




Scottish Home and Health Department
St Andrew's House Edinburgh EH1 3DE

Telephone 031-556 8501 ext

Your reference

Our reference ADM/7/2

Date 13 August 1975



Chief Executives:
Regional Councils) additional copy for the
Islands Area Councils) home defence planning staff
District Councils
Chief Constables
Firemasters

SHHD CIRCULAR NO ES(SCOT) 3/1975

Dear Sir

HOME DEFENCE

1. Circular No ES(Scot) 1/1972 included an undertaking that local authority home defence arrangements would be reviewed in the light of local government reorganisation. This circular contains guidance about the current home defence planning assumptions and explains the duties imposed on regional and islands area councils (with a duty of co-operation placed on district councils) to make plans in the light of those assumptions. In the main, it consolidates and brings up to date the duties previously imposed on the councils of counties and large burghs.
2. It had been intended to place new duties on authorities to make plans for providing and maintaining a service in their areas for the distribution, conservation and control of food in the event of a hostile attack in addition to the existing duty of making plans for emergency feeding services. It had also been intended to revise the grant arrangements to take account of other changes in circumstances. These proposals would have brought authorities in Scotland into line with county and district councils in England and Wales where revised arrangements were brought into effect last year on the reorganisation of local government there. Neither of these proposals is being implemented in Scotland at present because of the consideration described in the following paragraph.
3. In the present financial situation, and in the light of the consideration set out in Scottish Office Finance Circular 9/1975, the Secretary of State accepts that it will not be possible for authorities to devote extra resources to home defence planning work over and above those already employed by their predecessor authorities. Nevertheless, he hopes that within those constraints, authorities will carry out at least the identification of their wartime headquarters and standby headquarters so that communications can be established (at central government expense) between them and the zone controls. Some authorities will be able to take their planning a good deal further than that but the Secretary of State urges that even those who have not inherited experienced staff should make at least a start with home defence planning.
4. The information contained in Annexes A to D will help regional and islands authorities to review and revise existing planning arrangements which they have inherited. The Department will be happy to discuss points of difficulty with individual authorities. It is recognised that not all of the suggestions made in the annexes to this circular will be applicable, word for word, in the divergent geographical circumstances ranging from those of Strathclyde to predominately rural regions or islands areas. It seems likely that the operational control structure in Strathclyde, for example, may merit special consideration. The basic principles however are of universal application.

5. Annex A (which is classified RESTRICTED) sets out the home defence planning assumptions which underlie the rest of the arrangements. Annex B describes the arrangements necessary to provide for the continuation, in wartime, of internal government in Scotland. Annex C suggests the machinery which it will be necessary to set up, in peacetime, within local authorities to enable the authorities and their staff to play their full part in war. Annex D contains details of the Regulations which the Secretary of State has made imposing duties on the new authorities to plan. These consolidate the several planning regulations previously applicable to the old authorities.

6. For wartime planning the Chief Executive would appear to be best placed to co-ordinate the plans and actions of the many departments of local government whose resources must be called upon. It is, of course, for regional and islands authorities to decide where best to locate any home defence planning staff but it would seem logical to place them with the Chief Executive's staff.

7. The immediate points for Councils to note are the proposal that Chief Executives of Regional and Islands Councils and the Chief Executives of District Councils (each supported and advised by an Emergency Committee of elected members) should normally be the Regional and District controllers respectively; and the need to make contingency plans for staffing and accommodation to meet any possible wartime requirements.

8. Special arrangements for seminars for elected members and Chief Executives of Scottish local authorities are described in paragraph 11 of Annex C. In addition, Zone Commissioners (designate), accompanied by officials of the Department, may take the opportunity of arranging visits to the local authorities within their zones.

*9. Further circulars will be sent to authorities describing the role of the police and fire services in war; the arrangements for food distribution and a number of related aspects. A circular which describes the role of local authorities in civil emergencies is being prepared.

10. As stated in paragraph 2 the present arrangements for civil defence grant which is payable for expenses in connection with home defence planning will continue unaltered for the present. In the light of changes in the assumptions underlying the whole home defence policy, it will be necessary to review these arrangements in the course of the forthcoming year and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities will be consulted about details of changes to come into effect not earlier than 1 April 1976.


11. It would be helpful if Chief Executives would let the Department know, by 30 September 1975, which official is to be regarded as a normal contact for home defence planning matters (in the absence of a nomination, the Department will regard the Chief Executive himself as the point of contact). Details of staff to be employed on home defence planning should also be submitted for approval for 75% civil defence grant as soon as possible but, in any event, not later than 31 December 1975. These details should include names of officers appointed, salaries, and a breakdown of ancillary services, accommodation, central administration charges and any other charges which properly arise from the employment of the staff.

12. The Department should be told when the initial revision of home defence plans has been completed and of the outline content of the plans. In any event all regions and islands areas are requested to submit a progress report by 31 December 1976. Authorities are also asked to notify the Department by 31 December 1975, of the war headquarters which they have selected (see paragraph 6 of Annex C).


13. Circulars CD(Scot) 11/1964; 1/1968; 1/1969; 4/1969 and ES(Scot) 1/1972 (so far as it relates to home defence) are cancelled. Circulars CD(Scot) 3/1968; 4/1968; 5/1968; 6/1968 and 8/1968 are no longer relevant. Circular No ES(Scot) 2/1975 was issued to Chief Constables only.

