



MRS S C GOULTY
FINANCE & SECRETARIAT (NUCLEAR)1

D/DGSM/CSSE/Sec(Nuc) 5/143

Mr R Evans
6 Birtwhistle House
150 Parnell Road
LONDON
E3 2JY

DPA

**Defence
Procurement
Agency**

DGSM/CSSE
Defence Procurement Agency,
Ministry of Defence
Rowan 1a, #164
MOD Abbey Wood
Bristol, BS34 8JH

Switchboard: 0117 91 3000

16 June 1999

Dear Mr Evans

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS - PQ 84348

The documents you requested in your letter of 30 May are enclosed. I have had to use two boxes, and have enclosed a copy of this letter in each box. This is Box One of Two.

If you wish to make a complaint that your request for information has not been properly dealt with, you should appeal to The Ministry of Defence, OMD 14, Rm 617, Northumberland House, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BP. You may at any time register a complaint with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (the Ombudsman) through your Member of Parliament, but the Ombudsman will expect you to have exhausted the internal Ministry of Defence complaints procedure first.

*Yours sincerely
S C Goilty*

S C GOULTY

AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



MRS S C GOULTY
FINANCE & SECRETARIAT (NUCLEAR)1

D/DGSM/CSSE/Sec(Nuc) 5/143

Mr R Evans
6 Birtwhistle House
150 Parnell Road
LONDON
E3 2JY

DPA

Defence Procurement Agency

DGSM/CSSE
Defence Procurement Agency,
Ministry of Defence
Rowan 1a, #164
MOD Abbey Wood
Bristol, BS34 8JH

Switchboard: 0117 91 3000

16 June 1999

Dear Mr Evans,

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS - PQ 84348

The documents you requested in your letter of 30 May are enclosed. I have had to use two boxes, and have enclosed a copy of this letter in each box. This is Box Two of Two.

If you wish to make a complaint that your request for information has not been properly dealt with, you should appeal to The Ministry of Defence, OMD 14, Rm 617, Northumberland House, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BP. You may at any time register a complaint with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (the Ombudsman) through your Member of Parliament, but the Ombudsman will expect you to have exhausted the internal Ministry of Defence complaints procedure first.

*Yours sincerely
S C Goulty*

S C GOULTY

Protective Marking

AWE Bid Control Note
MOD Question/ AWE Answer

Tender Number:	Unique ID Ref: 1 MOD 1 Q 123	Date: 17-Mar-99
-----------------------	--	---------------------------

MOD Question:
Tech Spec 194

Can we request a copy of Nil feedback after last site emergency exercise to assess their performance.

MOD Originator:	MOD Release Authority:
------------------------	-------------------------------

AWE Response Time Category:
Enter A (5 days), B (10 days), C (15 days) or D (specified days)

The response time required for Category D, if selected, shall be: working days

AWE Answer:

1. AWE(A) Level 1 Exercise - SITEX98
Confirmation of HSE observations is contained in their letter ref ALD 70249R dated 27/5/98 attached.
2. AWE(B) Level 1 Exercise - SITEXB98
Confirmation of HSE observations are contained in the attached letters ref BUR 77061R dated 9/10/98 and BUR 77066R dated 3/2/99.

AWE Source/ Document Reference(s):

AWE Owner Name:	Date:
------------------------	--------------

AWE Peer Review Approval:	Date:
----------------------------------	--------------

AWE Bid Support Office Authorisation for Release:	Date: 31/03/99
--	--------------------------

MOD Authorisation: The AWE Answer is Delivered	Signature:	
Reference (if applicable):	Print Name:	Date:

Protective Marking



Health & Safety Executive
Nuclear Safety Directorate
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
Director and HM Chief Inspector, Laurence Williams

Hunting-BRAE Ltd
Regulatory Interface Control Centre (RICC)
A858/2/104
Atomic Weapons Establishment
Aldermaston
Reading
RG7 4PR

