

SCOTTISH emergency planning officers are being frustrated in their efforts to plan civilian defence against the effects of nuclear war because of inadequate resources, obsessive secrecy and a lack of co-ordination between State authorities, it has been claimed.

While the Government is spending millions of pounds on two new bunkers in Comrie and Galashells to house senior Ministers and civil servants, local authorities — even in areas where there is a high concentration of potential nuclear targets — are being discouraged from organising plans for evacuation, writes *Calum Macrae*. Instead, the Government is encouraging people to stay in their homes in the event of a nuclear threat.

Although the emergency planning

# Doomsday scenario defies civilian planners

21 5 89 ORS  
officers — most of whom are ex-servicemen or ex-policemen — are reluctant to be openly critical of the Government, there is a growing frustration over the fact that they are expected to plan to maintain supplies of basic needs such as food and shelter without being told what resources they would have.

Secret Government plans for huge Nato troop movements to strategically vital military bases in Scotland are certain to tie up a significant proportion — some experts say all — of available transport. A 'restricted'

map of the main military routes in Scotland indicates that many roads could be closed. Despite repeated requests, the Department of Agriculture has not told the emergency planners what stocks of food are held, or where they are. Nonetheless, the officers are required to ensure adequate public feeding programmes.

John MacVicar, principal emergency planning officer of Strathclyde region, said this week: 'It is futile preparing a plan unless you have the resources to implement it. We need

SC  
someone in charge of logistics, charged with co-ordination to make sure there is no double or triple booking of resources. It needs someone centrally, and really that falls on government.'

The situation has led to a growing cynicism in some quarters about the Government's real priorities. Alan Walker and Rod Mackenzie, of the East Central Scotland Planning Assumptions Study at Edinburgh University, for example, suspect that most Nato governments discourage civilian evacuation because the pub-

lic would get in the way of military mobilisation.

Nonetheless many emergency planners are trying to lay some plans for limited re-location. 'What we can perhaps do is take people away from the areas likely to be devastated by the immediate effects of a nuclear explosion — beyond the blast range,' said MacVicar. 'Realistically I would expect the people in Dunoon, Helensburgh and perhaps Campbelltown to want to move away.'

MacVicar said that while the situation had improved since the Seventies, when there were no preparations for civil defence, it remained difficult to organise for eventualities such as evacuation without a guarantee that he would be able to provide transport, food or shelter.

■ Nuclear dilemma, centre pages.

There are plans to save the population of Scotland in event of nuclear holocaust. But **CALLUM MACRAE** finds that distressingly few people know of them and that civilian needs come a poor second to the **OBS** priorities of the military.

# WHERE TO

In a statement issued last January, the Scottish Home and Health Department repeated one of the founding principles of Britain's Civil Defence strategy. In the event of the threat of nuclear war, it insisted, 'the public would be encouraged to take shelter at home, using and improving the radiation protection offered by their own houses'. What the SHHD did not mention in that nine-page statement was an unclassified Nato document from 1986, entitled the 'Compendium of Technical Information for the Basic Protection of Populations'. Perhaps one reason for the omission was the following unequivocal paragraph in that document.

'Crisis relocation (evacuation) of population can increase population survival substantially in those member countries where relocation is adopted as a basic measure for protection.' The incompatibility of that assertion and the SHHD advice suggests that something is far wrong with Scotland's plans for the protection of its people. At best, it implies serious inconsistency and unpreparedness. At worst, it indicates that military and political expediency is triumphing over the need to preserve civilian lives.

Scotland is central to Nato's war plan. It is a key forward base from which Nato would launch preemptive strikes against vital Soviet bases in Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula. As a result Scotland — and the central belt, especially — is packed with military bases, hardware, runways and locks. It is, in short, a vital military target.

If a serious deterioration in East-West relations led to international crisis and a situation where Nato and Warsaw Pact leaders were making military preparations, Scotland, like the rest of the UK, would enter a condition known as **TTW** — Transition To War. Theoretically, that would precipitate a smooth and integrated emergency response in which military and civilian authorities would work in close cooperation. The reality is different.

Many Scottish local authority emergency planning officers — those ultimately responsible for the safety of the civilian population — admitted last week that Government secrecy and limited resources were making much of their planning 'futile'.