14. Any enquiries about this circular should be addressed to Mr W W Howitt (Ext 3206) or Mr J McCallum (Ext 3242). Additional copies of this circular and its annexes may be obtained from Room 031, St Andrew's House (Ext 2225).

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'H. McNamara', written in dark ink.

H McNAMARA



The information given in this annex is not to be communicated directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not authorised to receive it.

HOME DEFENCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

1. "Civil Defence" is defined in section 9 of the Civil Defence Act 1948 as including "any measures not amounting to actual combat for affording defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power, or for depriving any form of hostile attack by a foreign power of the whole or part of its effect; whether the measures are taken before, at, or after the time of the attack". This definition is the basis of civil preparations made by both central and local government to meet a war or the threat of a war. The current aims of home defence are defined as those defensive measures necessary in the United Kingdom:-

- a. to secure the United Kingdom against any internal threat;
- b. to mitigate as far as is practicable the effects of any direct attack on the United Kingdom involving the use of conventional, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
- c. to provide alternative machinery of government at all levels to increase the prospects of and to direct national survival; and
- d. to enhance the basis for national recovery in the post-attack period.

2. Although it is recognised that local authorities would have to be ready to deal with the effects of a breakdown in law and order insofar as their own responsibilities are concerned, the main responsibility for the internal security of the United Kingdom (a above) rests with central government supported by the police and, where necessary, the armed forces. This annex is therefore directed primarily to the aims set out in sub paragraphs 1b, c and d, responsibility for which is shared between central and local government and it outlines the assumptions on which local authority war emergency planning should be based. The annex also indicates the nature of measures which local authorities may be asked to take in order to place themselves on a war footing in a period of mounting international tension. Its contents should be regarded as being of continuing validity until contrary notification is received.

THE WARNING PERIOD

3. Home defence planning for the United Kingdom, which is conducted within the framework of the NATO alliance, is based on military and political assessments of a number of potential threats to this country. The current NATO assessment is that there would be timely, possibly prolonged, warning of any change in the political situation that might make war in Europe more likely. The length of this warning period can be considered in terms of weeks rather than days, but solely for the purpose of planning it should be assumed that a period of 3-4 weeks would be available for local authorities to implement their war emergency plans. Such an assumption should not preclude plans for putting parts of the local authority organisation on a war footing in less than 3 weeks, where this is possible.

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FORMS OF ATTACK

4. The current assessments point clearly to nuclear war as the overriding consideration in determining the preparations to be made for home defence in the United Kingdom. While it is possible that chemical weapons and, to a lesser extent, biological warfare could be used against selected vitally important civil and military installations, their use against the civil population as a whole is considered to be unlikely. The use of aircraft and missiles armed with non-nuclear devices against selected targets cannot be discounted, but most of the measures taken in the context of a nuclear war would be of equal relevance to a war which began with conventional weapons.

EFFECTS OF ATTACK

5. As with the warning period, the scale and pattern of attack cannot be determined with precision but, whatever the scale, an attack by thermo-nuclear weapons directed against civil and military installations and against centres of population, with the attendant threat of widespread radioactive fall-out, would result in enormous casualties and extensive damage. Although estimates can be made of local casualties and of damage caused by varying attack patterns, no probability can be given to any one or to any group of attack patterns. Nevertheless, solely for the purpose of survival planning, it can be assumed that the population survival rate would range from 60% in the worst affected areas to 95% in the least affected areas. On the other hand loss of essential services and productive capacity due to installation damage, loss of power supplies and lack of raw materials could be as high as 80%. These figures are merely indicative of the possible scale of the effects of nuclear war.

6. Few, if any, parts of the country could expect to be completely unaffected. Those parts which escaped the direct effect of explosions and subsequent radioactive fall-out would be affected in varying degrees by widespread disruption of communications and essential services. For the purpose of local studies and exercises to test local planning, assumptions about the weight of attack and its effects will have to be made. For the reasons given in the previous paragraph, it would be misleading to issue general guidance on casualty and damage levels within a region.

PLANNING OBJECTIVES

7. The two most important features of war emergency planning which emerge from the assessments in paragraphs 4 to 6 are firstly, no local authority, whatever its geographical position, would necessarily be free from the effects of attack. Consequently, no authority is absolved from the requirement to carry out war emergency planning. Secondly, the planning itself should be orientated primarily towards the measures necessary for the provision of the basic essentials of life for the surviving population, such as water, food, health services and accommodation.

8. To achieve these objectives, co-ordination will be required not only between local authorities, but also with central government departments, statutory bodies and the public and private sector of industry, which have responsibility both for these essential services and for other vital resources. Local plans may also provide for basic life saving tasks such as rescue and first aid. These plans should take into account the likely constraints on movement under fall-out conditions and consequently, in the context of long-term survival, their preparation is of a lower priority.

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9. The war-time structure of local government should therefore be designed to marshal and co-ordinate surviving resources of essential services and to provide in the longer term within the framework of central government (operating in Scotland at first on a zone basis) the administrative framework necessary for a more stable existence. It is recognised that, within these broad objectives, the emphasis placed on individual planning measures may well vary between densely populated industrial areas and the more sparsely populated rural areas; but the principles are the same.

