Thirty years ago: the nuclear crisis which frightened Thatcher and Reagan into ending the Cold War

Peter Burt (1.11.2013)

Expresses concerns that the paper relies primarily on [content redacted]. Suggests modifications to the paper to suggest that information “may reflect concern in the Soviet Union that the West might initiate a nuclear war and that this might be done through a surprise attack under cover of an exercise” and says “We have [redacted] of […]

Notes that the scope of the JIC paper has widened during its preparation from discussing reactions to Exercise Able Archer to Soviet Union concern about a surprise NATO attack. Raises two policy issues for consideration: – The issue of perceived Soviet reactions and concerns about Western intentions which is “clearly extremely important: The inference to […]

Refers to the third draft of the JIC report reference JIC(84)(N)45 and notes that the paper has been returned for action twice by the JIC. Requests further comments from within MoD.

The memo notes the earlier meeting to discuss the JIC report and that “the Prime Minister said that officials should urgently consider how to approach the Americans on the question of possible Soviet misapprehensions about a surprise NATO attack”. Preliminary discussions had been held on “the unusual Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83”. The discussion […]

This paper considers options for minimising the risk of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO command post exercises, particularly nuclear ones and was prepared “in the context of an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack”. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of prior notification of […]

The note advises on the line the Secretary of State for Defence might take at the meeting on 4 April 1984 to discuss the JIC report. It says that “Heightened Soviet concern about the possibility of a surprise NATO attack would of course be a very proper cause of concern for Western governments. But it […]

Refers to a meeting on 10 April 1984 attended by the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Robert Armstrong, ‘C’, and one other person to discuss what action should be taken about the conclusions of the Joint Intelligence Committee report. The Prime Minister had said that: “We […]

Refers to a meeting scheduled to take place on 4 April 1984 to discuss “action which might be taken with the United States on the evidence of Soviet concern about recent military exercises” set out in the JIC paper, and suggests that the Prime Minister may wish to see further information before the meeting. Evidence […]