Last month, *Observer Scotland* revealed that the Government was building two huge multi-million pound bunkers as emergency seats of government in the event of war. Work has already started on one, in the Cultybraggan Army Camp near Comrie, which will replace the current North Zone HQ at Troy Hill near Anstruther. Latest figures from Treasury accounts indicate that the cost of the Comrie bunker will reach £3.4 million. Work has not yet started on the other, at Peel Hospital in Galashiels, which will replace the South Zone HQ and overall Scottish Regional HQ, both located between East Calder and Kirknewton. It is from there that senior Ministers, police and military liaison personnel would govern Scotland.

Although one 'restricted' document supplied to us shows an apparently straightforward and integrated structure involving central government and local authorities, the priorities of each will seldom coincide or often conflict. This is clearly illustrated by the Government's opposition to widespread evacuations — a policy known as 'Stay-Put'.

Alan Walker and Rod Mackenzie, of the East Central Scotland Planning Assumptions Study at Edinburgh University, have few illusions about why the Government (and, indeed, most Nato countries) oppose evacuation. 'A major reason is that the public would get in the way of military mobilisation. Fleeing refugees would cause disruption and get in the way of military transport,' said Mackenzie.

'The Government says that, since you can't know what the targets or the scale of attack will be, virtually one place is as safe as the other. It would be best to stay put and build yourself a refuge in your home. But that is a poor argument. The siting of those two new bunkers — whatever the Government says — will confirm the feeling in the public mind that Perthshire and the Borders are well away from the military areas. The fact is, a lot of people will not obey the "stay put" policy — especially if they live near somewhere such as Pitreavie, for example. Pitreavie is the site of a new £70 million Nato bunker.

John MacVicar, principal emergency planning officer of Strathclyde region, agreed. 'It is one thing to stay put in a locality with few targets,' he said, 'but in Strathclyde there are obvious targets. People living close to these installations would perceive a danger and evacuate. It would be more sensible to have a planned evacuation from these areas rather than have people running all over the country.' As a result, said MacVicar, they will plan evacuation 'where we think



Left, the main roads which would be designated 'Home Defence' routes in time of crisis. Right, 'Scenario 1': a nuclear strike

# THE WIND

it is in the public interest,' regardless of directions from Government. He added: 'What we can perhaps do is take people away from the areas likely to be devastated by the immediate effects of a nuclear explosion — beyond the blast range. Realistically, I would expect people in Dunoon and Helensburgh and perhaps Campbeltown to want to move away.'

There would be, however, some serious obstacles — most of them centring on the conflicting needs of the military. It is doubtful, for example, whether evacuees would be allowed to use many Scottish roads. A 'restricted' Government map shows that most main roads would be designated 'Home Defence' routes (and given animal codenames). According to South Yorkshire civil defence researcher Stella McGuire, service stations on these routes would be earmarked as 'military control and support points'. The control of civilian movements on these roads — irrespective of whether an offence was being committed — was pioneered by police forces during the miners' strike.

One reason the military would wish to keep roads clear would be to facilitate the operation of a remarkable agreement with the United States known as the 'United States / United Kingdom Wartime Host Nation Support Lines Of Communication' or US/UK WHNS LOC. This would involve requisitioning transport, engineering, telecommunications and fuel facilities and the need for services such as laundry, food and grave-sites. They would also — the document makes clear — require civilian labour.

The Government is reluctant to confirm details of

US/UK WHNS LOC, although in response to a parliamentary question from Labour MP Tony Banks on what plans had been agreed for the services of workers in the energy, supply and distribution industries to be made available to support foreign military forces, Peter Walker admitted that 'such plans have been laid . . . but with UK requirements taking priority'. He added: 'Details of planning in support of this arrangement are classified.' It is clear that the US requirements in the first stages of a conventional European war would swamp UK transport facilities. The next European war will be very short. Even the most ambitious Nato scenarios assume a 30-day limit for a conventional conflict. Studies by McKenzie and Walker in Edinburgh suggest that 'sustainability' — determined by stocks of weapons, ammunition and supplies — may be as low as eight or nine days. That, they fear, could increase the pressure for a quick escalation to nuclear weapons.

The US answer to the problem is the 'Rapid Reinforcement Plan' which, at its peak, could see up to 100,000 American troops passing through Britain every day. American Brigadier F.A.L. Alstead estimates that they would require most of the transportation facilities in European Nato countries in the first five days of the RRP. That would not leave much in the way of buses for the people of Dunoon.

Virtually none of this information, however, is officially available to the emergency planning officers. John MacVicar said: 'If you were planning an evacuation of the order we are suggesting here, the local resources of the regional council wouldn't satisfy

the demand. We ourselves would be requisitioning transport, buses, railway and other organisations. It is futile preparing you have the resources to implement someone in charge of logistics to make no doubling of resources. It needs so — and that falls on government.'