TRANSITION-TO-WAR MACHINERY

10. The measures required to put the country on a war footing are many and varied. For convenience and speed of action in the event, comprehensive lists of all necessary measures, both civil and military, are maintained in the war books of all government departments. These lists are constantly revised and kept up to date. These measures would be supplemented by the local authorities' own war plans and those of the police and other essential services. Measures authorised by the Cabinet during a period of international tension would be communicated to government departments, which in turn would pass them on to local authorities and to the various other services with which government departments are concerned. These instructions would gather in detail as they were transmitted down the line and additional instructions would be added at the appropriate stages. A list of some of the measures which local authorities might be asked to take (though not necessarily in the order listed) is given in the Appendix.

11. It will be seen that some of the measures listed could be carried out without becoming public knowledge (covert measures), while others (overt measures) obviously could not. In some circumstances, for example, where the prime requirement was judged to be to avoid aggravating international tension or causing unnecessary public disquiet, only covert measures might be authorised initially. But the Government's main aim in a period of tension would continue to be to deter aggression and thus avert war altogether. In some circumstances an important ingredient of deterrence might be a demonstration that we were not only redeploying military forces but also bringing our home defence organisation to the appropriate level of readiness. The emphasis might then be on overt measures; or the Government might decide simultaneously to take selected covert measures and less contentious overt measures. There are many possible variations; and the extent to which, and the sequence in which, measures might be authorised would have to be a matter for decision at the time.

12. The chain of events and the time scale leading up to a deterioration in international relationships could vary widely and government planning retains a flexibility to provide a correspondingly wide range of options to meet any given circumstance. Local authority planning should also incorporate this flexibility. Action would have to be largely planned in advance and the aim should be to have plans in readiness capable of execution within a period of 3 to 4 weeks.

EMERGENCY POWERS

13. Some of the measures listed in the Appendix would require additional legislation. It should be assumed that these powers would be available in an emergency to enable local authorities' war plans to be implemented. However,

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they would not necessarily be available at the outset of the preparatory stages when local authorities are required to raise their level of preparations. Planning should therefore distinguish between action which could properly be taken prior to being notified that special powers were available on the one hand and, on the other, action which must await that notification. Controllers will be given advice in due course on the use of these powers.

NOTIFICATION

14. Government decisions authorising local authorities to take any measures listed in the Appendix would be transmitted by whatever means were considered most apt at the time. The initial notification (by circular, telex or telephone) to local authorities to raise the level of their civil defence preparation would specify which measures they were being asked to undertake. Any additional guidance and financial authority necessary to implement those measures would either be given at the time or would quickly follow. Once communications between zone controls and local authority war-time headquarters had been activated, these would be used to transmit subsequent instructions and information to local authorities.

ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC

15. At the appropriate time the public would be repeatedly advised, by leaflets, posters, television, radio and through the press, of the system of warnings of attack and fall-out and of the action they should take if the warnings were given. Householders would be advised through all forms of mass media to make preparations in order to enhance the protection afforded in their homes. Local authorities should arrange to supplement national announcements with local guidance and to help particularly those groups less able to fend for themselves. In this context local authority information centres and local schemes of self-help using voluntary effort should prove invaluable.

16. Government advice would be directed towards the avoidance of mass movement of the public on the sure ground that, since the pattern of any attack and resulting fall-out cannot be predicted and important installations in areas outside the towns are likely targets, families could expect better protection by staying in their own homes. A family in its own home would be best able to look after its members and to avail itself of the essential services provided by the various authorities. Movement to a strange area could well result in an inability on the part of the authorities in that area to provide essential services for an influx from elsewhere. The requirement for communal fall-out protection would be limited to those, who for one reason or another, could not in the time available find adequate protection at home.

17. The general aim in crisis would be to keep disruption of the social, economic and industrial life of the country to an absolute minimum. National announcements would advise the public to carry on with their day-to-day activities. In a worsening situation and as far as would be compatible with the general aim, people would be advised to stay as far as possible in or near to their own homes and to listen in regularly for further announcements.

18. Formal planning for the possible dispersal and reception of people in certain priority classes of the population from one area to another is no longer consistent with the policy outlined in paragraphs 16 and 17. The arrangements outlined in the Scottish Home Department letter of 28 March 1962 and Civil

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Defence (Scotland) Circular No 11/1964 are therefore cancelled. With the recognition that the advice to stay put might not be heeded by everyone, contingency planning on the more flexible basis for the care of the homeless, rest centres and billeting should continue. Schemes should be designed for implementation both before and after attack.

TRANSITION-TO-WAR MEASURES

This list is not exhaustive and is intended merely as a guide to the more important measures to be taken by local authorities in a period of war emergency. While the chronological sequence of authorisation of these measures could vary considerably, the following progression is illustrative as a basis for planning.

INITIAL REVIEW ARRANGEMENTS

1. Review of Controller and Emergency Committee designate appointments.
2. Review of designated key officers with home defence responsibilities and call out arrangements for these officers.
3. Review of arrangements for liaison and assistance from voluntary organisations and local self-help schemes.
4. Review of emergency feeding plans.
5. Review of rest centres, homeless and billeting arrangements.
6. Review of emergency water and essential works arrangements.
7. Review of telephone preference scheme.
8. Review emergency sanitary and environmental health services.

PREPARATORY MEASURES

9. Briefing of local authority staff and any other people to fill war posts.
10. Collection and distribution of radiac and other equipment from government stores.
11. Assumption by key officers of their home defence organisational responsibilities.
12. Warning to all personnel to stand by for designated war duties.
13. Preparation to activate wartime headquarters at all levels.
14. The formation of local self-help, first aid and personal welfare services.
- X 15. Provision for the control of the public under fall-out conditions. X

ACTIVATION

16. 24-hour manning of war-time headquarters by duty officers.
17. Activation of war-time headquarters communications in advance of full manning.
18. Advice and information to the public.

