On June 2nd, the United Kingdom published its Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The UK’s nuclear deterrent was described as central to the announced increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, the largest sustained increase since the end of the Cold War. The SDR upholds deterrence as the core strategic rationale underlying the UK’s nuclear weapons system, and it also highlights the UK’s unique role to deliver this strategy for international allies due to being the only European state to assign its nuclear forces to NATO’s collective defence. Alongside this strategic rationale, the nuclear weapons system is also described as a “national endeavour,” implying that it requires the active support of government, industry, and elements of the wider society such as educational institutions and local communities. This approach is consistent with the broader shift in the UK’s political rhetoric towards a “defence dividend”, also referenced in the SDR. This concept bolsters the socioeconomic role of defence by seeking to grow its contribution to employment, economic growth, and support for local communities; effectively supplanting the logic of the post-Cold War “peace dividend,” which prioritised redirecting resources from defence to civilian sectors. In line with this, the SDR’s announcement of a £15bn investment in the sovereign warhead programme was linked to the support of thousands of jobs. Also vital to this “national endeavour” is meeting the demand for a skilled workforce in the nuclear industry. The SDR also announced investments in Barrow, the site of construction of the UK’s nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered submarines, and Raynesway, where the reactors for these submarines are produced, to support the ambitious objective of producing a new submarine every 18 months.
Yet, one of several challenges previously cited by the MOD in the Major Projects Data are the difficulties of attracting such a sufficiently skilled workforce to support and develop the UK’s military projects. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the recruitment of personnel to operate the submarines themselves. This, along with other challenges previously identified in the Major Projects Data report – such as shortfalls in productivity and scheduling difficulties (as previously noted by NIS) – add to enduring and widespread scepticism about the overall strength and viability of the UK’s submarine-building industry and operational capacity.