There are other areas where the E dark. In 1985, Duncan Campbell revealed Cabinet has three Emergency Powers rushing through in an emergency. In around 'Key Points' would be declared Defence Areas (GDAs), within which everyone would be subject to military second, these would be extended to country and powers of requisition would. Under the third, central government almost total power. Subversives, dissenting foreign nationals and even suspected could be interned.

Again, these have major implications for authority emergency planners. 'What made in the Emergency Powers Act a going to affect us?' MacVicar asked. 'and the Government isn't going to tell. Government does not admit the existence. But Brigadier Alstead is less circumspect the need for speed, he argues, the 'st must be enforced. 'Overall, any decision implementation would be a serious bl reinforcement plans.' Even without emergency legislation, however, several extra po


# DO GO WHEN

## Service Command & Control System For Home Defence After Nuclear Strike

### in Chief Committee



## Scenario 1 targets



1: a nuclear strike on Scotland as envisaged by Edinburgh University researchers.

Graphic by JAMES LLAND

# AND BLOWS

We ourselves would be looking to transport, buses, railway carriages etc from London. It is futile preparing a plan unless resources to implement it. We need a large of logistics to make sure there is sufficient resources. It needs someone centrally located on government.

Other areas where the EPOs are in the Lothian region, Duncan Campbell revealed that the new Emergency Powers Bills ready for introduction in an emergency. In the first, areas designated as 'stay-put' would be declared to be 'Ground Defence Areas' (GDAs), within which everything and everyone would be subject to military rules. In the second, the would be extended to cover the whole of Scotland. The owners of requisition would be extended. The central government would assume overall. Subversives, dissidents, some criminals and even suspected disease carriers would be included.

There would be major implications for local emergency planners. 'What provisions are in the Emergency Powers Act and how are they to be used?' MacVicar asked. 'We don't know what isn't going to tell us.' The Government does not admit the existence of the Bills. Alstead is less circumspect. Because of the speed, he argues, the 'stay-put' policy is needed. 'Overall, any decision to delay the implementation would be a serious blow to NATO plans.' Even without emergency powers, several extra powers are

available to the authorities. Again, these may help the military but would hinder civilians.

In a time of international tension, for example, most gas production facilities and North sea rigs would be shut down. Although buffer supplies would probably be kept for some areas — for example, localities containing hospitals and, in all probability, military establishments — serious problems would be created for most of the civilian population.

'That would pose enormous difficulties,' said Walker. 'For example, most bakeries are powered by gas, and bread could soon be in short supply. It would also create a diversion to electricity, so there might have to be rationing.' Food supplies to the public are another responsibility of the local authorities — and again there are problems. MacVicar said: 'It is difficult to plan for emergency feeding when we don't know what plans MAFFS (the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fish) and DAFS (the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) have.'

John Smith, EPO for Tayside, also criticised the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries in Scotland. 'Its planning on food policy is not as advanced as it should be. It is an area of real concern.' Another problem is posed by privatisation. Schools facilities provide the mainstay of local authority feeding programmes. If they are privatised that will become less easy, a problem already experienced with the loss of regional transport departments. The use of Emergency Dormant Contract Hire agreements to avoid this problem has been mentioned in several defence documents, but its extent is not clear.

One curious anomaly has created some bitterness among EPOs. For some obscure reasons, local authority EPOs are not 'positively vetted,' unlike their equivalents in the fire brigades, police, health boards and so on. As a result, restricted information is denied to them yet made available to the others. This is particularly galling for the EPOs because most of them are ex-service personnel or, like Strathclyde's MacVicar, ex-policemen. It means EPOs are not told of a wide range of military and central Government-related plans. Indeed John Smith, the Tayside EPO, did not know the Government had begun building the bunker to house the new Scottish Home Defence HQ in his region until he was told by *Observer Scotland* last month.

It is also known that the Government has plans to accommodate military casualties. Brigadier Alstead has identified Leith as the key Scottish port for their intake. US authorities estimate that there may be as many as 200,000 casualties in the first 30 days of conventional war. Mackenzie and Walker have established that 20,000 of those would be taken to Leith. The US has a number of pre-positioned hospitals, including one at Kirkcubright, near the Southern Zone Scottish HQ, but they expect to take about three weeks to set them up (using local labour). Duncan Campbell's TV series 'The Secret Society' claimed that both Gartnavel and Stobhill hospitals would be used to house US Navy casualties — a claim denied by the Scottish Office. Greater Glasgow Health Board's emergency planning officer said he had no knowledge of the plan.