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- * 19. Assumption of powers by Controller and Emergency Committee.
- 20. The education service shut down - Scottish Education Department Circular No 555 dated 20 March 1964.
- * 21. Requisitioning of premises and stores.
- 22. Activation jointly with the appropriate Health Board of simple personal health facilities at community level.
- 23. Full activation of local authority war-time headquarters and controls at all levels.
- 24. Activation of rest centres.
- 25. Activation of billeting arrangements.

* Emergency Powers required.

MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT IN WAR

1. The current aims of home defence are set out in paragraph 1 of Annex A. This annex deals in detail with the arrangements necessary to provide for the continuation in wartime of internal government in Scotland down to district level. The annex is not concerned with continuity of government in external matters (defence and foreign affairs).

2. As long as the central government could continue to function from its normal peacetime locations, the wartime arrangements described below would not take full effect. Succeeding paragraphs describe how, when the central government can no longer operate from its customary locations, a new form of government, on a zone basis, immediately assumes control of domestic and internal affairs. This concept of government-in-war necessarily ignores the statutory assignment of responsibilities which not only differentiates central from local government but also separates, within local government, the region and the district. Yet government-in-war at all levels is dependent upon the resources of the services which various public authorities control. In this setting, the importance of the contribution of local government resources to the survival of the nation is paramount. It is sometimes difficult to think of the region or district except in relation to the separate functions imposed on their respective councils by Parliament. As the following paragraphs describe, all the essential functions of internal government would be the responsibility of the Commissioner for Scotland, assisted by Zone Commissioners. Below the Commissioners, there are two further tiers, the Regional Controllers and below them (except in the case of islands areas) District Controllers, both appointed after the passing of emergency legislation. This is a wartime integrated command structure for survival and, while there may be variations in the nature and degree of responsibility at the four levels, the concept of all-embracing functions essential to the life of the surviving community is applicable at each level.

ZONE GOVERNMENT

3. In any future war involving the widespread use of nuclear weapons, it would be impossible to rely on the exercise of powers of central government. The basis of the wartime machinery of internal government is therefore the decentralisation and concentration of all functions within three home defence zones. The constituent regions of the zones are described in Appendix I. Wartime government would be headed by Commissioners having full authority to govern internally with authority derived from emergency powers approved by Parliament in the latter stages of a deteriorating situation before an attack. Nothing in this annex should be construed as restricting the discretion of Parliament at the time to decide the content of emergency legislation.

4. Zone Commissioners and their staff would have assembled before attack but would have no pre-attack executive functions. Government on a zone basis would begin to function immediately after an attack which made normal central government impossible. It would function from zone headquarters which are designed for minimum vulnerability and are equipped with special communications.

5. During the immediate post-attack period, the function of the Zone Commissioners would be to obtain, process and disseminate information about the extent and effect of the attack; to determine priorities and arrange for the reallocation, where appropriate, of resources to meet immediate needs; and to co-ordinate and support the activities of Regional Controllers within the zone. The assessment of local priorities, mutual aid arrangements, operational

deployment and the conduct of day-to-day affairs would be left to the Regional and District Controllers. Although the Zone Commissioner would rule on conflicting priorities, his intervention would aim at the conservation of resources (both manpower and materials) for longer-term survival rather than short-term aid to the hardest hit areas. Zone Commissioners would be concerned with the administration of justice, with the maintenance (by the police) of law and order and with the general behaviour and morale of the survivors. Zone facilities for sound broadcasting, backed by any surviving local radio capability, would be important.

SCOTTISH CENTRAL

6. Given the nationwide disruption of essential services and communications depicted in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex A, a form of government approaching that of the present day could not generally be effective for many weeks after a nuclear attack. The powers of civil government, therefore, would be exercised from a Scottish Central Control whose staff would have assembled before attack. During the immediate post-attack period Scottish Central would have a co-ordinating role based on the presumption that the lower the level at which decisions could be taken, the better they would fit the local situation. Where a zone needed help from another zone, or where an operation called for the combined efforts of two or all three zones, or where help was to be given to (or asked from) the North of England, then directions from Scottish Central would be required. The staff of the Commissioner for Scotland would comprise senior officers from government departments, the police, the fire service, the armed forces and vital sectors of commerce and industry. The primary task of Scottish Central (with help from the zone controls) would be the production and administration of a strategic plan for the continued survival and eventual restoration of Scotland to a more normal pattern of life. The execution of this strategy would depend upon proper utilisation of resources of local authorities, nationalised undertakings, government departments and key sectors of commerce and industry. In time, these plans would be modified to conform with any United Kingdom strategy which might emerge.

The arrangements in the paragraphs which follow may be varied for certain authorities in the light of paragraph 4 of the covering circular.

REGIONAL CONTROLLER AND EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

7. Regional and islands area councils should base their plans on there being provision in emergency legislation for the vesting of all the authority's powers in a small emergency committee of about three elected members. Because the Regional Controller, who would be empowered to exercise the full function of the local authority, is an officer in the chain of internal government it is important to define his relationship to the Emergency Committee. For so long as circumstances permitted it to act, the Committee should be consulted on general policy in relation to the disposition of regional council resources and to the discharge of those functions of the regional council which are essential to the life of the community. The controller for his part would, from time to time, report to the Committee on the steps which he, as a government official, was taking. The Committee would leave the day-to-day operational decisions to the Controller, whose actions must necessarily embrace matters going beyond the Committee's knowledge and responsibility. The Regional Controller would be answerable to the Zone Commissioner.

