This paper considers options for minimising the risk of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO command post exercises, particularly nuclear ones and was prepared “in the context of an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack”. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of prior notification of nuclear command post exercises (CPXs) as a confidence building measure. The paper states that: “Although the JIC reached no firm conclusion, we cannot discount the possibility that at least some Soviet officials / officers may have misinterpreted Able Archer 83 and possibly other nuclear CPXs as posing a real threat”
Notification measures already exist for reducing the possibility of misinterpretation of test ICBM launches under SALT II arrangements and “there seems no inherent reason why similar procedures could not be devised which extended to certain nuclear CPXs as well”. Super-power CPXs should form the centrepiece of any notification procedure, supplemented perhaps on the West’s side with notification of NATO-wide exercises involving a substantial American nuclear role. An ad-hoc forum, based on special contact between the US and the USSR seems the most practical way of achieving this and would be unlikely to cause problems within NATO. The report concludes that recommendations in the US ‘Scowcroft Report’ by the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces for bilateral exchange of information between US and Soviet defence officials about steps which could be misconstrued as indications of an attack should be “acted upon as soon as possible”.