.47	266.55	7.54	259.01
4. Movements	10.80	0.03	10.77	29.22	1.33	27.89	16.62	2.42	14.20	3.78	—	3.78	0.33	—	0.33	60.75	3.78	56.97
5. Supplies—																		
(a) Petrol, oil and lubricants	15.80	2.07	13.73	5.70	0.69	5.01	43.00	2.00	41.00	1.57	—	1.57	0.01	—	0.01	66.08	4.76	61.32
(b) Food and ration allowance	11.70	1.81	9.89	27.70	4.82	22.88	17.70	2.14	15.56	—	—	—	—	—	—	57.10	8.77	48.33
(c) Fuel and light	4.53	0.12	4.41	13.15	2.49	10.66	8.95	2.47	6.48	1.35	—	1.35	—	—	—	27.98	5.08	22.90
(d) Miscellaneous	0.38	—	0.38	3.04	0.23	2.81	1.52	0.26	1.26	—	—	—	0.18	—	0.18	5.12	0.49	4.63
	32.41	4.00	28.41	49.59	8.23	41.36	71.17	6.87	64.30	2.92	—	2.92	0.19	—	0.19	156.28	19.10	137.18
6. Production and research*	237.91	29.20	208.71	174.46	88.56	85.90	260.50	18.50	242.00	498.53	330.01	168.52	—	—	—	828.90†	123.77†	705.13
7. Works, buildings and land	26.27	6.61	19.66	67.69	17.78	49.91	64.77	22.47	42.30	10.03	—	10.03	12.44	4.50	7.94	181.20	61.39	119.81
8. Miscellaneous effective services	8.37	2.46	5.91	10.66	2.93	7.73	9.58	3.86	5.72	0.98	—	0.98	3.38	0.20	3.18	32.97	9.45	23.52
9. Non-effective charges	19.75	0.06	19.69	34.40	0.30	34.10	13.55	0.13	13.42	—	—	—	—	—	—	67.70	0.49	67.21
10. Totals	466.62	44.35	422.27	651.77	127.85	523.92	616.43	64.28	552.15	544.34	340.04	204.30	23.12	4.70	18.42	1,959.78†	238.72†	1,721.06

## Notes.—

Expenditure by the Ministry of Labour in the administration of the National Service Acts is not expected to be more than £2,500.

\* Includes the cost of development work undertaken by industry under contract, the purchase of stores for research and development establishments and costs of the Royal Ordnance Factories.

† To avoid double counting of payments by the Services to the Ministry of Aviation and War Office the cross totals of columns 2-6 have been reduced by £342.5 million.



## ANNEX III

## HOME DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY CIVIL DEPARTMENTS (NET)

Department	Item	Class and Vote	1962-63 Estimate (£ million)
Home Departments	Grants to local authorities; production of equipment and materials, &c.	Class III, 3 4	12.13
Health Departments	Grants to local authorities; maintenance of medical services including stocks of equipment and materials; emergency hospitals, &c.	Class VI, 16 18	0.94
Housing (including Scotland)	Grants to local authorities, &c.; production of equipment and materials	Class VI, 1 13	0.74
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (including Scotland)	Handling, storage, &c. of food stocks; grants to local authorities; storage and maintenance of equipment and vehicles, &c.	Class V, 7 8 Class VI, 13	2.61
Ministry of Power	Oil storage and distribution; grant to gas industry	Class IV, 15	0.42
Ministry of Transport	Due functioning of railways and shipping; port facilities	Class IV, 13	0.43
Ministry of Works	Storage and accommodation	Class IX, 2	1.32
Board of Trade	Maintenance and turnover of stocks of materials	Class IV, 2	0.38
Various Departments	Miscellaneous ... ..	—	0.40
		Total ...	19.37



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