8. It is envisaged that, if communications to zone could not be established, the Regional Controller would be expected by the Zone Commissioner to exercise the full powers of internal government within the Region until further notice. If necessary, Zone Commissioners would, by ordinance, sanction ex post-facto the actions of the Regional Controller in this short-term situation. Otherwise the

tasks of the Regional Controller would be to determine priorities; to plan for the most effective use of all surviving resources within the region; and to co-ordinate the activities of local essential services. In respect of local government services, this co-ordination would be achieved through the chief officers of the region (including any wartime appointments) and the District Controllers. For non-local government services, action would be taken through the representatives of those services who will be attached to the regional wartime headquarters or located nearby. The Chief Constable will remain, as in peacetime, responsible for the maintenance of law and order in his force area, which, in two cases, will be larger than the region. Chief Constables remain in full operational control of their own forces and of any police support units from other areas which may have been sent to their aid. The Regional Controller, as a senior executive of government-in-war, would need to have general information from the police about the public order situation in the region and conversely could well have important data and policy considerations which would affect the Chief Constable's plans. Close liaison between the Regional Controller and the Chief Constable would be essential. Chief Constables in each zone would be answerable to the Zone Police Commander who, in turn would be responsible to the Zone Commissioner.

9. Before the Regional Controller could plan for the effective use of surviving resources, his staff would need to identify these resources in terms of their potential use in measures to sustain life in the ensuing weeks and months. In performing this task District Controllers and their staff would make a major contribution. Initially at least, Regional Controllers should concern themselves primarily with the position in their own region. It should be assumed that other neighbouring regions would have just as big a problem on their hands and it is unlikely that there would be significant scope for mutual aid. Such scope as may exist would probably be in the fringes of adjacent areas. As soon as a Zone Commissioner had completed his assessment of the extent and effect of the attack (paragraph 5), he would consider whether any directions should be issued to Regional Controllers about the transfer of resources. It should be remembered that, even if one region should escape both the initial effects and any resultant fall-out, the Controller in that region would still face an enormous task in reorganising services for the continuing support of the total population of the area, in a situation where the supplies of water, fuel, power and other essentials were disrupted and scarce.

10. The already difficult situation would be further aggravated in those areas where radioactive fall-out was particularly heavy, with consequent restraints on movement inside and into the area. Separate guidance on public survival under these conditions will be issued later.

11. Post-attack decisions, following the identification of surviving key resources, should not be compared with the more deliberate peacetime planning and decision-taking processes of government. Inevitably post-attack plans would be crude and simple. The urgent decisions of the Regional Controller would be arbitrary and, to some people, would appear harsh and inequitable. They would be modified by him, as better information became available to him and to his specialist advisers in the region.

REGIONAL WARTIME HEADQUARTERS

12. The regional wartime headquarters would be either existing civil defence premises or the peacetime regional administrative offices. Essential activities in war would continue, as far as is practicable, through the region's peacetime offices. Circumstances could arise where the intensity of fallout in the early

stages after attack makes it impracticable for the staff of a regional headquarters to work from their normal offices. It is essential that where protected accommodation, preferably below ground level, does not already exist within the regional headquarters, the region's war emergency plans should include measures for improvised protection of a limited space within the headquarters, to enable key officers of the local authority and liaison staff (see paragraph 13b below) to operate until the level of radiation permits them to return to their normal offices. There are obvious limits to the numbers of staff which could be accommodated at civil defence premises or in protected accommodation at the regional headquarters.

STAFFING AND ORGANISATION - REGION

13. A number of local government peacetime services would not be regarded as essential in the post-attack period and some redeployment of staff would be possible. For example, schools, libraries and parks would not be operating as in more normal times. Regional and district plans should provide for the mobilisation and redeployment of local government staff and, as appropriate, for their supplementation by voluntary organisations. Within the integrated regional wartime headquarters, three staffing components can be identified:

- a. the local authority staff required to control those essential services which the authorities normally provide or administer;
- b. liaison staff drawn from government departments, nationalised and other essential industries, the police, fire and armed services; and
- c. a "support services" element (composed of local authority staff) manning communications and providing secretarial, clerical and housekeeping staff for the headquarters as a whole.

Staff under a. would be supplemented by the scientific advisers (Circular No ES(Scot)7/1972). An indication of the extent of representation under b. above is given in Appendix 2. The size and content of the "support services" element c. would be decided by the Region.

14. In war, as in peace, there would be scope for grouping together related functions and services to make for easier co-ordination and speedier implementation of decisions. Since many non-essential services would be discontinued for some time after attack, the peacetime groupings adopted by the region would not be entirely appropriate. Nevertheless, taking into account the changed conditions and the absence of an extensive committee structure, many of the points on functional management and structure, which are developed in the report of the Paterson study group (The New Scottish Local Authorities - Organisation and Management Structure, HMSO 1973), would be applicable to the Controller's post-attack organisation. One possible grouping is at Appendix 3. It is emphasised that decisions on groupings are for individual Controllers (designate) to incorporate in their regional plans.