Other extraordinary powers which remain shrouded in secrecy include those of the police. Chief constables have access to information which they cannot transmit to local authorities. It is understood that the police have 'Manual of Home Defence,' a restricted document which lists certain police tasks, including the detention of 'potentially subversive people,' keeping 'essential roads' open, assisting armed forces' mobilisations, and, of course, 'advising the public'. A spokesman for Lothian and Borders police said that other than to confirm that 'various tasks' would fall to the police, he was not prepared to comment on its contents.

There is also concern about fire fighting plans. In Lothian, the fire brigade plans to 'disperse' its modern fire-fighting appliances away from target areas and rely on the old 'Green Goddesses' in the centre of town. Assistant divisional officer Charles Prophet, Tayside Fire Brigade's emergency planning officer, confirmed that they would expect to do the same.

There are also careful plans for giving 'advice' to and controlling the output of, the media. Regional emergency committees, which were introduced in the Seventies (provoked, it seems, by problems such as the three-day week and the miners' strike) will operate as a secretariat at a local level. Liaise for Government with local authorities, statutory bodies like the Post Office and so on. But one of their tasks, according to a document from the Cabinet Office, is to 'give sustained, positive publicity to Government policy as directed by the Standing Committee on Information Policy or the Press Working Party'. Telephone communication will also be severely curtailed. Under a Government Telephone Preference System, it appears that 90 per cent of subscribers will only be able to receive incoming calls.

But in the short term most concern continues to focus on the difficulties faced by local authority EPOs — a problem illustrated when a major Home Defence exercise last October, code-named 'Bonnie Dundee' was organised with minimal local authority involvement. Certain EPOs were invited to take part but only in a personal capacity and not as official representatives of their authority. At least one refused, although in Lothian the former EPO apparently had to be accepted. Critics suspect the authorities' motive was simply to avoid problems with 'unco-operative' or 'nuclear free zone' authorities. They suspect it was an attempt to avoid unwanted political interest — and consequent publicity.

But there can be no doubt that their reluctance to involve the very authorities responsible for public safety and survival in Scotland's biggest Home Defence exercise for three years stands uneasily by the notion of an integrated response. Last year the group of authorities sponsoring the East Central Scotland Planning Assumptions Study asked the Scottish Home and Health Department a series of questions in an attempt to clarify some of the problems.

Richard Brown, assistant emergency planning officer at Lothian region, said: 'Our concern is with facilities people like the military and Government departments would require which we might, unknown to them, be planning to use ourselves. We suspect that the military and the health organisations may well have some ideas of using buildings which we might plan to use for other purposes.' He describes the answers that came back from the Scottish Office as 'inconclusive'. 'Many of them didn't really answer the questions that were asked.'

Brian Smith, of Central region, echoed his concern. In particular, as the EPO for a region likely to have many problems with evacuees as relocation, he is worried about the lack of plans for relocation. In the SHHD did appear to introduce a slight relaxation of the 'stay-put' stance in its reply by authorising local authorities to look at local evacuation options. But, given the lack of national co-ordination and uncertainties over transport, many authorities remain unimpressed.

Clearly, whatever happens, there will be large numbers of refugees. Walker and MacKenzie have made some estimates of the numbers and the directions in which people will move. 'The Forth Estuary is a natural barrier to movement north for people in Lothian,' said Mackenzie. 'And the major military routes and the GDAs around Turnhouse, for example, will make it impossible to move north. People wouldn't want to move west, so they would probably head south towards the Borders and Dumfries and Galloway.'

'Similarly, a lot of people in Glasgow would try to head for Ayrshire and Dumfries and Galloway, but would be stopped by the military routes and GDAs, so they might end up going north into Perthshire. But the problem, he insists, is the Government would admit to the possibility of making these kinds of predictions. In its reply to the authorities earlier this year the SHHD justified the 'stay-put' policy by stating: 'Since it is not clear what priorities and intentions would determine an enemy's choice of targets, the Government would not, in the case of a nuclear attack, be able to say that one area of the country would be safer than any other.'

'They won't admit to the possibility of identifying targets or safe areas,' complained Mackenzie. 'Or, at least, that is the situation with local authorities. It comes to the guidance for emergency planning — fire brigades, or for the health service, they use language like "identifying target areas" or "high areas". Magically, there is this difference between planning for the population and planning for valu-