Analysis by Okopi Ajonye
NIS has previously reported on the release of the UK Government’s Major Projects Portfolio (GMPP) for 2023-2024. The latest report, covering 2024-2025, is the first released under the newly formed National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA), which joins the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) and National Infrastructure Commission. Consistent with previous reports, the report provides a Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) for major projects, which is described as “an assessment of the likelihood of a project delivering its objectives to time and cost”. DCA ratings are provided by the IPA and/or the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), the latter of which is “accountable for a program or a project meeting its objectives”. DCAs currently adopt a three-tier colour rating system, ranging from “Green” to “Red.” A “Green” rating indicates that successful delivery is “highly likely”, while a “Red” rating shows that successful delivery appears “unachievable”. Nestled between Green and Red is an “Amber” rating, which is when successful delivery is “feasible” but faces significant challenges. Also, projects can be designated as “Reset”, which is provided when there is “a significant change to a project’s baseline which involves a business case refresh or change”, and “Exempt” when data or DCA ratings are “exempt from publication under exceptional circumstances and in accordance with Freedom of Information requirements i.e. national security”. Additionally, the GMPP can disclose other relevant project information such as scheduled end dates and estimated whole-life costs.
“Military Capabilities”, delivered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), is one of the four project categories in the GMPP, and projects within the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), the full spectrum of activities and projects to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons system, fall under Military Capabilities. Yet, this category is singled out in this report as yielding “the lowest amount of monetised benefits” (£22 billion)” …the second-largest category in terms of total whole-life costs (£327 billion)”, and “often lengthier durations than other categories”.
The project ratings within the DNE reflect and reinforce long-term concerns about the enterprise’s performance. In contrast to the previous report, in which all but one of the projects were rated as Amber, and one was Red, the latest report rates two projects as Red. Also, while only one project was exempt in the previous report, three projects are now exempt from disclosure, and two of these projects were previously rated Amber by the IPA. Taken together, these developments point to the ongoing precarity of the UK’s DNE and the growing level of secrecy surrounding it.
| Project | 23/24-Q4 | 24/25-Q4 |
| Astute Boats 1 – 7 | Amber | Amber (SRO) |
| Clyde Infrastructure | Amber | Amber (SRO) |
| Core Production Capability | Red | Red (IPA) |
| Dreadnought | Amber | Section 24 – National security, Section 26 – Defence (IPA), Section 24 – National security, Section 26 – Defence (SRO) |
| Future Materials Campus | Amber | Section 24 – National security, (IPA), Section 24 – National security (SRO) |
| MENSA | Amber (IPA) | Amber (IPA) |
| Submarine Dismantling Project | Amber (IPA) | Amber (SRO) |
| Submarine Waterfront Infrastructure Future | Amber (IPA) | Red (IPA) |
| Submarine Ship Nuclear AUKUS | Amber (IPA) | Amber (IPA) |
| TEUTATES | Exempt | Section 27 – International relations (IPA), Section 27 – International relations (SRO) |
Although the report and officials stress that these DCA ratings are “snapshots” as opposed to long-term forecasts of the prospect of success or failure, the persistent low ratings and underperformance of these projects in previous reports, as also previously investigated by NIS, indicate deep-rooted structural issues within the DNE.
The following is a summary of several relevant changes in some of the DNE projects included in this report.
Dreadnought
This project to replace the current Vanguard-class of nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered submarines is included among the projects whose DCA is designated as “Exempt” in accord with national security and defence clauses. This contrasts with earlier reports, which provided a DCA rating. Due to this omission, there is hence now no publicly available information to confirm that the Dreadnought programme is on schedule, which is problematic since this project has been consistently linked to numerous problems and low DCA ratings. As will be shown below, there are delays and issues in the following projects that further imperil the timely completion of Dreadnought.
Core Production Capability
The Core Production Capability (CPC) programme, based in Raynesway, Derby, aims to build new facilities to facilitate the delivery of nuclear reactor cores for the Dreadnought and AUKUS submarines – the latter being the trilateral partnership between the U.S., U.K., and Australia to develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. This project retains a “Red” rating. Departmental commentary on this rating links this to:
“Ongoing challenges associated with achieving the required delivery date for the first Dreadnought submarine nuclear core and the importance of that milestone to sustaining the Continuous at Sea Deterrent. Work continues with Rolls-Royce Submarines to address the risks involved and ensure core delivery remains aligned to Dreadnought Boat 1 delivery progress, whilst also delivering the last core for the Astute class of submarines.”
Also, and fitting the pattern of MOD projects being of relatively longer durations, the CPC’s end date has now increased from 30/04/28 (as set out in the previous GMPP portfolio) to 31/12/2043. The schedule narrative on this increase gives the following rationale:
“Increased scope. Programme end-date has been adjusted as this is the date by which the core manufacturing capabilities necessary to manufacture cores for the next generation of UK (and Australian) attack submarines is planned to achieve Full Operating Capability. This element of the programme was given Ministerial Approval in October 24 and the increased scope has now been incorporated”.
The whole-life costs of the CPC have also increased from £4051 million in 23/24-Q4 to £5930 million in 24/25 Q4, primarily due to:
“Scope change to generate the manufacturing capability to deliver cores for the next generation UK and Australian attack submarines. This cost increase reflects early estimates for some of the work required to generate this capability and will change/increase as detailed design and development work proceeds and is reflected in Departmental budgets allocated to the programme.”
Submarine Waterfront Infrastructure Future (SWIF)
This project aspires to upgrade and modernize facilities in His Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Devonport to improve maintenance of the UK’s nuclear powered submarine fleet. Earlier in 2025, SWIF moved from the Design to Construction phase, but the report shows declining prospects for this project as it has now slid from an Amber to Red rating. According to the departmental commentary on this rating, this results from:
“The main focus through the year has been design. Velocity has not been as forecast owing to a backlog of approving/closing out design packages at the end of each phase. There has been key interventions in simplifying design in year and initiatives are underway to reduce the backlog, both of which will enable the transition to construction. Actions are ongoing to recover the delivery confidence, mature the design and reduce the significant levels of risk/uncertainty in the programme. This will culminate in a reset during financial year 2025.”
SWIF is included in the wider Devonport Submarine Infrastructure Upgrade programme, which also consists of projects to refurbish 9 Dock and 15 Dock. According to the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR) Chief Nuclear Inspector’s annual report, published in October 2025, two nuclear submarines were permitted to be docked and maintained at 9 Dock and 15 Dock this year, despite initial expectations that work on both docks under the Devonport Infrastructure Upgrade programme would be complete by 2024.
SWIF’s end date was “Exempt” due to it being anticipated to be “Reset” during the financial year 2025. As shown by the departmental comment above, the anticipated “Reset” of this project is attributable to resolving issues that have earned it the “Red” rating.