REGIONAL STANDBY WARTIME HEADQUARTERS

15. Regions (and islands areas who consider it necessary) should also designate a standby headquarters in another part of the region. This could be located in the peacetime offices of the region's area organisation or in an existing civil defence control centre. Where the region has no substantial area organisation exercising a large measure of delegated authority, a regional standby headquarters could, with the agreement of the district council concerned, be set up in the

latter's premises. The purpose of the standby headquarters is to provide an alternative location which would be linked by special communications to zone and from which administration within the region could be exercised in the event of the main regional wartime headquarters ceasing to operate. It may not be possible to duplicate all staff in the standby headquarters and availability, particularly of liaison staff, may vary from region to region. For the reasons given in paragraph 12 plans should provide for similar protected accommodation within the standby headquarters. It may not be possible to provide as much space in the standby headquarters as in the main headquarters.

DISTRICT CONTROLLER AND EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

16. District councils should, like the regions, base their plans on provision in emergency legislation for the vesting of all the powers of the council in a small emergency committee of about three elected members. The District Controller would be in the same position in war in relation to the District Emergency Committee as the Regional Controller would be to the Regional Emergency Committee (paragraph 7).

17. The tasks of the District Controller will be to make an assessment of the situation within his district, to determine priorities, to identify and co-ordinate the deployment of resources, and to exercise the full functions of the district council and those additional functions which may be given to him by the Regional Controller. In respect of local government services this would be achieved through the chief officers of the district and senior officers of the region at area or divisional level. For non-local government services it would be secured through the representatives of government departments attached to the district wartime headquarters as given in Appendix 2. Normally the District Controller would be answerable directly to the Regional Controller and, through him, to the Zone Commissioner.

DISTRICT WARTIME HEADQUARTERS

18. The wartime headquarters of the district should normally be in the peacetime district offices or in existing civil defence premises if available. In districts where, in the early stages after attack, the intensity of fallout did not permit the District Controller and his staff to work from their normal offices, it is unlikely that the movement of essential services would be possible over much of the district. Nevertheless, as described in paragraph 12 war emergency plans should provide for additional improvised protection of a limited part of the district headquarters, to enable some key staff to operate during this period. Again there are limits to the number of staff which could be accommodated in protected accommodation.

STAFFING AND ORGANISATION - DISTRICT

19. As in the region (paragraph 14), there is scope for grouping certain functions and services under the District Controller. The size and composition of these groups may vary according to the district and its size.

PLANNING

20. It is recognised that, in some parts of the country, communications with any level of government might not survive and that isolated communities might have to fend for themselves for short periods without any recognised form of government. Guidance will be given later about action which might be planned below district level to cover the period until communications were restored. In the meantime

plans should not be prepared in peacetime for action in war at levels below district in advance of completion of the plans for district and region. It may prove essential in the larger districts to decentralise the actual provision of services. Otherwise, plans will deal with simple measures of self-help within the community.

SUMMARY OF APPOINTMENTS

21. After the passing of emergency legislation a regional council would be required by the Secretary of State for Scotland to appoint an emergency committee (see paragraph 7). A district council would be similarly required to appoint an emergency committee (see paragraph 16). Regional and District Controllers would be appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland as part of the 4-tier system of government-in-war. The powers of these controllers would not be restricted to the assigned statutory responsibilities of their own local authority but would also include the powers (eg requisitioning) given by emergency legislation and later the further powers which Zone Commissioners may grant by ordinance. In addition to these extensive powers, Controllers would be subject to the directions of the next highest tier - the District to the Region, and the Region to the Zone.

COMPOSITION OF ZONES

<u>Zone</u>	<u>Regions/Islands Areas</u>
Eastern	Border Lothian
Northern	Fife Grampian Highland Tayside Orkney Shetland Western Isles
Western	Central Dumfries and Galloway Strathclyde



LOCAL AUTHORITY WARTIME HEADQUARTERS
 REPRESENTATION OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES


The government departments and services listed below intend to be represented to the extent stated. This appendix is no more than a general guide and there would be variations according to local circumstances. In some cases the representative may be drawn from the private sector (for example, the food trade, oil companies and major engineering concerns). Where the words "in touch" are entered there would be liaison arrangements by telephone or other means, but the officer would not normally be stationed within the headquarters itself.

DEPARTMENT or service	Region	District
ENVIRONMENT:		
Transport*	Yes	Yes
Works	Yes	Yes
EMPLOYMENT	In touch	In touch
FOOD	Yes	Yes
Post Office **	Yes	Yes
ENERGY:		
Gas	In touch	In touch
Coal	At some	At some
Petroleum	Yes	Yes
SCOTTISH ECONOMIC PLANNING:		
Electricity	In touch	In touch
Police	Yes	Yes
ARMED SERVICES	Yes	At some
SOCIAL SECURITY	In touch	In touch
Health Boards***	Yes	Yes

* The Department of the Environment intend that there should be representatives for goods and passenger services(road transport only).

** It may not be possible to provide representation at all headquarters. Each case will be decided locally between the local authority and the General Manager of the Telephone Area.

*** The presence of Health Board representatives at local authority controls must be regarded as provisional until discussions with the Boards have taken place.