Direct Dial: 0151 951 4794
Email ian.crossan@hse.gov.uk

File Ref. No.: NUC700/52/11 P1 E12
Unique Number: BUR77066R

For the attention of Mr R Tinsley, Licensed Site Manager Burghfield

3 February 1999

Dear Mr Tinsley,

BURGHFIELD EMERGENCY EXERCISE - 20 JANUARY 1999

I am writing to confirm that the exercise witnessed by HSE inspectors on 20 January 1999 was overall considered to be an adequate demonstration of the emergency arrangements for the Burghfield licensed site. However, as discussed at the wash-up meeting following the exercise, some aspects of the response to this type of event were carried out in accordance with a revised strategy that has yet to be formally adopted by the Company. It is therefore important that this strategy is now carried forward as part of the emergency arrangements for both licensed sites and will therefore also require consideration by the Nuclear Safety Committee.

The inspectors also noted some other aspects of the exercise require further attention and these are listed in the attached Appendix.

Would you please provide a reply by 19 February 1999 on your proposals and timescale for formally implementing your revised strategy for a tritium release and would you also provide by 1 March 1999 your comments and an action plan for addressing any outstanding matters arising from the exercise on 22 September 1998 and those listed in the attached Appendix to this letter.

If you would like to discuss any aspect of this exercise further, please do not hesitate in contacting me.

Would you please arrange for a copy of this letter to be copied to the relevant safety representatives.

Yours sincerely,



I F CROSSAN

HM Principal Inspector
(Nuclear Installations)

Head of Division 3, General Sites: Dr R P Pape, HM Deputy Chief Inspector
St Peter's House, Stanley Precinct, Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ
Tel. 0151 951 4000 Fax: 0151 951 3942

**COMMENTS BY HSE OBSERVERS ON EXERCISE HELD AT BURGFIELD ON 20
JANUARY 1999**

1. Scene of Incident

a. The door to the outer office had been wedged open prior to the incident and was not closed by the evacuating operators or fire team. The presence of door chocks would indicate they are used as part of the operating process, but it would have been expected that during this part of the operation the procedures would have called for closure of both the inner calorimeter room door and this outer door both to limit the spread of any RA release, and to provide some delay to the spread of fire and smoke.

b. Since the fire and smoke were not simulated it was difficult for the fire crew to identify the location of the fire, also only one extinguisher appeared to have been brought into the facility to fight a known fire

c. The licensee should review the period of operation of the fire alarm bells such that the need to warn personnel is balanced against the communication difficulties and masking of other alarms. e.g. radiation alarms. In this particular incident the fire alarm was ringing throughout the fire fighting event.

d. There are still uncertainties concerning the ventilation of the facility in that smoke from the simulation smoke generator was extracted from the inner rooms and emerged as fresh air in the main facility. When this matter was raised with the facility personnel the HSE were advised that the design of the system was for recirculation until the RA alarm triggered rapid extract at which point the ventilation would switch to 100% extract. It would appear prudent to the HSE observers that in the case of smoke detection in ventilation systems, those systems with recirculation/ 100% extract switching capability change to 100% extract in order to clear the smoke and reduce the spread to other areas thus reducing the risk of smoke inhalation to any personnel/ casualties without SCBA and improving visibility to those wearing SCBA.

2. Forward Control Point

a. The use of the casualty state board at the FCP be reinstated.

b. There was a delay in getting vehicle and personnel through the security gates outside the forward control point. This arose from a reluctance of the MDP officer to commit two MDP to secure the open gates since he was uncertain of their safety. The licensee needs to consider the safety of MDP personnel directly affected by the incident and the health physics advice given to them.

3. Zone Control

a. The Zone Control was set up smoothly and efficiently and it was noted that there were improvements in reducing general background noise which aided team communications.

b. The roll call appeared to work well and missing persons were accounted for within the target of 45 minutes.