PEACETIME PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS

1. As announced in Circular No ES(Scot) 1/1972 the local authority home defence arrangements were to be reviewed in the light of local government reorganisation. Accordingly, that circular is now cancelled but the home defence policy formulated as a result of the 1971 Review still stands. That policy is:

- a. to improve defence against external attack within the levels of expenditure obtaining during 1971 by adjustment of expenditure on individual purposes.
- b. to develop the machinery of government in war.
- c. to base plans on strengthening voluntary support.

2. In the context of local government reorganisation in Scotland the vital level for the co-ordination of war emergency planning in peacetime is seen as being the region and the islands area. It is recognised that district councils will be required to execute war plans relevant to their own statutory responsibilities and to this end, it will be necessary to ensure the full and effective participation of district councils in the preparation of these plans. There would clearly need to be very close integration of the region's organisation with that of the district councils in a war emergency. These planning responsibilities are embodied in Regulations, copies of which are at Annex D.

HOME DEFENCE PLANNING STAFF

3. Current financial stringency does not permit the creation of additional posts. Most regional authorities will inherit home defence planning posts from the predecessor authorities.

WAR PLANNING

4. In formulating local plans for war it is essential to take account of other public services and the activity of industry, commerce and the voluntary bodies. Particular attention should be paid to the plans of government departments and the public corporations. For this purpose, the planning staff should liaise with officials of these bodies.

ACCOMMODATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

5. Specific grants will not be made towards the capital cost of providing protected local authority wartime accommodation. Local authorities who seek Departmental advice may expect guidance as to the design and equipping of the accommodation suitable for use as a wartime headquarters, but the location and selection of accommodation will be matters entirely within the local authority's discretion.

6. Subject to discussion with those authorities whose area may provide special problems of communication and control the Department will complete, as soon as possible, the war communication system down to region and islands area irrespective of the degree of protection afforded by a particular local authority's headquarters. For this purpose the regions and islands areas will be linked to the zone communications network. The question of war communications below this level is under consideration. Regions and islands areas should, as soon as possible, nominate one wartime headquarters and one standby headquarters in a separate location in another part of the region. Islands areas may not consider it necessary to nominate a standby headquarters. Communications will be installed at Government expense in both headquarters, subject to any technical limitations. Nominations of regional and islands wartime headquarters, standby headquarters and district wartime

headquarters, wherever possible, should reach the Department by 31 December 1975. Delay will defer the installation of communications. In the meantime the existing war communications network will not be disturbed.

7. The lease or disposal of any existing civil defence property must be approved by the Department in accordance with CD (Scotland) Circular No 9/1968.

LOCAL TRAINING

8. Regions and islands areas will be responsible for the organisation of essential training for their wartime staff (including district staff in the case of regions). Training should include the organisation of local exercises and studies.

9. As a first step councils are requested to prepare and maintain a crash training programme ready for implementation early in a period of increasing tension. In addition, some practical training is required in peacetime for those key personnel earmarked for duties in the authorities' wartime headquarters. So far as possible this peacetime training should be carried out in normal working hours. It is also desirable for some elected members and management staff to be made familiar from time to time with the authorities' own plans for transition-to-war.

10. The purchase of essential additional training aids and unavoidable expenditure incurred outside normal working hours will be eligible for grant. Applications for authority to spend money on local training should be submitted to the Department. The amount available for this purpose is severely restricted. Information should be given about the nature of the training to be carried out, the people to be trained, and the major items of proposed expenditure. Councils which forward proposals will be advised as soon as possible of the sum which will be acceptable for civil defence grant.

CENTRAL TRAINING

11. Facilities exist for the attendance of Scottish local authority elected members and senior officials at courses and studies held at the Home Defence College, Easingwold. Details of the College programme are issued twice yearly. Arrangements have been made for seminars, designed specially for Chief Executives and elected members of Scottish local authorities, to be held at Easingwold during the week 25 - 31 January 1976.

VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

12. The Government consider it essential that local authorities should make the maximum use of voluntary effort in support of their own war plans. It must be for local authorities to decide how best the voluntary contribution can be incorporated into schemes of local self-help.

13. There will be no civil defence grant from the Department for expenditure incurred by local authorities, in the form of grants or loans to voluntary societies or other organisations in respect of their wartime role.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

14. The Department will pay civil defence grant on authorised expenditure in respect of

- a. home defence planning staff;
- b. premises and communications for the control system;

- c. local home defence training;
- d. the cost of training at the Home Defence College (as provided in Circular No ES (Scot) 8/1973 and Civil Defence (Scotland) Circulars Nos 2/1970 and 9/1970);
- e. Scientific Advisers (as provided in Civil Defence (Scotland) Circular No 1/1970);
- f. continuing compensation to civil defence employees made redundant on disbandment of the Civil Defence Corps.



CIVIL DEFENCE ACT 1948
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

1. Copies of two new statutory instruments, which have been made under the Civil Defence Act 1948, are attached. They came into force on 16 May 1975. The statutory instruments are:-

The Civil Defence (Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 1975 (SI 1975 No 849)
The Civil Defence (General) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1975 (SI 1975 No 848).

PLANNING REGULATIONS

2. Section 2 of the Civil Defence Act 1948 enables the designated Minister to make regulations prescribing the civil defence functions of local and police authorities. The Civil Defence (Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 1975 consolidate and simplify into a single statutory instrument the main civil defence planning functions of local authorities with effect from 16 May 1975. No change is made in these Regulations in the functions of police authorities or in the functions of local authorities in their capacity as fire authorities.

3. As a result of the consolidation, all the statutory instruments set out in the Schedule to the Regulations have been revoked. Three factors have led to the need for the new set of regulations. First the announcement that regional and islands councils are the appropriate authorities for the effective co-ordination and preparation of local war emergency plans in peacetime (paragraph 2 of Annex C). Secondly, consequential amendments to existing regulations would have been necessary because of the provision in the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 creating the various new authorities. Finally, some of the specific tasks mentioned in the existing regulations are no longer appropriate to local authorities (for example, nursing has become the responsibility of the health boards established under the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1972).

4. The consolidation of the main planning responsibilities of local authorities into a single statutory instrument should help to form a clear assessment of their statutory duties.

5. Regulations 1 and 2 are self explanatory. Regulation 3 revokes the regulations set out in the Schedule. The relevant substance of these is now consolidated and simplified in Regulation 4.

6. Regulation 4 lists the civil defence planning functions of regional and islands councils. Amplifying notes on certain sub-paragraphs of regulation 4 are given to clarify the local authority position.

Sub-paragraph (a)(iii) (advice to the public): It is the responsibility of central government to prepare comprehensive public advice and to promulgate it at the appropriate time. The task of local authorities would be to supplement the Government's advice with local campaigns. After a nuclear attack producing fall-out, regional (including islands area) and district controllers, in conjunction with the police, would advise when, and for what limited periods, emergence from cover might be justified.

Sub-paragraph (a)(iv) (billeting): There will be no official dispersal of the population before an attack (paragraph 18 of Annex A). Local authorities, however, will still be expected to prepare plans to billet people who are made homeless as a result of an attack.

Sub-paragraph (a)(v) is concerned with services for the prevention of disease and the possible spread of disease, particularly elementary measures for emergency

sanitation and refuse disposal. Notwithstanding the longer-term planning which would be carried out by the health boards, local authorities would be expected to alleviate the immediate consequences of the disruption of the more sophisticated services on which the health of the community depends. The provision of pit latrines and the burial of rubbish are obvious examples of these elementary measures:

Sub-paragraph (vi) requires local authorities to provide facilities for the disposal of the dead (but not for the identification of bodies).

Sub-paragraph (ix) covers the provision and maintenance of other services essential to the life of the community not specifically mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) to (viii).

Sub-paragraph (x) makes it a function of regional and islands councils to prepare plans for training an appropriate number of members of their own staff and of the staff of the councils of districts (in the case of regions) in their war-time duties under the various plans described in sub-paragraphs (i) to (ix). Training arrangements are described in Annex C. The extent to which additional training might be carried out during a worsening international situation would be the subject of further guidance.

7. Regulation 4(b) is concerned with the transition from peacetime to wartime arrangements during a period of international tension when an attack by a foreign power appears more likely. It makes it a function of regional and islands councils, at the request of the Secretary of State to take such preparatory steps as may be necessary to ensure that the plans which have been prepared under Regulation 4(a) can be carried out and, subsequently, to carry them out. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that prompt and effective action would be taken by local authorities to put their administration on a war footing in stages which the Government could harmonise with the progress of the international situation. It enables certain essential precautionary steps to be taken by local authorities in advance of the assumption of emergency powers under Defence Regulations.

8. Regulation 5(1) requires regional councils to make their plans under Regulation 4(a) in consultation with the affected district councils in their area. The councils of districts provide a wide range of peacetime services relevant to wartime needs, and the successful preparation of wartime plans by the regions depends on the co-operation of the districts. The districts are in turn required by Regulation 5(2)(a) to furnish to the regions, for civil defence purposes, any necessary information and, under Regulation 5(2)(b)(i) to assist in the making of plans under Regulation 4(a). Regulations 5(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) impose a function, similar to the provisions of Regulation 4(b), on the councils of districts, in the taking of preparatory steps and the subsequent carrying out of the various plans.

9. Regulation 6 requires local authorities, in the exercise of their functions under these Regulations, to comply with the directions of the Secretary of State. The Ministerial power to issue directions is regarded as a reserve power to be used only when the national interest is at stake and when the long-established procedures of advice and guidance fail to ensure the necessary local action.

10. The Schedule to the Regulations lists the Regulations revoked by Regulation 3(1). None of the provisions of the Civil Defence (Training in Nursing) (Scotland) Regulations 1963 are incorporated in the Planning Regulations because the functions contained in those earlier Regulations have been assumed by the health boards and are thus no longer appropriate to local authorities. With that exception, the new Regulations contain all that is of continuing relevance in a simplified form designed to provide a degree of flexibility in meeting the special requirements of each local authority in question.

GENERAL AMENDMENT REGULATIONS

11. The Civil Defence (General) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1975 amend the Civil Defence (General) (Scotland) Regulations 1949. Most of the amendments are consequential upon the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973.

12. Regulation 2(1) revokes Regulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and certain definitions in 9(1) of the 1949 Regulations. Section 2(2)(b) of the Civil Defence Act 1948, under which Regulations 1, 2, 3 and 4 provided for the appointment of committees by local authorities and the delegation of their civil defence functions, was repealed in Schedule 29 to the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. General provisions applicable to the discharge of local authority functions are contained in Sections 56 to 63 of the 1973 Act. Regulation 7 enabled the designated Minister to impose limits on the people, premises or equipment which local authorities devoted to civil defence. Such a regulation is not compatible with the current policy of giving local authorities the utmost discretion, consistent with the national interest. The definitions in Regulation 9(1) which are revoked are superfluous.

